39. In the early part of the night shift of 8th-9th September, at about midnight, J. Izatt, cable belt attendant, was cleaning up the Cable Belt Road near its junction with the Loader Mine. He heard several rumbling noises; he did not regard them as unusual, however, thinking they were due to normal movement of the strata. At about 2.30 a.m. he travelled down the Loader Mine and went into the under-manager's office on the low side of the Loco Level, where he saw A. Stirling, overman. He told Stirling that he had heard rumbling in the roof and that there had been one loud bang. As a result of this conversation, Stirling went up the Loader Mine a few minutes later to where Izatt was working. He noticed nothing unusual en route and concluded that the bang had resulted from the breaking of the sandstone roof.
40. About an hour later Stirling, having returned to the under-manager's office, smelt smoke coming through ventilation pipes from the Loco Level. He went out of the office to the Loco Level where he saw a blue haze. He then turned right into the Loco Level and walked as far as No. 3 Heading which he entered and found quite clear. He came back and looked up the Loader Mine and saw what he took to be burning coal falling from the roof about 20 to 25 yards away from him. There was no smoke. Amongst a small quantity of this material, he particularly noticed "one piece lying on the floor about six inches square and it was blazing; it was black but there were fumes coming from it". He rushed along the Loco Level, up Bell's Heading and back down the top end of the Loader Mine where, about 15 or 20 yards from the entrance, he met Izatt coming out of very heavy smoke. Izatt had returned to his work in the Cable Belt Dook, and had been cleaning out at the back of the loading point when he had been suddenly enveloped in thick black smoke. The conveyors were stationary and had been so for some time, although they had been running normally earlier in the shift.
41. Stirling sent Izatt up Bell's Heading (Plan No. 2) and told him to inform the onsetter at No. 3 Shaft bottom about the fire. The onsetter, J. J. Teevan, sent for R. McIntyre, the pit bottom deputy, who saw Izatt in a state of collapse under the pit bottom clock at 3.50 a.m. Stirling himself went to the telephone at the bottom of Bell's Heading and tried to telephone the Dysart Dip Sections. Getting no answer, he went to the Coronation Dipping (Plan No. 1) and sent P. Ritchie, a backbrusher, to warn the men in the Dysart Dip No. 1 Section. After again trying unsuccessfully to telephone No. 2 and No. 3 Sections, he spoke to T. Lister, deputy, in charge of the surface Control Room, and told him "There is a fire at the Cable Belt Load, get everybody concerned informed."
42. Izatt's arrival at the No. 3 Shaft bottom and Stirling's message to Lister raised the alarm. Following this, a very large number of telephone calls were made and messages sent by men to warn others. At the time, there were 311 men below ground: 45 in No. 3 Pit Bottom, 64 in the Dysart Dip Sections, 25 in the Four Feet Section and 177 in the No. 2 Pit workings; it is remarkable, having regard to the denseness of the smoke and its irritant effect, that all but nine escaped. There is no doubt that, in large measure, this was due to the comprehensive and rapid manner in which messages were transmitted round the pit.
43. The following account of the warnings given to the men underground and their escape from the pit is based on the evidence of many of the witnesses. It must be borne in mind that very few of them looked at their watches to check the time and that the smoke was so thick that they were often unable to see their companions.
Events between 3.30 a.m. and 5.15 a.m.
44. Lister's duty in the Control Room was to receive and pass on messages and information. He did not keep a complete log. Before he gave Stirling's message to C. Webster, the senior overman in charge of the night shift, he received a routine call from J. Tait, the overman in the Four Feet Section. Lister informed him that a fire in the Cable Belt Dook had been reported and that he thought that the trouble was confined to the Dysart Dip side of the pit. Next, W. Semple, Jnr., an overman in the Branxton No. 22 Section, who had received a message about the fire from A. Watson, an overman in No. 3 Pit Bottom, rang the Control Room for further information. Eventually, at about 3.45 a.m., Lister spoke to Webster and was instructed to withdraw all the men from the Dysart Dip Sections and to call A. Nicol, the deputy manager, and J. Simpson, the under-manager for the Dysart Dips. Soon afterwards, Watson telephoned to say that, as conditions were worsening, the Rescue Brigades should be called out. There was some inconclusive discussion between Lister and the Time Office staff about who was authorised to do this. The upshot of it was that Lister persisted in his attempts to summon Nicol and J. Simpson and managed to speak to the former at 4.00 a.m. or shortly afterwards.
45. Nicol's first reaction on receiving the call from the colliery was that "it was one of those roadway heatings". He left for the colliery straight away and on arrival found that Lister could not give him any definite information about the situation underground. He was told that some men had already been taken to hospital and, seeing three or four men who had come up the pit, learned from them of the conditions that they had seen, including the fire in the Loader Mine. He deduced "I had a belt fire on my hands". At about 4.35 a.m. he went to his office to determine a plan of action. He instructed the telephone operator to get the Rescue Station for him but the call was frustrated by a number of incoming callers including the police and the hospital. He arranged for the general manager, G. Duncan, and the under-managers, J. Simpson and D. Wilson, to be sent for. He spoke to Stirling in Bell's Heading who told him that he was putting up screens to fight the fire and expressed concern about the chances of all his men to escape. The call to the Rescue Station was logged at 5.00 a.m. After a conversation with McIntyre, who like Stirling was concerned about the difficulties of men escaping through the smoke, Nichol decided to stop the fan. The evidence about the times is conflicting but it appears likely that it was stopped at about a quarter to five and restarted about half an hour later, after Stirling had sent a message that the smoke was backing up Bell's Heading and was hampering the fire-fighting.
Events after 5.15 a.m.
46. Duncan reached the colliery at about 5.15 a.m. and took charge of operations. He was told that there were possibly 60 men in the Dysart Dip Sections. 30 in the Four Feet Section and a considerable number in the No. 2 Pit workings. He realised that the only way of improving the prospect of their safe withdrawal was by reversing the ventilation in the Loco Level. When reports were received that the Dysart Dip and the No. 2 Pit Sections were clear of men, attention was concentrated on the Four Feet and a decision was taken at about 6.00 a.m. to open the doors in No. 2 Heading to draw the smoke into the Dysart Main Return (Plan No. 2). Although the doors were opened at 7.15 a.m. by a rescue brigade, the smoke continued to flow into the Sea Mine for a further two hours.
47. At about 7.00 am. W. Rowell, the deputy director (operations), reached the colliery and collaborated with Duncan in exercising overall control. During the afternoon, it was agreed at a meeting of representatives of all the parties concerned that it was unlikely that the three men who had not been found could be rescued but efforts to this end continued for a further 24 hours until 3.00 p.m. on 10th September.
48. After McIntyre had seen Izatt in a collapsed state at No. 3 Shaft bottom, he went down Bell's Heading to withdraw his men from the New Pumphouse (Plan No. 2). He was stopped by smoke at the Loco Level but on going round the other way he met B. White, the pumpsman, in Tilson's Alley. Meanwhile, J. Duncan, the pumphouse greaser, had informed A. Watson in the Overman's Office that smoke was going from the Loco Level into the Sea Mine. After seeing this for himself, Watson made a number of telephone calls to warn inbye sections and McIntyre telephoned to the pumpsman in the Chemiss Inset and told him to go up to the surface.
49. A. S. Todd, the overman in charge of reconstruction, after seeing the fire in the Loader Mine, hurried back to No. 3 Shaft and instructed J. Field, the reconstruction deputy, to withdraw all the men in the Pit Bottom Section. After making several telephone calls Todd with K. Buckley, another overman, opened the doors in Davidson's Mine in an attempt to direct the smoke from Dysart Turn to the upcast shaft. Thereafter they continued to assist the men coming out of the Sea Mine.
50. At about 5.00 a.m. the under-managers, D. Wilson and J. Simpson arrived, the one at the Sea Mine and the other at the Dysart Dip side. All the 45 men in the No. 3 Pit Bottom Section reached the surface safely.
Dysart Dip Sections generally
51. After Stirling had sent Ritchie into the Dysart Dip No. 1 Section and had spoken to Lister, he was able to speak to R. C. M. Fraser, a deputy at the return roadhead in Dysart Dip No. 3 Section, and to J. H. Drummond, a deputy at the foot of the cable belt (Plan No. 1). He told them that all the men were to come out through the return airway, the No. 3 Dook. Amongst others, he also spoke to J. Drummond, the shot firer from the Dysart Dip No. 2 Development, and to J. M. Imrie, one of the development workmen, agreeing with them that, in view of the denseness of the smoke, it would be better for them to walk up the return rather than to attempt to go up the intake on the manriding train.
52. Stirling accompanied by D. C. Dryburgh, deputy, went down the Dysart Dip No. 2 Dook and opened the doors in the Dysart Dip lA connection. Finding that this had little effect on the smoke, they closed them again and, with some difficulty, returned to the East Loco Level. Stirling was driven back up Bell's Heading by the smoke when the fan was stopped but he remained in the area throughout his shift organising the escape of the men and the fire-fighting.
53. T. Barr, the Dysart Dip manriding haulage driver, lowered the train on receipt of a signal at 3.40 a.m. The journey took five minutes in each direction. He stopped the train at Dip No. 1 on the way up, and later heard some men get off at the top; he lowered it again and brought up one man, J. McDonald, the pumpsman. He then lowered the train for the third time and, while it was at the bottom, the electric power went off. A. McRobie, the foreman electrician, who was with Barr, had defeated the top over-run switches so that the train could be drawn up as far as possible; when the power went off, he came up Bell's Heading through the smoke which was coming out of the Loader Mine and met Stirling who asked him to get the fan re-started. Being unable to find a free telephone, he went up the pit and reported to W. L. Wilson, the colliery electrical engineer, who was going into the automatic telephone exchange to attend to a breakdown. After obtaining permission from Nicol, they re-started the fan.
54. Of the 64 men in the Dysart Dip workings, all but two escaped. P. Thomson, a greaser on the Cable Belt Dook, was last seen at about 3.00 a.m. near the motor house at the top of the No. 1 Dook by J. Duncan, who worked in the New Pumphouse. His body was recovered from the Cable Belt Dook by a rescue brigade (Plan No. 3). J. McKay, a greaser, was with a number of men near the telephone when J. Drummond was speaking to Stirling. The smoke at that time was very thick and McKay was not seen again.
Dysart Dip No. 1 Section
55. Ritchie went in through the Dysart Dip No. 1 Section top road and found J. Culross, overman, and J. Linden, the face deputy, at the roadhead. He then returned with some of the men and came out through the East Loco Level (Plans Nos. 1 and 2). Culross telephoned down the face and sent Linden out along the bottom gate, where he met men coming up from other sections. He returned with the last of these men to Bell's Heading. W. Armour, the roadways deputy, was told by a workman at 3.45 a.m. by his watch, that smoke was coming into the section. He sent his men out through the face and went along the bottom road to the dooks. The smoke was light grey at first but it turned black later; it smelt of burnt wood and caught his throat.
Dysart Dip No. 2 Development
56. J. Drummond, a shot firer, who was firing shots in the bottom of the two roads being driven to develop the Dysart Dip No. 2 face (Plan No. 1) smelt smoke coming in through the ventilation tubes and went out to the telephone near the pumphouse where he spoke to Stirling and warned McDonald. Thick black smoke was coming down the dooks when he was joined by men from the development headings and J. McKay, the greaser. They went back to the No 3 Dook, the return airway, through the doors at the top road of the Dysart No. 3 Section and made their way outbye through the smoke in several separate parties. McDonald, however, went down to the bottom of the No. 1 Dook, stopped the pumps, and made his way up the No. 2 Dook. He went to the No. 3 top road doors where he saw J. Watson and R. Bernard, deputies, but returned to the manriding train. After he had been hauled to the top, he signalled the bogies down again to fetch Watson and Bernard.
Dysart Dip No. 3 Section
57. J. Watson, R. Bernard and R. C. M. Fraser, deputies, were in the top roadhead of Dysart Dip No. 3 Section when they received a message from Stirling that all the men were to go out through the No. 3 Dook. Fraser went down the face where he met B. Moore, the overman, and travelled out along the bottom road with him. They met J. H. Drummond and checked with him that all the men further inbye had been warned. J. H. Drummond went on to the face keeping pace with the smoke and taking the workmen with him. Eventually all these officials and workmen travelled in smoke up the No. 3 Dook to the stairs at the top, where visibility was only about ten feet and several of them who were physically distressed had to be helped.
58. By this time, the smoke had backed along the East Loco Level and consequently the men had to travel out through the Dysart Main Return. Because there were alternative routes from the top of the Coronation Dipping and the No. 3 Dook, J. Linden went back into the return at about 4.30 a.m. to show any men coming up the best way out. They travelled in small parties; some, finding thick smoke at the doors in the No. 2 Heading, came out through roads with which they were unfamiliar to the 300 fathoms Lateral; others came through the 1 in 1 Drift and Davidson's Mine; one group, who tried to come out to the Lochhead Level but were stopped by smoke, went back to the return airway and others after attempting other routes eventually came out through the overcast to the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook.
Warnings and withdrawal of men
59. A great many telephone messages were sent to the Four Feet workings. In most cases they were simply to the effect that the men should come out, but J. E. Nowak, a belt maintenance man, standing near the Dysart Turn saw the black smoke going into the Sea Mine, and accordingly advised J. Tait, the Four Feet Section overman, and J. McArthur, a greaser, to come out through the return. Eventually all the men, except McArthur and J. C. McEneamy, a beltman, who were accompanied part of the way by A. Taylor, the deputy, No. 31 face, walked out by the shortest way, the one they were accustomed to travel, through the Sea Mine, which was filled with black smoke before any of them entered it.
60. D. Hunter, the roadways deputy, received an urgent message and came outbye sending his men on ahead. He met haze 150 yards from the face and smoke as he rode on the conveyors up the Four Feet Dook. At the top he telephoned to warn H. Gallacher, the 750 Branxton pumpsman (Plans Nos. 1 and 3) and then stayed a few minutes to keep the conveyors running. He next tried to get to the top of the 750 Branxton Cable Belt Dook where some of his men had been working but he managed to travel only about 40 yards in the dense smoke. (The men had already seen the smoke and escaped successfully). Hunter then went outbye along the Sea Mine to the Dysart Turn where he saw several men including Todd, Buckley and McIntyre. He told them to start the conveyor and to shout into the Sea Mine to see if they could get any answering calls. After a while he heard a voice and, with nil visibility, he went into the smoke and guided by shouts found C. Cunningham, pumpsman, lying on the ground. He carried Cunningham most of the 50/60 yards into fresh air receiving help from some men at the Dysart Turn (Plan No. 2).
61. Meanwhile, Tait had sent messages up No. 31 face to warn the men and had telephoned to Taylor who was at the face return roadhead. All the men except Taylor came down the face and walked out through the Sea Mine. D. Wilson, an apprentice fitter, set off from the face with J. Smith and A. Thomson, power loader operators. They rode up the first of the two conveyors in the Dook together but when they reached the top of the second one, Thomson was not with them. About 50 yards from the Dysart Turn, D. Wilson found A. Grieve, a maintenance man, lying on the floor and told him to get up and keep walking. However, when Wilson found that Grieve was not following him, he lifted him on to his feet and assisted him to fresh air.
62. Several of the men who came out of the Sea Mine vomited and most of them suffered from dizziness, coughing and loss of power in their legs. Of the 25 in the workings at the time, 18 were able to escape.
Escape of men from the Bowhouse Inset
63. Immediately after McArthur at the top of the Four Feet Dook had received the telephone message advising escape through the return, the black smoke appeared. He telephoned to McEneamy, who was at the bottom of the Dook, and arranged to meet him at the top. They went through the doors into the No. 31 Section top road and saw Taylor coming towards them. After Taylor had been through the doors and seen how thick the smoke was in the intake, they set off up the return airway which was signposted. They turned left at the first junction and stopped for a rest at the ladder at the next junction (Plan No. 1). They saw the first signs of smoke in the return at this time. Taylor, who had been alone at the top of the No. 31 face, did not know that his men had gone down to the bottom road; in spite of protestations from Mc Arthur and McEneamy, he decided to go back to make sure that they were all out being particularly worried about Gallacher, the 750 Branxton pumpsman. He arranged with McArthur and McEneamy that if he did not return in a few minutes, they should look for him and, if they did not find him quickly, they were to go through the return, following the signs. After about five minutes, they went back down the return, but not seeing Taylor they set off outbye. At the top of the ladder, they turned right; continuing to turn right and following the signs to the "Escape Pit", they came to the junction of Walker's Dook and Steven's Brae. They went up Steven's Brae to the inset in No. 2 Shaft at the Bowhouse level. By this time, the smoke was quite thick but, on going towards No. 3 Shaft, it cleared and they stopped at a fence where there was a "no road" sign. They spent some time in old workings to the north of the shafts and eventually returned to the No. 2 Shaft Inset. McEneamy started to strike an old rusty bell-plate with a brick and they shouted when they saw a cage go by. Later, a second cage with rescue men blowing hooters passed them.
64. When A. D. H. Smith, overman, came up the No. 2 Shaft at about 7.00 a.m. he heard and saw nothing, but W. Shaw, acting as a rescue brigade captain, heard voices at 10.35 a.m. Shaw's brigade who returned down the shaft were unable to identify the inset but L. M. Irvine, the workmen's inspector, deduced that it must be at the Bowhouse level. A rescue brigade under G. Pratt, part-time rescue man, went down at 11.30 a.m. to attempt a rescue but, on account of signalling difficulties, they were unsuccessful. McArthur and McEneamy were eventually brought out through the No. 3 Shaft at about 2.50 p.m.
Warning messages
65. C. Webster, the senior overman, was in the Bowhouse No. 40 Section bottom road when he was told at about 3.45 a.m. that there was a fire in the Cable Belt Dook (Plan No. 1). He told T. Inglis, an overman, that he was going outbye to see about it but made no mention of withdrawing the men from the No. 2 Pit workings. He rode on a locomotive out along the 360 fathoms Lateral, finding blue haze at the Compressor House and smoke at the turn half way between Nos. 1 and 2 Cross Cuts. He came back inbye, made arrangements about withdrawing the men and then walked down through the 360 fathoms No. 2 Cross Cut to the Compressor House in the 430 fathoms Lateral where he spoke to Nicol at the surface. He got the impression that Nicol had just arrived at the colliery and was as much in the dark about the fire as he was.
Inbye sections
66. Meanwhile Nowak had spoken to W. K. Paterson, a deputy in charge of mechanisation, at the Coal More Turn and advised him to send the men out through the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook. A. Watson at No. 3 Pit Bottom had told some workmen in the 360 fathoms Lateral to warn everyone to go to the No. 2 Shaft via the 430 fathoms Mine. These messages were passed on and, in the event, all the men in the No. 2 Pit workings were safely withdrawn.
67. The men from the inbye workings made their way to the Compressor House via the 430 fathoms Lateral, where they were checked out by their deputies. Some of them were taken out on locomotive trains to the bottom of the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook. The majority of the men walked up the Dook; some required assistance on account of the steep gradient.
No. 2 Pit Bottom
68. A. D. H. Smith left the Coal More Turn at about 4.40 a.m. and walked along the 430 Mine towards the shaft. He was passed by two fitters who told him that there was a fire and that the men should withdraw. Near the pit bottom at about 5.10 a.m. M. Blankenstein, a deputy, told him that the onsetter had gone up the shaft and that it was closed. After some delay in getting through on the telephone, Smith spoke to Nicol and told him that he had a stretcher case to send up and that the atmosphere was getting hazy. All the men except about half a dozen were sent up by 5.40 a.m. Readings taken with a P.S. carbon monoxide tube showed a trace at the pit bottom and a little more in the 430 Mine. Smith went to the bottom of the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook to satisfy himself that all the men from inbye were out and finally rode up the No. 2 Shaft at 7.00 a.m. leaving the acting onsetter and the pumpsman at the pit bottom to await their day shift reliefs; their services were required as the pumps had to be run continuously. He kept in touch with them from the surface by telephone.
69. W. Cull, a deputy, went down the No.3 Shaft at 8.50 a.m. with the day shift onsetter and pumpsman. They walked down the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook and found thick smoke on the inbye side of the doors to the 430 Mine. After leaving the doors open for a while, it cleared and they went on to the No. 2 Shaft bottom. Conditions deteriorated and at 10.45 a.m. wearing short period breathing apparatus, they were brought up the No. 2 Shaft by a rescue brigade.
70. I cannot conclude this necessarily brief account of the escape of the men from the mine without referring to their general behaviour. That the evacuation was completed in extremely difficult conditions in such a commendably short time is in itself a tribute to the very high standard of self-discipline exercised by all. Under-officials displayed their concern for the safety of the men in their charge and the men an equal concern for the welfare of their workmates. That there was at times some confusion is, in the circumstances which obtained, quite understandable. That there was at no time the slightest degree of panic is remarkable. Had there been, the death role in this incident would undoubtedly have been very much higher.
Rescue Brigade Operations
71. As I have said earlier the Cowdenbeath Rescue Station was called at 5.00 a.m.; the first van left in a matter of minutes and arrived at the colliery, some 15 miles away, at 5.35 a.m. The first brigade went underground at 5.55 a.m. quickly followed by a second brigade from Cowdenbeath and by a brigade from the colliery. Coatbridge Rescue Station was alerted at 5.10 a.m. and were called out at 5.50 a.m. They had a brigade underground by 7.20 a.m.
72. As an initial task, the rescue brigades sought to penetrate the Sea Mine, but attempts had to be suspended at 6.45 a.m. because the smoke had become so dense. In order to reduce this, it was decided to send a rescue brigade, under W. Shaw, the colliery fire officer, to open the three doors in the No. 2 Heading (Plan No. 2). They attempted to do this from the intake side but were driven back by heat and smoke. They then travelled 450 yards in a smoke laden atmosphere to reach the doors from the return side. The first two doors were successfully opened but, on opening the third, they were subjected to a blast of intense heat, which singed them and stung their eyes. Visibility was considerably reduced. Some of the brigade were blown over by the blast and their ultimate return to base was only achieved with great difficulty. At about the same time, the body of P. Thomson, greaser, was located in the Cable Belt Dook and a rescue brigade under W. A. Kennedy, rescue man, recovered it at about 8.30 a.m. (Plan No. 3).
73. At about 9.15 a.m., the atmosphere in the Sea Mine improved and a brigade under J. S. Moyes, rescue man, went in there again. On coming out at 9.35 a.m., they reported having seen four bodies along the Sea Mine inbye the Redd Road. Further brigades were then sent in and the bodies of J. Smith, A. Henderson, A. Thomson and H. Morrison, power loader operators, and J. Tait, overman, were recovered between 9.40 a.m. and 10.25 a.m. Thereafter a brigade, captained by W. Aitken, rescue man, commenced a reconnaissance of the Four Feet area in a search for McArthur, McEneamy, Taylor and Gallacher, all of whom were still missing, but found no signs of them. Conditions were fair at first but they worsened, so much so that a second brigade, under J. McG. Malcolm, was sent in to recall the first brigade. The brigades failed to make contact with each other but the first returned to base at about 11.00 a.m. and the second at about 1.00 p.m. by which time conditions had deteriorated considerably.
Conditions in the Loader Mine
74. As we have seen, in investigating the fire he had observed, Stirling hurried round from one end of the Loader Mine, where the atmosphere was clear, to the other end, where he found Izatt coming out of thick smoke. The distance was less than 200 yards and the journey time probably no more than two minutes. Yet in this short time, an apparently clear atmosphere had changed to one ladened with dense smoke. A few minutes later, Barr, the Dysart manriding haulage driver, was standing with Stirling at the junction with the Bell's Heading and saw flames, which he thought were at the junction with the Cable Belt Dook; the flames appeared to be coming down from the roof and striking the floor. Some ten minutes later, McRobie went down the upper length of the Loader Mine and saw dense smoke and two or three piles of burning material in the mine inbye of the cable belt junction, while McIntyre, from a short distance into the Loader Mine, particularly noticed an intense fire which appeared to be somewhere near the junction of the Loader Mine and the Cable Belt Dook. At about the same time, Todd and Buckley saw smoke coming from between the boards in the webs of the girders; they reckoned they were about 20 yards from the cable belt transfer point.
75. Soon after the fan had been restarted, J. Simpson was able to go down Bell's Heading as far as the East Loco Level. Looking down the Loader Mine, as he passed the junction, he saw extremely dense smoke. On his way back, at about 5.35 a.m., he and Webster penetrated the Loader Mine as far as the return end of the conveyor. About six yards ahead of them they could see flame creeping up from the floor on the left-hand side of the roadway. Some time later, fire-fighters were able to get below the return end of the conveyor and they saw glowing material in a pile some 30 yards from the cable belt transfer point; the heat overhead was intense. When the smoke abated, G. C. Cowie, developer, was able, from the transfer point, to see two fires, one quite small, about three or four feet across on the belt some ten yards down and the other, much larger, some twenty yards farther on, burning fiercely across the full width of the mine and three or four feet above the level of the belt.
Examination of the Loader Mine
76. By 7.00 a.m., the fire had been reduced to a small one on the belt about seven yards below the junction of the Loader Mine and the Cable Belt Dook and a much larger one at a point about 25 yards below the junction. A few minutes before 7.00 a.m. J. Simpson was again in the Loader Mine when he observed that, whilst the cable belt was whole at the return drum, the top belt was gradually charring towards the louvre plate until it disappeared into powder; the bottom belt was fused to the rollers. At the start of the stretch of road treated with polyurethane foam, the roof and right-hand side were covered with black charred blisters. There were some places from which the foam had been completely burned exposing the fire-resistant boards and concrete slabs. At about the same time Shaw scratched the burnt foam surface with a nail and one inch or so of "black stuff" came away to reveal a chalky brown colour beneath.
77. Much later, at about 6.00 p.m. A. H. Barker, H.M. District Inspector, went five yards beyond the cable belt transfer point. He saw burning material on the floor twenty yards beyond him and observed that the conveyor belt had melted and was hanging in shreds around the return drum. Where he was standing, he found the foam surface had been charred black to a depth of a sixteenth of an inch but the foam beneath was sound.
Spread of smoke in the Loader Mine
78. The smoke spread from the fire rapidly up and down the Loader Mine into both the Cable Belt Dook and the Loco Level. It split both ways along the Loco Level, to the Dysart Nos. 1 and 2 Dooks in one direction and to the Sea Mine and the Lochhead Level in the other. The consensus of opinion among the witnesses who gave evidence was that the smoke was first smelt, then seen as a white, grey or blue haze and then as very dense and black. The nearer the witnesses were to the Loader Mine the quicker was the change from haze to dense black smoke. There was evidence that the smoke had reached the Dysart Dip No. 1 Section and the Four Feet No. 31 Section by about 3.45 a.m., and the 360 Lateral by 4.00 a.m.
Opening doors and stopping the fan
79. The first priority in dealing with the emergency was to give the men an opportunity of getting out of the pit. The next was to make it possible for the rescue brigades to search for those not accounted for and, if not found alive, to bring out the bodies. The intakes had been contaminated by smoke right from the start. Reversing the ventilating currents might be thought to have been a course affording some relief. In fact it would have taken a considerable time to take effect and, in any event, would not have been a sensible action because the returns would have been more quickly affected by smoke than in fact they were. Stirling and Dryburgh attempted a local short-circuit of air by opening the doors in the Dysart Dip 1 A Connection with a view to minimising the spread of smoke into the inbye Dysart Dip Sections, but this ineffective. With more success, Todd and Buckley opened the doors in Davidson's Mine to afford relief to the Sea Mine. Nicol's action in stopping the surface fan seems to have had no effect at the Sea Mine side and it aggravated conditions on the Dysart Dip side. He therefore decided to restart the fan but it was not until 9.15 a.m. that the smoke began to clear at the Sea Mine entrance. The most likely reason for this development was that the surface fan doors had by then been slightly opened and the fan slowed down, rather than stopped. The relief was of short duration, however, for conditions were as bad as ever by 1.00 p.m.
Spread of fire from the Loader Mine
80. The fire had spread into the Loco Level well before 7.00 a.m. and flame was seen in the roof at the Old Pumphouse entrance at about 7.30 a.m.; a little further towards the Loader Mine burning coal was falling from the roof. The fire spread slowly towards the Sea Mine and by 4.00 p.m. had reached Tilson's Alley. At 10.00 a.m. flame was seen in the main return at the 1-in-l Mine and much later at 6.00 p.m. fire was burning fiercely at the junction of Bell's Heading and the Loco Level.
Attempts to control the fire
81. As soon as men could be assembled after the discovery of the fire, arrangements were made for a screen to be erected in the Loader Mine near the Bell's Heading junction. Hoses were brought to the Loader Mine but, as the nearest hydrant was in smoke in the Loco Level, they could not be used. There was insufficient hose available to use the hydrant at the bottom of No. 3 Shaft, the nearest in fresh air, so the hydrant was itself transferred to Bell's Heading. The fitting of this hydrant took some time and it was not until two hours after the outbreak of fire that water was first applied to it. When the newly-sited hydrant was brought into use, it was successful in isolating the burning material on the floor of the Loader Mine but the fire was by then virtually out of control. The heat was intense and prevented any advance by fire-fighters towards the Loco Level; indeed, they soon had to be withdrawn to the transfer point. Smoke frustrated an attack on the fire through Bell's Heading and the Loco Level. At about 7.30 a.m. D. Wilson, under-manager, saw fire in the Loco Level from the Old Pumphouse entrance. There was some delay in obtaining hoses; sometime after 8.30 a.m., however, fire-fighters started to play water on the lire, although a roof fall restricted their activity. After about half an hour, they had to withdraw leaving their hoses to play on the fire. Fire-fighting in this part of the pit bottom continued until about 1.00 p.m. when the supply of electricity and water both failed.
82. Apart from the use of water, screens were erected, doors opened, the fan stopped and started and later slowed down, all as measures designed to control the fire and the movement of smoke.
Effect of measures
83. The effect of opening the doors in Davidson's Mine was to increase the quantity of air, and thus smoke, passing along the Loco Level towards the Sea Mine and so to reduce the quantity going towards Bell's Heading. Notwithstanding this, after an initial clear period, smoke in considerable quantity passed along the Loco Level and down Nos. 1 and 2 Dysart Dooks. Smoke moving towards Tilson's Alley was diluted at the Alley and again at the Dysart Turn, where it split three ways. Nevertheless considerable quantities of black smoke still passed into the Sea Mine, one of the three splits. The opening of the No. 2 Heading doors, probably because the doors at Davidson's Mine were open at the same time, seems to have had no marked effect on the fire or smoke movement, but, as I have mentioned earlier, the slowing down of the surface fan and the partial opening of the fan doors was probably responsible for a temporary clearance of smoke from the Sea Mine.
Extent to which measures failed
84. At about 6.00 a.m. it became apparent that eleven men were missing. By 11.00 a.m. six bodies had been recovered. Two men were rescued from the Bowhouse Inset at 2.30 p.m. J. McKay, last seen in Dysart Dip No. 3 Section, A. Taylor, who went back in along Four Feet return and H. Gallacher, the 750 Branxton pumper, were still missing. Efforts were made to fight the fire in such a way that it might be possible to find the three men but by 3.00 p.m. on 10th September, conditions had so deteriorated that it was decided that too many men were being placed at risk and stoppings would have to be put on, thus sealing in the bodies. On the evidence brought before me, I am satisfied that this was the right decision.