Museum Entrance Museum
Museum
Friends of Durham Mining Museum
Events Calendar
e-Books and Books for sale
Photograph Gallery
Document Archive
Master Name Index
What's new in the site
Mining
Mining History
Colliery Index
Colliery Maps
Company Overviews
Who's Who
Mineral Information
Educational Material
Bibliography
Statistics
Workers/Employee Lists
Notes for Family Historians
War Service information
Disasters
Disaster Reports
Disaster Report Text
Disaster Report Name Index
UK Disaster Report Text
UK Disaster Report Name Index
Inquest Texts
Names of those killed
Disasters in the 1700s
Disasters in the 1800s
Disasters in the 1900s
Memorials
Awards for Gallantry
On this day ...

Links to other sites of interest
Industrial Heritage Days Out
Former www.pitwork.net web site

Index to site

Contact and address details

Share Page with Social Media

Share on Facebook

Share with Reddit

Share on Delicious

Reports Prev Page Return to Index Next Page Reports
Index

V. — Point Of Origin And Cause Of The Explosion.

There was considerable divergence of opinion both as to the immediate cause and the point of origin of the explosion.

Messrs. J. Dyer Lewis and John Kane, Mining Engineers, who were called as expert witnesses by the owners of the mine, considered that the explosion started in No. 1 tophole and that it was caused by a cloud of coal dust coming in contact with the naked flame of an acetylene lamp. They were confident that firedamp had played no part at all in the explosion.

Their conclusions were based mainly on the following premises :—

(1) As to the cause :— the previous history of the working of the seam indicated that the presence of firedamp in dangerous quantity was very improbable. The extreme friability of the coal, particularly in the workings of No. 13 level, made inevitable the presence of much dust in the workings; and, further, there might have been a "pounce" by which dust was suddenly emitted in the tophole. Experiments carried out at Sheffield by Dr. Wheeler (see Appendix IV) showed that under certain conditions it was possible for coal dust from this seam to be ignited and to propagate flame by contact with the flame of an acetylene lamp.

(2) As to the point of origin :— the two colliers who were presumably at work in No. 1 tophole were severely burnt. Pieces of stone found in timber in the level near the bottom of No. 1 tophole were taken as an indication that the blast of the explosion emerged from the tophole and split to the right and left in the level. Bennett was filling a tram at the bottom of the tophole. The evidence, however, as will be shown later, does not substantiate several of these premises.

Mr. Phillips, Manager, preferred to express no definite opinion except that the naked flame of an acetylene lamp was the source of ignition and that the ignition took place in No. 1 tophole. In view of the firedamp found after the explosion he could not entirely dismiss from his mind the possibility of a sudden emission of firedamp having occurred.

Mr. D. L. Davies, Miners’ Agent, who gave evidence on behalf of the South Wales. Miners’ Federation, like Mr. Phillips, was unable entirely to rule out the possibility that firedamp was first ignited, but on the whole leaned towards an ignition of coal dust alone. He placed the point of ignition in the level somewhere between Nos. 1 and 2 topholes.

Messrs. Lea, Waldin and Finney, H.M. Inspectors of Mines, agreed with Mr. Davies as to the point of origin, but they all thought the initiating cause was an accumulation of firedamp — not necessarily a large one — at the high side of the level between No. 1 and No. 2 topholes, and that the explosion of this firedamp was extended by coal dust in the level and the adjacent topholes Nos. 2, 3 and 4.

Of these conclusions the latter seems to me to be most in keeping with the facts. I do not think this was an explosion of coal dust alone. In my opinion, firedamp was first ignited as suggested by the Inspectors and the explosion of firedamp was extended by coal dust.

I propose to give at some length my reasons for coming to this conclusion.

In this connection, it is desirable carefully to review, firstly, the disposition, as far as it is known, of the seven deceased persons immediately prior to the catastrophe; secondly, the positions in which their bodies were found afterwards; and, thirdly, the nature of the injuries they sustained.

With respect to five of the deceased there is no room for doubt as to where they were and what they were doing. Commencing with No. 2 tophole, T. L. Hughes was working at the face; his body was found in the level at the bottom of the tophole; he had died from carbon monoxide poisoning and was otherwise uninjured. Thomas Henry Harry was working at the face of the crossing in No. 2 tophole; his body was found alongside that of Hughes; his death was caused by carbon monoxide poisoning and he was otherwise uninjured. Henry Griffiths was boring a shothole at the face of the level; his body was found in the parting not many yards from the slant; he died from the effects of carbon monoxide and was otherwise uninjured. William Arnold Bennett had completed the filling of a tub at the foot of No. 1 tophole and had trammed it to a point about halfway between Nos. 2 and 3 topholes; his body was found quite close to the slant a few yards further outbye than that of Griffiths; his death was due to the effects of carbon monoxide, but he had also been severely burned about the face, neck, chest, arms and hands, and marks on his arms and chest suggested he had been struck by small stones. Thomas Jones was somewhere in the level inbye of the parting. Although there is no direct evidence as to how far he had gone along the level, I think it is reasonable to assume that he was near to No. 2 tophole, for, where was he more likely to find the timber he was seeking than near where other colliers were at work? His body was found about halfway between Nos. 5 and 6 topholes; he died from the effects of carbon monoxide poisoning, but he had also been burned about the head, face, neck and chest and there was a wound on the back of his head.

It remains now to consider Edwin Harry and David Davies, both of whom, it was generally agreed, were working at the face of No. 1 tophole at any rate until Bennett had completed filling. the tub already referred to. The body of Davies was found in the level some distance outbye and a few yards behind Jones. His death was caused by carbon monoxide, but he had been severely burned about the face, neck, chest, arms and hands and was otherwise knocked about; the right side of his head was swollen and bruised; his right knee was swollen; his left forearm was cut and bruised and there was a cut on the left foot which had gone through the boot. The body of Edwin Harry was found lying in the level at the foot of No. 1 tophole. Death in his case again was due to carbon monoxide but he had been also severely burned about the head, face, arms and hands.

The skin of the deceased persons in every case was covered with a coating of black dust, and in this one respect there was nothing to differentiate between them. On the other hand, it is to be observed that the three who were definitely at work in culs-de-sac, viz., the faces of the level, No. 2 tophole and the crossing were not burnt at all, whereas of the four who suffered by burning two at least, viz Bennett and Jones were definitely in the level and in the case of Bennett also definitely close to the bottom of No. 2 tophole when the explosion occurred.

It is evident that Bennett, Griffiths, Jones and Davies had travelled outbye a considerable distance along the level after the explosion before they were overcome by the afterdamp. Hughes and T. H. Harry could get no further than the foot of the tophole in which they were working, while E. Harry, who was over 60 years of age and comparatively feeble, probably fell when the explosion struck him and was unable to move afterwards.

If the explosion originated, as was suggested by Messrs. Lewis, Kane and Phillips, in No. 1 tophole, it is inconceivable to my mind that Davies and E. Harry, whom they assumed to be at work there, could have been burnt as badly as they were and that no other traces of burning or even heating should have been found in the tophole. Even in the level itself immediately at the foot of the tophole the indications of heating were almost negligible.

How then is the burning of these two men to be accounted for? The explosion occurred at or about 7 p.m. or just about the time when, in the ordinary course of things, the men would suspend work to take their food. Now, it was known that Edwin Harry acted as timekeeper for this purpose (his watch was in fact found undamaged in a pocket of his waistcoat in No. 1 tophole after the explosion). Again, it is not unreasonable to assume that, Bennett having just filled a tub, Harry and Davies would consider it to be a suitable time to withdraw to the level, where their coats were later found hanging with food untouched in the pockets thereof, and have their meal.

In my opinion, this is what happened: Davies and E. Harry, the former in front, came down the tophole and Davies was about to reach down his coat from its position at the rise side of the level a few yards inbye of No. 2 tophole, when the flame of his acetylene lamp ignited a mixture of firedamp and air which exploded and in so doing raised a cloud of coal dust by which the explosion was extended into No. 2 tophole and along the level. The burns sustained by Edwin Harry, Davies, Jones and Bennett were characteristic of burns caused by flame from burning firedamp.

I do not share with Messrs. Dyer Lewis, Kane, Phillips and Davies their scepticism as to the presence of firedamp. In Section IV of this Report I have already stated the facts in regard to the presence of firedamp in the workings of No. 13 level after the explosion. It may be that firedamp was emitted suddenly in some volume, but this is contrary to experience both before and since the occurrence, and in view of the method of ventilating the face of the level and No. 1 tophole, the occurrence of firedamp in the level between Nos. 1 and 2 topholes does not surprise me.

In the preceding paragraphs, I have endeavoured to reconstruct form the data available a picture of the occurrence. It. remains still to discuss in greater detail the theory that coal dust alone was the cause of this disaster. I have already referred to experiments carried out at Sheffield by Dr. Wheeler on samples of coal dust from the Penclawdd seam. Put quite shortly, the experiments showed that under certain conditions it was possible for a cloud of dust from this seam to be ignited by the flame of an acetylene lamp such as was used by the colliers working there. The conditions necessary for ignition to occur were —

(1) that dust of a certain fineness be used;

(2) that the concentration of dust be not less than about 0.2 ounces per cubic foot of air;

(3) that the dust be brought into contact with the flame by a blast of air

(4) that the experiment be carried out in a confined space.

Unless conditions reasonably comparable with these conditions can be shown to have existed in the workings of the mine, the conclusion that coal dust alone was responsible for the explosion is not, in my opinion, justified.

In the mine the existence of only the first of these conditions could be demonstrated.

As regards the second condition, many opinions were expressed at the inquiry regarding the density of the cloud of dust produced when tubs were being filled and also upon the occurrence of the so-called "pounces". Opinions on a matter of this nature being worth little or nothing, I arranged with Dr. Wheeler to visit the workings and scientifically to test the density of the dust in the air. Three tests were made on 27th March as follows :—

(1) Two persons, each with a shovel, were ridding coal down a split, specially made between No. 2 and No. 3 topholes, and on to the level.

The density of the dust cloud produced was .029 ounces per cubic foot of air.

(2) As in (1) but in a split specially made between No. 1 and No. 2 topholes.

The density of the dust cloud produced was .0056 ounces per cubic foot of air.

(3) A trammer was filling a tram at a working tophole, the test being made when the tram was nearly full.

The density of the dust cloud produced was .015 ounces per cubic foot of air.

It is to be noted that in none of these tests does the density of dust approach the minimum density of the cloud required to propagate an explosion in the experiments at Sheffield.

Further, in evidence, Dr. Wheeler stated that in a dust cloud of a density of 0.2 ounces per cubic foot it is practically impossible to see the flame of a safety lamp at a distance of about 2 feet. From my own observations I am confident that no cloud of dust approaching such a density is produced in the course of working even the abnormal coal met with in No. 13 level at Wernbwll.

As regards the third condition, I cannot visualise any circumstances in the mine in which a dense cloud of dust would be projected across the naked flame of an acetylene lamp in the manner in which it was projected across the flame at Sheffield. In comparison, the cloud of dust normally in the atmosphere in the mine would be stagnant or travelling only at a very low velocity, and at a very short distance from the point of origin of the cloud the initial density would be largely dispersed.

As regards the fourth condition, again I think on the whole the conditions in the mine are not comparable with the conditions of the experiments, chiefly because in the unconfined space, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the density of the cloud is rapidly dispersed.

To sum up the position in a few words, it is not at all an easy task to initiate an explosion of coal dust per se, by means of a source of heat such as the flame of an acetylene lamp provides.

In this connection Mr. Frowen put to Mr. Kane two very pertinent questions, as follows :—

Q. If it is true that this ignition took place from dust, would not we expect, under the conditions that existed at this time, to have had a number of dust explosions in times past?

A. I do not know that that should be so.

Q. The condition of filling coal and getting coal in No. 1 and No. 2 topholes were precisely the same, we take it, on this occasion as on other occasions?

A. Yes, but you must remember the further point that was occurring about this time — these pounces, which had not been known previously.

Mr. Kane appears to have been rather at a loss to account for an ignition of coal dust per se without the added factor of the pounce. Unfortunately, from the point of view of Mr. Kane’s theory, and as has already been mentioned, there is no evidence of excessive pouncing having occurred until some time after the explosion.

The explosion is easily accounted for if firedamp was present; without firedamp it is indeed difficult to account for its occurrence.

 

Prev Page Return to Top of Page Next Page


A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.

 

mail
Mail:
Webmaster
Back
Back
Home
Home
Open Government Licence   Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Copyright © 1999-2024 by The Durham Mining Museum and its contributors
Registered Charity No: 1110608
Page last updated: 31 Dec 2022

Privacy Policy
 
Terms & Conditions
 
Search
Search
Print
Print
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z