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VI. — General Conclusions.Ventilation. — The system of ventilation adopted at this mine was unsatisfactory, and had been the cause of comment by Mr. P. T. Jenkins, the Senior Inspector for the District in which the colliery is situated, when he visited the mine on December 5th last. The available air current was coursed throughout the workings of Kay's Slope and Milfraen in one stream, the system of airways being so situated as to necessitate the passage of the ventilation in close proximity to the Upcast Pit before it reached the Black Vein workings in Milfraen. I have already referred to the unsatisfactory nature of the air lock between the intake for Milfraen workings and Milfraen Pit itself. Measurements of air taken by Mr. Hughes, H.M. Junior Inspector, show that a limited quantity of air only was reaching the Black Vein workings and that this limited quantity was further reduced by the unsatisfactory nature of the air lock in the Crosscut between the Buller road and the main return. These measurements taken on the 12th July when conditions were exactly similar to those obtaining on the morning of the explosion, showed that at a point on the Winch Heading 100 yards outbye of the air lock on the crosscut to Milfraen Pit there was passing 7,822 cubic feet per minute, whereas the quantity passing through the Buller road was insufficient to turn the vanes of the anemometer. A certain amount of air was passing down through the Siskol heading and finding its way back through the Crosscut; measured in the return from the Black Vein just outbye of this crosscut, 1,452 cubic feet per minute is recorded. It was contended in evidence by Mr. Lewison that the, presence of the sheet below Gunter's roadway combined with the fact that there was a fall between Powell's and Gunter's stalls in the face prevented any air from passing into Mapstone's immediately before the explosion. From experiments made at a neighbouring colliery by Mr. Madley, H.M. Junior Inspector, it was found that with 5,520 cubic feet of air passing freely through an airway, 4,784 cubic feet passed a loose sheet and 3,358 cubic feet a tight sheet. The particulars of these experiments are given in Appendix VII. There is, I believe, no doubt that had the fall on the C face Permitted the passage of air in reasonable quantity, and had the air locks already referred to been of such a substantial nature as to force a good current of air into the district, then, even assuming the fall between Powell's and Gunter's stalls to have come before the explosion, the sheet below Gunter's not being tight and being six inches above the floor, would have permitted a good current of air to pass, and part of this air would have passed into the B level and up B face, over the fall and into Mapstone's, removing in its passage, or at any rate diluting, the gas at the fall on B. But here again the fall on B was of such a nature as to form a serious blockage to the passage of air. The Black Vein is one requiring constant and ample ventilation in order to remove the firedamp which it gives off. The air in the main return from the Milfraen workings was measured by Mr. Hughes some time after the explosion when the mine was idle and when greatly improved conditions obtained. The quantity of air passing was found to amount to 8,348 cubic feet per minute (Barometer 28.65; Water Gauge 1.9) and, upon sampling, it was found to contain .16 per cent. of firedamp. This gives approximately 13.35 cubic feet of firedamp passing a given point in the main return per minute. The quantity of gas is apparently small, but when one considers what the position would be when the amount of air passing was say, as measured by Mr. Hughes in the main return outbye the crosscut on the 12th July, two days after the explosion, 1,450 cubic feet per minute, the aspect of affairs becomes altered. In fact, at that time this amount of air was not passing through the faces, the air within the workings being incapable of measurement because it refused to turn the vanes of the anemometer. The difficulty, therefore, of accounting for the presence of gas at the time of the explosion becomes lessened and especially so when it is remembered that the falls in the district had reached up to the Horn Coal, a seam one foot eight inches in thickness, seven feet above the Black Vein which was virgin in this area, and in which a blower of gas might be expected to give off, and did in fact give off after the explosion and almost certainly before the explosion. I have come to the conclusion that the ventilation of this district on the morning of the 10th July was defective and did not comply with the requirements of Section 29 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911. Electricity. — The condition in which the electrical apparatus was found denotes lack of appreciation of the requirements of safety and good practice. The examination made by the electrical staff appears to be of an haphazard order, and the general maintenance of the plant was poor in consequence. Had an important piece of plant like a coal-cutting machine been carefully examined, the loss of a number of set screws and the ill-fitting condition of the semicircular cover of the machine would have been noted and remedied. The condition of the Hopkinson coal-cutting machine in use in the Black Vein was such that when firedamp was ignited within the case, flame was communicated to the atmosphere outside. General Regulation 132 reads as follows "132. In any part of a mine in which inflammable gas, although not normally present, is likely to occur in quantity sufficient to be indicative of danger, the following additional requirements shall be observed :— (i) All cables, apparatus, signalling wires and signalling instruments shall be constructed, installed, protected, worked and maintained, so that in the normal working thereof there shall be no risk, of open sparking." In view of the fact already stated that inflammable gas had sometime prior to the explosion, appeared in the workings to such an extent that the Overman, Daniels, had had to withdraw the workmen from B face, it follows that General Regulation 132 applied to the electric plant in use in the Black Vein; but the coal-cutting machine, in the condition in which it was found after the explosion, did not comply with the requirement quoted above. It is unfortunate that the advice given by H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines in the letter he addressed to all concerned with the working of coal mines where electricity is used, on the 12th November, 1928, was apparently disregarded by the officials of this Colliery. A copy of this important document is included in this Report (Appendix VIII). As the question of good maintenance is a vital one, I wish here to draw especial notice to certain passages in this letter. In Part 2 the Chief Inspector draws attention to two possible defects in electrical plant (1) Imperfection of design, and (2) Lack of proper maintenance. With (1) in this instance I am not concerned, but (2) is particularly relevant to the condition of the coal cutter in use at the time of this disaster. In the fourth paragraph, attention is most particularly drawn to the commonest cause of defects, namely, "the loss or omission of screws from cover plates whereby an opening is left into a switch box or some equally dangerous part of the apparatus ". This was a defect which, in the case under review, was one of the most important contributory causes of the disaster and one which had not been observed by the persons responsible for the proper maintenance of the electrical machinery. The Chief Inspector, however, goes further. He recommends in (b) of the seventh paragraph a definite remedy thus: "(b) some device, such as a spring washer or a lock-nut, to check the tendency of screws to work loose under vibration." This recommendation was ignored, in spite of the fact that the electrician in his evidence referred to the constant loss of bolts and nuts which he alleged was taking place. It is probable that, in this instance: the loss of screws and nuts was due to vibration and the simple remedy suggested might have obviated the loss of vital parts. The other passage in Sir Henry Walker's letter to which I wish to refer, is contained in the introduction thus: "(a) A temporary and, generally, local deficiency in the ventilating current together with failure on the part of the officials in the area directly affected, to detect that deficiency in time or to appreciate its probable consequences." Herein lies the other important contributory cause of the accident. Notwithstanding that men had had to be withdrawn from the workings because of the presence of firedamp, the officials were apparently under the impression that the Black Vein at this colliery was non-fiery and did not apprehend any danger on account of the dislocation of the air current due to falls in the working faces. Safety Lamps. — The safety lamps in use were found to be, with one exception, in good order and safe, and can be dismissed as innocent of a charge of having caused or contributed to the explosion. The exception referred to, although in poor condition, can also be dismissed, Capt. Platt, the Superintending Testing Officer of the Mines Department, having certified it as having, in his opinion, in no way been connected with the production of flame. All persons in the colliery were provided with electric safety lamps, with the exception of the following classes of men, viz., Firemen, Pumpsmen, Enginemen and Coal-Cutting Machine men, to whom flame safety lamps were issued in addition to the electric lamps with which they were provided. There were nineteen flame safety lamps kept in the lamproom, and their allocation was as follows :— Firemen, 3, Pumpsmen 4, Enginemen 4, and Coal Cutting Machine men 1, making a total of twelve. The remaining seven lamps being kept in the lamproom as spares. It is to be noted that only one flame safety lamp was allocated to the use of the coal-cutting machine men, and, as already stated, this lamp was riot issued to these persons when they descended to their work on the night of the 9th-10th July. General Regulation 132 (v) requires that, inter alia, "a safety lamp shall be provided and used with each motor when working ". The maintenance, in good condition, of the safety lamps generally, calls for no comment, but the system of recording the issue and return of lamps to the lamproom was inadequate for the purpose of ensuring that all lamps issued were returned to the lamproom in the manner prescribed by General Regulation 13. For instance, lamp No. 187 had been issued on the 9th July to a man named Evans who, instead of returning it at the end of his shift, loaned it to another man who, in turn, left it in the workings. This lamp was found after the explosion within Mapstone's area, and was the lamp which was found to be (see Capt. Platt's report, Appendix IV), although beyond suspicion, in poor condition. The issue of electric lamps in addition to flame lamps to the firemen has everything to recommend it. A fireman has more confidence in making his examination for gas if he is conscious of having a standbye light and, besides, his statutory duties require him to examine the state of the roadways, a function he can perform more efficiently with an electric than a flame lamp. Evidence was given in an endeavour to show that the firemen, at Milfraen, although provided with flame lamps did not use them. Whilst I should be sorry to think that any fireman would be so negligent, it seems to me that the examinations made by the firemen in the Black Vein can only have been of a cursory description. I can only come to the conclusion that the general immunity from gas which this area was credited with enjoying, predisposed the officials generally to view the whole question of ventilation with an equanimity which was, in the light of events, deplorable, and, indeed, reprehensible. Point of Origin and Cause of Ignition. — I am of the opinion that — (1) the explosion originated in the face of Mapstone's Level; (2) the ventilating current was insufficient to dilute and render harmless a blower of gas which was issuing from a cavity over the fall in that place; (3) the gas accumulated until the explosive point was reached; (4) the gas was ignited by sparking at the switch within the electric coal-cutting machine; and (5) owing to the defective condition of the cover of that machine, flame was emitted and ignited gas outside the machine. It is with regret I have to report that certain breaches of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and of the General Regulations made thereunder, were committed by the Management of the Colliery. They were as follows (1) Section 29 (1) in that an adequate amount of ventilation was not being produced in the Black Vein to render harmless inflammable gases produced therein. (2) Section 35 (2) in that all persons, or a number of them selected by a system approved by the Inspector of the Division, were not searched daily for matches or apparatus for producing a light or contrivance for smoking after or immediately before entering the mine. (3) Section 36 (3) in that more than nine persons were engaged in the Black Vein at Milfraen Pit, there being no available means of egress to the surface other than the main return. (4) General Regulation 132 (v) in that the person appointed to work the coal-cutting machine, in a part of the mine where inflammable gas, although not normally present, was likely to occur in quantity sufficient to be indicative of danger, was not provided with a safety lamp of a type to enable him to test for firedamp. (5) General Regulation 132 (i) in that the coal-cutter machine, although being worked in a part of the mine where gas, although not normally present, was likely to occur in quantity sufficient to be indicative of danger, was not installed, protected, worked and maintained so that there was no danger of open sparking. In conclusion I desire to thank H.M. Coroner — Mr. W. R. Dauncey — for his courtesy and consideration at all times and for making the excellent arrangements at Blaenavon for the holding of our joint inquiry. My thanks are also due to the Representatives of the various parties interested, for their able examination and cross-examination of witnesses, by means of which all the relevant facts were brought out for my consideration, and also to Mr. D. L. Davies for his kindly and at all times helpful assistance towards the same end. In particular, I wish to record my grateful thanks for, and appreciation of, the services of my two assistants — Mr. P. T. Jenkins, the Senior Inspector, and Mr. Morris Hughes, one of the Junior Inspectors, in the Newport District — for their assistance, not only at the time when the disaster was under investigation, but in the preparation of the Plans which are attached to this Report. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, J. Macleod Carey, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines,
A copy of this report was kindly donated by
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