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Conclusions

62. I am satisfied that the evidence given at the Inquiry covered all the relevant aspects. This, together with the professional opinions offered and helpful submissions which were made at the close of the Inquiry, has enabled me to reach firm conclusions on the cause of the explosion and the circumstances leading up to it.

63. Much of the Inquiry turned upon the air bridge over the Maindy Heading Return. Experiments demonstrated that, even when the access holes in the air bridge were covered, air leaked to a marked degree into the Maindy Heading Return. While some of this leakage could have been the result of badly fitting covers to the holes, the probability is that the greater part resulted from the generally poor construction of the air bridge. One can understand that an expedient, such as the access facility in the air bridge, may have been necessary in the early days when the district was being opened up and while arrangements were being made for a properly equipped connection. This was said to be the intention of the management and, although at the outset some work was undertaken, this was not continued. Instead, it seems that reliance was placed on a system whereby the access holes were to be used for the passage of men and materials, but for only short periods of time. In practice, however, the smaller access hole equipped with a ladder for the passage of men seems to have been allowed to stay open, if not for the whole of the time, certainly for the greater part of it. In so far as the larger access hole is concerned, it seems reasonably clear that, prior to the morning of the explosion, it was opened only infrequently and then for periods of no more than an hour and not on every shift. Before the P.11 District was encountered, the effect on the face ventilation of leaving the smaller access hole open was probably only marginal, but opening the larger access hole at the same time would have a more marked effect. Even under these conditions, and despite the air bridge leakage, there was still, in my opinion, sufficient air to provide adequate ventilation for the face. But the poor construction of the air bridge and the way in which it was used were examples of deplorably bad pit practice, which should not have been tolerated by anyone having responsibilities for the safe working of the mine.

64. Paradoxically, it is in the excessive quantity of air available to the P.26 District that I find the real key to the circumstances of this explosion. In a situation in which the firedamp content of the return air was low and in which the air available was greatly in excess of requirements, the defects in the air bridge and the way in which it was used were accepted as being of little consequence and a sense of complacency in regard to the ventilation seems to have been engendered in everyone concerned. This sense of complacency continued after the P.11 District was contacted, even though the effect of the holing was to change quite dramatically the distribution of ventilating pressure throughout the district.

65. With the ladder way open, the quantity of air passing over the air bridge was about 9,000 cubic feet per minute, but, of this, some 3,000 cubic feet per minute was then lost into the P.11 workings, leaving 6,000 cubic feet per minute for the P.26 face. When both access holes were open, however, only about 4,000 cubic feet of air per minute passed over the air bridge; with a loss of 3,000 cubic feet per minute into the P.11 workings, the quantity of air available for the face was then reduced to no more than about 1,000 cubic feet per minute. I regard this quantity as being totally inadequate for the proper ventilation of the face in any circumstances.

66. Thus, while only one access hole was open, all was seemingly well but, whenever the second access hole was opened, a potentially dangerous situation arose, in that the velocity in the return gate must then have fallen to as low as 20 feet per minute. With a velocity of this order, there was always a distinct possibility of firedamp layering, given that firedamp was being emitted into the roadway. In my opinion, there was just such an emission, and a layer developed whenever the two access holes were open. That layering was never detected is probably explained by the fact that, up to the day of the explosion, the two access holes were open together for only short periods and thus the interruptions in ventilation would have been of short duration; upon the restoration of the normal velocity, as experiments showed, any accumulation of firedamp would be quickly dispersed.

67. Everyone concerned at the colliery regarded the Pentre Seam and the P.26 face in particular as virtually gas free. The management were no doubt fortified in this belief by the fact that the statutory mine air samples taken during normal coal production never showed more than 0.38 per cent of firedamp, equivalent to a "make" of 30 cubic feet per minute into the face air stream. When coaling was not in progress, this was reduced to about ten cubic feet per minute. From measurements taken after the explosion it may be deduced that concentrations of firedamp in the waste were negligible, and that there was little increment in the firedamp content of the air for the first 120 yards of the return gate outbye the main ripping. Outbye this point there was, however, an accession of about 20 cubic feet per minute of firedamp. This region of emission was in the vicinity of the pillar from which the face started and hence a place where roof breaks would be induced as the face moved away. These breaks would extend to seams above and provide a passage for firedamp to migrate from these seams into the P. 26 Return Gate. This migration of firedamp would depend neither upon the ventilation pressures across the district nor upon the nature of the operations on the face. It would fill any cavities over the arches, but in spilling it out into the roadway it would be readily dispersed if the speed of the ventilation was around 100 feet per minute. At velocities somewhat below 75 feet per minute but in excess of 20 feet per minute, as was shown by experiment, the firedamp would not be completely dispersed, and would form a layer, the length and depth of which would increase as the velocity decreased. Furthermore, because of the rising gradient of the road, the layer would move rapidly uphill against the air stream. The experiments showed that, in two and a quarter hours, a layer such as this could extend as far back as the ripping lip and increase to over four feet so that its lower fringe was below the level of the top of the switches.

68. The evidence clearly established that, on the morning of the explosion, both access holes in the airbridge were open at the time of the explosion and had been in that condition for at least two and a half hours. With such a prolonged interruption in the ventilation of the district, everything points to the likelihood that by 12.55 p.m. that morning a situation very similar to that obtained by experiment had developed and that sufficient firedamp had accumulated in the return gate to sustain the ensuing explosion.

69. The point of ignition was clearly in the gate-end switch controlling the return end plough motor. All the evidence points to the fact that two electricians were trying to locate a fault which had stopped the motor and for this purpose had opened up the switch by withdrawing the ten bolts which held the hinged cover in place. It is reasonable to presume that they were carrying out a sequence of tests employing the not uncommon method of connecting control circuits to earth via a rectifier. This would have the consequential effect of operating the contactor within the gate-end switch, creating an arc of some intensity. Such arcing always accompanies the operation of a switch; this is clearly recognised and is safeguarded by locating the switch in a flameproof enclosure. For reasons which come readily to mind, the electricians did not close and bolt the cover of the switch, thereby destroying its flameproofness. Unfortunately, this occurred at a time when the atmosphere surrounding and within the switch had, unknown to them, become charged with inflammable gas.

70. For the National Coal Board it was accepted that the switch was the point of ignition and that firedamp had issued from the strata in the length of the return gate at a short distance inbye the top of the drift. It was suggested, however, that this issue commenced less than an hour before the explosion. This I regard as an extremely remote possibility; it is far more likely that the firedamp had been issuing into the return gate from breaks induced since soon after the face started moving away from the solid coal.

 

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