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Index

The Investigation

General

36. With the completion of recovery operations, a preliminary examination of the district was undertaken by H.M. Inspectorate of Mines and Quarries. This examination indicated that the explosion had affected the face and the return gate. To establish the cause of the explosion, H.M. Inspectors and scientists of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment (S.M.R.E.), with every assistance from the representatives of management and workpeople, then engaged in an intensive examination of the district, in the course of which a number of pieces of equipment and many samples of articles and materials were collected and later subjected to laboratory examination.

The Extent of Flame and Blast

37. From the results of the examination it was concluded that flame had passed along 325 yards of face and associated roadway and that about double this distance had been subjected to blast. These are shown on Plan No. 4.

The Intake Gate

38. Over a length of roadway 30-50 yards from the main ripping there was a partly built stone dust barrier. Some of the frames of this had been displaced, but this was the only sign of violence in the roadway outbye the main ripping. A great deal of coal dust spillage from the conveyor was observed, but the road had not recently been stone dusted nearer than 15 yards outbye from the main ripping. Nevertheless, there were no signs of heating or coking in this part of the gate. Between the main ripping and the face there was evidence of mild blast in an outbye direction and of very slight coking, but none of heating on the collected samples. Appreciable amounts of post explosion dust were found particularly on surfaces facing inbye, and also in the old P.11 road. In this road there were, however, no signs of burning, coking or blast.

The Face

39. Of the samples collected in the face working area only a few items, such as safety helmets, bore evidence of blast or heating. There were moderate deposits of dust in the half of the face adjacent to the intake gate and heavier deposits in the other half, particularly on surfaces facing the return end. Examination of samples indicated some degree of coking, mainly at the return end of the face.

The Return Gate Roadhead

40. In the face of the return stable there was a four feet eight inch deep uncharged shot hole, two feet from the left hand side, while five feet six inches to the right of this was a socket, 11 inches deep and 12 inches in diameter, containing fine damp coal. There was no loose coal in the stable. There were indications of heavy burning on a number of wood splinters and plastic covered wire, and of heavy coking on the outbye sides of props. Moderately heavy deposits of post explosion dust were observed on the rib side wall of the stable, and there were distinct signs of blast in an inbye direction.

The Return Gate

41. Four flameproof gate-end switches were mounted on a trolley at a point 11 yards outbye the main ripping in the return gate. The hinged cover of the one nearest the face, which controlled the return end plough motor, was not securely closed as none of its ten bolts was in position; they were found lying on the apparatus or nearby. The three-pin control cable connection at the back of the switch was disconnected. After the switch had been removed for testing, a damaged rectifier was found under the left hand rail of the track immediately below the position of the switch. A few feet farther outbye, also on trolleys, were two flameproof motors and two hydraulic pumps and tanks. A single-shot exploder and a six-shot exploder were found in this area. There were signs of heavy burning for about 32 yards outbye the main ripping lip. Throughout the length of the return gate explosion dust was observed and there were clear signs of coking.

42. At a point 24 yards down the return gate from the main ripping, a vacuum flask impacted into the outbye end of a wooden prop, one of a horizontal stack, gave an indication of the violence. At 124 yards, a tub had been overturned, and at 140 yards, an arch girder had been displaced in an outbye direction. Over the next 21 yards three more arches had been similarly displaced, and near the junction with the Maindy Heading Return strong indications of blast in an outbye direction were observed.

Maindy Heading Return

43. Indications of blast were found in the Maindy Heading Return for about 65 yards of the roadway inbye of the junction with the P. 26 Return Gate; shattered pieces of brattice cloth and wood were found strewn about. In the roadway outbye of the junction, there were signs of violence for a distance of 55 yards. There was no evidence of heating and little post explosion dust in the 120 yards of the Maindy Heading Return which had been affected by blast.

Electrical Apparatus

General

44. Electricity for the district was supplied from two mobile flameproof air-cooled transformers situated in the Maindy Heading Return, one just inbye the junction with P. 26 Return Gate and the other near the air bridge. In the intake gate outbye the air bridge were two switches controlling the motors of one of the chain conveyors in that gate. Farther inbye were four other gate-end switches controlling motors for the other chain conveyor, the face conveyor and the plough. In addition there was one spare switch with a test plug in the socket. There was also a signalling transformer. In the return gate close to the roadhead were four gate-end switches controlling motors for a ram pump, a chock pump, the face conveyor and the plough. The two plough motors were arranged for simultaneous working. The face was equipped with sound powered telephones for communication between the gate ends, and with a face signalling system.

Examination in the Pit

45. All the electrical apparatus and associated cables were examined in situ by H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines and Quarries. He found the switches on both the transformers and the isolators on all the gate-end switches in the return gate in the "Off" position, but it was later disclosed that they had been switched off soon after the explosion as a safety measure. With one exception all the apparatus was found to be in a satisfactory condition. Nevertheless, a number of pieces, including the signalling equipment, were withdrawn from the mine and sent to the S.M.R.E. for laboratory examination and test. Again, with the same exception, all were found to be in a satisfactory condition, being either intrinsically safe or flameproof as appropriate, with nothing to give rise to the suspicion that any one of them might have provided an igniting source. The exception was the gate-end switch in the return gate which supplied power to the return end plough motor.

The Switch Controlling the Plough Motor

46. When this unit was examined, the sequence/independent switch was in the "independent" position and the bypass/operate switch in the "operate" position. The ten bolts of the cover were found lying on top of the switch or nearby; the cover itself was closed but with a flange gap of about one-quarter inch at the side opposite the hinges. The bolted plug of the control cable had been withdrawn from the back of the switch, leaving the pins exposed. Inside the switch it was noted that the earth leakage and the proving relays had been removed and these were later found on the floor nearby. To complete the circuits, pieces of wire had been inserted in the sockets provided for these relays, and the stop switch contacts had been bridged with a piece of V.I.R. cable. When later examined in the laboratory at the S.M.R.E. no signs of heating on any component within the enclosure were immediately visible, but microscopic examination disclosed particles of coke and definite signs of burning, the latter especially on the string harness used for securing the relay connecting wires. With the isolator in the "On" position, it was found that the cover could be opened three inches at the side opposite the hinges.

47. The switch was then subjected to flameproof testing in an explosion chamber with the hinged cover closed but not bolted, and with the isolator in the "On" position. In these conditions a gap of 0.08 inch was measured between the enclosure and the cover. Ignition tests were then carried out with the chamber containing an explosively weak mixture of 5.9 per cent firedamp in air. In each of two tests the external mixture was ignited and the cover was found to have opened to 11 / 16 of an inch at the side opposite the hinges. In further tests, using richer mixtures of seven or eight per cent of firedamp in air, the gap revealed after ignition was only 3 / 32 of an inch and the external inflammation was noticeably more violent. The smaller gap could have resulted from the partial reclosing of the cover by external pressure. During all the tests there was no violent movement of the cover and no mechanical damage to it or to the cover/isolator interlocking device.

Mechanical Apparatus

48. All the mechanical apparatus in the district was examined by H.M. Inspector of Mechanical Engineering for signs of frictional heating, frictional sparking, spontaneous ignition of oil vapour or any other likely source of' ignition. Not only did he fail to discover any, but he found all the equipment to be in a satisfactory condition.

Safety Lamps

49. Five flame safety lamps and 44 electric cap lamps recovered from the district were sent to the S.M.R.E. for examination and test. Only one, an electric cap lamp, was regarded as a possible igniting source, but it could not have caused the explosion because it was found at a point on the face near the intake end and the flame and blast pattern were totally inconsistent. with an explosion having originated there.

Contraband

50. Among the effects of one of the victims there were two cigarettes but no matches or lighters were found, either there or in the explosion area. I am entirely satisfied that contraband was not the cause of this explosion.

Road Dust Samples

51. Dust samples were collected from the roof, sides and floor at 33 places in the district, three in the return gate, 15 in the intake gate and 15 in the Maindy Heading Return. Upon analysis, those from the return gate were found to be satisfactory, with percentages of incombustible content varying from 61 to 80 per cent. The others ranged from 22 to 91 per cent, 22 of them being under 55 per cent.

Ventilation

Air Quantities

52. In two series of ventilation experiments made on 20th/21st May and on 4th June, H.M. Inspectors took measurements of the quantity of air passing certain points in the district in varying circumstances involving the opening and shutting of both the ventilation doors and the access holes in the air bridge. When the experiments took place the door into the old P. 11 District, which had been damaged in the explosion, had been repaired. Inspectors noted that the opening and shutting of the ventilation doors had little or no effect on the quantity of air reaching the air bridge and throughout the experiments this varied from 21,000 to 25,000 cubic feet per minute.

53. The opening and closing of the access holes in the air bridge, however, had a very significant effect on the ventilation inbye. With the holes closed, only 13,000 cubic feet of air per minute reached the intake roadhead. This in itself was indicative of the unsatisfactory condition of the air bridge. When the ladder way hole was open, the quantity of air reaching the intake roadhead fell to about 9,000 cubic feet per minute. When the other access hole was also opened, the quantity of air reaching the roadhead fell by a further 5,000 cubic feet per minute to about 4,000 cubic feet per minute. Further measurements disclosed that of these quantities, about 3,000 cubic feet per minute of air was being lost into P. 11 District, notwithstanding the presence in the road in that district of a door and sheets.

54. Coincident with these measurements other measurements were being taken in the return gate. These gave quantities of about 10,000 cubic feet per minute when both access holes in the air bridge were closed; about 6,000 cubic feet per minute when the ladder way was open; and about 1,000 cubic feet per minute when both access holes were open.

Firedamp

55. In the course of other experiments, the S.M.R.E. found that at a point 120 yards outbye the main ripping lip in the return gate, with a ventilating current of about 7,500 cubic feet per minute (corresponding to a velocity of about 110 feet per minute) firedamp concentrations were present in small cavities over the crown of the arches, but that there was none in the gate itself. Later, when the velocity was reduced to 75 feet per minute (corresponding to a quantity of about 5,000 cubic feet per minute) by the opening of the ladder way, there was still no firedamp below the crown of the arches. When, however, the velocity fell to 20 feet per minute and the quantity to about 1,000 cubic feet per minute, with both access holes in the air bridge open, firedamp appeared below the crown of the arches at the same place, and moved uphill against the ventilating current in the form of a continuous layer, in concentrations varying from five per cent upwards.

56. Inspectors found that in similar conditions, that is, when both access holes were open and the quantity of air passing was about 1,000 cubic feet per minute, in the space of two and a quarter hours a concentration of firedamp developed in the area of the switches with three and a half per cent concentration slightly above the middle of the roadway or just below the top of the switches. When the holes were closed, the accumulated firedamp dispersed in a matter of 20 minutes.

57. While these layers were forming in the return gate, no firedamp could be detected on a flame safety lamp inbye the main ripping lip in that gate. During the period of two and a quarter hours methanometer determinations, taken at distances of up to 14 feet into the waste at ten yard intervals along the face line, in no case exceeded 0.6 per cent. On the other hand, except for 0. 15 per cent firedamp at the corner of the return gate roadside pack, no firedamp was detected either on the face or in the waste when the access holes in the air bridge were closed.

58. On four occasions, over a seven week period from the day of the explosion, during the whole of which time the face was idle, and when the quantity of air passing varied from 8,000 to 12,000 cubic feet per minute, determinations of the firedamp content m the general body of the return air were taken by the colliery management. These observations were taken at three stations, and the concentrations of firedamp were found to remain virtually constant during the period varying from 0.1 per cent at 20 yards from the face to 0.14 per cent at 70 yards and 0.4 per cent at 180 yards.

Point of Ignition

59. The blast and flame pattern disclosed by the investigation was in the S.M.R.E.'s view consistent with the explosion having originated in the return gate between the main ripping and a point 120 yards outbye of that ripping. Within this region the only possible source of ignition was the bank of gate-end switches located eleven yards outbye of the main ripping, one of which was the suspect switch to which I have already referred. Evidence of the conversation just before the explosion between Overman Price and K. Davies, the plough operator who was one of the victims, indicated that immediately prior to it, two electricians were working on an open gate-end switch. From the condition in which this switch was found one can only conclude that a sequence of testing was being carried out to locate a fault while the power was on, and that this could have led to the closing of a contactor within the switch. As was explained at the Inquiry by H.M. Electrical Inspector the probability was that the electricians, in trying to locate the fault by elimination, might well have connected a rectifier between either the reverse or forward pin of the control circuit socket and earth. As the proving relay contacts had been bridged, the use of the rectifier would have resulted in the operation of the contactor. This could have caused heavy arcing, which in the view of the S.M.R.E. would have ignited any explosive mixture of firedamp and air. Their experiments leave no doubt that with the cover unbolted, flames within the switch would have been communicated to the external atmosphere. During the examination of the equipment a fault, which would have prevented the operation of the proving relay and consequently the motor itself, was found in the interlock circuit in the plug at the plough motor.

The Development of the Explosion

60. It was the view of the S.M.R.E. that flame from within the gate-end switch ignited firedamp in its vicinity, the firedamp being in the form of a roof layer similar to the one obtained by experiment, with the possibility that in addition there may have been some accumulation in the stable area. Flame would then be propagated slowly both inbye and outbye probably along the lower inflammable fringe of the layer. The turbulence generated by pressure waves in advance of the flame would break up the firedamp layer producing a highly explosive mixture farther outbye in the return gate. When the flame reached that area, possibly 100 yards outbye the main ripping, rapid burning would occur, producing strong blast waves in both directions. The flame would then travel with increasing velocity into highly explosive pre-mixed firedamp outbye along the return gate, giving rise to the extreme violence observed at the junction of the return gate and the Maindy Heading Return. There was evidence of fairly heavy burning but little of violence inbye of the main ripping in the return gate. Flame appeared to have travelled down the face to about its mid-point but the effect of blast here was slight. This suggested that the flame on the face had been mainly an extension of the explosion in the return gate, rather than that the face itself had been excessively fouled with firedamp. That the explosion had virtually died out on the face is shown by the fact that only slight signs of blast but none of burning were found in the intake gate.

61. The volume of return gate and face affected by flame was about 2,000 cubic yards. Any calculation of the quantity of firedamp involved would be subject to a number of uncertainties, but a figure of 1,000 cubic feet of pure methane would not be inconsistent with the flame pattern observed. This quantity of firedamp corresponds with that likely to have been present in the layer found in the course of the experiments to which I have referred earlier. The evidence was that coal-dust had played a very insignificant part in the explosion.

 

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