General Description
The Colliery
5. Cambrian Colliery, in the No. 3 Area of the National Coal Board's South Western Division, is situated near the village of Clydach Vale in the Borough of Rhondda, some 20 miles north-west of Cardiff. There are four shafts; No. 1 Shaft, a downcast sixteen feet in diameter, sunk to the Five Feet Seam at a depth of 506 yards, the present winding level being at the Pentre Seam inset at a depth of 212 yards; the Maindy Shaft, at the former Colliery of that name, elliptical 14 feet by 12 feet, serving as the upcast for the Pentre Seam workings; and No. 3 and No. 4 Shafts, used for workings in the Five Feet, Lower Nine Feet and Bute Seams. The Maindy Shaft was equipped with a radial flow fan producing 103,000 cubic feet per minute at 4.8 inches of water gauge.
6. The principal officials were :—
| Area General Manager | G. Blackmore. |
| Area Production Manager | G. Hodkin. |
| Deputy Area Production Manager (Operations) | J. J. Lewis. |
| Deputy Area Production Manager (Planning) | W. J. Strong. |
| Group Manager | E. Pugh. |
| Manager | E. Breeze. |
| Under-Manager No. 1 Pit | L. Williams. |
Both Mr. Breeze and Mr. Williams were killed in the explosion.
Output and Persons Employed
7. The Colliery employed 816 men at the time of the incident, 654 below ground and 162 on the surface, and the daily output was 700 tons from the Pentre Seam and 300 tons from the Lower Nine Feet and Bute Seams. The Colliery has always been a safety-lamp mine and had a lamp room of the "self-service" type equipped with 770 cap lamps, 129 flame safety lamps, of which 59 were of the internal re-lighter type, and eight automatic firedamp detectors.
8. The general layout of the present underground workings in the Pentre Seam and the system of ventilation are shown on Plan No. 2. The Seam, 240 yards deep at the shaft and three feet thick, is overlain by the Pentre Rider Seam some 24 feet above, coal measure shales and sandstone separating the two seams. Beneath the Pentre Seam, at a distance of 41 feet, is the Lower Pentre Seam, beds of sandstone, one 19 feet thick, and mudstone separating these two seams.
General
9. Plan No. 1, the Incident Plan, shows details of the condition in which the P. 26 District was found after the explosion.
10. The district, situated some 3,000 yards from the No. 1 Pit bottom, was in effect a continuation of the P. 25 District which had of necessity to be stopped as it approached the main return airway known as the Maindy Heading Return. It was formed by extending the P. 25 Conveyor Road as a coal heading over the Maindy Heading Return, while at the same time a short drift rising at a gradient of 1 in 2.4, parallel to the coal heading, was driven from the Maindy Heading Return to intersect the seam. The two roads were then connected to form a face which came into full production in January, 1965. At the time of the incident, the face was 192 yards long and was advancing to the north on a rising gradient of 1 in 33, while the gradient across the face was rising at 1 in 17 from the intake gate.
11. The face machinery consisted of a rapid plough worked in conjunction with an armoured face conveyor, both electrically driven. The intake gate (or conveyor roadway), supported by 12 feet by 8 feet arch girders, had a coal rib on the right side and an eight yard wide pack on the left. The return gate (or supply roadway), supported by 10 feet by 8 feet arch girders, had a coal rib on the left side and an eight yard wide pack on the right. Rippings to form the roadways were taken in two sections, each approximately three feet six inches thick, the front sections just in advance of the face line, and the main sections normally in line with the packs. The stables at each end of the face were 18 feet wide. Coal getting was carried out on the day and afternoon shifts on alternate weeks ; the front sections of the rippings were invariably taken on the night shift, and the main sections on the other non-coaling shifts.
Support on the Face
12. The face was open caved and a "prop-free front" system of support was employed using hand-set hydraulic props contained in pairs of frames set at five feet intervals, each pair consisting of one frame with three props and the other with two. The frames in each pair were advanced alternately. The areas immediately in front of the gate side packs were supported by hydraulic props with metre long link bars, and the roadheads by 11 feet long straight steel girders, each set on three props.
Transport
13. Coal from the face was delivered by an armoured conveyor on to a chain conveyor in the intake gate, which in turn delivered on to a second chain conveyor and thence on to a 30 inch wide belt conveyor. At a loading point some 800 yards outbye the coal was transferred to 30 hundredweight trains and taken by rope haulage to the No. 1 Shaft bottom. Supplies for the district were brought from the No. 1 Shaft along the main haulage road and then by way of a road, named MacBains, into the Maindy Heading Return and thence into the district (see Plan No. 2).
Explosives
14. Pulsed infusion shotfiring was practised in the stables while the rippings were brought down by Eq. S explosives.
Ventilation
15. The district was ventilated by a separate split, from the main intake, which crossed over the Maindy Heading Return at an air crossing, locally known as an air bridge, a term I shall use in the remainder of this Report. On leaving the face, the air passed down the return gate into the Maindy Heading Return, under the air bridge, and thence to the Maindy Upcast Shaft. Near the outbye end of the split was a pair of ventilation doors, to which I shall refer later. The last statutory ventilation measurements taken on 26th April, 1965, while the face was in full production, show that the quantities of air available outbye the air bridge and circulating the face were 23,000 cubic feet per minute and 8,000 cubic feet per minute respectively. An air sample taken at about the same time ten yards from the face in the return gate contained 0.38 per cent of firedamp.
The Air Bridge
16. The details of the construction of the air bridge are shown in Plan No. 3, from which it will be seen that there were two openings in the floor of the bridge, one approximately nine square feet and covered with loose boards and the other approximately four square feet and covered with a corrugated sheet. Apart from the openings, the floor of the air bridge was formed by wood boards inserted into the flanges of straight girders, the intervening space to the top of the girders being filled with small dirt.
Precautions against Coal Dust
17. The last statutory road dust samples were taken in April, 1965, and the records of their analysis show that the incombustible content varied between 66 and 77 per cent. These figures are well in excess of the 55 per cent statutorily required for a seam, such as the Pentre, having a volatile content of 20.25 per cent.
Automatic Firedamp Detectors
18. At the time of the explosion automatic firedamp detectors were not in use in the district, nor was there any evidence to suggest that they ever had been.
General Experience
19. The district had been in full production for only four months at the time of the explosion, but during that time work seems to have proceeded without undue incident. There had been some difficulty arising from the fact that the props were a little too long for the working height at the face, but the management had decided to replace them and this was being done. When the face started it was parallel to the Maindy Heading Return and so not at right angles to the intake and return gates. From the outset, the return end of the face had been advanced more rapidly than the intake end so as to bring it into line at right angles with the roads, and this had almost been achieved at the time of the explosion. The effect of this procedure, however, was to distort the line of the face and to create a situation whereby the return roadside pack did not always keep pace with the advance of the face. At the time of the explosion this pack was about eight yards behind, hence the air leaving the face could not sweep into the fast end. In spite of the reduction in packing, support of the roof in this area by chocks and props appeared to be adequate.
20. Although it was said that the management intended to complete the air bridge by providing a concrete floor, this had not been done. Further, the access holes were, in the beginning, regarded as no more than a temporary expedient pending the drivage of a proper connection between the intake gate and the Maindy Heading Return. Although this had been started, other work was accorded a higher priority and the drivage of the connection was discontinued. It is quite understandable that the evidence about the way the access holes were used was not always entirely consistent because witnesses passed the air bridge at different times and saw it in differing conditions, but I was left with the impression that the smaller of the two holes, which was equipped with a ladder, was open for most of the time, if indeed it was not permanently open. The larger of the two holes was used to facilitate the passage of bulky materials, although up to the day of the explosion this appears to have been relatively infrequent and then only for periods of up to about an hour. The loose covering boards did not, however, provide a good seal.
21. In the course of the Inquiry many references were made to the pair of ventilation doors near the outbye end of the split. The evidence concerning their purpose was somewhat conflicting, but I think it would be right to say that they were originally provided in connection with the ventilation of the P. 25 face. When that face ceased production the doors were kept open except for the few occasions when it was necessary to deflect air into the P. 25 District when salvage operations were in progress there. They were simply regulators and in fact any air deflected into P. 25 would have rejoined the main current outbye of the air bridge. Opened or closed, they could have had little effect on subsequent events.
22. On 7th May, the intake end of the face made contact with the right hand roadhead of the old P. 11 District. The connection was made at the end of the coaling shift and the deputy took immediate steps to close the small opening with brattice cloth. In succeeding shifts brattice sheets were erected in the old roadway and on the Tuesday, six days before the explosion, T. Evans, a mason, began to construct a wood and cloth stopping with a door across the old roadway near to the holing. Because of a shortage of materials, the work on the door was not completed by the week-end, and so, on the Monday morning, Evans, having acquired the necessary materials, went in to close off the remaining area of about one square yard of the stopping. He completed the work by 11.15 a.m. and then left the district.