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V. — CommentsThe Emission of Firedamp The seam is not normally very gassy and gives off 120 cubic feet of firedamp per ton of coal mined. The Barnsley and Parkgate seams have been worked out, somewhat untidily, under the explosion area and as the total thickness of coal extracted was about ten feet, it would cause considerable subsidence. This combined with the presence of the fault at the left side of the face would tend to the formation of cavities. The main gate ripping being five to six feet higher than the height to which the wastes normally fell, would be most likely to tap any gas. The history of this seam is that the wastes keep clear and that any gas found is in cavities or ripping lips. The evidence of the deputies was that the district had been free from firedamp for many months prior to the explosion, but approximately a year earlier explosive quantities of firedamp had been found in the left hand gate ripping and a cavity four yards outbye. This was soon cleared. The feeder in the centre gate (Plan 2) which fouled that gate and provided the fuel for the explosion persisted for some time after the explosion but was not accompanied by an emission from any of the wastes. There were no other breaks or signs of bed separation in the centre gate. The ripping was a thick one and the break in the roof probably connected with a source of firedamp which could not escape freely by any other route. The night shift deputy had observed this break but had not found any gas issuing from it, and the day shift deputy did not remember seeing it nor did he find any gas at the ripping. It is possible that although the break was first observed during the previous night shift, it only opened up sufficiently to make contact with the firedamp reservoir at a later stage. If that be so, it is a further possibility that the completion of coal turning on the day shift, or alternatively the withdrawal of supports at the commencement of the packing shift, was the stage in the advance of the face when the break extended to give a heavy feeder of firedamp. This would be after the pre-shift inspection at 12.30 p.m., the last inspection before the explosion. The Accumulation of Firedamp Given the sudden issue of a strong feeder of firedamp, it must then be considered how circumstances allowed the feeder to form an accumulation which extended back in an intake airway for a distance of 80 yards and was sufficiently concentrated to cause the explosion flame to spread over a large area. It would be an extraordinary coincidence if an expanding accumulation of gas resulting from a strong feeder happened to reach the back ripping just after a gas examination had been made and before the shot was fired, a period of ten to 15 minutes. It is more probable that the strong feeder had produced an accumulation which backed against the air current in the leakage intake until it achieved some form of equilibrium with its outbye fringe in the region of the inbye back ripping. If the accumulation extended into the back ripping cavity it should have been detected, but it cannot be ruled out that it extended to the lip but not beyond it. There was a change of floor level near the back ripping, caused by a combination of floor heave and the spreading of ripping dirt to level the roadway, which brought the floor of the ripped roadway to a distance of about six feet from the roof of the unripped roadway ahead of it. The effect could well be to direct the general air stream sufficiently close to the ripping face for any make of gas backing along the unripped roof to be diluted, yet to allow the general air stream to fall away from the roof on the inbye side of the ripping and permit a "skin" of firedamp at roof level to back up close to the ripping. The policy which had been adopted with this roadway was to make it large and keep it large. The roadway was ripped to make an airway which was 13 feet 6 inches wide and 12 feet 6 inches high at the face. The dimensions decreased as the face advanced but where the crush was heaviest, about 100 yards from the face, a series of back rippings was carried to maintain the size of the roadway, the first back ripping being about 80 yards from the face. This policy of making and maintaining good roads is accepted as one of the essentials of good mining practice, but the circumstances of this explosion emphasize that it carries with it an obligation which must not be overlooked. The workings of a mine must be constantly and adequately ventilated and in Section 55 (1) of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, it is made quite clear that the ventilation must be adequate for the purpose of diluting gases that are inflammable or noxious so as to render them harmless and removing them. The cross-sectional area of the loading gate varied from 100 to 150 square feet which gives average air velocities of 40 to 27 feet per minute, respectively, which is insufficient. The system of support was by cockering, which offers additional resistance to air flow and encourages the formation of eddy currents. The adequacy of the ventilation in any particular case must be a question of fact, but quantity alone is not sufficient to guarantee adequate ventilation of the workings if the distribution of that quantity is so uneven that some important part is left with insufficient air velocity to sweep out gas and dilute it in the general air current. The velocity of air in a roadway is by no means uniform, particularly if the total quantity is low in relation to the size of the roadway. This was emphasised in Safety Pamphlet No. 26* — The Ventilation of Rippings — published by the Ministry at the beginning of this year — in which a section devoted to" Speed of Air on Roads" was summarised in the following terms :— "The velocity of air near roof level on a road of large cross-sectional area may not be enough to prevent the accumulation of a layer of firedamp unless deflecting sheets are used. Even deflecting sheets may not be sufficient if the general velocity of air passing along the road is very small." The roadway in which this explosion originated was a "leakage intake ", a type of road where the ventilation lay-out made it necessary to restrict the quantity of air passing so as to avoid robbing other parts of the district of air needed for their ventilation. Such lay outs are difficult to regulate consistently and have the additional disadvantage that different sides of the face may be ventilated by widely different air currents. Modern practice tends more and more to avoid such lay outs, but there will always be particular circumstances in which they are necessary. In such circumstances it is essential that the size of roadway and the quantity of ventilation allocated to it should be planned in a proper relationship and thereafter kept under close and constant review. * Ministry of Power, Safety Pamphlet No. 26: H.M. Stationery Office, price 8d. net. The Detection of Firedamp The presence of a firedamp accumulation in the working parts of a mine calls into question the steps taken to detect it and deal with it safely. The day shift deputy, J. Triffitt, gave evidence that he inspected the face ripping on the conveyor gate approximately 2¾ hours before the explosion, during his pre-shift inspection for the afternoon shift, and found it clear. There is nothing to suggest that the feeder was present at the time and it may well have originated after this inspection. The afternoon shift deputy, R. Ashton, had left his surplus clothing in the loader gate about 15 yards from the face but had in no sense made a thorough examination at or near the road-head, nor was he required to do so; he was not n a position to be aware of the break or any gas issuing from it. Ashton claims that he examined the back ripping cavity before firing the shot and this was confirmed by B. Holliday. This examination should have shown an explosive mixture of gas if it had spilled over into the cavity and filled it. Two points arise in this connection so far as deputies and shot firers are concerned. The first is that it is obviously necessary that suitable provision should be made to enable them to test close to the roof in high places. The second is that deputies and shot firers should realise that a thin "skin" of firedamp may be very significant and that it may remain undetected unless the lamp with the middle air-feed closed is held long enough in each testing position for firedamp to reach the flame. Before firing a single shot otherwise than on a longwall face a shot firer is required by. Regulation 43 (6) of the Coal Mines (Explosives) Regulations, 1956, to carry out an examination for general safety and test for gas in the vicinity and at the mouth of the shot hole. It was suggested in the course of the inquiry that the more extensive examination prescribed in Regulation 43 (5) for rounds or groups of shots ought to apply in the case of single shots. However, I consider that in this case a careful examination in accordance with the requirement of Regulation 43 (6) should have revealed the presence of firedamp. Firedamp Detectors There was failure to comply with Regulation 12 (1) (a) of the Coal and Other Mines (Ventilation) Regulations, 1956, as none of the 18 men at work on the face on the afternoon shift had means for detecting firedamp, and the only flame lamps in the district were in the possession of the deputy and Charlesworth the surveyor's assistant. This breach of the above regulation was said to be due to absenteeism and the failure of one man to take a flame lamp. Mechanical Damage to Electric Cable The material used for protecting the cable was inappropriate and failed to comply with the requirements of Regulation 10 of the Coal and Other Mines (Electricity) Order, 1956, which states that "every person doing any work which may result in such damage to any electrical apparatus at a mine that that apparatus might be a source of danger to persons employed thereat shall take such steps to protect it from such damage as may be appropriate." Evidence indicated that it had been the normal practice to protect cables by pieces of timber, that there had been no previous damage to cables by shot firing, and no special means of protection had been provided. It is the duty of the management to ensure that proper provisions are made for complying with legal requirements. For the purpose of Regulation 10 of the Electricity Regulations, suitable materials must be made available and suitable instructions for their use given to the shot firers: an appropriate medium for explaining what the shot firers should do in this respect would be the "Shot Firer's Handbook," which has been issued by the National Coal Board, in collaboration with the Ministry, following the recommendation of a committee appointed by the Minister in 1948 that the shot firing regulations should be supplemented by detailed guidance in good practice. Rigid protection of cables has been suggested, but it would be difficult and indeed undesirable to attempt a more precise statutory requirement. Contact between Source of Ignition and Explosive Mixture It is certain that at some point between roof and floor at the first back ripping there were at the same time an explosive mixture of firedamp and air and an igniting medium, which might have been either the electric arc or hot particles projected from the cable burst. It is not possible on the evidence available to fix the point of ignition with greater precision, nor to form any reliable estimate of the extent of the gas accumulation before the shot was fired. The direction and range of the electric arc or of projected particles are to some extent matters of conjecture and it is known that falling stone can bring down firedamp with it. There have been similar instances of this in other Divisions and I am satisfied that, to some extent at least, this was another example. The Ignition Risk from use of Electrical Apparatus Tests carried out by the Safety in Mines Research Establishment on specimens of the cable showed that mechanical damage sufficient to cause the breakdown of the insulation and lead to a short circuit could be caused by a localised impact equivalent to a weight of 30 lbs. falling a distance of five to six feet. In other words, damage sufficient to cause this type of failure could be caused by a fall of ground, let alone shot firing. It is clearly impractical to make cables of such mechanical strength that they will withstand any treatment which they can conceivably be subjected to underground, but it may be that the use for some mining cables of constructional methods and materials which have been developed in recent years for other cables could give a worthwhile improvement of mechanical strength without restricting their ease of handling and other features. The combination of inadequate maintenance and unreliability of the 550 volt circuit breaker and of the high overload trip setting on the 3,300 volts circuit breaker probably resulted in the short circuit damage to the cable being more severe than it would have been if everything had been in correct adjustment. This could have increased the range of hot products thrown out by the short circuit and increased the probable chance of their igniting roof gas which was undetected by the deputy's examination. In other words, if the protective devices had been in correct adjustment they might well have prevented a destructive short circuit and the risk of igniting roof gas would have been lessened. The overload trip characteristics and settings on the 3,300 volt and 550 volt oil circuit breakers were such that on the occurrence of a short circuit on the 550 volt system, the 3,300 volt switch would probably trip first. To be fully satisfactory, however, overload protection should be so graded that the circuit control switch would operate first on fault. Examination of the records showed that the periodic thorough overhauls of apparatus had not been carried out at the intervals laid down in the scheme for the mine required by Regulation 7 (1) of the Coal and Other Mines (Mechanics and Electricians) Regulations, 1956.
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