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Index

IV. — The Cause Of The Explosion

Investigation of the Affected Area

There was no disruption of the ventilation system; the ventilation resumed its normal course and the dust cloud had dispersed by the time the casualties were removed. A first inspection by Inspectors and N.C.B. officials was made between 5.0 p.m. and 7.0 p.m., i.e. two to four hours after the explosion. On the following day further inspections were made, including those by members of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment who made special examinations of the shot firing and the electrical apparatus and took specimens for microscopical examination to determine the spread and nature of the explosion. Their detailed examinations confirmed the opinion formed by Inspectors who examined the district.

(a) The spread of flame

There was evidence of the passage of flame along the full length of the face and outbye for about 40 yards along the left side intake and right side return airways and in the conveyor gate from the front ripping lip to a point some 50 yards outbye from the place where the shot was fired at the first back ripping. There was no evidence of explosive violence and only very slight coking at widely scattered points. Microscopic examination of coke particles showed that the coal dust had been coked in situ and had not been coked while raised in a cloud. All indications were that the explosion had been one of firedamp and that coal dust played little or no part in its propagation. There was no visual evidence to indicate the probable point of origin of the explosion. Burning appeared to have been heaviest in the conveyor gate between the inbye back ripping and the face. In this portion of roadway several articles of clothing, hanging about six feet from the roof, were partially burned or scorched, the sheathing on the telephone cables was burned and blistered and charred paper was found. Outbye this back ripping burning was confined to the roof. There were charred articles of clothing and paper on both faces and also in the right and left hand gates. In the left hand gate about ten yards from the face an air hose had been on fire and a fire extinguisher had been used to put out the flame.

(b) Inflammable gas

During the first inspection after the explosion, firedamp was found in explosive quantities in the conveyor roadway and at the left hand side roadway ripping lip against the fault slip. In the conveyor roadway there was 3 per cent. of firedamp near the roof of the excavation formed at the inbye back ripping where the shot was fired, this being diluted to 1½ per cent. at the base of the ripping. On the inbye side of this ripping the quantity of firedamp increased near the roof as the face was approached. At 40 yards from the face ripping there was a layer of explosive quality about six inches in thickness and this increased to more than two feet at the ripping lip. Inspection revealed that firedamp was issuing freely from a backward hading break, nine feet from the ripping lip. The percentage of firedamp in the general body of the air current was very low on all three roadways and on the face, nor could any firedamp be found in the wastes. When the district was inspected the following day there was still a heavy feeder from the break in the centre gate near the face ripping but gas could not be detected in any of the wastes nor at the back ripping. The ventilation had been increased some 12 hours earlier.

The Source of Ignition

The ignition almost immediately followed the firing of the shot, but there soon emerged a possibility that the shot had damaged the electric cable and caused a flash. The shot and the damaged cable were possible sources of ignition.

(a) Shot firing

There was no evidence of bed separation or roof breaks and the shot had done its work well. Samples of explosives and detonators were examined and found to conform to specification. There was no evidence that shot firing had ignited the gas or indication to suggest the likelihood that it had done so.

(b) The electric cable

Tests showed that the cable feeding from the transformer to the switchgear near the face was faulty and the fault was located at the point where the cable had been buried by debris from the firing of a shot. The cable had been covered by a piece of conveyor belting but the shot had dislodged a large stone which had fallen and damaged the cable. A short circuit had resulted between phases and had blown a hole 7/8 in. by 1¼ in. in the outer armouring (see Plates 1 and 2).

(c) Other possible sources of ignition

The telephone and switchboard, signalling bell and relay were removed from the mine, tested and found to conform to the limits laid down for their safe operation. The safety lamps in use in the district when the explosion occurred were tested at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment and were found to be in order or to have only defects which were consistent with having been damaged as a result of the explosion. Two damaged cap lamps which were found to be capable of igniting gas had been in such a position as to exclude both as a source of ignition.

The conclusion could only be that the electrical fault on the cable was a definite source of ignition and that other possibilities could be eliminated.

Subsequent surface examination of the switchgear which controlled the supply of electricity to this district showed that although the apparatus was not capable of being itself a source of ignition, the 550-volt oil-immersed circuit breaker controlling the district feeder was faulty in that the over-current protection was unreliable and the under-voltage release mechanism was maladjusted and incapable of tripping when an earth leakage fault developed. On the high tension side, the protective devices of North West 1 District feeder switch operated for the settings they had been given, but the overload setting was too high to give adequate protection to the transwitch unit which fed the North West 1 district.

The Source of Firedamp

Ignition took place at the first back ripping of the loading gate and the flame travelled in to the face, along both sides of the face, and a short distance out on the flank roadways. The source of firedamp was the roof break near the face of the centre gate, the roof of which was otherwise unbroken, and firedamp must have extended along the roof of this gate outbye to the back ripping. There may have been a small feeder of firedamp at the back ripping but no evidence of this has been found. Since the brattice hurdle which had been hung near the face of this gate was not good enough to disperse the firedamp which accumulated at the ripping lip after the explosion, it probably allowed a similar accumulation before the explosion. This is confirmed by signs that heavy burning took place down to floor level in the part of the gate which was nearest to the face.

Ignition near the outbye end of a wedge-shaped body of firedamp thickening towards the face and probably at a very high percentage near the roof could be expected to cause expulsion of gas on to the face particularly to the right, with the main ventilating current, where some firedamp may even have been present prior to the shot being fired. Gas could not be found in the wastes after the explosion and none of the evidence available suggests that flame spread into the wastes. There was evidence after the explosion of a slight feeder from the fault side in the left side (intake) gate and this diluted feeder might have been carried down the face in the general air stream to be augmented by gas from the feeder in the centre gate.

 

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