VI. — Conclusions
1. It is obvious that there was a large body of very rich firedamp mixture in the top part of the loading gate between the face ripping and the inbye back ripping immediately before the explosion. The source of this gas was a break in the roof nine feet back from the face of the ripping which probably opened into a gas reservoir sometime after the pre-shift inspection.
The quick make of firedamp was obviously too much for the low velocity air current. I consider the ventilation close to the roof would be very sluggish and would offer little resistance to the tendency of the low density methane to layer next to the roof, against the general ventilation.
2. There was strong evidence that the deputy tested for gas ten to 15 minutes before firing the shot. I feel that careful examination should have revealed gas.
3. I consider that the flash from the damaged cable was the cause of the explosion. This would have been avoided if the cable had been properly protected in accordance with Regulation 10 of the Coal and Other Mines (Electricity) Regulations, 1956 in which the legal requirements are clearly set out.
4. Examination afterwards showed that the 550 volt switch, because of a mechanical defect of the tripping gear, could not trip on earth fault and the overload protection was also unreliable.
5. Large roadways are required in modern mining and there may be occasions when leakage intakes are difficult to avoid. However, the quantity of air passing along all roadways should be such that velocities near the roof are sufficient to prevent layering of firedamp.