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7. Conclusions.

After considering carefully the whole of the evidence submitted at the Inquiry, I have come to the conclusion that, up to the time of the repeated minor explosions on the 16th — 17th July, the efforts of the management to subdue the fire were in conformity with the recognised practice adopted in dealing with gob fires, and that it was not through any lack of attention or precautions that the fire was not arrested. It was suggested that water might have been effectively applied to the fire by filling a "swilley" which existed in the neighbourhood of the fire. This method might, or might not, have had the desired result. Personally I think it would have failed, and Mr. Neal informed the court that Mr. Butler, the manager, made no complaint that his opinion in favour of trying to put out the fire by this method was not accepted.

It is customary, when such serious trouble arises at a mine, to hold a council of practical men and eminent mining engineers to assist the management with the best advice they can give. It was by weight of opinion at a council of this character that the manager's suggestion as to applying water was overruled. The manager's opinion was overruled again at later stages: firstly, when it was decided to slow the speed of the fan; secondly, when it came to deciding upon the exact position of the air regulator which was put in after the fan had been speeded up again. I do not consider, however, that disagreement on such points as these played any real part in the disaster. Whatever had taken place before the 22nd July, it was agreed by everyone on that date, after the prevailing conditions had been examined, that if the mine, on which the livelihood of so many people depended, was to be saved certain stoppings must be erected in the mine, notwithstanding that such an operation was attendant with some risk. The extent of that risk on the 22nd July was known and I think the miners' representatives expected, and they were entitled to expect, that all possible measures would be promptly taken, if need arose, to prevent that risk from increasing, more particularly as regards the presence of inflammable gas on the intake side of the site of the stoppings.

Though it is generally known among the mining community that fighting a fire underground — particularly in a fiery mine — is a hazardous undertaking, there are always volunteers — brave miners and officials — ready to give any help that may be deemed essential when occasion arises. Amongst such persons there are, not infrequently to be found men, who, in their desire to attain the object they have set out to accomplish, sometimes, when left to themselves to act, allow zeal to overrule discretion, even at the risk of endangering their own lives. There was, I think, no difference of opinion at the Inquiry that this was what happened at Maltby Main Colliery on the 27th and 28th July and brought about the disaster. On those days high percentages of firedamp were reported on the intake side of the stoppings. There can be no question that, when these were first observed, the workmen should have been immediately withdrawn to safety, and should not have been allowed to resume work until adequate ventilation had been definitely restored and the percentage of gas greatly reduced.

I have now to consider how it came about that the Deputies and Overmen on the spot had no guidance or instruction as to the degree of danger from firedamp which it was permissible for them to incur as regards the workmen in their charge who were engaged in the damming off operations on the intake side. On behalf of the workmen it was contended throughout the Inquiry by Mr. Herbert Smith and others that the conduct of the operations in this respect was definitely governed by Section 67 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and that there was clearly a grave contravention of the provisions of that Section. As regards the management generally, I think there can be no doubt that all the officials of the colliery, from the general manager to the deputies, were under the impression that, as they were fighting a gob fire, and speed was of great importance if the pit was to be saved, they had a discretionary power, and were not bound by Section 67 in so far as danger from inflammable gas was concerned.

For convenience of reference I quote here the first two subsections of Section 67 :—

"(1) If at any time it is found by the person for the time being in charge of the mine, or any part thereof, that, by reason of the prevalence of inflammable or noxious gases, or of any cause whatever, the mine or any place in the mine is dangerous, every workman shall be withdrawn from the mine or place found dangerous, and a fireman, examiner, or deputy, or other competent person authorised by the manager or under-manager for the purpose shall inspect the mine or place found dangerous, and, if the danger arises from inflammable gas, shall inspect the mine or place with a locked safety lamp, and in every case shall make a full and accurate report of the condition of the mine or place; and a workman shall not, except in so far as is necessary for inquiring into the cause of danger or for the removal thereof, or for exploration, be re-admitted into the mine or place found dangerous, until the same is reported by the fireman, examiner, or deputy not to be dangerous.

"(2) For the purposes of this section, a place shall be deemed to be dangerous if the percentage of inflammable gas in the general body of the air in that place is found to be two and a half or upwards, or, if situate in a part of a mine worked with naked lights, one and one quarter or upwards."

These two sub-sections are couched in quite general terms and looking more particularly at sub-section (2) it may be open to doubt whether they were intended to govern such grave and exceptional circumstances as existed in this case. It might be argued that the Section, read in the letter, is capable of bearing a construction which would reconcile the operations at Maltby with the provisions of the Section, since the workmen employed on the damming off operations had been re-admitted, after a general withdrawal of workmen in face of danger, for the removal of a cause of danger and for no other purpose. On the other hand it can be argued that the cause of danger which the workmen were engaged in removing was not, on 27th and 28th July, the imminent cause of danger at that time, which was the presence of a high percentage of inflammable gas in the working places on the intake side. The true significance of Section 67 in the circumstances of this case could only be determined authoritatively by a Court of Law, but even if the operations were not contrary to the letter of the Section, they were not, in my opinion in accordance with its spirit. There were no great difficulties — as there were in regard to the ventilation up to the two stoppings on the return side — in the way of keeping the atmosphere on the intake free from any inflammable gas in excess of the danger standard laid down by the Section. The ventilation operations necessary were not more difficult than have at times to be carried out in the ordinary course of mine working. The proximity of the fire was a cogent reason not for disregarding or relaxing the danger standard fixed by the Section but for keeping on the safe side of that standard so far as practicable, and in my view the management ought to have taken more effective steps to improve the ventilation on the intake side immediately the percentage of firedamp was reported to be increasing there.

I am also of the opinion that the management, having taken the serious responsibility of acting on the view that the operations were not governed by Section 67 as regards the percentage of inflammable gas permissible, ought to have fixed for themselves, and laid down for the guidance of the officials supervising the work on the spot, some other definite standard as to the maximum percentage of firedamp to be tolerated on the intake side of the stoppings. In fact no such instructions were laid down and there was not even a rough common measure of agreement among the various persons responsible. I should like to quote quite briefly from the evidence of the officials on this point : —

Mr. W. B. M. Jackson, Managing Director and Mining Engineer. "There are certain conditions upon which it is absolutely necessary to work under circumstances that you would not normally work under, and I should say they were safe in working in above 2½ per cent. of gas." . . . He did not think there was any necessity for men to work in 2½ per cent. of gas if the ventilation had been regulated properly.

Mr. Basil H. Pickering, Agent of the Colliery. He did not consider 3½ per cent. of gas at 37's stopping dangerous. He would have withdrawn the workmen at 4 per cent. — that was his maximum.

Mr. Aaron Butler, Manager. He would have withdrawn men had he known there was more than 2½ per cent. of gas even though it was an exceptional case, and have tried to improve ventilation. His view was that 2½ per cent. mentioned in Section 67 of the Act was "absolutely binding and we have to stick to it as near as ever we can."

I cannot help thinking that Mr. Butler's opinion was influenced by the disaster, since he countersigned several reports showing firedamp in excess of 2½ per cent. when the men were at work.

Mr. Mark Gabbitas, Under-Manager. He would not take the men out of 2½ per cent. under the conditions prevailing, but he would say they were to be withdrawn when there was 3½ per cent. of firedamp.

Mr. Wm. Hodges, Overman. Did not consider it necessary to withdraw men with 3 per cent. and 4 per cent. in the general body of the air "under the abnormal conditions of trying to get the stoppings completed." He would have "considered" had there been 4½ per cent.

Mr. George Outram, Overman. Thought 4 per cent. not so bad under abnormal conditions.

Mr. Arthur Bagley, Deputy, agreed that with 3 per cent. he would have withdrawn the men. He would not have withdrawn them at 2½ per cent. if that percentage was constant. He would say that 3 per cent. was "reasonable." If he had to make his own rule he would not allow any work to be carried on in a fire area where there was over 1 per cent. of gas.

Mr. George Whitehouse, Deputy, thought it quite fit for men to work in 3½ or 4 per cent. under abnormal conditions.

It is clear, I think, from these quotations that each official had his own views as to percentage of firedamp which was "reasonable." The under-officials were left to act on their own discretion, and they committed a grave error of judgment in their zeal to get the work completed and save the pit.

Even at the last moment the situation might have been saved had the Under-manager, who was down the pit, made a point of reading the reports of the deputies who had come off shift on the morning of the explosion. These reports were waiting for him in the office at the pit bottom.

I have already described (page 34) the circumstances that distracted him from doing so. But, even though he had seen the Deputies before leaving the pit bottom and, having received an urgent call in another direction, had sent the Overman, Mr. Stoker, to the stoppings on the intake side, I consider that, with things at such a critical pass, an Under-manager ought to have made a point of reading the latest reports of the Deputies in order to complete his knowledge of the situation generally before he left the pit bottom to attend to one particular phase of it. Had he done this I judge from the evidence which he gave at the Inquiry that he would have withdrawn the men. He could have done so at a moment's notice, since there was a telephone connection between the pit bottom and the stoppings on the intake side.

The Overman, Mr. Stoker, was amongst the killed. Whether he took any steps to withdraw the men, or was in the act of doing so when the explosion occurred, will never be known.

The General Regulations of the 30th July, 1920, allow men to be employed in damming off a fire, but they do not define the conditions under which it is permissible to carry on such work. Having regard to the circumstances of this disaster, and subject to the result of any further steps you may deem it necessary to take to elucidate the significance of Section 67 in such circumstances, I recommend that the Regulations should be amended to provide that, where operations are in progress for combating fire, no person shall be employed on the intake side of the fire area in an atmosphere containing 2½ per cent. or upwards of inflammable gas, except for the sole purpose of improving the ventilation in order to bring the percentage of gas below that limit. As regards the return side of a fire area the Management should be left discretionary power, so that, in circumstances where it is impracticable promptly to carry in adequate ventilation, they may employ men wearing rescue apparatus where work in an impure atmosphere is essential for any of the purposes of exploring, erecting stoppings, or improving the ventilation.

 

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