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6. Supervision Of Operations.There was no lack of sufficient officials in point of numbers to supervise the operations. In addition to Mr. Pickering, the Agent, Mr. Butler, the Manager, and Mr. Gabbitas, the Undermanager, there was at least an Overman and two Deputies on duty on each shift at the intake side of the stoppings. The parts played by the Deputies and Overmen I have already indicated. The Under-manager, Mr. Gabbitas, in addition to the verbal reports which were made to him, saw and countersigned two of the reports made by the Deputies on the conditions existing during the critical time after mid-day on the 27th July. These reports were (a) 1 p.m. to 7 p.m. Special report under the Spontaneous Combustion Regulations Steady increase of CH4 from 3½ per cent. to 6 per cent., i.e., in the localities of 37's and 53's stoppings. (b) 6 p.m. on 27th July to 1 a.m. on 28th July. Special report under the Spontaneous Combustion Regulations CH4 reduced on 53's crossgate to 3½ per cent. It must be taken, therefore, that he was aware of the serious state of matters that existed between 1 p.m. and 7 p.m., though it is only fair to him to point out that the later of these two reports indicated improved conditions. Two later reports — which have been detailed earlier — were made by the Deputies in charge of the operations. Neither these nor the other reports mentioned on page 22 were seen or countersigned by the Under-manager when he went on duty on the morning of the explosion. The reason he gave for this was that on descending the pit at 7 to 7.15 a.m. he had an urgent call to Stopping D where there was difficulty with gas, and the men had been withdrawn. He remained there, although sent for to visit 53's and 37's. Being unable to leave, he telephoned to Mr. Stoker, the Overman on duty, asking him to go there instead to see what was required. After getting the ventilation improved on 7's he left there about 8.30 a.m. to visit 53's and 37's. On the way there he called at 21's, and finding that a test pipe required lengthening there he stayed while it was put on. As he was preparing to leave for 53's and 37's the explosion occurred. The Manager, Mr. Aaron Butler, appears not to have been at all well at this critical time. According to the evidence of his medical attendant, Dr. James M. Swanson-Wood, Mr. Butler had been under medical treatment since the 27th April, the day gob stink was discovered. He had many attacks of carbon monoxide poisoning from that date onwards, and was so bad at times that on one occasion the doctor found him in a semiconscious state. Two days before the explosion and again on the eve of the disaster the doctor found him "in a very poor state of health, generally speaking, and his nervous system showing decided effects of the repeated attacks of carbon-monoxide poisoning." The "puff" which had occurred about 4 o'clock on Friday the 27th had been reported to him over the telephone by Mr. Hodges, and he had instructed Mr. Hodges what to do to improve the ventilation. This was confirmed by Hodges' evidence. Against his doctor's advice Mr. Butler insisted on returning to the colliery about 9.30 o'clock the same night. He ascertained from the reports then available that matters were all right. On this point he was examined by Mr. Neal as follows :— Q. At half-past 9 did you go to the colliery again ? — A. I did. Q. And did you there meet Overmen Hodges and Outram? — A. I did. Q. And what report did they give you ? — A. My first question was, "How is 7's stopping?" He said: "That is quite all right, just about the same." I said: "How is 21's?" He said "That is a little better than when you left it." I said : "How is 37's?" He said : "That is quite all right." I said : "That is a good report." Q. Did they at that time either of them tell you of the slight puffs they had had at a quarter to 4 that afternoon and another at night ? — A. Yes. Q. Did they tell you where the puffs were ? — A. Yes, inside the stoppings a long way back. Q. And that everything was all right ? — A. Quite all right. Q. Was that from your point of view a very satisfactory report ? — A. It was. Q. And did you ring up the Agent and give him your view on that ? — A. I did. Mr. Butler did not, on the night of the 27th, see any of the reports which had been made by the Deputies as to the conditions prevailing during the afternoon of the 27th. He left the pit about 10 o'clock. The following morning — the morning of the explosion — he came to the colliery at 8.30 a.m. After attending to the supplies of material for the operations, he went to the office and there saw the deputies Horace Outram and Robert Bryden, who had just come off duty, and who told him that they were reporting 4-6 per cent. of firedamp on the intake side of the stoppings. He immediately telephoned to Mr. Pickering and told him of this, which had come to his notice for the first time. He was changing clothes when the disaster happened, so that, within a very few minutes of his learning that the conditions had become so serious, he was communicating with the Agent and getting ready to deal with the situation. Shortly afterwards the two Workmen's Inspectors, Alderman Dunn and Mr. Ross, arrived at the Manager's Office. Alderman Dunn was closely examined by Mr. Herbert Smith as to what then took place between the two Workmen's Inspectors and the Manager. Q. On Saturday morning what time did you get there ? — A. As far as I remember, it was a few minutes to nine. Q. You got there a few minutes to nine ? — A. Yes, we had arranged to be there at half-past eight and go immediately down the pit to 37's and 53's stoppings. Q. Yes, but the first thing you did when you got to the pit, did you go to the Manager's Office ? — A. Yes. Q. Did you ask to see the Deputies' reports ? — A. Well, I had not time. Ross went on. I am not sure whether he was in the office first or I was, but we were both there at a few minutes to nine. Ross came in from the office, and he said: "Good God, Ted, look here." That was the spontaneous combustion reports. Q. Is that the report dated the 27th ? — A. That is it. Q. By Sturdy ? — A. Yes. Q. Where it says: "Steady increase of CH4 from 3½ to 6 per cent" ? — A. That is right. Q. And these reports are kept at the top, are they not ? — A. That report was on the top that morning. Then from there — the under-manager's office — we went into the manager's office. Mr. Butler said to me : "What are you after, Ted ? Are you after the reports ?" I said : "Yes," and he threw them across the table to me and said : "Well, they are here." Q. You not only saw that spontaneous combustion report, but you saw these ? — A. These were the ordinary ventilation reports. Q. You saw these ? — A. At that time, while I was going to peruse and look through the ordinary ventilation statutory reports, Mr. Pickering came in, and we retired to look for some lamps, to get down the pit, when Mr. Butler came on to the passage. He said: "Something has happened down the pit." He said : "Will you go down ?" I said "Yes, at once." Q. So that I can take it you did not see the report of the inspection of the fireman, examiner or deputy, except the spontaneous combustion report ? — A. The only reports that we definitely saw were the spontaneous combustion reports, but the point I do make is that Mr. Butler threw the ordinary statutory reports across the table for me to look at. Q. Mr. Neal: That is just what he said. It agrees with what he said ? — A. We agree; so that the point is, they were out of the pit. Q. Mr. Herbert Smith: They were there for anybody to see when you went there to the Manager's Office ? — A. That is so. Q. And would be seen before the explosion ? — A. Well, they were there. Q. By the Manager, if he threw them across the table, or anybody else ? — A. They were there. Q. Is it not fair to assume, if I had seen a document, if you asked for the report and I threw it over, would you not assume I had read it ? — A: I took it as part of their duty to see to it, and in confirmation of that, I had a discussion with Mr. Butler on 21's road end — that is there (indicating) — before Mr. Pickering and Mr. Jackson came down the pit, relative to the reports. I think I then said to him: "I can't understand reports of this kind being out of the pit and the set of conditions like this at 37's and 53's prevailing." Q. That is the report you are referring to on the Saturday morning or Friday morning ? — A. That is the statutory reports that we saw at the pit top. Q. That would be Friday morning's report, or was it Saturday's ? — A. That would carry us to the last spontaneous combustion report that I was referring to, and also the statutory reports that had been thrown across the table. Q. Is this the report of Thompson and Sturdy of 4 to 6 per cent. on the Saturday morning ? You did not see that ? — A. No, I do not think that would be out of the pit: Q. It would be the report prior to that, would it not ? — A. Yes. Q. Let us see what that says: "27th, from 12.15 to 2.15 p.m. 2½ per cent. of CH4 in the air current from 95's to 26's; 3½ per cent. in air current from 26's to A.l stopping; 3½in air current at 37's face to A.2 stopping." Is that the one you mean ? — A. Yes. Q. Signed by Mr. Perrins ? — A. Those were the reports. Q. So you did not see the Saturday morning reports about 4 per cent. and 6 per cent. ? — A. No; the only report that we particularly noticed that morning was the one — the spontaneous combustion report. Q. You got down the pit and I think I am right in saying — stop me if I am wrong — that you rendered all the assistance you could from early morning until late on Saturday night ? — A. That is right, yes. Q. You were down that pit nearly continuously. I found you down the pit when I came ? — A. Yes, we were down the pit from just turned nine o'clock, I think, on the first rescue party, until — I am not sure — but about four o'clock in the afternoon, and then on the second rescue party when you and one section of them went again down the East Plane and Mr. Butler and myself and Mr. Tom Smith of Pontefract went and made an inspection of this return the same night — that is the south-east return. In reply to Mr. McQuisten. Q. Now then we come to the morning of the explosion. You went into the office, and Mr. Butler was there, and he said to you something like this: "If you are after the reports they are here." Had he read them ? — A. Well, he is here. Q. Did he appear to have read them ? — A. I do not think he did. Q. He had not signed them ? — A. I would not say whether he had signed them or not. He said "If you are after the reports. they are here." Q. And you thought he had not had time to see them? — A. I did not form any opinion then. Q. You think that now — that he had not had time to see them? Do not you think if he had seen 6 per cent. of gas that he would have been so alarmed that he would have made an exclamation of some kind, and said "Look at this. Is not this terrible — the danger" and joined you on the spot ? — A. That would have been a reasonable thing to have done. Q. What did you think when you saw it ? — A. I was alarmed. Q. You had already seen the combustion report ? — A. That is right. Q. Did you see it in Mr. Butler's office ? — A. No, I saw it on the passage, from Ross. We read it together. Q. And were you just going to tell Mr. Butler that when he handed the other report over to you ? — A. I was. Q. Were you in your pit clothes? — A. Yes. Q. Was Mr. Butler? — A. Yes. Q. Just going down ? — A. He was getting ready. Q. Did you suggest phoning down the pit to see if there were any men in this area? — A. No, we were on the passage when Mr. Butler said "Something has gone wrong in the pit. Will you go down?" and we got our lamps immediately and went down. Q. That was after the reports had been thrown across the table? — A. Yes. Q. A few minutes elapsed from that time to the time the message came that there was something wrong in the pit ? — A. Yes. Q. Was it just as those reports were thrown across the table to you that Mr. Pickering came in ? — A. It was, yes. Q. Did he know about the reports that had come in? — A. Mr. Pickering? Q. Yes? — A. I did not ask him. Q. Did he say anything that indicated that he knew about them? — A. No, he did not. Q. Was it just then that the message came that something was wrong in the pit ? — A. A few minutes afterwards. Q. Would it not have been quicker to have phoned down the pit to the pit bottom — down the telephone right along to 37's stopping or 53's stopping? — A. No, what I should have done had I been in the position to have done it, when I got the reports and signed them as the combustion report was signed that morning at a few minute's to six — if I had been the official in charge I should have telephoned, to 53's stopping — that is at the point there (indicating on the plan) with 6 per cent. of gas — and I should not have admitted any men in there until I had inspected it. Q. You know that Mr. Gabbitas signed that report? — A. Yes. Q. Is it on the report? — A. I do not think it is. He signed that afterwards. He signed it about a quarter or ten minutes to six. To carry on further, I do not think any man ought to have been there after the 6 per cent. was found, and if I had known there had been, they would not have got the men. Q. I think we are all agreed on that — once a percentage of that kind was discovered. I see the report, the spontaneous combustion report of the 27th, is signed by both Gabbitas and — whose signature is that (handing document to the witness) ? — A. That is Mr. Butler's (examining the document). Yes, the same report. And then you notice on the bottom : "When the phone rang just after from below." Q. Mr. McQuisten: So that practically the information came to them almost simultaneously with the phone? — A. I think Mr. Ross and I took the reports in. Although sometimes the Under-manager and the Manager visited the colliery at night, the regular duty of both of them during these difficult operations was during the day time. Whether his superiors, knowing Mr. Butler's weak state of health, made this arrangement in order to relieve him, I cannot say. But it does seem to me that — although not required by the Statute — it would have been a wise policy to have placed an under-manager in charge of the mine during the night, as the operations going on continuously were as important by night as by day. If, for whatever reason, it was deemed necessary to have both the manager and under-manager on duty by day, there should have been someone to act for one or the other while they were absent. But, whatever may be said about the methods of working the colliery (which were really inherited by the present officials) or about the action taken by certain officials when a critical state of affairs arose and demanded vital decision, it cannot be said that, in so far as personal attention and pluck were concerned, either they or the numerous workmen engaged disregarded what they thought to be their duty to accomplish the work they had been called upon to perform.
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