Events Immediately Before The Explosion
20. On the night shift immediately prior to the explosion coal had been filled normally for the first half of the shift but was interrupted by a mechanical breakdown in the MC3 loader. Because this breakdown could not be repaired without some delay it was decided to complete the shift by shortening the scraper chain conveyor and lengthening the belt conveyor. This work had not been completed at the end of the shift and was carried on during the succeeding morning shift when the normal complement of seven persons in the heading was augmented by two persons from other places in the district. Also in the heading were two fitters working on the MC3 loader, and the ventilation official who was subsequently joined by three electricians. Approaching the heading by way of the return roadway were two representatives of the workmen engaged on inspection duties.
21. The movement of the conveyors made it necessary to move forward the two coupled gate end switches, controlling the scraper chain conveyor and the MC3 loader, and the addition of a new length of cable. Electricians, N. Lewis (Class I), T. Davies (Class II) and an apprentice, M. A. Pearce, were instructed by the electrician in charge of the mine to move the switches and extend the cable. Some difficulty had occurred with a pump in another part of the mine and Lewis had first to attend to that. He ascertained that Davies knew how to proceed with the work to be done in the MC3 heading and instructed Davies and Pearce to go to the heading and start it.
22. Davies arrived in the 'G' panel at about 8.0 a.m. and found the undermanager, C. J. Bell, in the 'Miner' heading. After discussion, Davies cut off the power at the section switch in the substation from both the 'Miner' heading and the MC3 heading; removed the connecting pins in the tee box near the top of the 'Miner' heading and then restored power at the section switch. This action cut off all power to the MC3 heading without interfering with the supply to the 'Miner' heading which was thus able to continue to work. The time was then approximately 9.0 a.m.
23. Davies and Pearce then proceeded to disconnect the gate end switch in the MC3 heading and had almost completed this work when the electrician, Lewis, reached the scene. Leaving Pearce to complete the disconnecting of the switch Lewis and Davies made a test on the length of cable to be installed which, at this time, was lying alongside the main conveyor in the return roadway. Finding the cable to be in satisfactory condition Lewis secured a chain to the end of the cable which was then dragged by a horse for a distance of some 100 yards up the MC3 heading to its new position. This done the gate end switches were dragged into their new position. The time was then a few minutes after 10.0 a.m.
24. The undermanager, Bell, arrived in the heading at this time and was told by the deputy in charge, K. Strong, that the auxiliary fan had been stopped for some 15 minutes; a statement which cannot be reconciled with the fact that the power was cut off at 9.0 a.m. Some five or six yards back from the face of the heading Bell found a concentration of gas near the roof which he estimated to be about two per cent. He instructed the deputy to send everyone except the electricians back to have food at the bottom of the heading while he remained with the electricians until they completed the connecting up of the switch. This done he came out of the heading with the electricians.
25. Lewis and Davies, having first cut off the power at the section switch in the substation, restored the connecting pins at the tee box near the top of the 'Miner' heading and went back to the section switch to restore the power to the whole of the 'G' panel. They had not made any test of the re-erected apparatus.
The Explosion And Recovery
26. Davies was first to reach the section switch and stated that he tried to close the switch but failed because he was 'too quick'. Lewis then closed the switch. He stated that he was watching the ammeter expecting to see the indication of the load of the auxiliary fan starting up when the explosion occurred. At this he put the switch out. The time was now within minutes of 10.30 a.m.
27. The undermanager was in the intake level and went with the overman, who had been in the 'Miner' heading throughout the shift, back to the scene. He telephoned to the surface to inform the manager of the occurrence and then went some distance up the MC3 heading so as to be sure that no persons were there. He described the heading as being too full of dust for anything to be clearly seen. He saw no sign of flame or burning of any description. The normal ventilation of the two levels was only momentarily interrupted.
28. The manager immediately went to the scene and with other officials and workmen gave first aid treatment to the injured and arranged for their conveyance to the surface. The Dinas Rescue station permanent brigade arrived without delay and made an inspection of the heading. Later other brigades assisted in the re-establishment of the ventilation in the heading. For this purpose a separate auxiliary fan was installed and was supplied with current by a separate circuit.
The Investigation
General
29. The effects of the explosion were confined to the MC3 heading itself and to a short length of the return level outbye of the junction with the heading. There was little or no evidence of flame and indications of violence were apparent only at the junction with the return level and immediately outbye that junction. The degree of violence was not great and the most obvious effects were apparent on the bodies of the victims. Some of the roadside posts were discharged but the natural conditions were such that there was no great pressure on these posts. The explosion was one of gas only; coal dust played no part in it.
30. An examination of the reports by the deputies showed that they had never found gas in the heading. The ventilation officer of the mine had made determinations of the state of the ventilation in the heading at intervals of approximately one week. The average methane content of the air as reported by him in the five samples taken was 0.46 per cent. However, on the day before the explosion such a determination showed a substantial increase to 0.70 per cent. methane in a quantity of 2,985 cubic feet of air per minute delivered at the face of the heading. At this time the volume of air passing the auxiliary fan in the intake was 12,570 cubic feet per minute.
31. The heading had been unventilated for the period of some 90 minutes during which the power had been cut off and the auxiliary fan stopped. In this time the make of gas from the coal sides of the heading and the face was sufficient to produce an explosive concentration. This was confirmed some three days after the explosion when tests were made to determine the rate at which gas accumulated in the heading. Before stopping the auxiliary fan the only gas found was 0.55 per cent. close to the roof at the working face. With the fan stopped for 14 minutes a concentration in excess of five per cent, was found at the working face and 3 feet 6 inches below the roof. With the fan stopped for 18 minutes a concentration of 1.55 per cent. was found at a point 51 feet back from the face and 4 feet 6 inches below the roof.
32. At the time of the explosion there were no persons in the heading and no operations were proceeding there except that power was being applied from a point outbye to the newly extended electrical circuit in the heading. Examination of the electrical apparatus showed that a severe short circuit between all conductors and to earth had occurred in the length of 0.04 square inch P.I.L.C.D.W.A. cable newly inserted into the system (see Plates I, II and III). A hole, approximately one inch in diameter, had been blown through the cable and the resultant arcing would have been more than sufficient to ignite inflammable gas in the vicinity. The hole in the cable occurred on the inside of the loop formed by bending the cable at the switch, and there is no doubt that the explosion was caused by a short circuit at this point. Further investigations served only to discount any other means of ignition.