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Index

Conclusions

73. Although I have given long and earnest consideration to the mass of evidence produced and to the submissions made to me at the inquiry, I have not been able to find an entirely satisfactory explanation either of the source of the firedamp or of the means by which it was ignited.

74. I accept Hartwell's view that this was not an explosion of maximum violence and that not less than 2,000 cubic feet of pure firedamp was present in the return gate in a fairly well mixed body of gas and air. In considering the ways in which such a condition might arise, I dismiss the possibility that it resulted from an interruption of the normal ventilating current. The average firedamp content of air leaving the district was little more than per cent. in a quantity of about 20,000 cubic feet of air per minute and, in order to produce the quantity of firedamp estimated to have taken part in the explosion, the ventilation would have had to be completely stopped for about 20 minutes. There is no evidence that this occurred.

75. In considering the possibility of a rapid emission of firedamp in the return gate stable, one must bear in mind that the volume of the stable was about 700 cubic feet, and that it was not being positively ventilated. An emission of the order of at least 2,700 cubic feet would have been required to account for 2,000 cubic feet being rapidly displaced into the return gate, and that remaining in the stable, about 700 cubic feet, would have dispersed only very slowly. With some 2,000 cubic feet of firedamp moving very rapidly into the main ventilation current, it is possible that the required explosive mixture could have been formed in the return gate. On ignition, the blast ahead of the flame travelling up the return gate could have so dispersed any rich firedamp remaining in the stable as to cause it to inflame and to continue the explosion, with the help of coal dust, along the face. This depends entirely on not less than 2,700 cubic feet of firedamp being emitted very rapidly in the stable, and there was no evidence that this had occurred.

76. Had the firedamp come from the waste immediately behind the working face, it would have been emitted fairly rapidly as a solid plug, mixing with air taking place principally in the roadhead area, but some of the rich firedamp being diverted into the stable. This also could have produced the condition visualised by Hartwell of an explosive mixture some distance down the return gate and a local accumulation in the stable.

77. Firedamp from a high level in the waste could have been pushed out on to the face but this, I feel, would have required a heavy strata movement which one would expect to be audible, but no evidence as to this was produced. An emission from the waste could, however, have taken place quietly had the firedamp been hanging close to the edge of the waste, but after the explosion efforts to establish the location of the firedamp were unsuccessful even though probes were pushed up into the waste to a distance of 7 to 8 feet above the seam roof level.

78. Though they were not put forward at the inquiry, I cannot disregard two other possible sources of the firedamp. The first is the return gate ribside. A sudden emission of the amount postulated would normally be accompanied by breaks in the coal and surrounding strata. The fact that no such breaks were found after the explosion is not, however, conclusive proof that they did not exist. They could have been present near the ribside but concealed by packed material. The second possible source is unplugged methane drainage holes. There were five such holes in the return gate between 200 to 350 yards outbye from the face. Separation of the upper beds resulting from the working of No. 5 face could have made rich firedamp available to these holes. Relatively high pressures would have been needed to emit the firedamp, but not in my opinion higher than might have occurred.

79. In common with the representatives who made submissions at the inquiry, I accept that, on the evidence, all possible causes of ignition other than explosives and frictional heat can be dismissed.

80. The use of explosives has long been recognised as a possible cause of ignition of firedamp and there is ample evidence that shotfiring was in progress in the return gate stable at the time of the explosion. It is clear that shots in the stable were fired from a point immediately outbye the ripping debris. The position in which the body of the shotfirer was found, that is on top of the debris, face downwards with head pointing outbye and with the shotfiring key in his pocket, suggests that, after firing a shot, he was either going towards or returning from the stable when the explosion occurred. Fisk, who at the time was sheltering in the return gate outbye of the ripping, said in evidence that 'the blast came at me from the stable hole'. I am satisfied that the rate of emission of the firedamp involved in the explosion could have been such as to create adverse conditions in the vicinity of the stable between the shotfirer's examinations and the firing of any shots.

81. Had shotfiring in fact been the cause of an initial explosion, it would have required the flame from firedamp ignited in the stable to communicate with and explode a mixture farther down the gate. That the blast pattern showed marked signs of movement towards the face does not rule out this possibility, as blast from a minor explosion in the return gate stable would have been masked by the effects of a much larger explosion down the gate. This, of course, presupposes two explosions and is supported by a witness who gave evidence that the doors at the Cut-back opened and closed twice.

82. A great many pieces of foil of the type commonly used in the wrapping of confectionery and chewing tobacco were found in the return gate, including some in the 'quiet zone' referred to by Hartwell. The S.M.R.E. have shown that, if this material is laid on rusty steel and struck a glancing blow by a hammer, a thermite reaction capable of igniting firedamp may result. Two pieces of foil found immediately on the outbye side of the 'quiet zone' showed signs of fusion which, I am advised, would result from the thermite reaction to which I have referred. No pieces showing signs of fusion were found in the 'quiet zone' but this is no proof that none was present. Even the most meticulous search could not be expected to reveal all the pieces. I cannot, however, find any evidence of movement in this zone which would have produced the kind of blow required to cause a thermite reaction.

83. In considering whether the firedamp was ignited by frictional heat, it must be remembered that, at the beginning of the shift there were empty tubs at the top end of the return gate waiting to be taken down to the return wheel, and that these were found after the explosion piled up near the return wheel. But there is evidence that three supplies lads had been sent early in the shift to collect the tubs and that the rope itself, which was to be lengthened, was found after the explosion almost fully extended. The rope would not, in my opinion, have been drawn by hand down the gate solely for recapping by the mechanic. I consider it more likely that the supplies lads used it to lower the tubs as far as possible and, in this event, the tubs would then have been at a point not more than a few yards from the outbye fringe of the 'quiet zone'. Had the tubs run uncontrolled from this point and ignited firedamp either by running over aluminium foil or by violent impact with any other material, the resulting ignition would not, in my opinion, have produced the flame and blast pattern described by Hartwell.

84. I am led to the conclusion, therefore, that there was either one explosion, predominantly of firedamp in which coal dust played little part, initiated at a point from 180 to 280 yards outbye of the face by thermite flash from aluminium foil, or two explosions, a minor one of firedamp and coal dust initiated by shotfiring in the return gate stable, followed almost immediately by a major explosion of a large body of firedamp/air mixture in the return gate.

 

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