General Remarks
Firedamp Drainage and Caving
85. The effectiveness of drainage in retracting the firedamp fringe from the face edges of strip packed wastes has been generally demonstrated, but the effect where complete caving is practised is by no means clear. When firedamp drainage was first applied to the No. 2 face, the strata boreholes were driven from the return gate over the waste and angled towards the face. The mixture drained was, however, consistently low in methane, and to improve this the direction of the boreholes was changed to 90 degrees to the line of the roadway, and the elevation reduced from 45 degrees to 40 degrees to the horizontal. This increased the methane content of the mixture, but the reason for this is not known.
86. The object of drainage by boreholes is to remove firedamp from the strata and so by reducing accumulations in the waste, prevent the possibility of emissions of firedamp into the general air stream. It is assumed that substantial separation can occur in the uncaved beds and more needs to be known of the effect of strata borehole drainage on gas in the cavities so produced. The effect is obviously a function of borehole angles in relation to bedding planes and seam inclination and it may be that, in some cases of complete caving, two series of firedamp drainage holes may be needed — one aimed at the extraction of a mixture of high firedamp content from the relaxed strata and the other for removing relatively low firedamp content mixtures from the cavity immediately above the fallen material.
87. A useful additional feature of observations on the effects of firedamp drainage would be the continuous monitoring of the firedamp content in return airways to ensure the detection of any sudden emission from the waste into the ventilating current.
88. I was disturbed by the casual attitude of both management and officials to the coursing of the ventilation into No. 2 return stable. In evidence, the manager agreed that the decision whether or not to use a brattice sheet for this purpose was left entirely to his subordinate officials. The officials who gave evidence appear to have given little thought to the ventilation of the stable; rather they seem to have assumed that, as the ventilation on the face was brisk, sufficient air would enter the stable. One man, working on the return gate ripping the night before the explosion, took down the brattice sheet used to divert air into the stable because he thought it would interfere with the building of the waste side pack. The deputy on this shift agreed, however, that the sheet could have been maintained in position without interfering with the work of ripping and packing.
89. Stable holes are now a common feature of modern mining practice and, to fulfil their purpose of accommodating power loading machinery, they must be advanced rapidly by the use of machines and explosives. Where high rates of advance are achieved, the stables at some stage in the cycle of work are taking on the characteristics of short headings driven in advance of the face line and as such demand a positive system of ventilation.
Automatic Firedamp Alarms
90. The automatic firedamp alarms in use at the colliery had not functioned reliably, and they had been withdrawn for servicing some seven weeks before the explosion. The efficient performance of the various types of automatic firedamp alarms available to the industry demands a high standard of maintenance, but the unreliable behaviour of these over the past years has created a generally unfavourable impression of the degree of protection they offer. They were, however, originally designed and introduced to give warning of the sudden appearance of abnormal amounts of firedamp such as I envisage might have occurred at Hapton Valley Colliery.
91. The circumstances of the explosion clearly indicate the need for an improved type of automatic firedamp alarm, preferably one giving a strident audible warning.
92. During the investigation, a number of irregularities in the use of explosives came to light. Large quantities of explosives had been taken below ground in hessian bags instead of in proper containers; this can only have been done with the connivance of the shotfirers, probably as an aid to the rapid charging of shots, but I find it difficult to accept that the practice escaped the notice of officials. Another irregularity was the charging together of a number of shotholes intended to be fired singly. With this practice, the firing of any one shot may so affect the burden of successive shots that they become either dangerously overburdened or overcharged. Not infrequently groups of two shots were fired in coal with a single shot exploder, with the consequent risk, not only of misfires, but of undetected misfires.
93. It was the usual practice at the colliery for shotholes to be bored in the coal before undercutting, so that the operation of boring could be more conveniently fitted into the cycle of operations at the face. However convenient this may have been, the practice was undesirable. When a face is bored first, the subsequent machine undercutting may either shatter a hole and make it useless or leave it in a dangerous condition by producing breaks across it. Although breaks should be discovered by using a break detector, it is wrong to follow a method of working which might create a danger that could escape detection. In this connection I am not satisfied that break detectors were either conscientiously or regularly used at the colliery.
94. It is clear that, to complete the stripping of the deep cuts, the speed with which shots could be fired would have been an important factor; this, in itself, must have been an invitation to indulge in bad practices. The conditions under which shotfirers work should not be such that they are encouraged to disregard the requirements of regulations or neglect to carry out the proper methods of work which they have been taught during their training.
95. Although there were only two production units at the colliery, and these quite close together, it nevertheless had a full management structure and an ample complement of officials. It was all the more disappointing to me that irregularities such as those to which I have referred should have gone uncorrected.
96. I was also disappointed to learn that the workmen at the colliery had failed to take full advantage of the right conferred on them by Section 123 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, to inspect the colliery. Persons had been nominated for this purpose and there was an inspection of No. 2 District as recently as 22nd February, 1962, but the records show that such inspections averaged no more than one a year.
Aluminium Alloys and Wrapping Foil
97. The danger of incendive sparking from aluminium alloys has been known for some ten years now. Steps have already been taken by the National Coal Board to limit, so far as possible, the use of equipment made from these alloys to situations underground where the danger of inflammable gas is remote. In fact, the National Coal Board's Production Instruction on this matter had been revised shortly before the explosion. In view of the evidence from this disaster, I feel that another revision should be made of this Instruction with particular reference to aluminium equipment which may still be used in face workings and subsidiary roads, especially return airways. Portable drills should certainly be considered since I understand that manufacturers can now produce them constructed of steel or brass. At the same time, I see no reason why fire fighting equipment should not be constructed of material other than aluminium alloy. There may be other items in the construction of which the use of these alloys cannot be justified.
98. The position in regard to the use of metallic foil in wrapping confectionery and chewing tobacco is not so clearly within the control of the National Coal Board or other mine owners. This is a matter not confined to mining communities but in general use. Dr. Willett, in his submission, suggested that the various associations and organisations in the industry should jointly consider the steps which might be taken to prevent aluminium foil wrappings from being taken underground. I agree with this suggestion which I am pleased to say is, at the time of writing, being actively considered by the Safety and Health Committee of the Coal Industry National Consultative Council.