The Cause Of The Explosion
Point of Ignition and Spread of Explosion
66. At the inquiry, F. J. Hartwell, a Senior Principal Scientific Officer in charge of the S.M.R.E. investigation into the explosion, summarised the conclusions he had reached about the point of ignition and the spread of the explosion. These were based on three facts. Firstly, none of the fibrous specimens examined had been exposed to flame for more than a very short time. Secondly, at no point in the explosion area was there evidence of slow burning of rich firedamp. Thirdly, there had been a rapidly moving flame accompanied by considerable violence, although not so great as would be expected from the most explosive mixture of firedamp and air, with a relatively 'quiet zone' between 180 yards and 280 yards outbye of the return gate ripping. These three facts and his experience of other explosions, led Hartwell to take the view that the explosion could have originated in this 'quiet zone'. The signs were that flame had travelled outbye from this area with some violence to a point about 550 yards from the face ripping, and possibly with less violence inbye, to the return gate stable. Here it was probable that there had been additional firedamp which would have added to the violence sufficiently to raise some coal dust along the face, contributing to the spread of flame and blast in that direction.
67. He added, however, that alternatively, but equally possible, firedamp might have been present and ignited in the return gate stable and that flame from such an ignition could have blown out on to the face, causing a minor coal dust explosion there. If this did occur, flame from the stable could have been propagated down the return gate in a 'trail' of firedamp along the roof to a body of firedamp which would have exploded with flame and blast in both directions.
68. Either possibility would have required the presence in the return gate of a reasonably well mixed volume of firedamp and air. The violence observed was consistent with the explosion of about an 8 per cent. firedamp/air mixture. Assuming that a mixture of this order had been involved, Hartwell estimated that at least 2,000 cubic feet of pure firedamp must have been present. To have remained apparently undispersed in the relatively large volume of air passing through the district, this quantity must have been emitted quite quickly.
69. Hartwell said that he had not found any scientific evidence to indicate a possible source of the firedamp, but he thought probable places might be halfway along the face or the return gate stable. Dr. Willett, for the National Coal Board, thought the firedamp came 'either from the solid coal in the vicinity of the top stable or from the waste'. Mr. Clough, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines and Quarries, on the other hand, was firmly of the opinion that the firedamp could have come only from the waste because neither on the face nor in the return gate stable were there strata breaks or displaced coal, the more common signs of rapid emission. Sir Andrew Bryan, for the National Association of Colliery Managers and for the British Association of Colliery Management, considered that the evidence regarding the source of the firedamp was inconclusive.
70. All of the representatives were of the opinion that, of the possible causes of ignition, only explosives and frictional heat need be considered.
Frictional heat
71. Mr. Crawford, for the National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers, suggested that firedamp had been ignited by either frictional sparking or thermite reaction as a result of vehicles running uncontrolled down the return gate. No other form of frictional heat was considered by the representatives as a possible source of ignition.
Explosives
72. Mr. Gormley, for the National Union of Mineworkers, and Mr. Clough were both of the opinion that a shot fired in the return stable was the igniting agent in the explosion. Because of the finding of charged shotholes and indications of others having been fired, it was clear that shotfiring operations were in progress at the time of the explosion. Some of the men who died in the explosion were found grouped together some little way down the return gate, as if sheltering from shotfiring, and both Madden and Fisk, the only two survivors of those known to be in or near the return gate stable at the time of the explosion, thought that the explosion followed the firing of a shot. However, if a shot was fired immediately before the explosion, the shotfirer, Halstead, must have had time to return the shotfiring key to his pocket, where it was found afterwards. Mr. Clough thought that an ignition in the stable would have been of firedamp from the broken coal already produced by other shots and that this flame, in turn, ignited gas passing from the face into the return gate after being emitted from the waste. In these circumstances, he concluded that Halstead would have had time to return the firing key to his pocket and to begin returning to the shotholes before he realised that gas was burning in the stable.