IX. — Conclusions
(44) Sufficient evidence to ascertain the exact cause and course of the explosion is not available. The only persons to travel the affected parts of the mine after the explosion were the survivors and the rescue brigades. The survivors, quite understandably, were in no shape to make detailed observations. The rescue brigades were, quite rightly, pre-occupied with their prime task of searching for survivors and recovering the bodies of the dead men. They are, however, to be commended on the extent to which they did observe useful signs while going about their business. In these circumstances any conclusions must of necessity be largely a matter of opinion.
(45) In my opinion. firedamp was ignited somewhere on the face of No. 4 East District by the reheating of carbonaceous material which had been on fire in January. The explosion spread outbye through the district and up the common return airway increasing in violence as it went. It had, however, died down very considerably by the time it reached No. 1 East Air Crossing where it merely blew open the doors. I am also satisfied that although an electricallydriven pump was in use in the intake, effective steps were taken to ensure that current was not supplied to any cables or apparatus beyond it. The safetylamps used by the party working in the return were recovered and thoroughly examined, and I am satisfied that they were not the cause of ignition.
(46) In relation to the presence of firedamp progress in stopping substantial leakages through the various connections between intake and return seems to have been slow and somewhat haphazard. Although some air had been travelling along the right bank of No. 4 East face, it would have little effect on the accumulation in the waste. The fall of roof on the left bank materially restricted the flow of air to such an extent that the left-hand return contained a high percentage of firedamp shortly before the explosion. As a passage for the air was cleared over and through the fall on the left bank the amount passing out of the left-hand return was increased, and so a steadily increasing amount of firedamp was carried out through the common return. The increased flow of air along the left bank may well have been accompanied by a corresponding decrease on the right bank, and it is just possible that this resulted in the concentration of firedamp therein passing into the explosive range. I am also satisfied that sufficient firedamp was present on the face to cause flame to come out of the intake as far as its junction with the trunk road when it exploded. It was not necessary to have an explosive mixture in either or both the returns from No. 4 East to account for the known extent of the explosion. It is obvious that there was an explosive mixture in the common return.
(47) A large number of air samples were taken and analysed without delay. The results did not cause alarm at the time, but although the percentages of carbon monoxide and the oxygen deficiencies were too small to enable reliable and informative ratios to be calculated, the concentrations of carbon monoxide were often definitely above normal level. The method of collecting the air samples ensured a representative sample of the general body of the air in the roadway at the sampling points but I consider that it left something to be desired in the circumstances. The presence of the carbon monoxide should have prompted a review of the situation of the sampling points and of the method of collecting the individual samples.
(48) It is well known that half burned coal or half coked coal are very liable to reheat spontaneously when exposed to fresh air, especially if the temperature is slightly above the normal. The rate of reheating is slow at first but accelerates very rapidly in its later stages, especially as the point of open conflagration is reached. In the present case, fresh air reached the No. 4 East District (at any rate the outbye parts of it) very soon after the seals were breached, and some of it traversed both sides of No. 4 East face for several days. During this time there was ample opportunity for reheating to start and develop. I consider that it is very much more likely that this happened than that the igniting cause originated in something which was done by the men working in the return.
(49) The deputy and two mechanics who lost their lives at the time of the explosion were sent to work in the return while large accumulations of firedamp still existed on roadways on the inbye side of them. While they were in the return work was in progress to clear the fall of roof on the face, which might well have sent gas on to them.
(50) Rescue men, with breathing apparatus, were used to provide support for persons working underground and, at least at the time of the explosion, they accompanied them closely. I consider it would have been better practice for the rescue men to have remained not too far away but under cover in some shelter so as to avoid the risk of their being all overwhelmed simultaneously.
A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.