Museum Entrance Museum
Museum
Friends of Durham Mining Museum
Events Calendar
e-Books and Books for sale
Photograph Gallery
Document Archive
Master Name Index
What's new in the site
Mining
Mining History
Colliery Index
Colliery Maps
Company Overviews
Who's Who
Mineral Information
Educational Material
Bibliography
Statistics
Workers/Employee Lists
Notes for Family Historians
War Service information
Disasters
Disaster Reports
Disaster Report Text
Disaster Report Name Index
UK Disaster Report Text
UK Disaster Report Name Index
Inquest Texts
Names of those killed
Disasters in the 1700s
Disasters in the 1800s
Disasters in the 1900s
Memorials
Awards for Gallantry
On this day ...

Links to other sites of interest
Industrial Heritage Days Out
Former www.pitwork.net web site

Index to site

Contact and address details

Share Page with Social Media

Share on Facebook

Share with Reddit

Share on Delicious

Reports Prev Page Return to Index Next Page Reports
Index

WIDER CONSIDERATIONS

Fire Hazards at Fans

96. Any fire below ground is potentially a very serious matter. In the case of a fan particularly, the high velocity of the air current tends to assist a rapid spread of flame. Booster fans, which must constitute a fire risk, should therefore not be used if adequate ventilation can be provided by any other means.

97. Where booster fans are unavoidably used, the management should take every possible step to reduce the risk of fire and to ensure that if fire breaks out it is suppressed with the minimum of delay. The use of belts which are not fire-resistant should be eliminated. Inflammable oil as a lubricant should also be eliminated; until this has been done, any surplus oil in the neighbourhood of a fan should be carefully removed. The roadway for a suitable distance, particularly on the downwind side, should be completely fire-proof. There should be in readiness sufficient fire-fighting equipment in working order for immediate use and the man in charge of the fan should know how to use the equipment. Consideration should be given to the need for additional safeguards such as automatic devices for giving audible warning of over-heating and specially provided water sprinklers or curtains on the downwind side.

98. In some circumstances a forcing fan on the surface constitutes a similar danger and the recommendations I have made should be applied to forcing fans above ground wherever necessary.

Power Transmission Belts Generally

99. A major advance in reducing the risk of fire underground stemmed from the Creswell Colliery disaster. Fire resistant conveyor belting was developed and is now in general use. Power transmission belting presented different problems but the knowledge gained helped the development of fire resistant V-belts. In 1955, the National Coal Board issued an instruction that only fire resistant V-belts were to be used underground. The instruction was later extended to V-belts used anywhere at a colliery to prevent the possibility of belts intended for use on the surface being sent below ground. Fire resistant flat belting is now being developed and I am satisfied that it will not be long before there is available a type satisfactory in all respects. Power transmission belts used on any underground machinery should be made of fire resistant material as soon as satisfactory belting becomes available. Thereafter, no other material should be supplied for use above or below ground. In the meantime, managers of mines should make effective arrangements to ensure that any over-heating or fire in machinery driven by an inflammable belt will be discovered before danger can develop. I was glad to hear at the Inquiry that the tendency will probably be towards the elimination of flat transmission belts underground.

Man-riding Arrangements

100. Another point dealt with in the Report on the fire at Creswell Colliery calls for mention here. The suggestion was made that where man-riding by rope-haulage takes place in return airways, arrangements should be made, where practicable, to ventilate the haulage engine house by intake air. The Auchengeich Colliery fire emphasizes the desirability of this, since the haulage engineman was compelled by the smoke entering his engine house in the return airway to leave his engine before the train on which the men were riding had reached the outbye terminus. This situation is better avoided, although it seems unlikely to have had any bearing on the accident.

Telephone Communications

101. Telephone communications at Auchengeich Colliery could perhaps have been improved upon in two respects. Dickson encountered a slight delay when making a call to the surface because it had to go through a switchboard at the pump-house in the downcast pit bottom. Additionally, there was no means of telephonic communication on the man-riding haulage road. The outcome of the fire was not thereby affected but I recommend for consideration that all telephones at a colliery should be connected directly to one surface exchange, constantly manned and preferably located with the General Post Office telephone. Wherever men ride in trains worked by rope haulage, I think there would be advantages in having two-way communication between the driver and the guard over the whole length of the roadway.

General Consideration of Fire Hazards by Colliery Managements

102. The fire at Auchengeich Colliery started at a booster fan, that at Creswell Colliery in a conveyor installation. Before these accidents neither of these classes of plant had been regarded as particularly serious potential source of fire. Smaller fires have been caused by other underground equipment, and it is clearly most desirable that the considerations which I have advanced in relation to the fire hazard at booster fans should be applied equally to all underground equipment which might be capable of causing a fire. I, therefore, recommend every colliery manager to review his pit with the object of identifying every place of unusually high fire risk and of ensuring that there are adequate safeguards against the outbreak and spread of fire at each of these places. Careful consideration should be given to such precautions as the elimination of inflammable material, the proper maintenance of machinery, fire-proofing of roadways and the provision, where appropriate, of automatic protection against heating and of early fire extinguishing. Both the organisation and the equipment for fire-fighting need careful consideration in the course of this review. A situation, as at Auchengeich Colliery, in which fire extinguishers are out of order when needed, or in which there is a delay of an hour or so before water can be applied through hoses to a major fire, cannot be tolerated. It was submitted at the Inquiry that a considerable time might be lost in assembling sufficient trained men to operate a standard fire hose. This aspect of the arrangements should be carefully reviewed.

Committee of Experts to Review Fire Hazards Generally

103. Finally, I think there is a need for some additional means of correlating and keeping under constant review any lessons which are to be learned from the experience of fires, both at home and abroad, with a view to averting accidents from known causes. An equally necessary task is to endeavour to recognise in advance existing hazards hitherto unsuspected and fresh hazards which may come with rapidly-changing mining practice. A great deal of work has always been done and continues to be done on these lines but there is too great a tendency to look at each accident and each precautionary measure in isolation.

104. Following a sequence of explosions in 1956-57, the Safety and Health Committee of the Coal Industry National Consultative Council set up a Sub-Committee on Mining Explosions which produced a most valuable report drawing attention to common features in a number of explosions which have occurred in recent years in this country. Some of these features have been brought to notice again by events since the report of the Sub-Committee was issued. I recommend that there should be a small and active standing committee of experts from the Industry and the Ministry of Power charged with the duty of keeping under constant review the potentialities of disaster from main causes such as fire and explosion.

 

Prev Page Return to Top of Page Next Page


mail
Mail:
Webmaster
Back
Back
Home
Home
Open Government Licence   Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Copyright © 1999-2024 by The Durham Mining Museum and its contributors
Registered Charity No: 1110608
Page last updated: 31 Dec 2022

Privacy Policy
 
Terms & Conditions
 
Search
Search
Print
Print
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z