GENERAL DISCUSSION
The Indication of Danger
66. In the light of subsequent knowledge it is difficult to understand why the the haze observed at the pit bottom, and also inbye by the men on the first train, was not recognised as a symptom of an outbreak of fire. But it was not so recognised by anybody. It had no effect on the eyes, or on breathing and, although some of the men mentioned a smell, this was not sufficiently distinctive to be identified. Many of the men who saw the haze were experienced underground workers, but none was alarmed in any way.
67. Dickson went down the return airway with about seventeen other men and I cannot believe that he was so reckless of his own and other lives as to have disregarded imminent danger had he sensed it. When he reached Johnston's Crosscut conditions were, he considered, slightly worse and he took all the men with him into the intake airway. He seems to have had in mind that the haze might get thicker if he approached its source from the return side. He was doubtless anxious to keep the men with him so that they would not lose touch and so that he would have assistance if he needed it when he reached the source of the haze. It is apparent that he did not expect any worsening of the atmospheric conditions in the return airway outbye of Johnston's Crosscut. Had he done so, he could have telephoned from Johnston's Crosscut to the shaft bottom to stop any more men coming inbye. When he found the fan stopped and the belt on fire he lost no time in advising the surface by telephone both of the fire and of the risk to the men in No. 1 Pit workings. He overlooked the possibility that the fire might endanger men on the return side in No. 2 Pit workings. It must be remembered, however, that all he had seen was the burning belt which was probably producing comparatively little smoke. If the fire had already spread outbye to burn timbers and produce the thick smoke which overcame the men on the second train, he was not aware of it. Nothing he could have done at that point in time would have prevented the second train starting inbye. In my reconstruction of these important events, dense smoke was already being given off by burning wood and the train was half-way to the inbye terminus.
68. There had been no apparent change in conditions at the pit bottom when the second train went inbye at or shortly before 7.00 a.m. The second train had amongst its forty-eight passengers a number of experienced men, including a deputy and eight shotfirers. But these men, like those on the earlier train, cannot have suspected danger. Green, the sole survivor, said that the train went off in the usual way and that the journey inbye was uneventful.
69. The day shift overman, Boyd, seems to have recognised when he came down the pit at about 6.50 a.m. that the haze was a symptom of some trouble inbye. Though he thought about machinery, it is evident that he had no thought of immediate danger. When, just after 7.00 a.m., he overheard on the telephone Dickson's message to the surface that the fan was on fire, he at once set off inbye to join Dickson at the fan. With positive information about a fire inbye he should immediately have taken effective steps to ensure that any men on the return side were withdrawn and that no others entered the return airway or the upcast shaft. At that time, however, no instruction to withdraw could have saved the unfortunate men on the train.
70. The under-manager did not take any steps to see that all men were withdrawn into an intake airway when he went down the upcast shaft at about 7.10 a.m. and found thick smoke. It would have been far too late for anything to have been done to save the men on the train but there were other men in the upcast pit bottom and they should not have been allowed to stay there.
71. I am satisfied that these officials conceived it to be their duty to get to the fire as quickly as possible, and to deal with it safely and expeditiously. Their reaction to the situation, however, is an example of an unfortunate tendency on the part of persons faced with an emergency to concentrate their attention on removing the cause of danger rather than first safeguarding against its possible effects. This makes it necessary for me to emphasize the vital importance of officials recognising that anything in the nature of smoke underground, however faint it may be, constitutes a potential danger to life, which must be met by the immediate withdrawal to a place of safety of all persons except those necessary to combat the danger, and by effective steps to prevent other persons entering the danger zone.
72. Section 79 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, imposes upon the person in charge of a part of a mine the duty of withdrawing workpeople who may be endangered if it appears to him that a danger exists. Regulation 11 (1) of the Coal and Other Mines (Fire and Rescue) Regulations, 1956, deals specifically with danger from fire and refers to smoke or other signs indicating that a fire has or may have broken out.
The Development of the Fire and Smoke
73. Several witnesses of the fire in its early stages at the fan saw that the belt was lying on the ground below its normal position on the pulleys. The belt had burned through at the motor pulley and most of the belt was in flames. Dickson, who first saw the fire, thought that the belt was then on the fan pulley; Roe and Lynch were not sure of this. After the fire had passed beyond the fan house an inspection of the motor pulley disclosed that the face of it was blue in colour; the fan bearings remained free enough to allow the pulley to be turned easily by hand.
74. The raw materials used in the manufacture of balata belting were known to be readily inflammable. An investigation was carried out at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment at Buxton to examine and demonstrate to interested parties the degree of the fire hazard that may arise on balata belt drives. An experimental layout was assembled to simulate as far as possible the drive of the booster fan. The diameters of pulleys, the distance between their centres and the speed of drive were similar, but the belt was six inches wide and driven by a 50 horse-power motor. The driven shaft was coupled to a dynamometer, by means of which different loads could be applied to the drive. Tests were carried out with: (a) a belt slipping on a pulley; (b) a running belt with one edge rubbing against a stationary object; and (c) a belt stalled and remaining in contact with the rotating driving pulley. Photographs taken during the investigation are reproduced in Plates II and III.
75. In belt slipping tests, the temperature of the pulley on which slipping occurred rose to, but not beyond, 1100 centigrade; the belt became warm and stretched from one to two per cent. in the first few hours. With a state of continuous slipping established, the load dropped to a comparatively low value and any attempt to increase it tended to throw the belt off the pulleys. Various means, including the provision of guide rollers, were then adopted to keep a continuously slipping belt on the pulleys; in these conditions the temperature of the pulley on which slipping occurred rose only to a maximum of 1300 centigrade.
76. In experiments in which the edge of a belt rubbed against a stationary object, on only one occasion, when an asbestos cement sheet was used, did smouldering develop to such an extent that the belt finally broke. Rubbing against a brick wall did not produce smouldering.
77. When a stalled belt was only partly on the motor pulley it began to smoulder after thirteen minutes and finally broke seven minutes later. The ends fell on the floor and burst into flames after being exposed to a current of air. When a stalled belt was completely on the pulley, white fumes appeared in four minutes; smouldering began after nineteen minutes; the belt finally broke after 26 minutes and later burst into flames when a current of air was passed over it. The temperature of the motor pulley rose to 260° centigrade and the face of the pulley became blue.
78. From this investigation it seems reasonable to deduce that a running balata belt is unlikely to develop dangerous heating so long as it stays on the pulleys and does not rub against a stationary object. If rubbing occurs, smouldering may possibly develop on the rubbing edge. But there is no doubt at all that a serious fire hazard arises when a balata belt stalls completely and remains on a rotating pulley; providing the tension of the belt is high enough it will smoulder and burst into flames in a current of air.
79. F. J. Hartwell, a Senior Principal Scientific Officer of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment, in relating the results of the investigation to the circumstances of the fire, expressed the view that, when the belt on the fan stalled and started to smoulder and then caught fire near the motor pulley, the large quantity of air available would have diluted the smoke and carbon monoxide produced and accounted for the haze which was seen in the pit on the morning of the fire. He suggested that the flames from the burning belt might have ignited oil in the fan and in its vicinity and that this burning oil could well have produced the flame which witnesses saw issuing from the fan outlet. The flame would have been bunsen-like and the smoke would not have been very dense. Such a flame could then have rapidly ignited the wood outbye the fan and produced heavy smoke and carbon monoxide in dangerous quantities.
80. D. Lang, Area General Manager, expressed this view "I think this fire arose through excessive stretch of the belt causing excessive slipping which in turn caused ply separation and ultimately I think the belt broke down, and I think it must have become jammed somewhere at the motor pulley, causing the motor pulley to create such heat at that point that the belt went on fire. I think too that in the process, this being a fan and there being a very high velocity in the vicinity, incandescent fibres from the belt were blown through and down the return airway, and we actually had several fires going at the same time."
81. Hartwell thought it unlikely that incandescent fibres blown through the fan into the return airway could alone have caused the timber to catch fire. In his opinion the build up of the fire would not have been sufficiently rapid to account for the suddenness with which dense smoke appeared in the return airway farther outbye. The essential difference between the two theories is that Hartwell's relies upon the presence of combustible material in the fan and Lang's does not. Hartwell's theory is better supported by the evidence but both reconstructions emphasize that only fire-proof materials should be used in the construction and fittings of a fan house and of the roadway for safe distances on both sides of a fan.
82. No one can say with certainty how the fire started and then developed but considering the evidence, including the results of the experiments made at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment, I visualise the course of events to have been generally as follows.
83. When Love, O'Connor and Black left the fan at about 5.30 a.m. on the morning of the fire, the power transmission belt had become soft in parts and the balata had exuded to some extent. It had been further weakened by the cutting out of one ply over a length of about three feet and the leading loose end of this ply would have had a tendency to ruck at the pulleys, thereby encouraging the belt to wander across them. Then, as had happened at least once before on this fan, the belt came off the fan pulley and jammed near it. The belt was stalled on the motor pulley and, there being sufficient tension to provide frictional resistance, the belt quickly heated up to the stages of smouldering and, eventually, flame. This reconstruction of what happened is not supported by the evidence of Dickson, whose recollection was that the belt was still on the fan pulley when he arrived. It must be remembered, however, that his attention was then, quite properly, concentrated on extinguishing the burning belt and not on establishing the cause of the fire. Moreover, the wire mesh fence was between him and the fan pulley and he may easily have been mistaken. As I have said, the Safety in Mines Research Establishment failed to ignite a belt which was slipping but not stalled.
84. It is possible that the belt was insufficiently and unevenly tensioned when first fitted, a condition which can lead to slip, over-heating and ply separation. Although there was no evidence that the belt was not cut at right angles, the method used to mark the cut can lead to inaccurate results, if only by perpetuating uneven stretch, and to uneven tension. The belt lost tension far more than is usual. McAuley cut six inches from it within half an hour of first starting up, and in two days before the fire a total length of 17 inches was cut out.
85. If the belt did, as I think, stall and become ignited by the revolving motor pulley, it would not have been long before it burned through and fell to the floor. The ends would have continued to burn towards the fan pulley. The fan must have been stationary for some time before flame reached the inlet on the pulley side, but the exhausting fan on the surface would have continued to induce a brisk current of air through the booster fan even though the by-pass doors would have opened when it stopped. The air-flow pattern of the flames and the hot products of combustion would have resulted in the vaporisation and ignition of the lubricating oil used in the fan shaft bearings and of oily deposits on the surfaces of the fan casing and runner. Flame issuing from the fan outlet would have been projected against and ignited similar deposits on the roof and upper part of the sides of the roadway near the fan and set alight the short wooden props and laggings. Thereafter the fire would have spread very quickly to other props and laggings outbye.
86. There were thus three stages of combustion, probably overlapping each other to some extent: (a) the belt; (b) oil from the bearings and oily dust in and around the fan; and (c) the wood props and laggings in the airway. The first two stages produced fumes and smoke which, being diluted, caused the haze in the return airway; the third stage produced dense smoke and carbon monoxide in dangerous quantities.
87. In attempting to estimate the time at which the fire started it is necessary to work back from the time when Paton first noticed the haze at his haulage engine. The quantity of air which passed in the return airway when the booster fan stopped was given in evidence as 50,000 cubic feet a minute and this can be confirmed by calculation. It can also be calculated that the velocity of this air current would have carried the haze from the fan to the man-riding engine house in less than nine minutes. Thus the haze which Paton first saw at about 6.25 a.m. would have been produced at the fan shortly after 6.15 a.m. and I take this to be the time when the fan belt started to heat up to the point where it gave off fumes. If the experiments by the Safety in Mines Research Establishment are taken as a guide, the belt probably stalled shortly after 6.00 a.m. when Campbell passed the fan on his way outbye. It may conceivably have been later by five or ten minutes as the belt had already been seriously impaired and both the belt and the pulleys would have been warm to begin with.
88. The time the fire took to spread from the belt to the timber in the roadway is largely a matter of conjecture, but I estimate that the belt commenced to smoulder about forty-five minutes before the wood outbye the fan was burning sufficiently to generate dense smoke. I form this opinion by deduction from Green's statement that thick smoke met the second train as it reached the inbye terminus at 7.05 a.m. or perhaps a minute or two later. The smoke would have taken about four minutes to reach this point from the fan so I conclude that the timber in the roadway outbye the fan was well alight soon after 7.00 a.m. Thus the fire was almost certainly spreading outbye of the fan by the time Dickson reached the fan house. The smoke which enveloped the second train at the inbye terminus would certainly have persisted and possibly thickened during the fatal journey outbye because the smoke was travelling quicker than the train.
Rescue
89. There was a delay of at least 20 minutes in calling for the services of the Central Rescue Station. It is true that if the call had been made immediately after the fire was discovered the rescue teams could not have saved life in this instance, but this does not detract from the general principle that as soon as anyone in charge of a mine or part of a mine has reason to suppose that an emergency has occurred he should forthwith summon rescue men. No harm is caused if events prove a call to have been unnecessary.
90. The final decision to withdraw everyone from the pit was taken with the approval of all parties when the quantity of methane passing over the fire was approaching explosive proportions. There was no alternative because of the risk of explosion. The only way left to extinguish the fire was to deny it a supply of air and this was done by applying water seals to intake and return airways in the valley near Johnston's Crosscut. By 24th September the bodies of the forty-seven victims had been recovered from the positions indicated on Plan No. 1.
91. The medical evidence is to the effect that all the victims of the accident died from asphyxia due to carbon monoxide poisoning, possibly associated with a lack of oxygen, and that death would have occurred rapidly. The dense smoke met the man-riding train at the inbye terminus and I conclude that the victims must have been overcome by poisonous fumes during the journey outbye and that all were dead by the time the bogies stopped or died a minute or two later.
92. The outcome of this accident might well have been less tragic if the men had carried and used self-rescue apparatus. Sir Andrew Bryan, then H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, included in his Report on the underground fire in 1950 at Cresswell Colliery (Cmd. 8574) a recommendation that underground trials of improved forms of self-rescue apparatus should be expedited. Extensive trials were carried out over a long period under the auspices of the industry's consultative machinery but, after very careful consideration of the results, all parties agreed to discontinue the trials. In view of the circumstances in which the men at Auchengeich Colliery met their death, I recommend that the whole question should again be reviewed by the industry.
The Provision and Maintenance of Fire-fighting Equipment Underground
93. The first line of attack on the fire failed when the two extinguishers which Dickson tried to use did not function. Some sand and stone dust was used but extinguishers might have served much better to extinguish the belt fire; two extinguishers quickly put out a smouldering belt at the same fan eight years before. If, however, this fire had, as I think, already extended beyond the belt, two extinguishers would not have had any worthwhile effect upon it.
94. There was no means of fighting the fire in the airway until hoses were brought from the surface and these did not arrive until between 8.20 and 8.30 a.m. In the interval of nearly one and half hours between the discovery of the fire and the application of water, the fire had taken a substantial hold on the timber in the return airway and the fire-fighters were faced with a task which proved to be impossible. But the smoke which killed the forty-seven men in the return airway was, I think, issuing from the fire before it would have been possible to bring a hose into use even had there been one readily available and the hydrant at No. 5 Bench been in working order. In other circumstances, however, reduction in the delay in starting effective fire-fighting might have made a great difference.
95. Colliery officials said that fire extinguishers underground had been tampered with on frequent occasions and this was suggested as a reason why the two extinguishers failed to function. The officials also said that some years ago brass fittings had been removed from hoses kept underground. The management put forward the view that, much as the absence of hoses below ground was to be regretted, it was better to have hoses intact on the surface and accept the delay in getting them below ground when required, than to have hoses in the pit and find them useless in an emergency. I cannot accept that these were the only alternatives. There was a special reason against keeping all the fire hoses on the surface in that none could be lowered to the downcast pit bottom until the needles had been raised. The malpractices to which reference was made cannot be too strongly condemned, but the management were not by reason of them absolved from their obligations under the Coal and Other Mines (Fire and Rescue) Regulations, 1956. According to witnesses the subject came before the Pit Consultative Committee but the discussions were not minuted. Any discussion in a Pit Committee on a subject so vital to safety as the maintenance of fire-fighting equipment should be properly recorded and vigorously followed up, both by the management and by the representatives of the workers.