CONCLUSIONS
105. (1) The fire originated in the balata transmission belt of the electrically driven booster fan in the return airway from No. 2 Pit workings. The fire was caused by frictional heat generated between the rotating motor pulley and the belt, which had left the fan pulley and jammed near it. Flame from the belt ignited oil vaporised from the fan shaft bearings and oily deposits in and around the fan. The flame then spread downwind to ignite roadway timbers.
(2) By tragic coincidence, forty-eight men riding through the return airway were overtaken by smoke containing carbon monoxide and forty-seven of these men were asphyxiated.
(3) The fire would not have reached disastrous proportions had inflammable material been excluded from a substantial length of roadway immediately adjacent to and on the return side of the fan.
(4) The haze which preceded the smoke was not recognised, either by officials or by workmen, as a sign of imminent danger. By the time the fire was found the second man-riding train had already left the pit bottom.
(5) Fire-fighting arrangements were inadequate but the deficiencies did not contribute to the loss of life.
(6) The fire would probably have been averted had the fan been under continuous supervision. It might have been averted or its development halted had the fan been inspected at the half-hourly intervals prescribed as a maximum by Regulation.
(7) Closer examination of belt performance after speeding up the fan might well have indicated the advisability of reverting to the previous speed or altering the drive.
(8) The unsatisfactory performance of the belt and the damage done to it in the two days before the fire, particularly the night immediately before, received insufficient attention.
(9) By calculation, a balata transmission belt made of 33½ oz. cotton duck put on after the speed-up of the fan had an excess capacity of about 50 per cent. and the 31 oz. belt which caught fire about 25 per cent. But the first of these belts lasted less than ten weeks and the other only two days.
(10) The belt which caught fire was not of the 33½ oz. weight ordered by the National Coal Board and failed to satisfy completely some of the tests prescribed by British Standard 2066.