THE BOOSTER FAN
Installation and General Experience
40. The fan was first installed at the colliery in 1946 to balance the available air between the No. 1 Pit workings and the more distant workings in No. 2 Pit without imposing any additional resistance. It was then situated near the bottom of the upcast shaft but, because in that position it caused a great deal of leakage between the intake and return airways, it was moved in 1947 to its present position in the return airway.
41. There were a few occasions when the belt was reported to have been slipping but the fan seems, with two exceptions, to have functioned without any serious trouble until it was speeded up on 20th June, 1959. There was an occasion, put generally at about eight years ago, when two deputies found the fan belt smouldering; their recollections were that they found about three feet of the belt burned through at the motor pulley and that they put out the fire by using two fire extinguishers. On 19th June, Harvey, the safety officer, and J. F. Dickson, who was engaged on general duties at the colliery, saw sparks at the fan outlet. They notified the under-manager and he stopped the fan; M. Barr, a mechanic, went to the fan and found that the thrust collars on the shaft had moved; he adjusted the collars to centralise the fan and left it working satisfactorily.
Speeding up the Fan
42. In May, 1959, the manager had decided to examine the possibility of speeding up the fan to improve ventilation generally and to provide additional ventilation in anticipation of development work. Consultations took place between him; the deputy area production managers; the group manager; S. Hogarth, then area ventilation engineer; and J. Smellie, an assistant area mechanical engineer. J. Smellie calculated that the existing fan belt was easily capable of transmitting 120 horse-power and so was ample to transmit the 100 horse-power which he and Hogarth expected the motor would deliver when the fan was speeded up to 540 revolutions per minute. He also calculated that an additional 11,000 cubic feet of air per minute could be expected to pass through the fan. Hogarth calculated that the increase would be 7,000 cubic feet per minute. The makers confirmed by telephone that the fan could safely be run at a speed of 540 revolutions per minute, subject to the reservation that the fan was in sound mechanical condition. Despite the makers' reservation, there was no evidence of an attempt to assess the condition of the fan by thorough inspection.
43. On 18th June, J. F. Dickson carried out a ventilation test on the booster fan. He found the motor current to be 85 amperes, corresponding to a motor output of approximately 70 horse-power. He measured the quantity of air passing a point in the return airway 300 feet outbye from the fan as 66,000 cubic feet per minute. The average ventilation pressure developed by the fan was 2.4 inches water gauge measured across the by-pass. The total ventilation pressure due to the combined effect of the booster fan and the surface fan was about 3.25 inches water gauge.
44. On 20th June, the fan was speeded up from 490 to about 540 revolutions per minute. The results of speeding up the fan, as observed by J. F. Dickson on the night of 23rd to 24th June, fell far short of expectations. The quantity of air was increased by only about 4,000 cubic feet per minute and the horsepower transmitted by the motor rose from 70 to 88, instead of to 100. According to ammeter readings quoted by mechanics, the load soon diminished. The current varied between 100 and 105 amperes, corresponding to 80 to 84 horse-power. This result was all to the good from the point of view of belt capacity. Calculations based on the publication British Standard 2066: 1953, "Balata Belting" indicate that a belt made from 33½ oz. cotton duck transmitting 80 horse-power would have had a theoretical capacity margin of about 50 per cent. But, although this was unknown at the time, the belt which caught fire was made from 31 oz duck and would have had an excess capacity of about 25 per cent. Experience went to show that the theoretical margins were, in fact, inadequate. A 33½ oz. Belt lasted less than ten weeks, a period so short in comparison with the usual use of a belt that it should have raised doubts in the minds of those concerned about the capacity of this belting to carry the load. The British Standard cannot provide guidance on every factor which should be taken into account when assessing the suitability of the belt for a particular duty, and it suggests that certain particulars, including the horsepower to be transmitted should be sent to the manufacturers.
The Fan Belts
The new belt after speeding up
45. On 11th July, G. Nelson, a deputy, was called to the fan and found the belt off the pulleys and wrapped around the motor pulley shaft; he observed smoke but there was no sign of burning or smouldering. D. O'Connor, a mechanic. put on a new belt the same day. In the course of fitting it he tied a length of half inch diameter hemp rope around the new belt and the fan pulley. He and his fellow mechanics adopted this method of putting belts over pulleys in the absence of a special belt-fitting tool. This belt remained in use until 16th September. Although the mechanics who examined the fan said that it was found to be slipping rather more frequently than the previous belt, they made no adverse criticisms in their reports. On 7th September, the belt had come off the fan pulley and was damaged by contact with the pedestal of the fan, a fastener being pulled out. J. Steel, a workshop mechanic, found the belt was in a very poor condition; he patched it by cutting out a five feet length and inserting two strips, 4 inches and 8 inches wide, respectively, side by side and held together by two belt fasteners. He then took measurements for a new belt, which was prepared in the engineer's shop on the surface and taken down the pit.
46. On 9th September, Barr, the shift mechanic for whom Steel had substituted on 7th September, inspected the belt and decided that a new one was required; he made a written report to that effect.
The belt which caught fire
47. On 3rd August, the colliery manager had requisitioned an 80-feet length of 12 inch wide, seven-ply balata belting. The requisition was marked "very urgent" and quoted the name of the last suppliers. The form was sent to the Area Chief Purchasing and Stores Manager who entered on it the reference letters and the number of a contract covering the whole country which, with the approval of the Production Department at National Coal Board Headquarters, had been placed with another manufacturer by the Purchasing and Stores Department. The order was then placed against this contract with the agent of the manufacturer. The 80-feet length of belting was delivered to the local railway station and collected on 7th September. It was placed in the colliery store; there was no evidence that it was stamped with the manufacturer's name or marked with the British Standard number, as required by British Standard 2066. A length of belting, given variously as 34 feet 6 inches and 35 feet 6 inches, was later cut from it and taken to the colliery workshops where it was prepared for use on the booster fan with bolted plate fasteners to join the free ends. This belt was fitted on 16th September and caught fire two days later. The national contract required that all balata belting supplied to the Board against colliery orders should be in accordance with "British Standard No. 2066: 1953, Balata Belting" and, unless otherwise stated in the order, should be made of 33½ oz. duck. The Board's Director of Engineering took steps to satisfy himself that the manufacturers could meet the specification requirement of the contract and afterwards, by sample testing at the manufacturer's works, to ensure that this was being done.
48. During the day shift on Wednesday, 16th September, when the pit was idle, D. McAuley, the day shift mechanic, was told by Dickson, the assistant overman, to attend to the fan because the belt was slipping. McAuley says that when he went to the fan at about 11.00 a.m. the ammeter was reading 90, some ten amperes below the normal reading. He decided to replace the belt with the new one which was there ready to be put on. Assisted by two pump men, he put on the new belt which was tensioned by moving back the motor. He knew which was the pulley side of the belt and was sure that the belt was put on the correct way. He watched the fan running and in about half-an-hour the belt began to slip. He stopped the motor and cut about six inches out of the belt; to fix the line of the cut he measured six inches along each side of the belt with a rule. He then refitted the belt, tensioned it and re-started the motor. He left the fan running satisfactorily at about 1.45 p.m.
49. Later that day, J. Bell, the back shift overman, visited the fan and found the ammeter reading 65, an indication that there was a great dealt of belt slip. He tried tensioning back the motor but could not tighten the belt sufficiently to stop it slipping. He therefore sent a message to T. Bone, the mechanic on the back shift, to go to the fan. Bone reached the fan at about 4.30 p.m. and, assisted by Bell and two others, cut another length of seven inches out of the belt, using the same method of measuring from the last cut as McAuley. There was at the time an electrical fault in the rotor starter. After an electrician had attended to the fault, the fan was re-started and left running satisfactorily at about 7.00 p.m.
50. On the morning of the following day, Thursday, 17th September, the pit was still idle. Boyd, the day shift overman, told McAuley to visit the fan because the belt was slipping again. When McAuley reached the fan at about 7.45 a.m. he found that the ammeter was reading 60-70 so he cut another length of four inches from the belt. In the course of this adjustment, in which he was assisted by three shotfirers, the fan rotor was pushed out of alignment. When the motor was started, the belt drifted partly off the fan pulley and one of the fasteners was pulled out by contact with the fan pedestal. McAuley trimmed the belt where the fastener had been, re-positioned the fastener and centred the fan rotor. While this work was going on, one of the shotfirers spent some time in applying water to the motor pulley, which was very warm. In the course of running-on the belt, one of the blades of the fan was broken off. McAuley left the fan running satisfactorily at 1.30 p.m. after an electrician had attended to an electrical fault in the main switch. McAuley said that when at the outlet side of the fan that morning he noticed that, apart from oil on the blades, there was oil on the apron of the fan and, for a distance of about four feet, on the pavement towards the safety fence and that there were signs of oil on the sides of the airway outbye. He also noticed that, there were blades missing in addition to the one which had been torn off that morning.
51. On the evening of 17th September, J. Love, the night shift overman, went down the pit at 10.45 p.m. and arranged the night shift work. He went to the fan at about 1.20 a.m. on Friday, 18th September; he examined it and was satisfied that it was working properly. He recalled that the ammeter was steadily recording 90 and he considered the condition of the fan was normal although McAuley, on the previous day, had regarded a reading of 90 amperes as an indication of belt slip. At 3.40 a.m. Love again visited the fan and found that a part of the ply on the pulley side of the belt had separated and was flapping against the motor end bearing; the ammeter reading had dropped to 60. He telephoned the surface asking for an engineer and an electrician to come down and for the No. 1 Pit overman to be informed that the fan might have to be stopped. He returned to the fan and stopped it. He cut from the belt a three feet length of loose ply (see Plate I), trimmed the ends of the ply left on the belt and re-started the fan. O'Connor, the night shift mechanic, and W. M. Black, an electrician, reached the fan at about 4.15 a.m. They found the ammeter still reading 60 and they stopped the motor. O'Connor examined the belt and found that the balata had exuded from a length of about 12 inches. The belt and the motor pulley were very warm. Love, with O'Connor and another man, cooled these by using about three gallons of water. To tension the belt, O'Connor moved the motor back about three inches and re-started it just after 5.00 a.m. The ammeter reading was then 100. The three watched the fan until about 5.30 a.m., then left it to return to the surface. On the surface, Love met Boyd, told him about the fan and said that a new belt was required. Love then saw the under-manager, told him about the fan's behaviour during the night and showed him the ply which he had cutoff. The time was then about 6.40 a.m. In the meantime, O'Connor had made a written report in which he said the belt was "ruined" and he told McKinnon that a new one was required immediately. In the two day's life of the belt, the mechanics were obliged to cut a total of 17 inches from it in an effort to stop it slipping. This unsatisfactory performance seems not to have attracted the urgent attention it warranted.
52. T. Campbell, a gearman (not to be confused with the engineman of the same name) passed the fan at about 6.00 a.m. on his way outbye from work on the night shift. He noticed nothing untoward. There is no evidence of anyone else going near the fan between 5.30 a.m. when Love left it and about 7.00 a.m. when Dickson discovered the fire.
53. After the fire, the Safety in Mines Research Establishment of the Ministry of Power carried out detailed examinations of four samples of belting. The first was the torn ply cut from the fan belt by Love on the morning of the fire. The second was taken from the belt which Pettigrew took underground with him on his way to the fire and which was recovered; this belt had been cut from the same 80-feet length as the belt which caught fire. The third sample was taken from the remains of a length of belting which had been in store for some years and from which the previous belt had been cut. The fourth was from a length of belting supplied after the fire by the manufacturers of the belt which went on fire. These examinations revealed that the belting recovered from underground and the torn ply were both made from 31 oz. duck. There can thus be no doubt that the belt in use on the fan at the time of the fire was made from 31 oz. duck. Tests showed that the 31 oz. belting met the requirements of British Standard 2066 except that under the standard conditions of the tests the elongation of the fabric averaged 13.4 per cent. against the specified maximum of 12.5 per cent. and adhesion between some plies was poor. The tensile strength satisfied the requirements of the British Standard 2066 for 31 oz. duck. The single torn ply showed signs of slipping but not of burning. The other lengths of belting tested were of 33½ oz. duck and complied with British Standard 2066 for that weight of belt.
Mechanics' Examinations
54. There was in force at the colliery, as required by Regulation 7 (1) of the Coal and Other Mines (Mechanics and Electricians) Regulations, 1956, a scheme of examination and test of all mechanical and electrical apparatus to ensure its maintenance in safe working condition. The scheme incorporated most of the relevant parts of the maintenance system drawn up by Headquarters of the National Coal Board for the guidance of managements, but prescribed only a daily external examination of the booster fan.
55. The daily examinations of the fan prescribed in the manager's scheme of examination and test were made on working days by one or other of four mechanics who worked at the colliery on a shift rota and were each on the day shift at this pit one week in four. The mechanics recorded the results of their daily examinations on N.C.B. forms. The reports were usually brief but comprehensive and included a note of any defect observed such as belt slip, and of any remedial action taken. A clerk collected these report sheets every day and passed them to McKinnon who extracted items of importance and entered them into the statutory log book, Mines and Quarries Form No. 267. The log book was signed by McKinnon and countersigned by the manager. Some entries on the N.C.B. forms were not recorded in Form 267. McKinnon said that he did not consider these entries to be of sufficient importance to warrant inclusion in the book; details of any mechanic's report were always available in the N.C.B. forms.
56. An examination of Form 267 disclosed that the initials of mechanics had been entered in the right hand columns of the pages of the book. McKinnon explained that he had made these entries merely to cross-reference each item to the appropriate mechanic's report sheet. This procedure does not conflict with the guidance on reporting given on the Form.
57. The last entry in Form 267 relating to the fan was dated 19th August, 1959, but McKinnon knew of the trouble with the fan belt on 16th and 17th September. The manager had not seen the reports but was aware of the trouble experienced. Entries in Form 267 must be kept up to date if the book is to serve the purpose for which it was designed. McKinnon's view as to the selection of items for inclusion in Form 267 was sound enough as a general principle, but any matter apparently material to safety should be entered for the immediate information of the manager and others and thereafter for record purposes.
General Maintenance
58. Thorough examination at suitable intervals is the essence of planned maintenance but there was no evidence of internal examination of the fan by a mechanic. W. Love, a young oncost worker, said that he cleaned the fan blades and the inside of the fan casing some time in or about May, 1959. He thought there were "four or maybe five" blades missing, not adjacent to each other but distributed around the fan. He scraped off a total of about half a cubic foot of "dust or damp dust" but he did not recall having seen any excess of oil in or near the fan.
59. It may well be that the men who oiled the bearings of the fan up to that time were sparing in their applications. On the other hand, much more oil than was necessary seems to have been used on some occasions during the six weeks or so before the fire, perhaps for want of instruction of those concerned. An expert witness expressed the opinion that about one pint of oil per week should have sufficed for each bearing if it were in good condition. There was no evidence as to the condition of these bearings, but I am satisfied that surplus oil played a part in propagating this fire. The average velocity of the air in the fan inlet would have been well over 3,000 feet per minute and this would have tended to carry any surplus oil into and through the fan. Over a long period this oil would have mixed with dust carried through the fan and formed an oily deposit of the nature described by W. Love as "damp dust". The minimum amount of oil necessary to spread flame is so small that sufficient could have been present even if reasonable care had always been taken to avoid over-oiling. All practicable steps should be taken to prevent, or at least minimise, the deposition of oily material near a fan outlet. Grease would be better suited than an inflammable oil to lubricate bearings in the special conditions which this accident has shown to exist at booster fans.
60. A report of a thorough examination made after May, 1959, would have disclosed that blades were missing. These should have been replaced because the absence of blades can unbalance a fan to some extent, depending upon the number missing and the relative positions from which they came, and, by setting up additional vibration, can aggravate any tendency of the belt to slip. I do not, however, consider that the missing blades were an important factor in causing this belt to slip.
Supervision
61. The fan was not in a deputy's district but, because it played an essential part in the ventilation of the gassy coal winning districts, the deputies took it upon themselves to visit the fan from time to time to assure themselves that it was working properly. It was only 170 yards from their meeting station and anybody travelling outbye in the return airway to the man-riding haulage would have passed it. This airway had not been inspected and reported upon daily since June, 1959. Regulations required that it should have been inspected and reported upon, but I am satisfied that it was in good condition and that the omission had no bearing on the accident.
62. There is some evidence that when the fan was first installed it was constantly attended on all shifts; afterwards, for some years up until July, 1959, there was regular attendance but only on a part-time basis. Three men, one on each shift, looked after the fan as well as running the haulage at No. 5 on the day and back shifts and undertaking pumping duties on the night shift. These three men retired in July, 1959. On 3rd August, J. Clarke became the day shift haulage man at No. 5. He was authorised in writing to operate electrical switchgear and to oil, examine and report on the fan; the undermanager gave him some instructions about his duties on the fan but these did not include an instruction to inspect the fan every half-hour; I am very doubtful whether he could have complied with such an instruction because it would have been incompatible with his haulage duties. Clarke attended to the fan three times during his shift. He did not examine the fan nor did he report on it. The attention he gave it seems to have been limited to seeing that the fan was running and to oiling it. He said that the quantity of oil he used was about two pints during his shift, one pint at the beginning of the shift, half a pint in the middle and another half a pint at the end. P. Keenan was the new haulage man on the back shift; he said that he had received a general instruction from the back shift overman, Bell, to look at the fan from time to time and report to him if he found anything wrong. Keenan was not otherwise authorised to look after the fan but he said that he oiled it occasionally. There was no regular arrangement for looking after the fan during the night shift. On the night before the fire the manager instructed the night shift overman, Love, through the safety officer, Harvey, to put a man on the fan for that night. The overman said that the instruction he received was to the effect that he was to pay attention to the fan and notify the overman in No. 1 Pit workings if it stopped. There was unusually high absenteeism on the night shift and the overman accepted personal responsibility for looking after the fan.
63. Regulations 18 and 19 of the Coal and Other Mines (Ventilation) Regulations, 1956, prescribe certain requirements in regard to the equipment and supervision of the fan. The equipment required by Regulation 18 — a water gauge and an automatic indicator registering the ventilation pressure — was properly provided but it is clear that the provisions of Regulation 19 were not observed. Regulation 19, which requires, as a minimum, inspection at half hourly intervals, may have been designed primarily to provide against danger from inadequate ventilation in the event of a fan stopping or slowing down but this accident has demonstrated the importance it can assume in regard to fire risks at underground booster fans. The speed with which fire at a fan can develop, as shown by this accident, points to the need for something more than half-hourly inspections. I have in mind such precautions as the fitting of automatic devices to give audible alarm at a place constantly attended in the event of over-heating and automatically operated fire-fighting devices, such as water sprinklers or curtains, especially on the downwind side. These are matters which call for careful consideration of all the circumstances at any colliery where there is an underground fan which presents a fire hazard.
64. As no one can say precisely when the fire started or how it developed, it follows that it is not possible to judge with certainty whether or not half-hourly examinations in this period of time would have affected the outcome of the accident. But I cannot discount the possibility, to put it no higher, that a half-hourly inspection may have disclosed a developing danger in time to afford an opportunity of averting the tragic result.
65. It was suggested at the Inquiry that even had fan attendants been appointed there might have been an interval of more than half an hour due to the change of shifts. I cannot accept the implication that the provisions of Regulation 19 are confined to shifts. I was glad to learn at the Inquiry that, as an immediate measure, the National Coal Board had instituted a system of constant supervision of all underground fans driven by balata transmission belts pending substitution by safer drives.