EVENTS ON THE DAY OF THE FIRE
Timing
18. It became apparent quite early in the Inquiry that there was a period of an hour or so during which every minute was potentially significant in considering whether or not, once the fire had started, anything could have been done to avert the loss of life. I was very favourably impressed by the way in which the witnesses, without exception, gave their evidence, but it is nevertheless necessary to keep constantly in mind their difficulty in the timing of events. Very few of the witnesses carried watches and it can be by no means certain that those which were carried were accurate. In these circumstances, it is surprising that the estimated times tie in as well as they do; but it might nevertheless be misleading to place too much reliance upon any one time quoted.
Appearance of Haze
19. About 6.25 a.m. on Friday, 18th September, 1959, after most of the night shift had gone up and before the day shift had come down, A. Paton, the night shift engineman in charge of the man-riding haulage, was waiting in his engine house near the upcast pit bottom to be relieved by T. Campbell, when he noticed a slight haze and a very slight smell of something burning. He was not perturbed but went to the pit bottom and met the first cage of day shift men just after 6.30 a.m. One of these was J. H. Dickson, the day shift assistant overman; Paton drew Dickson's attention to the haze and smell; Dickson was suffering from a cold and could not smell anything but he sensed signs of "a kind of heat" in the air. He decided to investigate inbye and told an oncost (day-wage) worker to inform R. Boyd, the day shift overman, when he came down the pit. Paton then went back to his engine house and ran the first train down the man-riding haulage road. Many of the men on this train gave evidence about the haze in the pit bottom but, although some sensed that all might not be well inbye, none seemed to have been in any way alarmed. The train left at 6.40 a.m., or perhaps a minute or two before, with Dickson and about seventeen others. The normal journey time was about eight minutes, so it would have arrived at the inbye terminus two or three minutes after 6.45 a.m. There was no appointed guard on this train but it was signalled back to the pit bottom.
20. Some of the men on the train, including Dickson, said that the haze at the inbye terminus of the man-riding haulage was perhaps very slightly thicker than at the pit bottom, but they were still not alarmed. It was the usual practice for some of them to continue to travel along the return airway towards their working places. On this occasion, Dickson decided as a safety precaution that all the men should accompany him through Johnston's Crosscut into the intake airway and he passed back instructions to that effect. The men followed him into the intake airway, then inbye to the crosscut nearest the fan arriving there at just about 7.00 a.m.
Discovery of the Fire
21. Dickson went alone through the doors at the back of No. 5 haulage engine house into the fan house and there found flames rising from the fan belt which had apparently burned through and was lying on the floor with the ends about three feet from the motor pulley. He said that the belt was around the fan pulley and that flame from the belt was being drawn into the fan casing. As I record in more detail later, others who followed Dickson into the fan house saw the fan casing and oil around the bearings burning and, going through the by-pass doors, saw flame coming from the fan outlet into the return airway at or shortly after 7.05 a.m.
At the Shafts
22. Meanwhile, the day shift overman, Boyd, who was down the pit by about 6.50 a.m., had received Dickson's message and had gone to the main switches near the downcast shaft with the intention of switching off all the electric current inbye. He was, however, uncertain about the switching arrangements, so he told D. Kirkpatrick, a pump maintenance man, who was conversant with the switchgear, to cut off the current. To make sure that this would not affect No. 1 Pit workings, Boyd decided to telephone to an electrician on the surface. While he was trying to do this he overheard Dickson on the telephone saying that the fan was ablaze. The time would, according to his movements, have been just after 7.00 a.m. In the meantime, J. Thornton, an electrician, had reached the pit bottom and Boyd sent him to the main switches to check that the electric current was off the fan. The electrician went to the switches and then telephoned Dickson asking him to cut off the electricity supply to the fan motor.
23. After he had been to the switches but before he went to the telephone, Boyd had told an oncost worker to give a message to Campbell in the engine house. The message was overheard by a conveyor beltman, but the precise form it took is a little uncertain; it seems to have been to the effect that no one was to be let down the man-riding haulage until further instructions were given. Boyd said in evidence that he intended that any men in the haulage were to be withdrawn, but that his words possibly did not convey that meaning. He then walked inbye down the intake airway; on the way he met a brusher who had been sent by Dickson to Johnston's Crosscut to stop any men going into the return airway beyond that point. Boyd felt sure he had stopped all men coming in, so he took the brusher in with him to the fan, which he reached shortly before 7.30 a.m.
24. Paton, on receiving the appropriate signal, started to haul the empty train outbye but was then, at about 6.50 a.m., relieved by Campbell. Paton walked to the cage and went up the pit. On the surface he told D. McKinnon, the chief engineer, and A. Pettigrew, the under-manager, that there was a haze in the return airway.
25. Pettigrew suspected that the haze was being caused by the fan belt which, as he knew, had given trouble during the night. He went to the lamp room and telephoned a warning to the overman in No. 1 Pit workings that the booster fan might not be working. He had just finished this telephone conversation when a call from Dickson was received in the lamp room. McKinnon spoke to Dickson who said that there was a fire at the fan and that hoses and extinguishers were urgently needed. McKinnon and Pettigrew, after informing the manager, went down the upcast shaft at about 7.10 a.m., taking with them a new fan belt which McKinnon had earlier sent to the pithead. It evidently did not occur to them that there was imminent danger to men in the No. 2 Pit return airway; they were anxious about the ventilation and their sole purpose in mind was to put the fire out and restart the fan. At the bottom of the upcast shaft, Pettigrew and McKinnon encountered fairly dense smoke. Pettigrew saw a number of the day shift men waiting to go up the pit and presumed that they included all the men from the return airway. He went down the intake airway with McKinnon and D. McAuley, a mechanic.
The Second Train Journey
26. The first train returned to the outbye terminus probably a little after 6.55 a.m. Forty-eight men then boarded the bogies to go inbye. This train, according to the engineman, left at 7.00 a.m. or perhaps a few minutes before. The recollection of T. Green, the sole survivor of the men on this train, was that the haze thickened very slightly during the journey to the inbye terminus. With a journey time of eight minutes, the train would have arrived inbye at or shortly after 7.05 a.m. None of the men left the vicinity of the inbye terminus, however, because the arrival of the train there more or less coincided with a thick blanket of smoke which came along the return airway towards them. By common consent, they decided that it was impossible to proceed inbye and they re-boarded the bogies. Campbell received a signal to haul outbye and started to do so; he then received signals to stop and start the train three times in quick succession, but when the train eventually got under way it did not stop again until it was near the outbye terminus. The sequence of signals is borne out in part by evidence of men who were near the engine house. Green, on the other hand, only recollected the train stopping once after it left the inbye terminus; this was at the top of the 1 in 5 gradient when the train was stopped so that one of the passengers who was slumping off a bogie could be pulled back into his seat. This was done and the train signalled away again after a delay which Green put at a few moments. The smoke, according to Green, was very thick indeed; he covered his mouth and nose as best he could with his jacket. He was at the outbye end of the train and when it stopped before it reached the terminus near the engine house, he got off and stumbled outbye until he was overcome just after passing the gate at the outbye end of the man-riding haulage road. As I shall describe later, he was rescued. None of the other forty-seven men on the bogies escaped from the return airway. Indeed, as they were found later, it was apparent that forty-three of them had been overcome as they sat on the bogies; one appeared to have fallen from the train about 300 yards inbye; only three seemed to have been able to attempt an escape and they had succumbed quite close to the train.
27. Earlier, as the ingoing train was nearing the inbye terminus, Campbell had received Boyd's message about not letting any more men down the haulage. He construed the message as meaning that his authorised guard and any men who remained on the bogies were to be withdrawn. He was not unduly worried at the time, however, because the haze at the engine house had not appreciably worsened since he had taken over from Paton. When he received the first signal to bring the bogies outbye, Campbell assumed that only the guard was on board; the subsequent signals to stop and start, however, led him to think that something had gone wrong. The train was about half way out when the haze at the engine house turned to thick smoke and he could not see his train position indicator. Conditions became even worse and Campbell, feeling he could not stay there any longer, was faced with the difficult decision whether or not to stop the train. He was still unaware how many men were aboard the bogies and, as conditions became impossible for him, it passed through his mind that he might leave the engine house without stopping the engine. The train would then have continued to the outbye terminus, where the engine would have cut out automatically. He was slowing the engine down when he heard a voice, and he then decided to stop the bogies for fear of running down any men who might be trying to escape on foot. He brought the train to rest about 100 yards from the terminus. By this time, probably just about 7.15 a.m., Campbell himself was almost overcome, but he was able to make his way out through the separation doors near the Main Coal haulage engine to the intake airway, whence he later rode in the downcast shaft to the surface.
Rescues at the Shaft Bottom
28. A number of men were waiting near the outbye terminus for a third train to take them inbye when the haze thickened to smoke. They went into the fresh air which was leaking through the separation doors in a connection a short distance outbye; but while waiting there, they heard sounds indicating that someone was moving. Some of them went back into the smoke and found Green by groping in an atmosphere with visibility at zero. They took him to the upcast shaft bottom whence he was taken to the surface. G. Brown, the onsetter at the upcast shaft bottom, was then also overcome. He was rescued and taken into intake air, then up the downcast shaft. Those who rescued Green and Brown, some of whom took part in both rescues, acted with undoubted courage and I am glad to associate myself with the tributes paid to them by representatives of all parties at the Inquiry.
At the Fire
29. After discovering the belt ablaze, Dickson stopped the motor, hurried to No. 5 haulage house, a distance of about 50 yards, and picked up a fire extinguisher. He took it to the fire but found it would not work. He thereupon instructed A. Cunningham, a deputy, and others who had followed him to the fan, to try to smother the fire with sand and stone dust while he went to the telephone. He telephoned the surface from No. 6 Bench, about 100 yards from the fan, and asked for extinguishers to be sent down. As officials had been instructed by the manager to notify No. 1 Pit workings if the fan stopped, Dickson also gave a warning that it was not working. He collected another fire extinguisher from No. 6 transformer house but found, on his return to the fan, that this extinguisher also would not work. He did not look for more extinguishers but returned to the telephone at No. 6 Bench and, probably a few moments after 7.05 a.m., made the call in which he asked for extinguishers and hoses. He said that when making one of his telephone calls he had to wait a minute or two before the pumpman who attended to the switchboard at the shaft bottom put his call through to the surface.
30. Dickson went to No. 5 Bench to prepare the hydrant there for the fire hoses but he found the water range blanked off. There was a hydrant some 300 yards away in No. 6 roadway. He thought this too distant and decided to take the hydrant and fix it on the water range at No. 5 Bench. He was assisted in this by others and the hydrant was ready when the hoses arrived from the surface some time later. At about 7.15 a.m. he made a further telephone call to the surface; he spoke to D. Gray, a general duties man, in the lamp room and asked for the Rescue Brigade to be summoned. Up to this time Dickson had seen only the fire inside the fan house.
31. Two deputies, M. Lynch and J. Roe, had walked down the return airway after the first train had left. They had come through Johnston's Crosscut to the intake airway and arrived at the fan shortly after Dickson. They and others had seen the fan casing and oil from the bearings burning at 7.05 a.m., or perhaps a little later. Roe helped Lynch to put stone dust on the fire for a very short time then, probably just after 7.05 a.m., went through the three by-pass doors. Lynch, who had local fire service experience, tested the extinguishers that had failed when Dickson tried to use them and he, too, found them unworkable. He then followed Roe through the doors. Both men saw flames coming from the fan outlet and striking the roof and the right hand side of the road between the fan and the safety fence. F. MacDonald, a brusher, said that at 7.15 a.m. the belt had been reduced to ash. The fan casing was alight and when he went through the doors soon afterwards, he saw fire at the roof outbye of the fan. Boyd reached the fan shortly before 7.30 a.m. The fire in the fan itself was still burning but when he went through the doors he saw only smouldering in the roadway between the fan and the safety fence although the return airway was ablaze outbye of the by-pass junction. When Pettigrew went through the three doors a few minutes later, he found fire and a fall of roof at the junction.
32. There is some uncertainty about the time when hoses and other fire-fighting appliances were taken down the pit, but I think it emerges that it was 8.00 a.m. or perhaps a few minutes afterwards. This equipment reached the scene of the lire between 8.20 and 8.30 a.m. and it was quickly put into service by men under the supervision of Pettigrew. At first only one hose was used, but later, by means of equipment brought down by the Rescue Brigade, two more hoses were brought into use. Much later in the morning Pettigrew learned that men were trapped in the return airway and he instructed R. Harvey, the safety officer, to carry out a check of all men in the pit. Harvey did this and then went to the surface where a similar check had been instituted by the manager at about 8.00 a.m. As a result of these checks it became apparent that forty-seven men were missing.
33. Fire-fighting continued throughout the day. For some hours the fire-fighters were able to keep up with the fire, but after a time they were hampered by falls of roof which occurred as the wooden laggings above the girders were burnt away.
Action on the Surface
34. Soon after Pettigrew and McKinnon went down the pit, Kirkpatrick, the pump maintenance man who had learned of the fire at the fan from Thornton, the electrician at the pit bottom, reached the surface with J. White, a roadman, and began to assemble hoses and extinguishers. The manager, who had been told of the fire by Pettigrew, prepared to go down the pit; he, like Pettigrew and McKinnon, had not appreciated that the lives of men were in danger. On his way to the lamp room, however, between 7.20 and 7.25 a.m., he saw Green being brought out of the pit unconscious and recognised that something was very seriously wrong below ground. The manager realised that it was not safe to use the upcast shaft and immediately gave instructions for winding in it to cease. He told White to inform the engineman of the downcast shaft that the needles were to be lifted at once and then to go down the pit himself and see that the lifting operation was carried out properly and quickly. The fire-fighting equipment collected by Kirkpatrick and White had meantime been assembled at the downcast pithead awaiting the lifting of the needles. The banksman at this pit, T. Montgomery, put the time at which White descended a little after 7.35 a.m. and said that before 8.00 a.m. the needles had been raised and the rope lengths adjusted (by a drum clutch) to permit winding down to the pit bottom; the manager put this time at 7.55 a.m. which he calculated by reference to his movements following a call he made to the Rescue Brigade. Before telephoning the Rescue Brigade the manager had spoken on the telephone to C. M. Inglis, the Group Manager, and told him of the fire. The manager gave as the reason for this order of priority the fact that access could not be gained to No. 2 Pit workings until the needles in the downcast shaft had been lifted, an operation which would take some 20 minutes.
35. Thereafter, the Area General Manager and other members of area management, B. Spencer, H.M. Senior District Inspector of Mines and Quarries, and L. Cheesbrough, H.M. District Inspector of Mines and Quarries, were informed of the fire and quickly arrived at the colliery.
Rescue Brigade Operations
36. The manager's telephone call to the Coatbridge Central Rescue Station was received at the Station at 7.40 a.m. The first team left the station at 7.45 a.m. and arrived at the colliery, 7½ miles away, at 8.00 a.m. The second team followed ten minutes behind. After briefing by the manager, the first rescue team of five men descended the pit at 8.08 a.m. and immediately set up a fresh air base on the intake side of the pair of separation doors nearest the man-riding haulage. Wearing self-contained breathing apparatus they made a preliminary inspection in the return airway and came out to report that the atmosphere was very bad; they had been unable to see anything, but had stumbled upon a body. The team returned and recovered the body; artificial respiration was given for over half an hour, but without success. In the meantime, the second team went into the return airway but returned within fifteen minutes to report that conditions were no better; when they came out the members of the team were in a distressed condition due mainly to heat. They were unable to determine the temperature, however, because the atmosphere was so dense that they could not take a reading except when close to the separation doors where there was some leakage of fresh air. The reaction bands of palladium sulphite tubes used for carbon monoxide determination became completely black, thus indicating a concentration well in excess of 0.1 per cent. Subsequent analyses of samples collected later by rescue men showed the presence in the return airway of 0.4 per cent, carbon monoxide, a concentration which, with other effects of fire, would cause death in a minute or two.
37. From about 9.30 a.m. onwards, rescue men made regular examinations a short distance into the return airway near the shafts and took air samples. From time to time the Rescue Superintendent looked into the return airway and decided that conditions were so bad that he was not justified in risking the lives of the members of his teams by asking them to undertake a full scale search. The conclusion had long before been reached, however, that there could be no hope of survival for those who were trapped. Rescue men at the fire worked without breathing apparatus alongside the colliery men, giving advice and valuable assistance generally.
38. When signal bells were heard at about 4.30 p.m. colliery workmen, with rescue brigade men standing-by, started at once to open a way to the return through a stopped-off crosscut (marked "Second crosscut stopped-off" on Plan No. 1); some time later two men broke through into the return, but the atmosphere there was such as to confirm conclusively the view, taken much earlier in the day, that there was no conceivable chance of survival for anyone in it. It was subsequently discovered that the bell signals had been caused by falls of roof fouling the haulage signal pull wire in the return airway.
Later at the Fire
39. The methane content of the air passing over the fire was continuously and closely watched. The air flow was regulated by varying the openings in doorways and by erecting sheets at strategic points. In this way the methane content was kept below two per cent. By 9.00 p.m., the fire-fighters, encouraged by an apparent reduction in the smoke, thought they had the fire under control. At Johnston's Crosscut, however, the smoke was found still to be very dense and it was realised that, despite their strenuous efforts, the fire-fighters were not overtaking the fire. Some time just before 9.30 p.m., R. J. Evans, H.M. District Inspector of Mines and Quarries, who some three hours earlier had succeeded his Inspectorate colleagues, L. Cheesbrough and F. Tootle, at the fire, noticed that a methanometer was recording two and a half per cent. of methane just outbye the junction of the two return airways. There were percentages approaching four and a half at places in the return airway from the Coking Coal Sections and he quite properly advised the withdrawal of all men to the intake airway. By 10.15 p.m. the methane content in places was five per cent. and he informed Dr. Hyde, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines and Quarries, who was at the surface. With the agreement of all parties concerned, everyone in the pit was withdrawn to the surface. Hoses, which had been earlier laid in the downcast pit bottom in readiness for such an eventuality, were then brought into use to commence flooding the valleys in the intake and return airways near Johnston's Crosscut to seal off the fire.