William Clennell, fireman — I was employed as a fireman at Davison's engine, and had been three months previous to the explosion. I went down about half-past four o'clock in the morning, and left at ten minutes to five o'clock in the afternoon. All had gone right with the boiler fire, just as usual, up to the time of my leaving. I damped the fire before I left. It had been burnt down as usual every night, and about half of it would be cinders, and half green coal. There would be better than half a tub — not quite a tub. I put on a tub and a half, or two tubs at the outside, to damp the fire. I saw the damper put down by Davison. That was when I had got the fire about half damped. The damper was usually left an inch and a half open, just to take away the smoke. The weight attached to it hangs almost against the wall, and I can tell by guessing what is the space left open. I left the fire doors open as usual when I left. Gas is a thing I know nothing about. I have never seen the engine or the boiler since the explosion. I have seen the damage done by the explosion, but I cannot form any opinion where it took place, or what caused it. This is the first underground boiler that I have tended, and that only for three months. This is the first time I have known an explosion of this sort. When I left, I had no apprehension of danger. When we come in a morning, sometimes the steam was blowing oft; and sometimes not. Sometimes the fire was well burnt up at the backside when blowing off and sometimes block.
Thomas Richardson, of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, reader in chemistry in the Durham University, chemical manufacturer, analytical chemist, and LL.D., said — I have been down the pit, and have examined it, and am able to state where the explosion took place. I found considerable damage to the flues of Davison's engine. I heard the evidence given by Mr. Bell of the injury done to the flue, and I believe it to be true. I do not think I noticed any further injury than he has described. I am of opinion the explosion has taken place between the boiler of the engine and the crossing of the north rolleyway. From what I have heard given in evidence, and my own examination, I believe the destructive effects which I noticed in connection with the damage done, arose from an explosion of gas in the flue between the boiler and the crossing. There was about 3000 cubic feet of flue between the boiler and the crossing, which would contain that amount of gaseous matter. The gas might be an explosive mixture, which might be a mixture of various gases. It might consist of carbonic oxide, light carburetted hydrogen, or olefiant gas, or a mixture of the three or any two of them. These gases might come from the destructive distillation of the fuel used in firing the boiler, which would proceed from the fire grates under the boiler, and pass underneath the damper into the flue, if the damper was open only an inch and a half. The space between the bottom of the damper and the sole — the heat of the flue — the draught of the upcast shaft — the temperature of the air admitted to the grates — the quantity and condition of the fuel used at and previous to the damping — are all points which would affect the filling of the flue with explosive gas; and if the combination was favourable, the flue would be so filled. The result proves that the combination must have been favourable to it. The evidence I have heard, and what I have seen, leads me to think so. I think there is no other mode for accounting for the explosion but the one I have given. Three or four hundred cubic feet of a mixture of these gases in the flues between the boiler and the crossing would cause, on explosion, the damage I found. As far as I understand the working of this pit, I consider it impossible that the explosion could have been from an accumulation of gas in the workings carried into the flues. If gunpowder had been in the flue, it might have caused some of the damage I have seen. It would require seventy-five quarter-barrels of gunpowder to cause the same effect as the gas contained in the flue. The first effect of the explosion would be to prevent the usual ventilation of the pit, and the after-damp would be carried by the current of air. A small quantity of after-damp would vitiate a large quantity of air; in fact, ten times its own quantity. It would be impossible to ascertain the amount of carbonic acid gas after the explosion, without knowing the composition of the explosive mixture in the flue at the time, and also the soot in it; and the combustion of the soot would increase the production of carbonic acid gas, and there would be in the flues sufficient heat generated by the explosion of this mixture to ignite the soot. I find, in a work entitled "Bunsen's Gasometry," by a German chemist of the name of Bunsen, published in 1857 by Walton and Maberly, that the temperature of the gases I have alluded to, when exploded, is very much higher than I had previously calculated upon, and which strengthens the opinion Mr. Bell and myself have already enunciated. Flame from a gunpowder explosion would not have extended so far as to set fire to hay in the north stables, a distance of 330 yards from where, I think, the explosion took place. The soot, if it had been ignited, would be carried to the stables in the same way, or the hot air either from a gunpowder explosion or the gaseous mixtures I have noticed. The stables have been set on fire either by the heated air of the explosion, or by incandescent particles taken by the air. The evidence of the burning of the men is very slight, and is nothing more than can be accounted for by the heated state of the gas or air. I know the concussion after the explosion at Newcastle was so great as to put out the lights in a manufactory at Jarrow Slake, a distance of eight miles, and that is why I consider that, the men being knocked down by this concussion, a very small quantity of after-damp would then kill them, when it would not a man in robust health, at the distances I have heard they were found. I cannot find any other cause for the explosion than the one I have pointed out. It is a direct and feasible one. Olefiant gas is a highly explosive gas — much more so than any of the others. I never met with it in any analysis of fire-damp from mines that I have made; but it is said to exist in the mines of the Rhine. It may be produced from coal by distillation. It might be so distilled from coal consumed in a fire damped as I have heard the fire at Davison's engine was. It is a constant constituent of our house gas. Ten per cent. of carbonic acid, mixed with air, would destroy life, and also put out a candle, but I cannot say what is the least percentage to put out a candle. The margin between the destruction of life and a candle being put out is very little. I have passed up the north rolleyway, and seen the effects of the explosion, and I believe, when the products of the combustion in this flue found vent into that north rolleyway by the destruction of the crossing, they would fill that rolleyway to such an extent as to pass on and destroy these men, having previously interrupted the usual ventilation. Carbonic acid and nitrogen mixed is after-damp. There is 20 per cent, of oxygen in air. I cannot say what deficiency of oxygen in air would kill a man. I cannot make any computation. I never heard of a man out of the flame being burnt by heated air in an underground explosion, but I can quite believe in its possibility. It depends upon circumstances. I think the explosion would have gone straight away if it had not been for the obstruction of the crossing, which was on a rise, and which diverted it north and south. It is possible the gas in the flue was in greater proportion than 1 in 10 of air, and that, on the explosion breaking the crossing down, the unconsumed gas got its proportion of air from the intake, and so increased the force of the explosion; but I do not think it probable. The concussion of air might kill these men in the south and north rolleyways, unmarked by violence, without any after-damp. If any difficulty arose to account for the ignition at the damper, it might arise by a tailing back of the gas at the roof of the arch from the furnace to the seat of the explosion from the ventilating furnace.
John Daglish, of Hetton Colliery, viewer to the Hetton Coal Company, said — The Hetton Colliery consists of three distinct collieries, Elemore, Eppleton, and Hetton. There are two distinct shafts at each colliery, one used as a downcast the other as an upcast. The Eppleton is connected with the Hetton, but the Elemore is not. The area of the downcast shaft of the East and West Minor Pits, after deducting for slides, brattices, &c., is 98 feet clear, and that of the upcast 132 square feet. The intakes and outtakes are considerably larger, I might say four times that size. That will allow 230,000 cubic feet of air to circulate. We have measured that quantity in the upcast, and, at the same time, there was 180,000 cubic feet in the downcast. That quantity of air was circulating in the East and West Minor Pits immediately before the explosion. The increased temperature in the upcast shaft apparently increased the quantity of air. The last measurements of air were taken a fortnight previously. The day of the explosion was the regular day for retaking them. That quantity was sufficient for the perfect ventilation of the pits. With that circulation, gas could not accumulate in the workings of the pits. There was no alteration made in the length or direction of any of the currents, and the water gauge was standing at the same point at the time of the explosion as at the time of the measurement a fortnight previously. The water gauge denotes the difference in pressure existing between the downcast and upcast shafts, and is, therefore, a measurement of the ventilating power. The water gauge is taken every hour, and a return made to the master wasteman every night, who enters it on a diagram, and forwards it to me for inspection every night, and from these reports I can tell any neglect on the part of the furnacemen. The greatest variation of pressure during the day of the explosion did not exceed two-tenths, which is very regular. At five o'clock it was 1.5; that is two-tenths beyond what I require — 1.3 is the standard of that pit. Up to that hour the ventilation had been perfect. On the Tuesday night before the explosion I examined the water gauge myself. We have a barometer in use in the pits, one at each colliery, and also at bank in connection therewith. They are registered daily, both on the surface and in the pits, as well as the thermometers. If there was a sudden fall in the barometer, reducing the atmospheric pressure, if there was any gas in the goaves it might come out. The object of these regulations is to insure watchfulness on the part of those in charge as much as anything else. The barometer in the pit indicated, on the morning of the explosion, 30.1, being a rise of three-tenths above the day previous. It reads higher than the surface barometer, which reads halt an inch below that of the pit. On the day of the accident, I had reports from all the men in charge. I receive such reports, twenty-eight in number, every night, besides the water gauge diagrams from each pit. I received the reports the night previous, but for the day of the explosion I received them immediately afterwards. They had been made immediately before the explosion, and the boy was on his way to me at the time of the explosion. The ventilation of the mine is produced by a difference of the weight of air in the downcast and upcast shafts. The buoyancy of the upcast is caused by highly heating the air by means of four furnaces in the Minor Pits, and three engine fires — the air rushes down the downcast in order to ascend the upcast. The water gauge may be explained thus :— A communication pipe is put between the two shafts, and attached to it is a tube of glass, bent in the form of a U which is partly filled with water, and the air of the downcast pressing on one side of the U raises the water in the opposite leg, and thus indicates the amount of the ventilating pressure. In this instance, the difference in the level of the water was an inch and a half, which is equivalent to about 9lbs. pressure per square foot, equal to about 11,000lbs pressure over the whole area of the upcast shaft. There were 37,000 cubic feet, by anemometer measure, going into the south way, which, making allowance for the friction of the instrument, would be 40,000 as measured by gunpowder smoke. That was immediately before the explosion. In the north way there were, by actual measurement by gunpowder smoke 46,000, by anemometer 44,000. With air thus circulating, it is impossible for gas to accumulate in the workings. The extreme distance the air has to travel, from the downcast shaft to the extreme portion of the south way, is 1400 yards, and of the north way, 2600 yards. The north way is the furthest the air has to travel. The reports for the day on which the explosion took place were all good. I produce the report, marked A, of James Dakers, the person in charge of the north way, up to five o'clock of the day of explosion, in which he says "pit all right." I had, also, a report from the witness Young, which was to the same effect. The master wasteman and his son send in a joint report. James Reed each day gives a report of the districts through which he has travelled, and also as to the ventilation of the pit, which report I produce, marked B, in which he states "all going on as usual." None of the reports, received that day, indicated the presence of gas in any portion of the pits. The quantity of air, we consider, we had in the pit at the time of the explosion was not only sufficient for the ordinary requirements of the mine, but intended to be sufficient under unusual circumstances, such as occurred on the Sunday previous to the explosion; and as proof; I would state that after the explosion, owing to the destruction of the stoppings and crossings at the end of the south drift, and the entire interruption to the ventilation of that part, a large quantity of gas accumulated, the whole of which has been removed by the present limited ventilation, without any appearance of it in the vicinity of the furnaces, although, since the explosion, all the three furnaces in the lower seam, and the three engine fires are out. The size of the furnaces are as follows :— the large east furnace, ten feet; the two west, eight feet each; and the main coal, between six and seven feet. These furnaces are for the ventilation of the pit. There is now one-third of the air circulating (owing to the furnaces not being in operation) that there was previously to the explosion; but the south way is not getting its full supply, on account of the contractions in it from the falls. Therefore, one-fourth of the ventilation, in operation previously to the explosion, was sufficient to carry off all gas accumulated during the fortnight since the explosion; not only all that was made, but also what had accumulated. The diminution of the air in the downcast was two-thirds, in consequence of the furnaces being out, and from no other cause. The downcast shaft is now divided into two pits by a brattice. It was at one time both an upcast and downcast shaft; but the Blossom Pit was some years since sunk down to the Hutton seam, and made an upcast, and since then both sides of the brattice have been used as an intercommon downcast shaft. That was done for the better ventilation of the colliery. I first heard of the explosion between eight and nine o'clock on Thursday night, the 20th of December, and I immediately went over to the pits and tried both engines of the East and West Minor Pits to get down, but found there was some obstruction which prevented the cages being drawn up by either of them. The upcast in the Blossom Pit is fitted up with wire rope guides to the main coal, and is used for drawing the coals from that seam; but as the guides do not go down to the Hutton seam, there is no access to it by this pit. There was then no means of getting down into the pit, so I at once rode over to Eppleton. On my road, I called on the underviewer of that colliery, and by the time we were ready to go down, Thomas Reed and Robert Young also arrived, and with two other men we descended the pit. [The witness then described the exertions used to get to the Minor Pits from the Eppleton Pit, and the manner in which the Eppleton air current was diverted to enable the exploring parties to reach the Minor Pit, and recover the survivors. He then resumed] :— In company with Mr. Heckels, Mr. John Taylor; and other gentlemen, I proceeded to examine the boilers, where we had the idea of the explosion having occurred. We noticed the direction of the blast as we proceeded, and on arriving at the end of No. 3 boiler, at the damper end, we found the entire flue blown away from the damper to the pipe drift — the top of the flue had been blown from the inside. Opposite the pipe drift, the sides of the flue, the whole flue, the travelling flues, and the brick work were blown away at that point. Following up the flue to the north wagonway, we found the arched crossing which carried the flue over it completely gone — the sides left standing, and the sole gone — which shows that the force came from above, and that part of the crossing next to the boiler was completely blown to pieces. On the opposite side, part of the crossing was left, showing that the blast had come from the direction of the boiler, and had found full vent at this crossing. I have also examined the continuation of the flue towards the furnaces. Here it is solid, and the apparent damage is not so great, but still following the direction of the blast from the boiler, but with diminished force. At the first turn, a few bricks were blown out, from the direction of the boiler; also, at the next turn, near the furnaces, and a small wall between the flue and the furnaces was overturned, still in the same direction. We have no further indication of the force of the blast in this direction, excepting from the witness Curry, at the east furnace. I have examined the pit in all the parts we have been able to get into, and in every direction I find evidences that the blast has proceeded from the neighbourhood of the damper of No. 3 boiler, which satisfies me that that was the seat of the explosion. Further, I also find that the blast has acted with diminished force in all directions from the damper, in some cases entirely ceasing where the distance is far enough. In the north wagonway we have no evidence of force beyond the crossing joining the travelling way to the Eppleton Pit, a distance of 1600 yards, although it had killed and mutilated four men at an intermediate point, about 600 or 700 yards from the shaft. Beyond the crossing no damage whatever was done. In the south part, beyond the crossing in the old bank, little or no damage has been done. That is 700 yards from the shaft, and about 100 yards beyond the foot of the new bank, where Ferguson and another man were found. In the other parts of this way the stone is so extremely bad that it is difficult to say where the blast has ceased its violence, such a large quantity of stone has fallen since the explosion. This we know by the whiteness of the roof. On the straight road the damage is greater than on the other ways, on account of the divergence of the blast, and the space allowed for its expansion. In the direction from the shaft, at right angles to the north and south ways, the damage done is comparatively slight. The size of the drift near the shaft being considerable, caused it not to be so great, but there was damage done sufficient to show the direction of the blast; and there is also the evidence of the men who felt the blast down the east bank. From all this, I come to the conclusion that the flue was the place where the explosion took place. I know, of my own knowledge, sufficient of chemistry to enable me to account for the violence of the explosion; and my own views and opinions are confirmed by the evidence of Mr. Bell and Dr. Richardson, which I have heard. I know that the coal put upon the boiler fire to damp it during that night, must have given off the whole of the gaseous matter it contained, which would, from the evidence of the fireman as to the quantity of coal he used, amount to 7000 cubic feet of inflammable gas, which requires ten times that amount of atmospheric air for its perfect combustion; and as the cubical contents of the flue are about 7000 feet, the gas given off from the coal mentioned by the fireman was sufficient to fill these flues ten times with a perfectly explosive mixture. That is how I account for the gas being there. It might have fired either at the ventilating furnace or the engine fire. I believe that there is very much greater power developed than is due merely to the quiet expansion of the gas, owing to the temperature of ignition. If we take gunpowder, over which we have more control, an ordinary charge for a rifle is equivalent to fifteen cubic inches; and taking its expansion due to the conversion both of the solid into the gaseous, and also the further expansion due to the temperature of ignition, and both these two at 2000 volumes, we have the ultimate expansion of a charge of gunpowder to be equivalent to 300 cubic inches. Take the bore of a rifle to be three-quarters of an inch, the area will be five inches; and if you take the length of the barrel to be thirty-six inches, its cubical contents will be eighteen inches, and as the ultimate expansion of the original charge was only 800 cubic inches, this is only equivalent to sixteen times the length of the gun barrel; whereas the ball is sent a mile and a half. And if so small a charge can project a ball to such a distance, I can readily believe that so large a quantity of gas collected in the flues when exploded is capable of doing all the damage which I have seen in the pit, especially considering that the damage is mostly confined to two single drifts. The gas could not have come from the workings of the pits, and I do not think it could have come from any other place than the boiler fire. The plans produced are correct ones of the workings, flues, &c., of the Minor Pits. [In explanation of the east furnace being put out on the Sunday night before the explosion, the witness described the nature of the repairs made in the Blossom Pit previous to the explosion in the Minor Pits. That the cast furnace, in the Minor Pit, was put out, and the two West Minor furnaces were damped up; but the main coal furnace and one boiler fire were kept away in full operation. During this time the regulators between the Hetton and Eppleton Collieries were opened wider than usual, which allowed a larger quantity of air to pass from the Eppleton Pit into the Minor Pits to prevent any accumulation of inflammable air. The witness resumed] The alteration in the air at this time could have nothing to do with the explosion, and could not have drawn any gas from any splits there might be in the pit. The whole of the south way was not interfered with. No part of the workings were laid dormant whilst this work was going on. There is a distance of two or three yards between the fire and the end of the flue of the ventilating furnace. The air passes all the edges of the goaves in the East and West Minor Pits, and so sweeps away any gas there may be. Some of it may be black damp, and some firedamp, but it is regularly swept away as it is given off. When carried away by the air, it would pass over the furnace, and not into the flue. Gas coming off the goaves could not get into the flues. If the gas was so given off as to contaminate the whole of the return air-currents, being all mixed before they arrived at the furnace, and if they had been inflammable and set fire to by passing over the furnace the explosion would pass back along the returns to where it came from, and its effects would have been there seen, and not in the wagonway, as in this case. If this had happened, the men at the east and west furnaces would have been burnt. I rather incline to the belief, that the gas in the flues was not thoroughly saturated with air, and on the blowing down of the crossing took up a fresh portion of air, and so produced a continuance of the blast with greater violence. I have never seen the air in the returns in such a state as to give any indication of the presence of gas by the lamp, nor have I received any reports from the men in charge that they have done so. The arching of the flue was in contact with the stone above. The arch of the fire flue is formed of bricks, but I cannot say they are placed edgeways, but I think so. Probably two bricks edgeways. There is a flat brick flooring at the upper flue. The bottom of the flue has a floor, I think of lime and gravel cement. The arch of the wagonway I believe to be formed in the same way as that over the small flue. I have no conception of the weight resting on the crossing at the wagonway. There is an arch stands over the side flues at this crossing. No firedamp could have burst into the flues. The flues are swept at stated times, but I cannot say how often, or when they were last swept.