III. - NARRATIVE OF THE EXPLOSION
(1) The Explosion and the Rescue Work. The explosion occurred at 1.50 a.m. on Friday, 6th July, 1951, during the second hour of the first or fore-shift while the full complement of 13 men was at work.
All the nine men working in the face area were killed; seven outright and two, including the deputy, died subsequently from their injuries, but the four others outbye at the time escaped without injury. None of the 348 persons at work in other parts of the mine, including 39 in the other South Busty districts, was affected.
The alarm was raised by the haulage engineman, Evans, who was on the landing at the tub loading point when he felt a sudden rush of air outbye followed by a thick cloud of dust. He telephoned the shaft bottom and the shift overman, M. Brown, who was in an adjoining district at the time. On reaching the district, Mr. Brown went inbye after testing the ventilation. He found the conveyor belt dislodged and lying across the travelling way. About ten yards inbye of the end of the belt he came across N. Holmes, deputy, and near him Hicks, a shuttle car driver. Both men were alive but badly injured and he arranged to get them taken to the surface.
Shortly before 3.0 a.m. the first rescue team arrived on the scene and explored most of the district before turning back in the return airway owing to thick smoke and fumes. About this time the Undermanager, Mr. Martyn, discovered that the two doors leading into the main return airway for the South Side (see Plan No.2) had been blown open by the blast. This was completely short-circuiting the air in the district but the doors were not damaged and they were quickly restored. The rescue teams replaced canvas sheets inbye which had been destroyed by the explosion, and by 3.30 a.m. the ventilation began to take its normal course. All the bodies were out of the mine by 6.30 a.m., and it was possible by 7.0 a.m. to explore the whole of the district without wearing apparatus.
The positions of the bodies are marked on Plan No. 1. At the face of No. 8 Left, T. Box, the operator, was found lying alongside his Joy loader and R. Foster, the driver, was in a sitting position facing outbye in the driving seat of his shuttle car. R. Parker, shot firer, and A. Patterson, driller, were found on No. 4 Main Bord between Nos. 7 and 8 Right Cross-cuts. J. Walker and A. Hunter, cutter men, were found at their arcwall machine at the junction of the return airway (No. 6 Bord) with No. 6 Right Cross-cut. R. Tait, the other Joy loader operator, was found on the main bord between Nos. 5 and 6 Right Cross-cuts.
As already stated, N. Holmes, the deputy, and W. G. Hicks, the other shuttle car driver, were found lying badly injured on the main bord just inbye of the ramps leading up to the return end of the belt conveyor.
According to the medical evidence, carbon monoxide poisoning was the primary cause of death in each case except that of the loader operator Box, who died from the effects of violence only.
The names, ages and occupations of all the casualties, also the apparent cause of death in each case, are listed in Appendix I.
(2) The Subsequent Exploration of the Affected Area. The district was first examined within about five hours of the explosion by representatives of the National Coal Board, the workmen, and the Mines Inspectorate.
A Joy loader and a shuttle car were in position at the face of a working lift in No. 8 Left. It was evident the two men there were engaged on "banding" (loading away the middle holings) when the explosion occurred. The shuttle car was nearly full of stone and coal and the driver was seated ready to move the car as required. It is surmised that the loader operator Box was "inching" one or both of the traction motors to slew the gathering head of his machine, to suit the loading, when he saw something untoward happening and managed to actuate the remote control push/pull switch as he was caught by the blast of the explosion.
The second Joy loader was on No. 6 Right Cross-cut, not at the working face. The coal had been cleared off from the face of this place. which was "skirting" the cross-cut, and showed that the last cut had holed into No. 6 Bord (the return airway). The wedge-shaped piece of coal 1eft on at the holing appeared to have been cut by the arcwall machine, which was situated in the return at its junction with No. 6 Right; and it was evident this machine was being manoeuvred into position to put on the first cut for the continuation of the skirting into the next pillar.
No work was being performed in No. 7 Right Cross-cut. A round of shot holes in No. 8 Right face had only been partly stemmed and the explosion dust which had settled in the heading was undisturbed by footprints. It may be concluded that the shot firer Parker and the driller Patterson. whose bodies were found on the main bord, were in the act of charging these holes when they felt the explosion and immediately made their way outbye where. however, they were overcome by carbon monoxide after the flame had passed along there. Neither men had sustained any burning injuries.
The second shuttle car was empty and was situated on No. 4 Main Bord opposite No. 6 Right Junction.
I inspected the affected area three days later and confirmed these findings. It was then observed that the back of the cut in No. 8 Left face had broken through into the goaf ahead.
(3) Course of Travel of the Explosion. The area traversed by the flame was confined to the vicinity of the coal faces. The flame died out quickly outbye; on the intake just inbye of the discharging ramps at the return end of the belt conveyor at a distance of about 160 yards from the face : and in the return airway (No. 6 Bord) at the outbye side of No. 6 Right at a distance of about 100 yards from the face.
The amount of violence was slight throughout. Several roof supports were displaced but the resultant falls were small owing to the strong character of the roof. The 14-inch thick brick stoppings at the mouths of Nos. 3, 4 and 5 Right Cross-cuts were burst northwards, and the deputy’s kist on the main bord was flung over. All the canvas sheets in the cross-cuts were, of course, destroyed.
In No. 8 Right the force of the explosion was very mild and no flame had reached the face. This would account for the shot firer and the driller working there escaping the impact of the explosion.
The inbye length of the return airway suffered no damage, the roof supports were intact and the brattice sheets hung near the goaf edge were undisturbed. It is probable that the main force of the explosion did not develop before flame penetrated the goaf on the higher side of the return airway, in the region of No. 7 Bord, and that violence then swept into the return airway and down Nos. 7 and 6 cross-cuts.
Evidences of coking were widely but not densely distributed, mainly on Nos. 6 and 7 Right cross-cuts and about their junctions with Nos. 4 and 6 Bords, but it was clear that there was no propagation outbye by coal dust.
The general indications were that an explosion of firedamp had originated in No. 8 Left face and had travelled round the goaf edge, following the path normally taken by the ventilating current, and that it had swept from the goaf into the workings but had not travelled far outbye before dying out.
(4) The Source of Firedamp. The method of ventilation in 69A District (see Plan No. 2) was the same as that adopted generally in pillar extraction work by hand getting and loading in Durham County and elsewhere, namely, to build brattice sheets in the roadways leading to the face and to course the ventilation current round the goaf edge. The strong nature of the roof also enabled an air passage to be left over the dirt packed in the stowbords to assist the coursing of the ventilation.
When the lifts are drawn off, the sandstone roof does not fall close up to the solid coal but leaves a good windway round the goaf edge which, however, is not travelled as it is in drawn-off ground.
The Busty Seam may be described as being moderately gassy at this mine. The methane content of air samples taken at intervals in the return airway of 69A District in accordance with the Ventilation Regulations ranged from 0.08 to 0.74 per cent., that for June, 1951, being 0.08.
The disparity between these results, taken in conjunction with fairly consistent air measurements, indicates a corresponding difference in the amount of firedamp entering the air stream or, in other words, a great variation in the quality of the ventilation. This is to be expected to some extent as being due to the system of working the seam. The effect of a falling barometer, for example, under such conditions would be to cause the inflammable fringe of firedamp back in the goaf to encroach nearer to the working places.
I do not wish to imply from this that the district was not kept normally well ventilated, but merely to point out that a disturbance of any of the diverting canvas sheets would be sufficient to interfere seriously with the flow of ventilation necessary to sweep the edge of the goaf clear for a safe distance from the workings.
Over the 12 months previous to the explosion, firedamp had been reported on four occasions by the deputies; the most recent report was by the now deceased deputy, N. Holmes, on 11th June. All these places are now back in the goaf. On the back shift prior to the explosion, firedamp was detected by a cutterman, W. Wilson, who stated that the gas "took his light" in the roof at the goaf side of No. 8 Left face. He reported it to his deputy, J. Burrows, who quickly cleared it by renewing a canvas sheet but did not enter the fact in his report or inform either the oncoming deputy or his superior official. This was an unfortunate omission on the deputy’s part, and it was a contravention of No. 7 of the 1938 General Regulations.
Firedamp is likely to appear at times in the working places under such conditions of working, but judging from the deputies’ reports there does not appear to have been any difficulty in keeping the places clear, either in whole working or brokens working. There are no recorded instances of workmen having been withdrawn by reason of the presence of gas.
The leaving of "fenders" of coal about 5 feet thick to the loose end lifts as they are being driven up, which are sometimes robbed before the lift is drawn off, tends to prevent the roof from falling; and the goaf is probably closed well back eventually by the heaving of the floor as much as by the lowering of the roof.
There is no previous history of heavy weighting of the roof beds in this part of the mine, but there is clearly the possibility that if such weighting did occur, it would force firedamp from the partly closed goaf into the working places.
The normal ventilation current, which was restored soon after the explosion, took some time to clear the firedamp which was still present at the goaf edge in the adjoining working places, but once the accumulation was split up and moved the district remained clear.
The barometer had dropped 0.25 inch during the previous 24 hours and it was falling steadily at the time of the explosion. This lowering of the atmospheric pressure would account for any gas in the unconsolidated goaf approaching the workings but it would not in itself account for a heavy emission of firedamp into the working places.
Investigation of the workings after the explosion showed the usual signs of weighting to be expected in a pillar extraction district, but there was no unusual crush and the windway round the goaf edge remained open.
A sudden weighting of the roof within the goaf area may have forced firedamp out of the goaf into No. 8 Left (the first working place in the district) and a weighting of such a kind could be expected to force larger quantities of firedamp into the return end of the face circuit, but there was no evidence to indicate this had happened.
Any derangement of canvas sheets on the outbye side of No. 8 Left would short-circuit the ventilation and allow firedamp to accumulate in that working place. If the derangement was at the entrance to No. 8 Right, extra ventilation would pass along No. 8 Right and into the goaf beyond, forming a pocket of fresh air which would protect No. 8 Right and the inbye end of No. 6 Bord from the full effects of the explosion. This is probably what did occur.
If a weak mixture was ignited in No. 8 Left it would burn back into the goaf until it reached the explosive range. The subsequent explosion would eject firedamp from the goaf and would leave behind in the mine a concentration of firedamp at the goaf edge.