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Mr. J. B. Atkinson, H.M. Inspector of Mines for the Newcastle district, received a communication at about 6.30 a.m. on Thursday May 12th, and left Newcastle by the first available train, viz., at 10.30 a.m., arriving at Whitehaven at 2.55 p.m. Having inspected the plan and had the situation explained to him, and having interviewed Wear and Kenmare and then Mr. Blair and Mr. Steele, who were sent for and brought out of the pit, he descended the mine and went inbye. He there found the rescuers engaged in carrying the brattice forward. After due enquiry and observation he "came to the conclusion that the situation was hopeless, and that there was very great risk being run by all the rescue parties. He considered that the means of reaching the fire was such that there was no hope of a successful issue." And he did not feel "that he could take the responsibility of allowing it to go on." This would be between 5 and 6 p.m. on Thursday evening. Before leaving Newcastle Mr. Atkinson got into telephonic communication with the colliery and asked whether arrangements should not be made to send for rescue parties equipped with breathing apparatus. The reply received was to the effect that they did not think they would be of any service. However, they were telegraphed for by the agent, Mr. James, and two kinds of apparatus arrived at the pit about 27 hours after the occurrence of the explosion, viz., the "Meco" from Sheffield (an approximate distance, in a straight line, of 126 miles from the Wellington pit), and the "Aerolith" from Newcastle (an approximate distance, in a straight line, of 86 miles).

Two "rescue" men (Messrs. Thorne and Littlewood) in the employ of the Mining Engineering Company of Sheffield, arrived at Whitehaven at 10.45 p.m. on May 12th with the "Meco" apparatus, but without electric lamps, and the two men from the Durham and Northumberland Rescue Station at Newcastle-upon-Tyne arrived at Whitehaven at the same time with the "Aerolith" apparatus, but without a supply of liquid air on which its use depends. A proper supply, however, followed them later.

Now the narrowing of the area by the double bratticing had markedly improved matters just before Henry left, and they were making considerable headway, but very shortly afterwards the fire again got the upper hand, and only 9 yards of bratticing was accomplished between the time when Henry left and the arrival at the scene of operations of Mr. Atkinson at or about 5 p.m.

As to the danger of an occurrence of a second explosion at the fire, which would have meant death to every one of the rescue party, Mr. Steele, the manager, said "Well I would not have been surprised if it had gone off any minute all the time we were putting the brattice up. I would not have been surprised. It was a very likely thing to happen, seeing that the ventilation was all disorganized by the short circuiting." Mr. Moore, who had first descended the mine at 3 a.m. on Thursday, 12th May, said he "was expecting every moment there would be an explosion. I think the rescue party incurred very great risk ; in fact they did not know the risk they were incurring. . . . . . . No. 6 District was making a lot of gas, and I dreaded that gas coming on to the fire." As was demonstrated by later events the danger of a fresh explosion was very real and imminent.*

It was not known until some months afterwards, when the mine was explored, that there were by this time two other fires raging in the mine, viz., in the 3rd North District. The existence of these fires rendered the precarious rescue operation still more dangerous. In my opinion the cutting off of the air enabled the products of combustion and accumulating firedamp to extinguish the fires. Had the air not been cut off an explosive mixture of gas and air would ultimately have been formed.

Later on the party who were at the scene of attempted rescue operations came to the surface for the purpose of holding a conference, and this was held at the manager's office at about 7.55 p.m. There were present Mr. J. B. Atkinson, with his Junior Inspectors of Mines, Messrs. Abbott and Leck, Messrs. Blair, Steele, Henry, Moore (Lord Lonsdale's agent), T. P. Martin (Secretary of Cumberland Coal Owners Association, and a well-known mining engineer), and others. Mr. Atkinson took the lead at this conference, asking all those present if they had anything to say against the proposition to complete the stopping which previous to his arrival had been partially erected in the mine intake. After 20 minutes open discussion, when Henry (the under-manager) and Mr. Moore (Lord Lonsdale's agent) — the latter in spite of his expressed opinion as regards the risk of a second explosion — opposed the building of the stopping the former (Henry) saying: "If it was no more than when I left it, we ought to be able to get down" (i.e., to the seat of the fire), but those who had just come up told him it was "more" so, in his own words, "I had to give in." Henry asked, however, to be allowed to have another try before a final decision was come to. In describing what followed I cannot do better than adopt his own words :—

Interrogated by the coroner :—

Mr. Moore said "I cannot agree with the erection of the stopping unless a further effort is made." He went down the pit with a with a second party at about 11.30 p.m. to find "that all attempts at getting down the front or back dips were impossible." He then also agree to the erection of the stopping.

So the stopping, the beginnings of which already existed, was completed, at a point about half-a-mile back from the "fan-site" The reason it was necessary to select a point so far outbye at which to erect the stopping was that it the first place outbye from the "fan-site" most suitable in respect of dimensions and compactness: it allowed of more rapid erection of the stopping and was a safe place in which to work in view of the possibility of the occurrence of a second explosion. The building of the stopping was started at 1.45 a.m. on the 13th May, and completed at 4.20 a.m. the same day, that is 32½ hours after the explosion, Henry being the last man to come out of the mine at 4.55 a.m.

This action in more effectually cutting off the intake air from the fire has been commonly spoken of as the "sealing off" of the mine, but the mine was not sealed off: the return airway, a road of ample dimensions for travelling purposes had had it been passable was still open from the workings to the shaft. The haulage road (intake) had all along been cut off by the fire. It was not till Sunday, May 22nd, that the return air road was also stopped off.

After the erection of the stopping all the men were withdrawn from the mine, and for a time no one was allowed down.

On Saturday Mr. Blair and Mr. Steele went down the pit and examined the stopping, and found that air was leaking through it, so they pointed it with slag lime. It was further arranged that Thorne, one of the "rescue" men from Sheffield, should remain at the mine, and that men should be instructed in the use of breathing apparatus in case it was found practicable to use the same at any moment.

On Saturday, May 21st, a party of 12, including the Inspectors of Mines, the Assistant General-Manager, the Manager, Under-Manager and H. Thorne, travelled to the stopping in the intake and found it intact but air leaking through it to some extent, so it was plastered over and an 18-inch pipe (man-hole), which was in it, was filled with sand outside a wooden plug which had been drawn into it from inbye after it was first erected. The temperature at the stopping registered 74° F. The "return" was then entered at a door a few yards outbye of the stopping and was found cool and free from gas with a small current of air passing inbye. This road was travelled for about 100 yards and no change observed. The party then came outbye and examined the return further out, where a small current was also found passing inbye, but on holding both doors open a large current passed both ways along the return, i.e., both inbye and outbye. It was therefore arranged that a stopping should be built in the return near the stopping in the intake road. Next day, however, without any express arrangement with Mr. Atkinson (who did consider in necessary) a further attempt was made by management and others to get inbye by the return. Messrs. Blair, Steele, and Thorne, equipped with breathing apparatus, and accompanied by Mr. R. W. Moore and Mr. James Gilchrist (of the Allandale Coal Co.), proceeded inbye along the return for a distance of 257 yards, at which point Messrs. Moore and Gilchrist could not proceed further owing to their safety lamps being full of firedamp, but the others, having electric lamps and being equipped with breathing apparatus, managed to do so. The party carried with them two canaries in separate cages. When they had travelled 200 yards Steele found gas in his lamp ; he reduced the flame and found a 1-inch cap, and so called a halt. They then discovered that a canary had dropped dead into the bottom of the cage. The four were enabled to travel on for 300 yards further, over many falls of ground, until the light of the electric lamps could no longer penetrate the dense smoke. They had by this time reached a point known as the "top of the chimney," and the temperature registered was 85° F. The "top of the chimney" is about 450 yards from No. 3 North way-end. The party were then very exhausted by their exertions, so they decided to return, but it was only with the utmost difficulty that they struggled back to the fresh air. They had been exactly 30 minutes in travelling 600 yards in and 600 yards out. This exploration, a most dangerous proceeding, showed clearly that firedamp — probably pure firedamp — was on the outbye side of the fire.

It was then decided to erect a stopping in the return and build another in the intake (see Plan I., Fig. 1.). Steele stated that the object of their effort to penetrate the return had been to discover whether any of the entombed miners had attempted to get up the return.

It was agreed, on 12th June, that an attempt should be made to erect stoppings in the intake and return airways nearer the site of the fire, if this could be effected, by means of breathing apparatus, but Mr. J. B. Atkinson impressed on the officials that on no account should fresh air be allowed to pass the existing stoppings until the new stoppings were completed.

On the 14th June, therefore, the officials attempted, while equipped with breathing apparatus, the erection of canvas stopping on the intake 230 yards further in than the existing stoppings: in this way they were not successful, and the Under-Manager nearly lost his life, having practically to be carried out. Then, in their anxiety to advance towards the seat of the fire, they opened doors leading to the return near the site of the attempted stopping, and coming out opened wide the two doors in the outer stopping on the intake and the door in the stopping in the return, and partially opened the door in the inner stopping, so allowing fresh air to go forward, which they hoped would pass into the return 230 yards further in, and not proceed to the seat of the fire. This condition prevailed for about 24 hours, and firedamp issued by the return in such volume that eventually the air in the fan drift, on the surface, was in a highly dangerous condition, and all naked lights were prohibited on the surface in the neighbourhood of the upcast shaft. At 10.50 a.m. on the 15th June, while men were engaged in the mine near the stoppings in the intake, a reversal of the air took place, and the door of the inner intake stopping which had been partially opened was blown full open. It was then fixed more securely in its partially opened condition by the two overmen who were in charge of the shift (John and Thomas Graham). At 11.40 a.m.; however, another reversal of air took place, but it did not this time move the door. The overmen then telephoned to the surface and received instructions from Mr. Henry to close all the doors in the intake. While they were proceeding to do this a third reversal of air took place, but by this time the three doors in the intake were closed and locked. The head officials went underground of the afternoon of the same day, and equipped with breathing apparatus, were able to close the door which had been left open in the return airway. That the three reversals, all of which occurred within an hour, were due to explosions of gas at the fire was subsequently proved by the fact that the 142 yards of bratticing and props in the Main Dip was afterwards discovered to have been blown right up the hill towards the stoppings, a fact indicative of great violence.

A conference was held on June 22nd which was attended by Mr. Atkinson and three Junior Inspectors of Mines, the Management of the Colliery, and two well-known mining experts, Messrs. J. H. Merivale and W. C. Blackett (who had been called in by the Whitehaven Coal Company). Also by Messrs. Moore, Andrew Sharpe (Cumberland Miners' Agent), T. Cape (Assistant Agent), John Hanlon (Whitehaven Miners' Agent), and J. T. Mather (Wellington Pit Miners' Agent). Mr. Atkinson descended the pit before the conference and found the conditions restored to what they were on the 12th June. Equipped with breathing apparatus, and accompanied by Messrs. Blair and Steele, similarly equipped, he penetrated to 100 yards beyond the stopping, and took samples of the atmosphere for analysis.

Having carefully considered all the circumstances of the most recent attempts to penetrate the workings by the help of breathing apparatus, and more particularly the fact that there had in all probability a series of small gas explosions as observed by the two overmen, Messrs. John and Thomas Graham, the conference unanimously decided that the mine should remain closed for a further period of three months.

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* On April 19th, 1888, an explosion occurred at St. Helens Colliery, near Workington in Cumberland (about 10 miles north of Whitehaven), whereby 30 persons lost their lives whilst engaged in erecting stoppings with a view to extinguishing a fire at the coal face.