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The movements of Wear and Kenrnare who came past the fire. — When Wear and Kenmare came through the fire it cannot have been of much extent otherwise they could never have got through it. It was hot, Wear said. They saw no bodies, though the remains of them were found there afterwards — those of persons who would naturally be stationed there. The tubs, &c., were all jumbled up by the force of the explosion, and the bodies may well have been covered over. When they got through they debated as to what they should do. Wear says he said to Kenmare, "I will go in and see what we can do here," i.e., past the fire again — and that Kenmare replied, "What's the good of going through again ; you had better come out, something is coming over the solid," (meaning a fall of stone). Wear thought that if they "could only manage to put the fires out they could save all the men's lives below," but Kenmare said, "It's no use you going through ; you cannot." Wear said it was too big a fire for two men to deal with. There were two casks at the friction gear kept always full of water ; they were kept there in view of the gear becoming hot when running ; and there were also a couple of buckets, but it is very doubtful whether Wear or Kenmare knew of the existence of casks or buckets, as the custom was for the coal hewers to be conveyed to and from the spot by mechanical haulage, and to get out as fast as they could so there was little opportunity for observation. So they went up the brow and out to where they met Henry and party.

Now, three points of first importance present themselves for solution — the one related to the other — viz., at what time did Wear and Kenmare pass by the fire? It could not have been of any extent then, or they could not have got by it ; and how long-after did Henry and party reach the scene, and what was its condition at that time?

From Wear and Kenmare's evidence I have constructed the following table :—

The explosion happened at		7.40 p.m.
The 5th North men and boys commenced to travel out by the return at		8.05 p.m.
They were travelling the return for 1 hour 5 minutes		9.10 p.m.
Wear started to come out with Kenmare (he says he is sure of this, as he looked at his watch) at		9.35 p.m.
They got past the "friction-gear" (Wear says he is sure of this, as he looked at his watch) at		10.10 p.m.
Wear says they met Henry and party at		10.30 p.m.

The attempted Rescue operations continued. — Now, either Wear or Benn and Henry were mistaken as to the time of the meeting ; as there is a difference of 40 minutes between the two accounts, but Benn and Henry's movements were so clearly described in evidence and the time of meeting is so impressed on Benn's mind as being the only time he consulted his watch during the whole proceedings, and is supported by the evidence of Henry and by calculations in respect of time based on their movements, that I think we may take it that the meeting was at or about 9.50 p.m. Then, as the "fan-site" is 400 yards from where Wear and Kenmare were met, it is safe to suppose that it was 10 o'clock or past when the rescue party arrived there. Henry said someone remarked that it was 10 minutes past 10.

Mr. Steele, the manager, said when he arrived at the "fan-site" at about 10.30 p.m. Henry and his son and the few workmen he had with him were engaged in trying to make a hole through a stopping about 20 yards below the fan site, but that they could not succeed then. It is not certain to my mind precisely at what time Wear and Kenmare did come past the fire, nor how long they sat down when they had got past, but I am clearly of the opinion, seeing that they did get through, that had Henry and his party gone directly inbye, from the shaft without stopping by the way, a full hour might have been saved and they would have been at the site in all probability long before Wear and Kenmare came through, and might have successfully combated the fire, especially had they been possessed of smoke helmets and fire extinguishers.*

The "friction-gear" was timbered over, 22 tubs full of coal were standing there and there was a cask of grease at the place (½ or ¾ full), and Henry said there was a stock of new timber (28 by 14 in extent) lying there for the purpose of renewing the platform, so that when Henry and party with Wear and Kenmare reached the "fan site" one is not surprised at the evidence of a great fire raging. Only wood was burning when Wear and Kenmare came through.

T. Graham, the overman of the middle shift, received a message when he was in the Market Hall at 9.15 p.m. to "come as soon as he could and bring all the strength he could get." It was past 10 o'clock when he got to the pit top and he descended by himself.

When Henry arrived at the "fan-site) he told the others to get buckets and follow him down. He got 20 yards below the "fan-site" when he came against "the full breadth and height of the smoke" that is, at a spot 372 yards outbye from the "friction-gear." A remarkable distance for it to back against a current of 26,000 cubic feet per minute.** They then broke through a stopping in order to short circuit the air at that point. Opposite the "fan-site" the intake air splits a small portion (about 3,000 cubic feet per minute) passing down the "South Back Dip." Henry accompanied by some of the others, tried to get in by this road, ; he got about 30 to 35 yards along it, but could proceed no further as he came against a wall of smoke. The heat was greater than in the "Main Dip." He then described his further movements :— "They shouted to come out. I said let them shout away, I am going to try to get down. When I got to the bord-end I could not see anything . . . I said to them (those of his companions who had followed him) 'there is no possible chance here.' I came out, the fellows shouted, I saw there was no chance there, then coming across into the fan site, I told some men to start and open out a place we had previously holed. They turned to and opened this place, Matthew Walsh and John Ferryman. By that time Steele and Mr. Blair had got down. I went and told them the whole conditions of the place, the situation and everything, and asked what they thought likeliest to do for the best and what I thought was the likeliest to do for the best. Mr. Steele telephoned up to the pit top to send word to send all the strength, to get brattice, tools, props, nails and everything required, canvas and everything to go with the work. We then went into the fan-site and by that time the men had worked as long as they could work and as much as they could do. I expect, for the smoke and one thing and another, and they got the place large enough to turn the air and fumes that were coming up from the main dip. So as soon as they got the place opened out big enough I went through the place. After the place was holed I went through, and when I went through I felt lucky to get back. I had a reason for going through. I wanted to see if this air had joined at No. 3 and No. 5 where the smoke was coming. I got so far down but I never yet saw for the heat and smoke and fumes coming up almost to firing point. I had to come back on my hands and knees and Johnny Fearon, who was watching in case anything went wrong, called me. I begged Fearon not to say a word to anybody, says I, 'If you say one word about this place every man will go and leave us.' He says, 'Matthew Walsh knows.' Says I, 'You tell him what I have said, we will buckle in, don't you tell them in case these men are frightened.' So then we started from that to short-circuit the air on the right side of the fan-drift, putting smoke and air into the return side of the fan-drift. We got about two lengths of brattice put up, when the men who were standing — in fact it was Johnny Graham, the overman — drew my attention to the brattice cloth, the tar was melting and running down, and he drew my attention to it. I went and I found it quite correct. I sent one of the men to watch it as well as he could, and to be careful and get some water, and I would go and arrange with Mr. Steele and Mr. Blair to come and see the condition of the place for themselves so that they would be satisfied the thing was so."

In the above narrative Henry mentions Graham, the overman, who says that when he arrived on the scene he did not agree with the method proposed by Henry, Steel, and Blair of getting past the fire. His proposition was to get round by the Back South Dip. As to the exact time when he put forward this proposition, and as to whether or not he urged it upon his superiors in the management of the mine, is not of particular moment, as the fact remains, and it came out in evidence, that they were conversant of this alternative scheme, considered it, and discarded it.

Three alternative methods of getting past the fire. — For getting past the fire there were three alternative methods which could present themselves for consideration, viz. :—

1. To get past the fire by the South Dip.

2. To get along the return airway with or without reversing the air current.

3. To adopt the method pursued by the Management of short-circuiting the air and approaching the fire by means of bratticing, with a view to extinguishing the fire when reached.

Considering these in the order stated :—

1. This was the method which T. Graham was desirous of adopting and which would require for its success the erection of a stopping across the main intake air-road, just inbye-side of the spot where the air splits (part going into the "back south dip") and the erection of stoppings in all the "thirls" between the main road and back south dip, and so confine the full force of the ventilating current to the latter road, force back the smoke, and so get in behind the fire and bring the entombed men out as quickly as possible. When Steele arrived on the scene at 10.30 p.m. he said the smoke was coming up both the main and back dip to equal extent although there were about 26,000 cubic feet of air per minute passing down the main road as against 2,000 to 3,000 cubic feet in the back dip. In view of this fact it is difficult to believe that there would have been much if any difference made by carrying out Graham's idea — though there may have been some owing to the smaller area of the road. If this failed bratticing would have been necessary in the back south dip and would have had to be carried on under worse conditions as to height, width of working space, and length of bratticing,*** than in the main road. It will be observed also that at one point the rescuers would come within 25 to 30 yards of the fire and would have had to erect a stopping at that point to keep out the smoke and to shield them from the heat and prevent the spread of the fire.

Graham acknowledged that his suggestion was a policy of desperation — I agree — though it was a time for desperate deeds. I am inclined to think it might have been successful in the very early stages of the fire. It is the method of procedure one might have suggested had one been at the seat of operations when Wear and Kenmare got past the fire, or shortly afterwards, one could then have put up temporary canvas stoppings and relied on the for some short space of time. But after having given much thought to this scheme and considered it in all its bearings I have come to the conclusion that when Henry commenced operations it was not possible that any other than the first few stoppings could have been erected owing to the heat (there would have been six blown out stoppings to restore) — there was not the material on the spot for even temporary erections much less for making the stoppings of a heat-resistant material (brick or stone) when Henry arrived on the scene ; furthermore the effect of putting more air on to the fire (as would be the case as the erection of stoppings was continued in the thirls), would have been to fan the fire into fiercer vehemence. I say it is my opinion that it would not then have been possible to carry out more than the first stages of the scheme, but suppose the rescuers had managed to get all the stoppings in and to pass behind the fire it would in all probability have been a matter of a few minutes only before those of the stoppings nearest the fire would have caught fire, the rescue party have been cut off, and a still greater loss of life have resulted.

Had Graham's scheme been adopted by Henry and sanctioned by Steele and Blair, the Management would, very justly, have laid themselves open to criticism for not having adopted the direct method of approach to the fire with the idea of extinguishing it, which was the method they did follow. Steele said he considered the possibilities of the scheme long before he heard Graham had mentioned it and having done so discarded it as impracticable.

The question might be asked could not both schemes have been adopted or were they mutually destructive? The answer is that they were mutually destructive, inasmuch as it would have necessitated splitting the air in carrying the two schemes concurrently, and hence resulted in a great reduction in its velocity. And at the same time the progress inwards against the smoke could only have been at half the rate owing to the fact the material had all to be brought from the surface.

2. Again supposing it had been possible to reverse the air within a few hours (as a matter of fact it would have taken many hours to have connected the downcast with the fan and so convert it into an upcast shaft) — and it would have been useless to attempt to proceed along the return airway even if equipped with breathing apparatus, unless the air were reversed, owing to the great heat carried by the return air from the fire — the reversal of the ventilation would only have extended to the 3rd North way-ends, as the air-crossings at the 3rd North had been blown out, and to carry it even far would have necessitated the re-erection of at least one blown-out stopping near the fire. The effect would also, in this case, have been to fan the fire, and so spread it with greater rapidity in both an outbye and an inbye direction, cutting off all retreat. But I do not think, even with a reversed air current, it would have been possible to proceed far along the return owing to the heat. The air-crossings were about 40 yards distant from the fire.

3. Plan III. Figs. 1 and 2 show in plan and section the method adopted in endeavouring to get at the fire, the idea being to short-circuit the air current and keep it off the fire. When the short-circuit to the return was completed the bratticing down the main road was commenced on the right side of the road, the object being to drive the fumes into the return. The distance from the commencement of the bratticing to the friction gear was about 300 yards. Said Henry, "We had only got the second length put up, when John Graham, the overman, came to me and drew my attention, and said the tar was running through the brattice cloth (i.e., owing to the heat). I went and found it for myself, so I told them to watch it and keep water on." They then commenced to brattice down the left side also, which diminished the sectional area from 80 to 20 square feet. The object being by reducing the air passage to increase the velocity of the current, and so render the atmosphere more endurable to the workmen engaged in erecting the brattice.

When the brattice reached a point known as the "pipe scuttle," about 100 yards further in from the "fan-site," the doors into the return were opened — it was the first place in the 100 yards at which it was possible to get an opening into the return, — and an air crossing was constructed to carry the smoke coming up the south side brattice over the north side brattice into the return, clear of the men engaged in erecting the brattice.

The bratticing proceeded apace, a large number of men being engaged in getting the necessary material down the pit and into Benks' Turn, from whence it was conveyed to the scene of the fire. Fire extinguishers and water were also hurried in. Only men experienced in erecting timber and brattice cloth were kept at the innermost point of operations. When Henry left to go home at about 3 p.m. on the 12th there were 133 yards erected.

Henry at 3 p.m. was persuaded by Mr. Blair and Steele to go home and rest. He must by then have been tried to the utmost, for on the 11th May he had been down the pit from 5.40 a.m. until 4.15p.m., and again from 8.15p.m. until between 3 and 4 p.m. on the day following, during the latter time engaged in incessant and most strenuous work.

Mr. Steele, the manager, received word at about 9 p.m., when he was in his house, that there was something wrong at the Wellington pit. He arrived at the pit, met Douglas, and heard of the men being found unconscious at Benks' Turn. He got down the pit at 5 minutes to 10.

Mr. Steele says that for 18 hours they had been erecting brattice incessantly, but during the last few hours of this period instead of making progress they lost ground, the "backed up 80 yards on the top of the canvas, and the tar was running out of it." The atmosphere at the bratticing became unbearable to the workmen, and the conclusion was arrived at that further efforts were hopeless and that all that could be done was to cut off the air entirely. Before this, water carried inbye in barrels had been used to cool the brattice and had been run down the dip, but the water had to be conveyed a great distance and it was found impossible to obtain in quantity sufficient to be of any use.

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* This would not have entailed the leaving of Walker and Gregory, had Henry been accompanied by sufficient helpers.

** As the steel wire rope attached to the full set at the friction-gear was observed at about 10.30 p.m. to spring back owing to its snapping being softened by the fire, the heat by this time must have been intense.

*** The stoppings being blown out in the thirls, it would have been necessary to brattice into these before stoppings could have been erected in them.