At 11.15 p.m., on the 25th April, 1882, an explosion of fire-damp and air occurred in the Whitehaven Colliery, in the County of Cumberland.
The explosion was entirely confined to a limited extent of workings in the main band or seam lying under the sea. and nearly 3 miles in a north-westerly direction from the shafts, which are situated near the town of Whitehaven, and close to the sea shore.
The Plan shows the workings affected by the explosion on a scale of 64 yards to an inch, and a plan on the same scale as the other plans, or 8 chains to an inch, is added for the sake of comparison. A section along the centre line of the stone drift, on a scale of 40 yards to an inch, is given.
The area affected by this explosion was so limited that it is unnecessary to show the whole of the workings, which were extensive.
It will be seen that a dip or downthrow trouble, of 32 yards throw, had been met with; the place A had been driven across the leader or fissure of the trouble into the beds on the other side, and a borehole from the floor of this place proved the seam lying below. A stone drift had been driven, dipping 1 in 6, and cutting the seam at B. The length of this drift, which is shown by dotted lines, was 208 yards, and it was 8 feet 6 inches high by 7 feet wide. It was arched with brickwork for a distance of 56 yards from the leader of the trouble in the direction of the shaft.
When the coal was first reached by the stone drift, gas burst out in such quantity that operations had to be suspended for some months. On resuming, the place C was driven in the coal at right angles to the direction of the drift, and a further passage, D, was driven back to the trouble in the coal; a staple, or slope drift, E, was sunk 32 yards on the leader, forming a double connection with the coal below the trouble and with the workings above.
While the winning of the coal below the trouble was being effected, a current of air was maintained next the face by means of bratticing, shown by a red line; in the stone drift, up to the point F, a brick brattice, 4½ inches thick, strengthened at intervals of about 5 feet by 9 inches of brickwork, was built the full height of the drift, and about 3 feet from one side; beyond the point F, wood brattice plastered with lime was used. The height of the places driven in the coal was 4 feet 6 inches, and their width 10 feet.
The air which returned up the drift on the lesser side of the brattice ascended a short staple about 6 feet deep at H into the level of the coal above the trouble. The direction in which the air passed in the workings above the trouble is shown by feathered arrows.
While the work in connection with securing two roads down the trouble was being carried out gas issued in large quantity from the coal and from the floor. As an extra precaution, only Stephenson safety lamps were allowed beyond the foot of the stone drift ; the Davy safety lamp being in general use in the colliery. The Stephenson safety lamp is extinguished by explosive mixtures of fire-damp and air.
About two months before the explosion a fall of stone took place in the return staple up the leader at E, and this place eventually closed entirely, and ventilation by means of the brattice had again to be resorted to. Attempts were made to reach this staple in order to re-open it, but these efforts were frustrated by the quantity of fire-damp, which was more than the current of air available could sweep away.
After the closing of the staple up the leader the air was conducted by bratticing to the face of the place G, then back to the trouble, it then passed along the other side of the brattice to the little staple at H.
Before the explosion, gas was frequently seen on the lamp at the face of the place G. It was known to be present in the place D, and four days before the explosion it was seen on the lamp on the intake side of the brattice, 15 yards from the place C, in the direction of the staple up the leader. The return side of the brattice could not be travelled owing to the presence of gas. Three or four days before the explosion, the state of the air at the top of the little staple at H was examined and found to be nearly explosive.
A current of about 10,800 cubic feet per minute passed down the drift at the time of the explosion.
There was no coal dust on the roads where this explosion took place; all the surroundings were damp — the coal being worked was wet.
This is the most considerable explosion of fire-damp and air that the writers are acquainted with. They have personally investigated, during the last twelve years, almost all the explosions occurring in the North of England, and they cannot point to a ease where there was direct evidence of so large a quantity of fire-damp and air exploding.
Pairs of wooden doors at (1), (2), and (3) were blown out in the direction shown by arrows. The framework of brick and stone in which these doors were set was not moved. It was thicker masonry than is common — about 1 foot 6 inches thick. Stoppings 2 feet thick at (4), (5), and (6) were blown down in the direction of arrow. The brick brattice, in the stone drift, was blown over in patches from the return side to the intake side, as shown by arrows An iron pipe in the drift was broken, but this was probably caused by bricks falling on it. Most of the wood brattice was blown down. Two or three props near the top of the staple H, at the end of the brattice in the drift, were blown down. No other timbering was displaced. There was an ordinary amount of it required. Some tubs at the top of the stone drift were moved, but not broken. A light wood stopping, having an area of 9 feet by 5 feet was forced over 1,700 yards away; and a man in a cabin, some distance further, noticed two doors leading from it shake at the time of the explosion. The explosion did not extend into the return air way beyond the top of the little staple at H.
The only evidence of flame was that of burning on the bodies of the victims, and the evidence of a survivor. The writers did not see the bodies of the men, but it appeared from those who had examined them, that they were not much burnt.
There were in the district of the explosion seven persons, each of whom had a safety lamp ; there was no other source of ignition of the gas; no gunpowder was being used.
The survivors were three, a man working at a pump at K; he was knocked down by the force of the explosion, but was not burnt, and saw no flame. His lamp, hanging to a prop near him, was extinguished. He passed out towards the shaft in the dark, leaving his lamp. A driver at the landing near the top of the drift at M escaped. One of the workmen down the drift, engaged at the face of the place G, succeeded in reaching the top of the drift.
The men who lost their lives were three pumpers, who were working at the pump near the bottom of the stone drift at 0, and one of the hewers from the place G. The lamp of one of the hewers was found at L1, and that of the other hewer at L2; the lamps of the pumpers lay on the floor between their bodies and place of work. The bodies of the victims were found near the top of the drift at the points marked X on the plan.
From the position in which the lamps were found it appeared that all the men in the drift had been under some alarm before the explosion, and this was confirmed by evidence of the survivor from the place G. This man stated that when he and his partner were preparing to commence work at G, he saw "flame lifting at the face of the coal." They immediately seized their lamps and hurried out, but were struck down by the explosion when in the place C. The pumpers would also appear to have been alarmed, and to have been retreating before the explosion took place.
It appeared probable that either the issue of gas had so increased, or the quantity of air entering the drift had so diminished that the air passing over the workmen had become explosive, and this alarmed them, then while endeavouring to escape the gas had been ignited at one of their lamps, and the explosion resulted.
The account of the survivor from the place G rather pointed to the gas being inflamed at the face of the place G before he and his partner left it. When he spoke of "flame lifting at the face of the coal," he said this was not near his lamp, but some distance from it. When workmen observe gas on their lamps they often say the flame "lifted," or elongated; and this is probably what the survivor saw in the place G. In passing out through an explosive mixture ignition had taken place at one of the lamps. The glasses of the Stephenson lamps of the two hewers were broken, but the gauzes were not injured ; they were cleaned and fresh glasses put in. On being tested in an explosive mixture one of them passed the flame. The person who cleaned them stated be must, by some mistake, have exchanged the gauzes ; and on changing the gauzes it was found both the lamps were perfect. This suggests the possibility of the person who cleaned the lamps not having changed the gauzes, but that, before the explosion, they may have been so changed, and so the defective lamp passed the flame.
If we assume that all the workings in the coal, from the foot of the stone drift, were filled with an explosive mixture, we have 18,500 cubic feet of such mixture, and if we add the space behind the brattice in the stone drift we have a further quantity of 14,300 cubic feet, or a total space possibly filled with explosive mixture of 32,800 cubic feet.
There was good reason to suppose that a quantity approaching this did explode. The air was conducted to the face at G, and back to the staple or slope drift at E, and the conditions appeared to be favourable for securing the mixture of such gas and air as there was present. The fact of the brattice in the stone drift being blown over on to the intake side pointed to flame having extended along the return side of the brattice for its whole length.