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Explosions in Coal Mines
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Trimdon Grange Colliery Explosion (cont.).

Proceeding into the Headways way, it was observed that doors and stoppings were blown to the returns. At the shaft end of the engine-landing at (12), tubs had been traversed by force going in-bye. At the other end a metal cistern was broken, and part of it carried in-bye. Further in, at the pillar workings (18), a deputy's chest was blown 20 yards in-bye, and at (14) tubs and doors were blown in-bye. At (15), doors in a passage between Trimdon Grange and East Hetton Collieries were blown out in the direction of the latter colliery, leading to the death of six men in its workings by after-damp.

The return air ways at Trimdon Grange were examined, and it was clear no explosion had traversed them, except for a short distance from the working face.

The following indications of fire were observed :—

Near the downcast shaft (1) a man was burnt. At the junction of the Pit Narrow Board and Cross-cut ways a man was burnt. On the Pit Narrow Board haulage road, 210 yards from the landing, a boy was burnt, and at that landing (2) another boy was burnt. The trapper boys at the First and Second South way ends (8) and (5) were burnt. The men at the face of the First, Second, and Third South ways were in most cases burnt, and coked coal dust was observed along the whole length of the working face and in the return air way adjacent, adhering to the timber. Coked dust was also observed in the unused passages of this part of the pit, so far as they could be examined. At the junction of the Cross-cut and Headways way (11) a man was burnt. At the landing in the Headways way (12) boys and horses were burnt. At the pillar workings, further in (18) and (14), men were burnt. A man and a pony were burnt in the narrow boards going south from the Headways way (16), and coked coal dust was observed at the working face and in the return air way adjacent.

No coked dust was observed on the main haulage roads, where flame had evidently passed, and where force had been greatest. At the extremities of the explosion coked dust was abundant, and the force exerted less.

No fires were caused in the mine by this explosion.

At the time of the explosion there were on the plane of the explosion 94 persons, and there were consequently a number who survived. All the workmen on the south side of the shaft escaped, and most of those from the Cross-cut district. Neither of these districts was affected by the explosion, but the road to the shaft from the Cross-cut district lay partly in the affected portion, and this led to the death of six of the Cross-cut workmen by after-damp. Two others were found insensible by the explorers. An engineman, about 40 yards south of the shaft, had just started his engine when the effect of the explosion on the other side of the shaft reached him, He was injured and rendered insensible, but was not burnt.

There were the following fires on the plane of the explosion :—

Furnace for ventilation.
Boiler fire near the shaft.
There were also open lights at the downcast shaft.

The workmen on the in-byeside of the caution boards had each a Davy safety lamp. Naked lights were used up to the caution boards on the main roads. Drivers, whose work lay on each side of the caution boards, used safety lamps. Those workmen who were employed altogether on the out-byeside of the caution boards used naked lights. Beyond this no positive evidence was adduced as to the description of lights used by the workmen. It was known that some of the boys used "midgies," or open lights, on the out-byeside of the caution boards, and that two wagonwaymen used oil lamps.

Gunpowder had been used in the coal in the South ways on the day of the explosion, and a shot was ready for firing, in the Headways way.

Dividing the workmen on the plane of the explosion, as at Seaham, there are —

1st. — The survivors.
2nd. — Victims in the field of the explosion.
3rd. — Victims outside the field of the explosion.

The survivors, comprising the men on the south side of the shaft, and those of the Cross-cut workmen who escaped to the shafts, all stated that they had been under no alarm up to the moment of the explosion.

The victims in the field of the explosion appeared, so far as a judgment could be made, to have been under no alarm up to within a few moments of their death. The four men who worked at the bottom of the downcast shaft were found dead there. The furnaceman was found near the shaft alive, but he died in a few days. An offtake lad and a wagonwayman were found at the junction of the Pit Narrow Board and Cross-cut haulage roads, where their work required them. On the Pit Narrow Board engine plane, 210 yards above the horse level, a driver was found. The empty tubs ran by gravitation to this point, bringing the rope with them. A driver met the set here, and pulled it with the rope into the landing with his horse. This driver was where his work required him. A lad was found near the landing (2). He was employed in driving a horse working a pump. He was within a few yards of his place of work. At the in-byeside of the doors, on the First South way, a trapper boy was found, apparently having been blown a short distance from his place of work. At the Second South way end a trapper boy was found on the horse level near his door. Between the Second and Third South ways, on the main road, a driver was found near his horse and tubs. The workmen and boys, 33 in number, at or near the face of work in the First, Second, and Third South ways were, in most instances, found at their working places. A few had moved a short distance, leaving their lamps, the most noticeable of whom were three hewers found on the Second South way near the face. At the junction of the Headways and Cross-cut haulage roads (11) an offtake lad was found at his place of work. At the landing in the Headways way (12) two drivers were found, where they might have been in the ordinary course of their work. At the first pillar workings, to the left of the Headways haulage road (18), five men had moved 30 or 40 yards from their working places; and at the second pillar workings (14), three men were found at their places of work. Six men were found at the face of the narrow hoards, off the Headways way (16), at or near their working places.

The victims outside the field of the explosion were six men from the Cross-cut way, who perished from after-damp near the junction of the Cross-cut and Headways way while on their road to the shaft. They had moved out nearly half-a-mile. Four persons in an adjoining colliery, and two officials attempting their rescue, lost their lives by after-damp coming through a passage connecting the two mines.

The conclusion drawn from the indications left by the explosion is, that it began in the Pit Narrow Board district, and went into the Headways district. Thus, the first two stoppings on the right hand side of the Cross-cut way (9) could not have been blown on to the haulage road, except by a force coming up the Pit Narrow Board; and indications at (10), (11), (12), and (18), showed that force had gone into the Headways way.

As to the exact place in the Pit Narrow Board district at which the explosion began, the evidence is somewhat conflicting. At both the First and Second South way ends (3) and (5), there were signs that some force had come outward, and near the face of the Second South way, three of the hewers had run a short distance out of the working places, leaving their lamps, from which it might be inferred they had observed some danger. No unusual fall or disturbance was observed along the goaf edge, where they were working, and all the officials were positive in stating, that prior to the explosion, no gas had ever been seen in that district. If the explosion began here it must have been by gas firing at one of the safety lamps.

On the other hand, the doors at the First and Second South way ends (3) and (5), had been blown inward towards the face, and all the stoppings in a line with them, from the Pit Narrow Board landing (2) to the Second South way end (5), (except those which were rendered immovable by stowing), were also blown southward or towards the return and working face. The putters' clothing in the First and Second South ways, at (4) and (6), was also blown towards the face. This inclines the writers to the opinion that the explosion began on the out-byeside of these doors and stoppings.

This limits the part of the mine to be considered to the main intake and haulage road lying between the Second South way end, and a point some distance in-bye of the junction of the Cross-cut way with the Pit Narrow Board. On this portion of road there were the two trappers at the First and Second South way ends, the pump driver at the landing, and the driver, 210 yards nearer the shaft, waiting for the engine set.

The two trappers had Davy safety lamps, and these lamps were tested with others after the explosion and found to be perfect. One of the trappers had apparently been traversed by great force and blown towards the face. There did not appeal to be any good reason for selecting either of these lamps as the point of origin.

It was not proved what description of light the driver at the pump or the driver meeting the engine set carried. They both worked on the out-byeside of the caution boards.

The indications near the landing (2) appeared to show that force had passed towards the shaft from here. The driver meeting the engine set had been traversed by considerable force, and was mutilated. There was nothing to suggest that the explosion had began at his light.

The Pit Narrow Board engine-landing was on the continuation of the road from the shaft, just beyond the horse level, passing to the left. Beyond the landing were some drowned workings lying to the dip of it. The current of air, ventilating the three South ways in this district, did not enter the landing, but passed along the horse level. The landing had been ventilated by a scale of air, which, after passing the landing, divided and passed through holes in the stoppings in the passages immediately below, and on each side of it; passing over the top of the water in both cases.

A horse pump was placed in a recess on the left side of the landing, and was used to pump the water out of the drowned workings, forcing it through pipes in the direction of the shaft. If the water was not pumped it rose on to the haulage roads. At the time of the explosion this pump was in use.

The writers think it probable that gas had risen into the landing from the drowned workings and ignited at the pump boy's light. The barometer was unusually low (29.10), which is a condition favourable to the movement of gas out of such places as these drowned workings. The lowering of the water by the pump may have liberated gas pent up in some part of them, and the issue may have overpowered the feeble current in the landing. After the explosion, and when the ventilation was restored, gas was found in the return air road, just above these drowned workings, and it could be beard bubbling through the water in them.

The mere statement that the explosion began either at this landing, or at the face of the Pit Narrow Board workings, is in no way sufficient to account for the results which ensued. When it is considered that the explosion extended with force and flame to parts of the pit more than a mile distant from either point, and that in doing so it had been confined to the main intake air ways, it appears impossible to attribute its extension to an accumulation or sudden outburst of gas at either place.

The state of the return air roads clearly proved that no blast had traversed them, except for a short distance from the working face, where the dust in them was principally coal dust, and where coked coal dust was observed after the explosion ; while on the intake air roads men and horses at different points were burnt, timber was blown out, tubs broken, and doors, air crossings, and stoppings, were blown from the intakes towards the returns.

The writers suppose the wave, or movement of air accompanying the ignition of a mixture of fire-damp and air in the landing, had raised a cloud of coal dust, and that the flame from the fire-damp had passed into this cloud, causing ignition of the coal dust ; the ignition of the coal dust thus started became self-propagating, and continued with force and flame over those parts of the pit where a sufficient quantity of coal dust existed.

A remarkable circumstance in this explosion was, that it did not extend into the Cross-cut way, and the writers can only account for this by stating that this road was damp, and consequently free from coal dust, for some distance from its junction with the Headways way. There were two sumps for collecting the water which accumulated on it, one 50 and the other 80 yards from the junction; the way was raised a little and ballasted with cinders which were moist. It will be seen from the plans that the direct course for the blast on leaving the Pit Narrow Board was into this way, and the air which passed along it was part of the same current as went into the Headways way. This appears to show that the air going into neither way could have been in an explosive condition, and the only fact which appears to account for the blast being deflected into the Headways way was, that there it found a sufficiency of fuel in the shape of coal dust, while in the Cross-cut way, this fuel was lacking.

Another wet portion of road, the Third South in the Pit Narrow Board way, had not been traversed by the explosion.

The explosion did not extend past the shaft into the workings beyond. The shaft was wet, and consequently the roads for some distance on each side of it were damp and free from dust.

 

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