24 At 6.49 pm Pearson, the guard, signalled the man riding train away from 42's station. It had travelled about 6 yards when there was a thump accompanied by a rush of air outbye, then inbye and the train stopped. The air was thick with dust and he was unable to see anyone. Pearson had looked at his watch before starting the train and this established the time of the explosion.
25 Lee, the deputy, was travelling on the man riding belt towards the Newhill seam when he was blown backwards by a violent rush of air. He was very confused as to what had occurred but, after collecting himself, managed to make his way inbye on foot by following the conveyor structure. Although unaware of it, there is a possibility that Lee was temporarily affected by carbon monoxide and this could well account for the discrepancy in the time taken between his travelling to the Newhill cross-slit, a relatively short distance, and the other survivors travelling the whole of E 21's district.
26 Buckley, Woodcock and Bannister, after walking inbye to E 21's maingate roadhead, reviewed the work they had to do and then walked outbye a short distance to the stage loader gearhead where they were awaiting the arrival of Upperdine with the pull-lifts necessary to change the face conveyor motor.
27 Suddenly they were blown off their feet by a blast of air. This came inbye along the maingate and the air was so thick with dust that it was impossible for them to see each other. In close contact and with Buckley in the lead they made their way outbye along the maingate until they arrived at the top of the 1 in 5 conveyor drift. Here they smelled burning and decided to go back inbye along the maingate and through the face. They donned their self-rescuers at this point but felt unable to wear them. They turned round and started to travel inbye along the maingate and Buckley changed places with Woodcock because the latter had lost his helmet and was concerned about injuring his head.
28 About this time Buckley and Woodcock lost contact with Bannister and they made their way through E 21's face along the tailgate and down the i in 5 supply drift. Buckley led and found his way by means of the haulage signal wires. At the bottom of the drift Buckley went towards the Meltonfield return but considered the conditions there to be worse. He was attempting to find his way out when he heard Lee shouting. They made contact in the cross-slit and Lee escorted the two men off the district through the Meltonfield intake airway.
29 On their way outbye they attempted to raise the alarm but the loud-speaking communication and telephone systems had been put out of operation by the explosion. When they arrived at 42's man rider road end they boarded the conveyor and rode outbye until they reached the fitting shop where Lee was able to make contact with the surface control room by telephone. He informed Johnson, the deputy in charge, that there had been an explosion.
30 Johnson received this call at about 7.10 pm and immediately told Askin, the seam overman, who was with him in the control room speaking by telephone to Bradley, the undermanager. Askin informed Bradley that there had been an explosion and at the same time Johnson telephoned Fox, the deputy manager. Askin then attempted to telephone Doncaster rescue station and had some difficulty in so doing, but after a short delay he contacted Wright, the rescue station superintendent.
31 Fox arrived at the mine shortly afterwards and, after satisfying himself that the rescue services had been called and that action had been taken to withdraw all persons from the mine, he telephoned Widdowson the manager. He then instituted the emergency procedure. In the meantime, at 7.33 pm on 12 June Wright at Doncaster rescue station, having ascertained that the call from Houghton Main Colliery was genuine, turned out the brigade and informed the standby station at Wakefield.