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Risca Colliery Disaster

Extracted from the Annual Mines Inspectors Report for 1860

Report of Lionel Brough (page 73)

As already explained in my evidence the ventilating medium at the Black Vein pit was not the furnace method now so thoroughly understood, and so appropriately and justly employed in nearly all the best managed coal mines of Great Britain. On the contrary, it was a machine power, depending altogether on the integrity of its various parts, and on its own continuity of action.

In fact, it may be said, that "Struve's aerometers" are nothing more nor less than air pumps of most gigantic dimensions, whose capabilities are simply proportionate to their internal diameter, to the extent of travel of their pistons, and to the number of strokes effected in any given unit of time.

There is no question that as long as all the parts hold good, and the numerous valves fit close and open freely, that an extraordinary amount of exhaustion can be arrived at with these remarkable machines ; in proof whereof, I may instance the mine that is the present subject of this memoir as a case in point ; for, taking into consideration the superficial area or extent of fresh face exposed, and also the quantity of coal daily excavated, I hardly know of a panel of work either in this or in any other colliery that received a larger or fresher proportion of air than that very part where the gas fired and caused such lamentable mortality. At the time I was of opinion, and do now also entertain the belief, that the quantity of air passing through the No. 3 cross heading and its corresponding group of stalls, was, under ordinary circumstances, sufficient to comply with the first general or government rule in the then existing Act of Parliament.

The greater the volume of air the quicker of course will an outburst of gas be diluted and swept harmlessly away. But, as I have already stated in evidence, 200,000 cubic feet per minute, or quantities of even greater magnitude, would have been altogether insufficient to have saved this pit, or caeteris paribus, any other colliery from explosion, under the fearful conditions that a defective lamp and a sudden emission of inflammable gas were simultaneously found in juxtaposition.

The preceding evidence delivered before the coroner and jury made allusion to an entire new shaft to the deep. Had this opening been timely and duly effected, in all probability the explosion would never have been heard of; because, in such case, a different arrangement of levels and cross headings would naturally have resulted ; that is to say, the whole of the work would have undergone a distinct and different distribution. But, even by this superior mode of winning, all skill and ability would have been defenceless against open or injured lamps, or those which had been in any possible manner tampered with.

In the reports of the Coal Mine Inspectors during the last ten years, it may be read that pits have fired in various ways ; some from actual deficiency of air ; others in consequence of a door or doors having been left open ; others again are surmised to have met with that calamity from the ignition of foul returns at the ventilating furnace. But there is no evidence to show that the Risca explosion resulted from any of these causes; one hundred thousand cubic feet of air per minute would, no doubt, have been better than the thirty-six or forty thousand feet that usually descended the slope ; still there was air enough to satisfy the law, and unquestionably a sufficient supply was allotted to the No. 3 cross heading in the No. 4 east level (19,000 cubic feet per minute). No door was left open ; no furnace was in existence for loaded returns to catch fire at. It becomes therefore most needful that some reliable exposition should now be entered into, to approximately and reasonably account for that explosion which was accompanied with so terrible a slaughter of our fellow creatures.

There was no lack of concurrent testimony at the inquest, that the actual calamity arose from a sudden effusion of gas coming into immediate contact with a damaged or defective lamp, or other naked flame. In fact, the evidence of the viewers was unanimous to that effect. The close investigation of the two government inspectors in the pit itself goes far to establish this view of the case, and according to my own opinion clearly reduces it to a confirmation ; but, which particular lamp, or the name of its unfortunate owner, is information that in all probability will for ever be hidden from our knowledge.

There was a straggling length of travel of the air to the extreme east, and the management is blameable for not having long previously laid in those useless and profitless workings. By cutting off all that portion of the mine straight to the upcast shaft, (as I have shown on the plan by a dotted line from the No. 3 cross heading in the third east), a very considerable drag would have been avoided. Such shortening of the district had been advised, and the viewer well knew how much it would have eased all his returns on that side of the slope. It would even have superseded the necessity of another eastern split ; indeed it was so self evident that it is surprising it was never carried into effect.

It is incontestable, that by splitting judiciously, the quantity of air passing through a mine can be greatly augmented, and there is no doubt that one of the errors of the Risca colliery, consisted in not more effectually adopting this very system, as by so doing the drag would have been considerably diminished.

At the inquest much was said and discussed on the subject, and this is the proper place to record that the greatest amount of actual drag was that which the air underwent in its tortuous passage through those eastern workings.

All collieries are more or less subject to that frictional action which is known as "the drag," and no extensive mine is worked without being subject to this inconvenience; hence the skill of the viewer is exhibited in reducing this class of obstruction to its minimum amount, and generally speaking this can only be performed by dividing the main column of air into a certain number of separate currents. But, I am bound to repeat that this mode of diminishing the resistance, was not carried out in the Risca Black Vein to that extent which the exigency of the case required. Nevertheless, I do not consider that the immediate cause of the explosion is by any means to be thus accounted for, inasmuch as the particular district where the gas fired had the advantage of the first and sharpest impulse of the fresh intake air.

Over the laying out of the workings of this pit, I, of course, could exercise no control, as they had assumed their existing shape long before I came into the south-western district of coal mines. The total absence of a new shaft to the deep no doubt induced the present wide spread distribution of slope and levels — of cross headings and stalls.

I have already spoken of one of the errors committed in the Risca black vein colliery; but the greatest of them all was the postponement to an indefinite period of a new shaft to the deep and the endeavour to obtain a certain maximum quantity of coal without the aid of such essential grand new winning.

The attempt to perform too much with restricted means is almost invariably attended with unsuccessful results. All experience tends to prove the truth of this assertion. It is, indeed, a serious complaint, and one of long standing in the coal-mining world, that an insufficiency of shafts is too often put down. In the present instance I consider a new opening most essential, and I reproduce my opinion, that if it had been timely performed, we should never have heard of the terrible loss of life that ensued.

If, then, this omission be considered as connected in a primary degree with the explosion, endeavour should be made to account for the immediate or actual cause of the ignition of the fire damp.

It is well known that some mines are far more liable to sudden outburst of gas than others ; it is a condition or event that occurs much more frequently than may be supposed, and no super-introduction of atmospheric air can prevent it. If the lamps hold good, but little is said on the subject, and for the most part the public know nothing at all about it.

The transactions of the Manchester Geological Society contain the statement of Mr. Higson, one of Her Majesty's inspectors, that in 1859 a quantity of gas was given off with enormous rapidity whilst the men were at work in the Arley mine, and it was so abundant as entirely to overcome the ventilation. This certainly was an immense effusion, and though there were more than 350 persons at work at the time, no explosion took place ; if it had, most likely all would have perished. Mr. Higson attributes their safety to the lamps throughout the colliery being in a state of perfect repair, and to the general maintenance in the pit of severe and strict discipline.

It is not long since that Mr. John Brown, of Lundhill, published a similar instance of terribly rapid throwing off of gas, and of all lives being saved by steadiness and sound safety lamps. In both those cases it is evident that the quantity of carburretted hydrogen gas discharged was infinitely more than at Risca, nevertheless, the grand principle of order and of discipline prevailed, and explosion was avoided.

By searching the annals of coal-mining operations, it will be found that such sudden and dangerous eruptions are not altogether uncommon ; but, happily, it often occurs that the lamps hold good, and the people preserve their presence of mind, and no explosion follows. Under these circumstances, for the most part, all knowledge of the event is confined to those who are connected with the pit. Occasionally, however, instances are made known and described, as in the two praiseworthy cases just quoted. The details of such startling incidents act as most useful warnings, and afford very valuable information to all those who are occupied in coal-mining pursuits. But at intervals (mercifully rare), the very converse of escape takes place, and we become shocked with the fearful details of the destruction of our fellow creatures.

Whether or not the Risca Colliery possessed the advantage of that chance of escape which we find recorded in the two instances already referred to (those of Messrs. Higson and Brown), is a question for the gravest consideration.

Some of the evidence given at the inquest tended to the effect that the discipline was not such as should prevail in a fiery mine, and it further showed that the lamp department was not managed in the scrupulous manner demanded in a pit known to be liable to sudden outbursts of inflammable air. The viewer certainly had exerted himself to put an end to the dangerous habit of smoking underground. But we find, notwithstanding, that tobacco pipes were taken below, and that false keys were known to be in possession of the men ; indeed, one was actually found in the pocket of a sufferer on that melancholy occasion. Lamps were also brought up not locked, though with their gauze cylinders attached and uninjured. The locking was performed both at the top and the bottom of the pit, even when the same shift of men proceeded to their daily labour. One witness, (William Thomas), deposed that his lamp was locked at the top of the pit, whilst another of the same name swore that his was locked at the bottom ; both cases on the same morning. I may further state that during the time I was occupied underground (nearly five weeks), it could not escape my observation that the lamps were not always well supplied with oil and wicks, and on different occasions I remarked on the quality of both to those who were then employed with me.

Men who had never worked in fiery mines, and who were ignorant of the mode of handling lamps, had been known to be put on to work, and not many years since this very circumstance had given rise to something like a strike or stand out amongst the more experienced colliers.

George Hemmons, the lamp man, deposed that on the morning of the explosion he "gave out about 200 lamps in a fit and proper state for working, but that he did not examine the gauzes, because the viewer had authorized the firemen to do so!" If this man did not examine them, he could not safely testify to their being "in a fit and proper state." It appears the men took the gauzes with them, and cleaned them in their own houses. This is the custom in some mining districts, and is, perhaps, in them, perfectly safe and reliable ; but the security and effectiveness of the practice may be questioned as regards the Risca and neighbouring collieries, inasmuch as it is not the prevailing custom throughout all Wales.

The No. 41 special rule provides that "the lampkeeper shall see that every lamp sent out of the lamp room for use in the workings is in proper condition and repair, and that it is securely locked ;" yet this man admitted in his examination that "he did not even examine or lock them." It is true that other persons were deputed to do so, and for his non-compliance with his duty, as laid down in the special rule, he was certainly not himself to blame. But taking this and the other circumstances altogether, they exhibit a departure from that exactitude which so important a department demands. Thus, from the general evidence tendered, I should form an opinion that it was scarcely conducted in such a manner as to be a complete guarantee against danger ; under, for example, those very conditions which appear in the two most fortunate instances I have already quoted. To take an imperfect lamp into a fiery pit is as dangerous as the introduction of a naked candle into a powder magazine.

With regard to the general state of discipline at the colliery, I can only make the remark, that though divided authority is not conducive to order and regularity of action, the absorption in too great a degree of all power and direction is equally dangerous. Where there is no amount of practical knowledge to guide and control the operations of a fiery coal mine, any undue interference in the actual working details is replete with perplexity and danger.

My own opinion is, that the viewer was entirely equal to the development of the mine; but, I should judge by the evidence at the inquest, that he was not vested with sufficient power to carry out his own views. There were several distinct departments to the conducting of which each individual chief and he only, was especially confined, whereas the viewer of a colliery should invariably have every branch completely under his own direction and command, and should never be unnecessarily interfered with by the head manager, or any other person in authority.

The head overman could neither read nor write, but as he lost his life in the discharge of his duty, it would now be want of proper feeling to call in question his merits or abilities. Of the deputies (firemen) I may speak in a more decided manner: — One of them lost his life in the explosion ; another proved by his own evidence that he was altogether an incapable person; a third (called an assistant fireman) was too young and inexperienced ever to have been placed in the responsible position of watcher over the lives and safety of his fellow workmen ; of the fourth I do not find it needful to make any special comment. Officers of this class are, I think, but little likely to exercise salutary control over the workpeople of the mine.

I am induced then to make the statement, that from all that passed under observation at the inquest, the discipline of this, pit was unquestionably defective.

A fiery colliery should possess that system, and be in that state of order and obedience that we find to prevail in a ship of war, or in a well regulated regiment of the line; if it be not so, all the air that can be forced through its workings will be insufficient to protect it from the danger of explosion.

The remarkable twist, or northern turn which the map shows on the eastern side, is attributable to a bend or swamp in that neighbourhood. The leading or hauling of the coals from this part had become expensive, therefore it should have been long previously abandoned. By limiting these eastern workings to the dotted line on the plan, or even by going as far as the downthrow fault and stripping all the coal up to it, they would have greatly eased the ventilation, and would at once have reduced the heaviest drag the air sustained in the whole colliery. This curtailment had been recommended long before the explosion. Four miles (the entire coursing of the air on the eastern side), is a long travel for one split, though in some of the best managed collieries there are instances of still greater length even in the north of England.

A pit should be so laid out that fatal results should be confined to the panel of work where explosion might take place, and not destroy three-fourths of all the people. A grand new shaft to the deep would have enabled them to make ample arrangements to this effect. Indeed it would have changed the whole system of ventilation, and given them a vast command of coal without pressing on restricted openings whenever there was a brisk demand.

Instead of as at present, facing the gas and breaking into its stores in the wrong direction, a new shaft would have released it the contrary way, giving it a far more natural and perfect drainage upwards through the slope, or through an entire new windway altogether, if they had so determined ; in this manner the old goaves would have been distant from all their operations.

I may here remark that there were no gobs or goaves near the part of the pit that fired, nor could that panel itself be considered a goaf, inasmuch as it was at the time of the accident a group of worked stalls where the pillars were being ripped or drawn back. This operation exposed a considerable surface of fresh coal face, which, when the atmospheric pressure became reduced, suddenly gave out a large quantity of gas. The barometer, as explained in my evidence, was singularly low on that morning ; it had, in fact, fluctuated for many weeks, and exhibited atmospheric disturbance to an extent far greater than I had ever before observed. At my recommendation they had long previously placed a good barometer not far from the bottom of the shaft.

In relation to these goaves, it is a curious fact, that in the black vein, as far as they have ever been examined, inflammable gas is not found. But black damp or carbonic acid exists in very considerable quantities. In a place which had very shortly before contained fire-damp, I found that it was replaced by the carbonic acid gas, to such an extent indeed as to have a serious effect on us all, one of our party nearly succumbing to it. I do not myself believe that the old gobs had any effect whatever in bringing about the catastrophe.

Mr. Thomas Evans in his evidence as to the cause of the eruption, offered a practical opinion ; "that the roof over the rippings had fallen and suddenly liberated the gas." This view may well receive corroboration on account of the loose and dangerous nature of the top, which sometimes cuts up to the "big vein," a thick seam that is known to be a vast reservoir of carburetted hydrogen, and unquestionably it does at times send down its gas. But, however, my own opinion remains firm and constant, that the gas which first fired was an effusion from the black vein itself, and that the explosion brought down a great fall of roof so that there was a double concussion, or rather a rapid succession of explosions ; in such case there will be an entire coincidence in evidence between Mr. Evans and myself.

At the inquest evidence was tendered as to limited size of windways, and also of insufficient timbering. I have already stated that the roof of the black vein is as bad as bad can be, and I may make the same remark of the thill or floor; in one single night it is liable to "puck" or heave up in a manner that is almost incredible. I was more in the pit than most of the witnesses ; abundant opportunity was afforded me to come to some approximate opinion as regards these matters, and I must say I am unable to allege that the local customary dimensions of air passages had been at all departed from ; nor in my opinion, had there been that remarkable scarcity of timber of which some of the witnesses made accusation ; indeed, the black vein will not put up with or admit of any such economy. After the explosion, the shattered and destroyed state of the workings, required much practical knowledge and large experience to enable any person whatever to offer reliable testimony as to sectional areas, or of the quantities of timber set up.

It was also stated that the men habitually worked too far beyond the brattice ; and here I am bound to say that one measurement we made showed that the face was actually more then 12 yards from the last length, but I certainly consider that to have been quite an exceptional case. The bad custom prevailed of the colliers setting up their own brattice, but this dangerous practice was of long standing and had arisen from the high price paid for cutting and filling the coal. It unquestionably carried with it the evil of the hewers being occasionally tempted to neglect their brattice, and was, no doubt in its general tendency subversive of discipline and carefulness.

That the workmen were not cognizant of danger I quite believe ; had they thought the pit was unsafe, they would very quickly have sought my intervention, as it is quite the custom in the district to call in my aid when anything is supposed to be the matter.

I now desire to state over again my own conviction, that this terrible event is attributable to a sudden emission of fire damp in the rippings of the No. 3 cross heading of the No. 4 east level, and that naked flame came into immediate contact with the gas and caused the explosion. In all probability this naked flame was exposed by an injured or imperfect lamp, and that lamp after all may possibly have been the one which belonged to Richard Jenkins, and which was found perforated as if with the point of a pick or mandril, though there is no actual evidence to confirm that supposition.

I furthermore state that the intricate workings to the far east should have been earlier cut off as recommended by me long previously, and I reiterate my opinion that there might with advantage to the ventilation have been more splits of air in the mine, though the accident cannot justly be charged to the absence of these two precautions. Lastly, and more important than all, a new shaft should have been sunk to the extreme deep, and then most probably no such appalling catastrophe would ever have taken place. I again record the expression of my opinion that the lamp department was not strictly conducted, and that the general discipline in the mine was not equal to that which a fiery pit demands. This double laxity may have much more connexion with the explosion than any other supposition contained throughout the whole of my report.

The deaths were occasioned by burning, by falls of roof and sides, and by asphyxia from after-damp ; by far the greatest loss of life arose from this latter cause, from which indeed for many of the people there was no chance of escape on account of their becoming completely imprisoned and locked in by tremendous and inaccessible falls of rock and rubbish.

Finally, I have reason to entertain the belief that this calamity is not capable of other or further solution than that which I have endeavoured to record in these pages.

As the leading enquiry was held on the body of James Hammond I append the verdict of the jury, adding the remark that all the remaining inquests were attended with a similar return :—

"We find that the deceased James Hammond died on the first of December 1860 from the effects of an explosion of fire-damp in the Black Vein coal pit at Risca, which gas was given off suddenly in the group of stalls in the third cross heading in the fourth east level, but there is no evidence to show how this gas became ignited. To this we beg to affix the following recommendations :— First, that the present rules of the colliery shall be revised. Secondly, that the working places in the pit shall be more frequently inspected; and, thirdly, that the suggestions of Mr. Brough, the Government Inspector, that the ventilation and underground workings shall be so arranged, that in case of any future explosion unfortunately occurring, the disastrous results would be confined to the district in which it took place ; and that a new pit shall be sunk for the permanent improvement of the ventilation of the colliery, which pit should be taken into the serious consideration of the directors and proprietors of the works. We take this opportunity of remarking that it appears to us that the Stephenson lamp is the best and safest."

The proceedings occupied 19 days, spread over five weeks, and the case was most patiently and searchingly investigated by the coroner and jury.

It is most pleasing to record the prompt assistance tendered on this afflicting occasion by the mineral agents and workmen from all parts of the two inspectors districts ; amongst those selected were Messrs. Wales, Brown, Palmer, and Gwillim. With the two latter I had most to act ; indeed they were with me constantly throughout the whole anxious and protracted period. I cannot say too much in praise of the skill and courage of them all ; I may, indeed, include all the shifts of men who lent their aid so willingly and laboured on until the last body was brought to daylight.

 

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