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Lundhill Colliery Disaster

Extracted from the Annual Mines Inspectors Report for 1857

Report of Charles Morton (page 134)

The coroner's inquest in this case was as remarkable for its ample and careful investigation, as was the misfortune to be inquired into for its gravity and magnitude.

A respectable and intelligent jury, summoned from several neighbouring townships, assembled on eleven different days and heard sixty witnesses during a period of three months; it was presided over with his usual ability and impartiality by Mr. Badger, of Rotherham, whose indefatigable examinations (as coroner), relative to mining accidents in Yorkshire, have often been highly and deservedly praised.

The minutes of evidence taken at the inquest are too voluminous to appear in these pages ; I therefore submit the following summary of the proceedings, abridged from the accurate notes of a professional shorthand writer, whose useful assistance in the coroner's court was kindly offered to me by Secretary Sir George Grey.

William Corbridge, a deputy at Lundhill colliery, said, — I have been employed here three years. The explosion took place from twenty minutes to half-past twelve at noon, on 19th February. I, and nineteen others were got out of the pit between four and five o'clock. Four deputies were employed, two in the day and two in the night.

When the explosion happened, I and five others were getting dinner, near to the drawing pit bottom. I descended the pit on Thursday morning, about four o'clock ; went with a Davy-lamp, and examined the boardgates and banks on the south side, and found the places safe. I also examined the goaves, and found no gas in them. William Illingworth (deceased) examined the north-west workings. No collier was allowed to enter till we had been through the works. I was employed till dinner time in going round the workings on the north side, and putting brattices in the north levels.

The brattices were properly placed, excepting in the endings, where the brattices are not so near to the face as the 23rd special rule requires (namely, 12 feet); some of them were more than 20 feet from the face. The miners have not complained of the brattices being too far from the face, but they have complained of their being too near.

Davy-lamps are used where necessary, but generally naked lights were used, because we thought the pit was safe. The packers had Davy-lamps, but they were not locked. There were parts on the north side where the air course was nearly stopped. In No. 3 and No. 4 north goaves the air-courses were fallen in, and we were making new ones. In No. 3 goaf the roof of the airway was fallen for 20 yards in length; some of it had fallen only a few days before the explosion, and some several weeks before : a man could scarcely creep over the fall.

No. 4 north goaf was fallen so as partly to stop the airway. Some part of this obstruction fell a fortnight before the explosion ; for about 20 yards it was fallen so close that it had to be crawled over. There were not any obstructions in other parts of the mine. The roof is so tender that the falls just mentioned could not be prevented.

On the south side all the all courses were open, and I did not see any danger in working the pit with naked lights. I was at the ventilating furnace twice on the day of the explosion ; the first time, at half-past six a.m., the second time about noon. The furnace was constantly attended to (according to special rule 3). The two furnace men had nothing else to do but attend to the furnace.

Some of the packwall builders have been miners, and others labourers; there were about twelve in all. The packwalls have been well built, according to the materials we have had to work with. I looked after the packers, and they ought regularly to have used safety-lamps. I have seen them unscrew the gauzes, and I reprimanded them for it, but I did not lock the lamp tops (according to special rule 1).

I never reported these things to Mr. Coe, but I have no doubt that he has seen them. The safety-lamps were unlocked on the day of the explosion, and I did not see or hear of any danger until the explosion occurred.

I last examined No. 3 and No. 4 north goaves on the Monday before the explosion, when there was a good air coming over, and I did not find gas in either. I examined all the goaves in the pit once or twice every week, and sometimes I found gas. About a week before the explosion I saw a "blower" of gas, but it was not very strong ; the men had just lighted it, and I ordered it to be put out immediately. This was in the north water level, and I considered it safe to work with candles there.

I have known many such "blowers" of gas in this pit. It was customary for the door-keepers to leave their doors at dinner hour; they got their dinners at the furnace, and then went back to their doors. I and the other deputies allowed the boys thus to leave their doors, and I never informed Mr. Coe about this. The door-keepers also left their doors at supper hour, in the night shift.

I cannot form any opinion as to whether the gas fired at the furnace ; and I do not know the cause of the explosion.

John Warhurst, a deputy at Lundhill colliery, said, — I was at home when the explosion took place. I immediately went to the pit, and found that the explosion had blown the cage up to the pulley-wheels, and it was fastened there. The rope was then cut off, and put on the other side of the shaft as speedily as possible. It was past four o'clock before any person could get into the pit. I, and Mr. Coe, and William Beevors went down first ; we found sheeting boards blown loose on the shaft side, and we removed them, and brought them to the surface. I and Beevors then went down to the bottom, and found a number of men there, whom we got out as soon as possible. I went near to the furnace pit, and saw a great blaze above the furnace. I found a man lying on a heap of burning coals, and I dragged him off. I went up the furnace boardgate for a few yards, but I was stopped by gas firing in my safety-lamp ; I then returned to the level, and found another dead body ; went on the south level, and found another dead man, and then another. After going 70 or 80 yards, I returned to the surface, and reported to Mr. Coe what I had seen. Messrs. Coe, Maddison, Webster, Uttley, and myself then descended the pit, and went on the south level as far as the second or third boardgates, where we found four or five dead bodies. Travelled about 250 yards southward, where gas fired in the safety-lamps and we were afraid to go further. We returned to the pit bottom, and I went to the surface again, and took down some more men. Messrs. Coe and Webster then left me, and told me to try and remove the dead bodies, and afterwards join Coe on the north side. I and Benjamin Hoyland went on the south level as far as the 4th boardgate ; went 40 yards up the board, and gas fired in the safety-lamps. The dead bodies we had found were brought to the bottom of the pit and left there., I then followed Messrs, Coe and Webster on the north side, and we found five or six more dead bodies in the level.

Being frightened of the furnace pit falling in, we had not time to remove the other dead bodies. I went back to look at the furnace, and it was falling; the coal was on fire for about 25 yards on each side of the furnace-pit bottom. I returned to Mr. Coe and his comrades, and told them that I had seen the furnace arches fall, and that masses of burning coal were tumbling from the sides of the drift leading to the furnace. We could not get to the stables, they were in flames.

The gas fired in the safety-lamps about 30 yards up the stable boardgate. We went up every boardgate on the north and south sides, as far as we could get for gas. The greatest distance we got up any of them was 40 yards. When I last came out of the pit about half-past seven o'clock, there was not in my opinion a living person left in it. About three o'clock on the same morning I examined the south district of the mine, and I never saw it in better condition ; there was not a working place where gas would fire in the safety-lamp, and the goaves seemed all clear. On the preceding night, William Lodge, who worked in the top level on the north side, complained to me that the brattices were a long way from the face. They were from 20 to 30 yards off; and according to special rule 23 they ought to have been only four. I told him that I did not see any danger, and that there was no occasion to have brattices so near to the face in the headings, as the coal does not make much gas on the end ; but, in the boardgates, we act up to special rule 23, because the coal yields gas.

We have driven levels and slits more, than 40 yards without any brattices. I know that it is very unhealthy to, do so. William Lodge was working with a candle. I offered him a safety-lamp, but he declined it. No other person but William Lodge complained of the brattices being so far from the face ; many have grumbled about them being so near. I have sometimes told Mr. Coe that we were short of brattices, and he has often reprimanded me for allowing them to be so far behind. We have not complied with special rule 23 in reference to brattices, because we (the deputies) thought there was no necessity. We have not been in the habit of having more than one slit open near the face of boardgates or levels. On the day and night previous to the explosion there was not any great fall of roof; it is a very tender roof, and we have continually little falls. I examined the goaves with a safety-lamp on the day previous to the explosion, and they were quite clear. We have generally worked with naked lights, and have seldom had occasion to use safety-lamps, and then only in boardgates. In the second boardgates, on the north side, we have had feeders and "blowers" of gas, sometimes. Special rule 23 has been observed as regards the sectional area of air-courses, with the exception of a few places where the roof fell in and blocked the passage. The airways and air crossings ought to be not less than 30 square feet, sectional area ; some of the air-crossings were less, and some airways (where the roof was crushed down) were not more than 16 square feet, sectional area; there were two such on the north side. Some of the slits are 40 yards apart, but generally they are 20 or 30 yards apart ; and we have driven 40 yards with candles, and without air-pipes or brattices. I cannot account for this explosion, except that there may have been a door left open. The doors were single in the boardgate ends, and they should have been double (according to special rule 24). We had doorkeepers at the boardgate ends, but not elsewhere; all the other doors were opened and shut by the burners, and I have not often known doors left open.

Mr. William Porter Maddison, viewer at Wombwell Main colliery, near Barnsley, said, — About twenty minutes to one o'clock on the afternoon of the explosion I arrived at Lundhill pit, and found the men had just completed fastening the broken chain on the head-gear ; they were also reversing the rope and adjusting it on to the drum. Every exertion was made, no time was lost, and the rope was got to work about a quarter to three. Mr. Coe, and two of his men went down the shaft, but their descent was much impeded by pieces of loose timber, which were removed ; and after some time they reached the bottom. Shortly afterwards Mr. Coe returned to the surface, and then he and I and Mr. Webster went down the pit together. We had great difficulty in keeping our lights in, because of the current of air : we had to scramble over a heap of broken slides and stays, and proceeded along the south-horse level about fifteen yards ; saw an opening to the upcast pit, where there had been two doors, not a vestige of which remained. A fire was here raging furiously, the arching of the furnace was in ruins, and fire was also coming down the furnace boardgate towards the pit. We went further along the south-horse level, and turned up the next opening westward, in the hope of getting round to the other side of the fire, but the flames soon stopped us. On the rise, we found the corner of a solid pillar of coal on fire, but it was afterwards put out. Altogether we got about 70 yards to the rise of the horse level at this point. Mr. Coe tried to go further up, but he was stopped by want of air. We then returned to the horse level, and travelled southward, turning up the several west boardgates as far as we could until gas fired in the safety-lamps. We went to the south, a distance of about 350 yards, found three dead bodies, and were again stopped by gas firing in the lamps. We then returned to the downcast pit, scrambled over the debris, went on the north levels, and a few yards from the pit bottom we saw a dead horse, and a train of loaded corves, on the top of which he had been blown by the explosion. We then turned up the boardgate leading into the stables, and found two horses lying dead. The stables were on fire, more particularly on the side next to the hay cribs; and the edges of the coal were also on fire. We then went along the north-horse level, turned up No. 1 boardgates, found the stables on fire there also, and a large body of smoke backing along the north level, which led us to suppose that there was fire still further to the north. Proceeding on the horse-level we found several dead men ; went, up No. 2 boardgates about 40 yards, until we could go no further because of firedamp ; returned to the horse-level, examining the stoppings as we went northward, some of which, were not blown out. Went up No. 3 boardgates about 40 yards, where gas fired in the safety-lamps; proceeded along the north horse-level to within 40 yards of the face ; at the entrance of No. 4 boardgates we found a dead boy, burnt and blackened ; then went into the water-level and brought out the dead body of a man. Just at this time John Warhurst came to tell us that if we did not at once return to the shaft, our means of escape would be lost ; but we did not leave the levels and boardgates, even then, until we had examined every place that was approachable, or in which it was possible for any person to be alive. We examined several places on the dip-side, but found no one, dead or living; those who had been working there had got out. We returned to the shaft, counting eight dead bodies on the way, and tried to enter the stables again, but we could not. The flames were then raging so furiously that it was impossible for us to go near; for more than 100 yards the solid coal, timber, &c. were a sheet of flame, and it was fearful to contemplate the increase of the fire during the time we had been in the pit. In the first instance we might have gone up to the fire, but afterwards we dare not go within many yards of it. Again we went to the bottom of the upcast shaft, and found the flames there burning at a white heat.

We did not leave the mine until we believed beyond doubt that there could not be a living person in it, excepting ourselves. About half-past seven o'clock at night we ascended the pit, and consulted with the proprietors, and others, as to what was best to be done in this emergency. Robert Charles Webster, Joseph Coe, William Uttley, John Hoyland, William Duckworth, James Cookson, Benjamin Hoyland, John James, and Ellis Wilcock (persons connected with collieries) were present; and all of them had been down the pit. The unanimous opinion was that there could not be a living person in the mine at that hour (7.40 p.m.) ; that it would be dangerous and unsafe for any man to descend the pit for any purpose whatever ; and that the only remedy, seeing that the fire was now so strong, was instantly to close the downcast shafts ; and they were closed accordingly, leaving the furnace pit open. At 7.40 the flames rose upwards of 100 feet above the top of the furnace pit, and the sparks rose at least 300 feet into the air.

The closing of the pits was completed about ten o'clock. No person objected to the closing of the pits ; and as much expedition was used as possible to get into the mine (after the explosion) to rescue the victims. There was no water at hand by which the underground fire could have been extinguished when we first descended. Before the shafts were closed, the fire must have extended from the pit bottom towards the west at least 70 or 80 yards. Wheresoever we went underground our progress was stopped by inflammable gas firing in the safety lamps, and there was also a good deal of afterdamp. I have not been able to form an opinion as to the cause of the explosion.

Mr. Robert Charles Webster, manager of the Hoyland and Elsecar colliery, near Barnsley, said, — I accompanied Mr. Maddison, and others, into the pit on the afternoon of the explosion, and I concur in his statement of the facts and circumstances whom transpired. I also agreed with him, and others, as to the propriety of closing the pits, which was the only way of saving the colliery. I had great fear that the sides of the upcast shaft would fall in, and no person could then have got into the mine, perhaps for months to come. When we left the pit, there could not possibly be any person alive in it. We went up every boardgate as far as we could get, and listened attentively to hear cries or moans, but there were no indications of life ; everything was as still as death, and we could not have existed there much longer. We left the mine about 7.15 p.m. Mr. Nicholas Wood, Mr. George Elliot, Mr. John Thomas Woodhouse, Mr. Henry Holt, and Mr. Morton, the Government Inspector, have since approved of the steps we took as regards closing the downcast shafts. No speedier or better means could have been devised than those we adopted to extricate the sufferers ; but we could not rescue more than nineteen or twenty persons.

William Lodge, a miner at Lundhill colliery, said, — I was in the pit during the night preceding the explosion; I went to work in the north bank level, and I saw chalked on my buffet the words "be careful." I had a candle lighted, and as there seemed to be very little air, I sent for John Warhurst, the deputy, and told him that I was fearful of danger. He tried it with his safety-lamp, but gas did not fire. I asked him why we could not get some bratticing ; he replied that it was not his fault, that he had asked for it and could not get it, and that there was a scarcity of bratticing. I said I would work no more unless he got me some bratticing, and he answered that I should use a safety-lamp : I wanted air up to the face of the level, which was then 35 yards without bratticing. I continued to work in the same place during the whole of that shift; and from what Warhurst said, I felt satisfied that there was no danger of being burnt then. I found fault because I was forced to work so far out of the air. I told Warhurst that it was a scandalous shame that men should work in a way to be either burnt or smothered. We have some "fireboards," or danger-signals, in the store-room ; but I have never seen them brought into the works. I never informed Mr. Coe that the special rules were being neglected, but Mr. Coe knew it. I never heard any person complain of there being too much air in the north levels. On the night before the explosion I worked with a safety-lamp, but my hurrier came in with his candle: it is contrary to special rule 21 to do so, but it has been done regularly. I have seen the gas fire two or three times on the south side.

Joseph Swift, a miner at Lundhill colliery, said, — During the night previous to the explosion, I was working with a candle on the south side, and in the leading bank up No. 5 boardgates ; there was good air when I left it at half-past two o'clock in the morning. I can form no opinion as to the cause of the explosion, further than that I think the gas had been driven out of the goaves by a fall of roof. I did not see or hear of any gas that night; I have seen a little gas in the boardgates, occasionally : in No. 1 boardgates, on the north side, I have seen gas, and I worked with a candle there, but I had bratticing up to the face. Some great and sudden falls of roof have happened in my bank, but I have not seen any gas follow the falls.

George Burrows, a miner at Lundhill colliery, said, — On the morning of the explosion I came out of the pit about half-past four o'clock; I had been working with a candle in the east boardgates on the dip side, where there was a good air, and no gas. I have not had occasion to complain generally of want of air. My own notion about the cause of the explosion is that it arose from a great fall of roof in some of the goaves on the north side of the mine. I have seen gas in No. 4 boardgates on the south side ; we always had brattices there about 15 or 20 feet from the face. I have seen several "blowers" of gas in No. 5 boardgates, and occasionally safety-lamps were used, but more commonly we had candles: we used safety-lamps until the gas got worked out of the place, and then we lighted candles; the colliers exercised their own judgment concerning this. We were acting contrary to special rule 18 in this matter; we ought to have been guided by the steward, or his deputy, but the latter seldom came near us. I have never heard any complaints about deficiency of air in the works.

John Thompson, a miner at Lundhill colliery, said, — On the night preceding the explosion I was in the leading-bank on the left-hand of No. 4 boardgates on the south side. I have not seen any gas in it ; there was a good air, and I worked with a candle. I have not complained of the state of the pit; it was always in good working order where I have been. The doorkeepers always left their doors nearly an hour at supper time in the night shift, and at dinner time in the day. The deputies have allowed them to do so ; the door-boys and the deputies dined and supped together at the furnace. There was a fall of roof in my bank two or three nights before the explosion ; it was neither great nor sudden ; we have not had very large falls, and they have been gradual. I have not observed whether gas came after a fall of roof; I have seen gas fire at the candle in boardgates, when we have struck a "blower." I have seen the "blowers" blaze even when there has been a strong wind ; and after the blaze has been knocked out, we have continued working with candles.

John Robinson, a miner at Lundhill colliery, said, — I worked up the No. 2 boardgates on the south side of the pit, and in the second following-up bank on the left hand. On the morning of the explosion I came out of the pit at three o'clock, and thought it was then as safe as ever I had seen it. If there was anything to complain of it was having too much air, which wasted the candles. I have not seen gas in my bank, and I am not aware that there was gas in the adjoining goaf. I have seen gas in the boardgates, more particularly in No. 2 and No. 3 on the north side; there was a little gas in all the boardgates. I did not hear any great fall of roof on the night previous to the explosion ; and I cannot form any opinion as to the cause of it.

Edward Simmons, a miner at Lundhill colliery, said, — When the explosion occurred, I was working in a boardgate on the dip side of the pit, about 140 yards east from the pit bottom. In running to the shaft, I met the afterdamp, and it nearly choked me ; but I laid down until the fresh air came again, and I was afterwards rescued. We had no firedamp in our boardgates ; we burnt candles, and the air seemed to be in its usual state. We drove 40 yards from one slit to another, and had 20 or 30 yards unbratticed. I have no idea as to where the explosion began, or what caused it.

David Rollings, a miner at Lundhill colliery, said, — I was working on the day of the explosion in the face of No. 1 boardgates on the north side, but I was not there when the blast occurred, having left the pit a few minutes after twelve o'clock. I had no apprehension of danger, and I thought the mine was as safe as being at home. There was gas, but not enough to harm any one. We drove 40 yards from one slit to another (with candles), having brattices about seven yards from the face, and I have never had occasion to complain of want of air. During the morning of the explosion I did not hear any fall of roof in the neighbourhood of my working place, and I do not know the cause of the accident.

William Hubbershaw, a miner at Lundhill colliery, said, — I was working at the low side of the north-horse level, about 200 yards from the shaft, when the explosion took place. Three persons were with me ; one ran away, and he perished ; but the other two came out with me. We remained in our own place several hours, and the air was so hot I thought we could not survive: we laid still, and then taking hold of one another, we made the best of our way to the pit bottom, where we found several persons alive, having passed over two or three dead bodies: my senses then left me, and I do not remember who brought me up the shaft. On the morning of the explosion, I thought my place was in a good state; but one place I knew was in a very bad state, namely, between No. 3 and No. 4 boardgates (north side), where the main airway had been fallen in for two or three months, to such a degree that the air had not a free passage, and the fall was 20 or 30 yards long. The proper quantity of air could not reach the bank faces in this part, and they may have got "fiery." Mr. Coe knew all about this fall, and I have seen him turn back rather than go over it. According to special rule 23, this airway was far too small. I have often complained of the packing being too far behind, especially in following-up banks, where I have seen the packwalls 20 yards short of the face; they ought not to be more than 4 or 5 yards from the bank face, to keep the roof up, and to preserve the air in its proper course. Mr. Coe set on packers who ought not to have been there, — some of them farm labourers, who knew nothing about gas, or safety-lamps, or how to make packwalls. There were 12 or 14 packers, who sometimes worked with naked lights, and sometimes with safety-lamps ; and I have seen them take the lamp gauzes off. They perhaps commenced with safety-lamps, but they screwed off the gauzes when they got to work ; they took off the lamp gauzes whenever they chose, because the lamps were not locked. The deputies have found the packers working with lamps in this way, and close to the edge of the goaf. If the deputies have stated that the packers use nothing but safety-lamps, they have made a wrong statement. They ought not to have had naked lights near the goaf, and they ought to be very experienced men. The goaf might be free from gas at one moment, and not at another, if a fall of roof came down.

John Dunston said, — I am a miner, I worked on the north side, and in the leadingbank of No. 4 goaf. The airway from No. 4 boardgate to my bank was fallen in and nearly stopped up : I have tried to pass over this fall, and for some weeks I could creep over it, but for the last few weeks it has fallen so close that I could neither get up nor down. If this place had been kept properly open, I should have had the air brought to the face of my bank ; but there was very little air came. Before the airway fell in there was plenty of air, but for more than six weeks the air has been slack. I do not know whether there was gas in the goaf, or in the bank, but I worked with a candle; I was never ordered to use a safety-lamp, but I had no objection, if I had been told to do so. I never refused to work in the bank, and I never complained about it to Mr. Coe. I was not in the pit when the explosion happened, and I have no idea as to where and how it occurred.

William Beevers, a deputy at Lundhill colliery, said, — I was in the night shift previous to the explosion ; I examined the south side of the mine, and the workings seemed to be free from gas. I left the pit at three o'clock in the morning, when everything appeared quite safe on the south side. No complaints were made to me during the night that the works were unsafe. I know nothing of the condition of the north side of the mine during that night. Four or five days before the explosion I saw that the airway in No; 1 goaf was stopped by fall of roof ; the airway was not entirely closed, but it was nearly so for a period of six weeks. There was another airway in the same state on the north side of No. 3 goaf but none in the south part of the pit had fallen in so. I did not see any defective stoppings on the night previous to the explosion, nor did I see any doors left open. I examined the goaves on the south side that night, but did not find gas. I went to the ventilating furnace about 2.30 on the morning of the explosion, and it was in a goof working state. Special rule 9 has not been observed, as to the deputies duties when the pit worked double shift. I did not see or hear of any great falls of roof in the banks or in the goaves on the night before the explosion. The packers safety-lamps had locks, but they were not locked ; the gauzes have been taken off in my presence, and the packers have worked with them so. Some of the packers were experienced men, and some were not. I can offer no explanation of the origin of the explosion. I thought it was as safe a pit as ever I travelled in.

George Goodison, one of the ventilating furnace men at Lundhill colliery, said, — I left the furnace at five o'clock on the morning of the explosion; I kept a good fire burning during the whole of the preceding night, and there seemed to be about the usual draught of air. The furnace is attended to both night and day ; the furnace men change at the furnace, and have no other employment. The flames of the furnace did not look as if gas was coming with the return air of the mine; and I have no reason to suspect that the explosion took place at the furnace. About thirty men and boys came to the furnace usually at noon to get their dinners, but not quite so many came to supper at night ; they remained from half an hour to an hour. I have often driven the door keepers away, and told them to go to their doors. The deputies sometimes came, and remained with the doorkeepers at the furnace. It was wrong for the boys to leave their doors.

James Flint said, — I came out of the pit at three o'clock on the morning of the explosion. I worked in the face of the north-horse level. I had plenty of air there, and I used a candle. There were brattices, but they were 20 or 30 yards from the face of the level. I did not see any danger from gas.

Thomas Dallison said, — I left the pit at five o'clock on the morning of the explosion. I worked on the north side, and in the leading bank on the right of No. 2 boardgates. The airway in this bank had fallen in ; it has been impassable for several weeks, and no new airway had been made. Whatever air there was in the face of the bank, came over the top of the fall ; I used candles. I dare not attempt to creep over the fall with a naked light. Since the airway got closed, I have found as much gas in the bank as a candle would "flush" at. I did so on the night before the explosion ; but, as I did not see any of the deputies, I did not tell them about the gas. There was no danger signal put in the bank that night ; no deputy came to me between seven o'clock in the evening and five o'clock the next morning, when I came out. I was never told to work with a safety-lamp during the time that the airway was fallen in, and I did not know there was danger until the gas "flushed." According to special rule 13, it was my duty to report the presence of gas to the under-viewer or the deputy. The goaf behind me was not tried for gas during that night.

John Long said, — I came out of the pit at ten o'clock on the night previous to the explosion. I had been in No. 1 boardgates on the north side. There were 44 yards from one slit to another; but the brattices were about four yards from the face. I did not like driving so far without slitting ; formerly a slit was holed every 20 yards. I worked usually with candles, but not always. I have sometimes seen gas there. Slits have been driven out of the boardgate into the banks a distance of 40 yards without any brattices ; and at the same time there were "blowers" of gas in the boardgates. I used a safety-lamp when required. I did not see any "blowers" on the night before the explosion.

Joseph Scholey said, — On the Friday before the explosion I was in No. 3 bank on the south side of the mine. I never but once saw gas there. I had a very good air, and worked with candles. I do not know the state of the goaves. I have seen the deputies try them, and they said the goaves were not foul. My opinion is that gas has been lodging higher up, and a great fall of roof might at any time bring gas down with it.

George Ramsden said, — I left the pit at four o'clock in the afternoon before the explosion. I had been in No. 1 boardgates on the north side. I have noticed gas in my place several times, and occasionally it fired at my candle. The gas "flushed" in this way a few days before the explosion, when the brattice was 12 yards from the face. I have often told the deputies about gas in my place. I have worked with a safety-lamp occasionally, but not often. No person has been burnt in these boardgates, but I have seen gas fire in the safety-lamp only two yards from the brattice end. I do not like the slits being so far as 40 yards apart, and especially when we are short of brattices. We have not had more than one slit open at once ; the stoppings are made of bricks and lime. I have no objection whatever to work with a safety-lamp, and I have always done so when ordered.

Samuel Law said, — I ceased work at four o'clock on the morning of the explosion. I had been in a leading-bank on the left hand of No. 1 boardgates, (south side.) I thought it safe to work with candles there, as I never saw any gas, and the air was generally good. There was not any fall of roof in my bank during the night; and the airways leading into and out of it, though somewhat fallen at one point, were quite open. The goaf was frequently tried for gas, but none was found, and I considered the pit was safe.

Abraham Levitt, a packer in the Lundhill colliery, said, — When the explosion took place I was sitting in the cabin near the pit bottom, and five other persons were with me. I was building a pack-wall in No. 4 north goaf on the day before the explosion; the ventilation was stopped some weeks previously by a fall of roof in the airway, but I did not see any gas there on the morning of the explosion, or on the preceding day. I worked with a candle, but at times I used a safety-lamp ; I thought it safe to have a naked light, but I had been told to use a Davy-lamp. Mr. Coe said the packers were always to use safety-lamps ; but the oil was so bad we could not make the lamps burn ; the gauzes were never locked, and sometimes we screwed them off. We had both safety-lamps and naked lights near to the goaves, when making pack-walls. We were disobeying special rules 18, 20, and 21 in this matter; but Mr. Coe and the deputies have seen us doing so, and they did not reprove us, because they knew that the lamp oil burnt so badly. The packers ought to have thoroughly understood their work ; but Mr. Coe employed farm-servants, or any sort of men, if he could get them cheaper. I think the explosion was caused by a fall of roof. There is a very tender roof for six or seven yards above the coal ; then there is a rock, which has probably broken down and forced the gas out towards the candles. I do not know in which goaf this has happened, but such a fall might take place in any one of them. About five days before the explosion I was in the leading-bank of No. 3 north goaf; the airway was nearly blocked up by a fall of roof; a little air went over the fall, but not so much as there should have been. The air-course had been obstructed about five weeks, and the men worked there with candles. On Saturday before the explosion, I was in No. 2 and No. 1 north goaves, removing props; I used a naked light, because I did not observe any gas in either; and the airways were open. I do not know anything of the state of these two goaves on the day of the explosion. I had been working on that day in the furnace boardgates, but I saw no gas. I never objected to work with a safety-lamp when I had good lamp oil. Some of the packers knew nothing about safety-lamps, or about gas. I think that both packers and colliers should use safety-lamps in a fiery mine, and that no naked lights should be allowed. I have often seen "blowers" of gas ; more particularly in No. 4 bank on the north side, and in the furnace boardgates. I have no reason to believe that the gas fired at the furnace. I was at the furnace about ten minutes before the explosion occurred, and I saw between 20 and 30 men and boys dining there. A very strong current of air was passing over the furnace at that time, and I thought I had never seen the mine in safer condition.

Samuel Abbot said, — I have worked in No. 2 and No. 4 boardgates on the north side, and in the levels on the south side. The pit was not rightly ventilated, because at the boardgate ends there were only single doors, and there ought to have been double doors: this is contrary to special rule 24, and it is decidedly unsafe. In No. 4 north goaf there was not sufficient room for the air to pass, owing to a fall of roof in the airway, which was almost blocked up. I have seen gas in nearly all the boardgate faces, where it rushes out with a hissing noise ; I have also seen it in No. 3 north goaf.

George Hartley said, — I had the safety-lamps to clean and trim, but I never locked them (as required by special rule 1). I do not know whether the safety-lamps were proper and fit to work with, and according to that rule. The lamps were not furnished with shields and wire pickers. I have never heard any complaints about bad oil. During the week before the explosion there was so much gas in the face of the furnace boardgates as to make it needful to use safety-lamps. There was also gas in the north and south levels branching out of the top of these boardgates, the bratticing in which levels was nearly 30 yards from the faces.

George Blackburn said, — I worked in a following-up bank on the left hand of No. 3 boardgates (south side). I came out of the mine about 20 minutes before the explosion happened. There was a sufficiency of air in my working place, and I never saw as much gas in it as would fire at my candle. I have sometimes heard a rumbling and crashing noise over my head, as if the roof was falling a great height up; and I have feared that gas might come down on those occasions ; but I do not know whether gas has actually been seen in the goaves at such times. I think the explosion has been caused by a fall of roof, which has brought down so much gas with it as to overpower the air. The goaves in this pit were not as they ought to have been ; they were entirely unventilated. At Thorpe's Gawber Pits, near Barnsley, the goaves in the thick coal are ventilated, and I think they should have been so at Lundhill. Holes might be left in the pack-walls to allow portions of air to pass across the goaves.

Henry Holt, a miner at Lundhill colliery, said, — I worked on the south side in No. 2 boardgates. I came out of the pit at noon on the day of the explosion, when the general ventilation seemed in its usual state. My work was in a slit; but I had very little air at the face of it, being 32 yards out of the airway, and I had no brattice to take air into the face. I did not see any gas in the slit, but it was very close and warm. I have driven several other slits in this way, a distance of 32 yards, and with candles. I have seen gas fire at my light in such slits. I have also seen gas in the face of No. 2 boardgates on the south side, where there was a deficiency of bratticing. We have lately been much in want of brattice. I think the explosion has been caused by a fall of roof in some of the goaves, which have not been ventilated rightly, as air could not pass through or over them. I would let air go up the goaves, as well as up the bank-gates ; and thus the goaves would be kept nearly free from gas. There has been no attempt in this pit to ventilate the goaves, and there must generally have been more or less gas lodging in them ; and if a great or sudden fall of roof came on, the gas would be forced out. I should also like to bring in safety-lamps ; there ought not to be any candles in the thick coal of the Barnsley district.

(Certain allegations having been published that due diligence had not been exerted, after the explosion, to extricate the sufferers, several witnesses (supposed to be complainants) were next examined on the subject ; and the result was that such imputations remained not proved.)

Mr. Rowland Childe said, — I am a mineral surveyor at Wakefield, and assistant to Mr. Henry Holt, mining engineer. On the 1st January 1857, I made a survey and plan of the Lundhill colliery, on behalf of the lessees ; and at that time, upwards of 12 acres of the thick coal had been got (including all the goaves, levels, boardgates, and slits). There were nine goaves, the total area of which was nearly ten acres. I thought the mine was then in very good working condition. It appeared to be well conducted and well officered, and the ventilation seemed efficient.

Mr. Benjamin Sellars, mineral surveyor at Netherhaugh, near Rotherham, said, — On the 5th February 1857 I made a survey of the Lundhill workings, on behalf of the lessors ; and at that time, nearly 14 acres of the thick coal had been got. I did not ascertain what quantity of air was then passing through the mine, but I thought that it was in as good a state of ventilation as any of the pits in the neighbourhood. For the purpose of ventilation, the mine was divided into two districts; one north, the other south of the pit. I went to the extremities of the north and south levels, and nearly to the faces of the nine pairs of west boardgates. The two currents of air appeared to be fairly distributed, and I considered the works were quite safe. I heard gas issuing in one or two places. We used naked lights ; there was no reason to suspect that there was gas enough to fire. One of the goaves on the south side was tried for gas, but none was found. The ventilating furnace was sufficiently large for the requirements of the mine; but it would be better if the foul air was taken into the upcast shaft without going through the furnace. I think it wrong in principle to pass the return air of a fiery mine through the furnace, because the gas might ignite at the furnace. I should prefer to have a "dumb drift" to carry the return air into the upcast shaft without touching the furnace at all. It was my opinion, at the time I made my survey, that it was safe to work the colliery with naked lights. If double doors were placed at the boardgate ends, and the mine worked only one shift, and the furnace improved in the manner already suggested, and holes left in the pack-walls, so as to circulate air through the goaves, the mine would be very much safer. I object to putting safety-lamps into the hands of boys, and this is my chief objection to the use of safety-lamps.

Mr. Joseph Coe said, — I am the under-viewer of Lundhill colliery, and I have been so since the commencement of the present year: previous to that time I was the principal viewer, and then Mr. Henry Holt, of Wakefield, was appointed to that office. My duty was to manage the working department, and the ventilation ; the deputies were under my immediate control. I was in the pit the day previous to the explosion, when I examined the air currents, and found them circulating in their usual quantities ; I also examined the faces of the north levels, and of the boardgates, leading-banks, and following-up banks on the north side. The airway in No. 4 north goaf was partially fallen in, but I found a strong current of air passing ; there were about two feet of height on the top of the fall; I found no gas in the goaf or in the bank face, and I thought it safe to work there with candles. The airway in No. 3 north goaf was also partially fallen in ; I went on the top of the fall, and found a strong current of air passing there. No. 3 boardgates, and the leading-bank of No. 3 north goaf had good air, and caudles were being used. The faces of No. 2 boardgates were also well aired. No. 2 north goaf, and the working places around it had good ventilation, and showed no indications of gas. No. 1 boardgates were also well ventilated by brattice, and No. 1 north goaf and banks were safe at that time. There was a brisk fire at the furnace ; but I did not go up the furnace boardgates, so I cannot tell the state of the faces there. I did not examine the south side workings on that day, but I was in them three or four days before the explosion. There were no obstructed airways on the south side; I did not find any gas in the goaves, or in the working places ; I thought the ventilation was in its usual condition, but I did not examine the south district so particularly as to enable me to speak positively about it. I was in the western extremities of the furnace boardgates about a week before the explosion, when I found them in safe working order. In the faces of all the boardgates a little gas oozed from fissures in the coal ; and when a candle is applied, a small flame is produced ; but I have not seen any large "blowers." In the headings at the top of the furnace boardgates, the brattice was 20 or 25 yards from the faces ; but I deemed it safe to work with naked lights there. I appointed the pack-wall builders, and I considered that they were competent and careful; they generally worked with naked lights, but they were prohibited from going into the goaf, except with a safety-lamp. They went into the goaf to get stones for making the pack-walls, and their work was usually alongside the edges of the goaves. The packers provided their own candles, and rather than buy candles they have screwed off the tops of their safety-lamps, which were not locked. There were probably 50 doors fixed at 50 different places in the mine ; they were all single doors, with two exceptions only ; and according to special rule 24 we ought to have had double doors in the principal airways. If a single door at the lower end of a boardgate was carelessly or accidentally left open, the workings beyond it would be unventilated. A great number of doors must be used, so long as the present method of getting coal by leading-banks and following-up banks is persevered in. I have not had cause to complain of neglect on the part of the doorkeepers; nor was I aware until recently that the special rules had not been strictly observed by the deputies and workmen. There were about 290 persons employed under ground, of whom about 70 worked in the night, and 220 in the day. From 500 to 600 tons of coal were raised in 24 hours ; the pit generally worked six days a week ; and I did not consider that the quantity of gas in the mine was such as to make it unsafe to work night and day at this rate. It was my duty (according to general rule 1) to see that an adequate amount of ventilation was constantly, produced in the colliery; and the proprietors wished no expense to be spared in the ventilating and other arrangements. The quantity of air passing through the northern part was usually from 25,000 to 30,000 cubic feet per minute, and the quantity going on the south side was about the same ; making a total of from 50,000 to 60,000 cubic feet per minute. Steady and careful men have been employed at the ventilating furnace day and night, and I never allowed them to leave it for a moment. I thought the air was judiciously split into two currents; that the ventilation was strong enough in all parts; and I never saw a better ventilated mine in my life. Before this explosion, I believed the construction of the furnace was right and safe ; but I now think that it was wrong and unsafe to carry the return air through the furnace; and for the future, in all the Barnsley collieries subject to sudden influxes of gas, (and most of them are so,) I should feed the furnace with fresh air, and take the return air along a "dumb drift," and thus avoid the risk of gas igniting at the furnace. I have no reason to suppose that the explosion at Lundhill originated at the furnace. This objectionable mode of passing return air through the furnace is common around Barnsley. Prior to the explosion, I considered it quite safe to work the Lundhill colliery with naked lights; but I should now recommend that every mine in the Barnsley district should be worked exclusively with safety-lamps. As regards the system of working coal generally in this neighbourhood, I will venture to say (from my own experience in the North of England, in Staffordshire, and in Yorkshire,) that the Barnsley mode of getting coal is the most wretched and the most dangerous that I know. In reference to the probable cause of the Lundhill explosion, I can only offer an opinion: the roof is very tender to a height of six or seven yards above the coal, and falls freely in the goaf; the strata-higher up are much stronger, and maintain the weight above for a long time after the roof falls below ; and immediately above the strong strata, a thin seam of coal and a bed of black bituminous shale occur, which yield a considerable quantity of inflammable gas. After the lower roof fell, and the goaves became more extensive, the stronger roof above may have suddenly broken, and liberated Volumes of gas from the coal and shale measures higher up ; and even so quickly as to overpower the existing ventilation, and explode at the first naked light. I believe there is abundance of gas in all the upper strata, and until the gas is thoroughly drawn off, it is likely that similar influxes of it may occur again ; and hence the danger of using naked lights. With respect to the events which followed the explosion, I agree with the testimony already given by Messrs. Maddison, Webster, and Warhurst.

Mr. Nicholas Wood, of Hetton, in the county of Durham, mining engineer, said, — I was sent for by the owners of Lundhill colliery on the day after the explosion; and the following day I visited the spot, where I met Mr. George Elliot, mining engineer, of Houghton-le-Spring, Durham ; Mr. John Thomas Woodhouse, mining engineer, of Derby ; Mr. Henry Holt, mining engineer, of Wakefield ; and Mr. Morton, the Government Inspector of coal mines for Yorkshire. We found the tops of the two downcast pits entirely closed, and the top of the upcast pit was nearly so. We inquired into all the circumstances under which the pits had been closed, in order to decide whether we could approve, or not, of their having been closed ; and judging from the statements made to us, and from our own experience in similar cases, we were of opinion that not a person was left alive in the mine on the evening of the explosion ; and that the existence of a standing fire was likely at any moment (if the pits were left open) to ignite inflammable gas, and produce another explosion. We therefore thought it was quite necessary and proper that the pits had been closed at the time referred to, and we fully concurred in what had been done. We also devised measures to extinguish the underground fire, and to recover the dead bodies ; and we resolved that the only safe and expeditious mode of quenching the fire was to run water into the workings so as to immerse all the burning matter; and we ultimately determined that the water should rise to a height of 60 feet in the shaft. The temperature of the air in the mine (before the water was admitted) exceeded 105° ; and after the water had risen to 60 feet, the temperature was only 63°. We then ordered the water to be drawn out, and on the 20th April it was accomplished, when steps were taken to recover the dead bodies ; and up to the present time 101 corpses have been found. Messrs Woodhouse, Elliot, Holt, Morton, and myself have carefully examined the southern portion of the mine up Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 boardgates ; and we have also examined the remainder up No. 1 boardgate (south), and Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 boardgates (north). We found all the boardgates open, and the air passing freely around them ; but, the roof in the banks having fallen, they were not approachable; and the remaining bodies were under the falls. Although the banks were not accessible, there was a considerable quantity of air passing through them; and the mine is now secure, if lighted exclusively with safety-lamps. It has been the system here, and in the Barnsley district generally, to work the coal in boardgates and banks, the latter being wide, and from which the coal is entirely extracted ; the roof then falls in the space excavated ; and if the coal produced no gas, this might be a safe mode of working with naked lights ; but if the coal be "fiery" (as it is at Lundhill) the gas, being lighter than air, fills the space above the falls in the goaves ; thus forming magazines of gas. There was more or less gas in all the banks, and in such cases it is quite improper to use candles; and in the mode in which this pit has been worked, it is more than ordinarily dangerous to do so. In some collieries the entire width of the bank is taken at one time, all the men being employed at the face, but at Lundhill, the coal has been worked by following up banks, i.e., by taking away a portion of coal on each side, while other of the miners are taking it away at the upper face. This involves the use of lights on two sides as well as at one extremity of each goaf, so that there are three sides surrounded with lights. Candles were used in this pit; and if any gas (by falls or otherwise) came out of the goaf, it was liable to ignite at the naked lights; and in my opinion, this has been the proximate cause of the explosion. I will now explain how the mine was ventilated, and then make some remarks on the use of candles and lamps, and on the discipline and management ; I shall then state the result of our examination with reference to ascertaining in what part of the pit the explosion occurred, and so endeavour, if possible, to point out the immediate cause of the explosion. There are a downcast, and an upcast shaft; the ventilation is produced by a furnace ; the quantity of air is stated at 50,000 to 60,000 cubic feet per minute ; which, if judiciously distributed around the workings, was quite sufficient to ventilate the colliery and make it secure, if safety-lamps alone had been used. The air was split into two currents, one going round the southern the other round the northern part of the mine, and meeting in the boardgate immediately west of the upcast pit. I quite approve of this division of air, but I do not think it has been carried sufficiently far; and more divisions would have been advisable. The distribution of air into the several boardgates and banks was not the most judicious, but in some degree very objectionable, there being more than 50 doors in the pit ; and no distribution of air in such a mine ought to have anything like that number of doors. A large number of doors is very objectionable, as they are liable to be neglected. In all the main roads double doors should be used, so that when one is open the other may be shut. At the lower ends of the boardgates, double doors ought to have been fixed, whereas single doors only have been used. The effect of one of these doors being open is, that the air, instead of being carried round the workings beyond, will pass through that open door, and so lay dormant the ventilation beyond it. If the door nearest to the shaft were left open, it would lay dormant on the south side, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 banks, Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 boardgates, and the south levels. To leave open the first door on the northern side, would lay dormant Nos. 2, 3, and 4 banks, Nos. 2, 3, and 4 board gates, and the north levels ; and so on with the rest of the doors. Practically, naked lights were used throughout the mine ; for although orders are said to have been given to the packers to use safety-lamps, yet they had the gauzes on only when they thought fit; and to have naked lights around such goaves is extremely dangerous. This is the third great explosion in the Barnsley district which I have been called upon to investigate ; and all the three have been caused by the use of naked lights under similar circumstances, and would have been avoided if safety-lamps had been employed. I stated on the two former occasions that it was highly imprudent and hazardous to use naked lights in the vicinity of goaves ; and I have repeated the statement very strongly before committees of both Houses of Parliament. I hope these terrible examples will induce a safer mode of working the coal and lighting the mines in this neighbourhood. The discipline underground at Lundhill seems to have been very lax and defective: it is unsafe to give discretionary power to workmen to decide whether they should burn safety-lamps or candles ; the door-keepers have been allowed to leave their doors at meal times, but they should not be permitted to do so ; and, to avoid fatal accidents in collieries, the strictest discipline must be observed by all parties.

In our examination of the works we endeavoured to ascertain in what direction the explosion had passed, by noticing the way in which the doors and stoppings were blown (whenever that could be determined) ; and my colleagues and myself are of opinion that the blast came from the north-west part of the mine towards and into the south ; that it went up Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 boardgates on the south side; but it was very difficult from the appearances to determine whether fire accompanied the blast or not. The blast had gone with immense force against the faces of the boardgates and levels ; and whether fire went thither or not, there would be after-damp, which is almost as fatal. In the north part of the mine the exact course of the blast (as indicated by the stoppings and doors) was not so easy to decide as it was in the south ; some of the stoppings being blown towards a bank, others in a contrary direction. The indications of fire on the sides of the coal were in some places clearly the result of ignited gas, while in others the coal had been coked by the standing fire, to extinguish which water was poured into the mine. The standing fire had extended a considerable distance north and west of the shafts, and partly southward, but not to so great an extent. It was not always easy to distinguish between the effects of smoke arising from the standing fire, and those produced by the fire of the explosion ; but there were decided marks of the latter in Nos. 1 and 2 north goaves, and in the slits going into No. 1 south goaf. Gas had been exploded in these three goaves, and (I think) in No. 3 north goaf.

And now as to the manner in which the gas was ignited. I have already stated that the removal of the coal and the formation of goaves created magazines of gas; that each goaf was surrounded on three sides by naked lights; and that if a fall of roof occurred, it might force gas out of the goaf upon the naked lights, and so produce the explosion. In Nos. 3 and 4 banks on the north side, falls of roof obstructed the airways, thereby diminishing the quantity of air in each bank, and forcing it across the goaf to the opposite side; and the air might carry gas from the goaf to the candles of the workmen, and so ignite. We found on the southern side of No. 3 goaf two safety-lamps with their gauzes screwed off, and these were probably burning at the time of the explosion. There is another mode by which the gas might have been ignited. The eastern extremity of No. 1 north and No. 1 south goaf is only seventy yards from the furnace ; and a sudden fall of roof in either of these goaves might have forced gas out, which may have kindled at the furnace.

Another way of accounting for the explosion is, that some of the doors may have been left open, and the circulation of air thereby stopped or interrupted ; but I do not believe that the disaster originated in this manner, nor do I think that the gas ignited at the furnace; and I find much difficulty in assigning it positively to any one of the causes alluded to. In my opinion, the probabilities are that the explosion arose from a sudden fall of roof forcing firedamp from the goaves upon the naked lights. This is not an unlikely occurrence, although it is said that no gas had been seen in the goaves; but the edge of a goaf might at one moment be free from gas, and yet at the next moment a fall of roof might drive gas from the upper part of the goaf down upon the candles. This is the more probable, inasmuch as immediately above the main coal there is a considerable thickness of loose metal, and above that a thick bed of hard rock, and some thin seams of coal and black shale. As a goaf became longer and wider, the first fall would be that of the loose metal or roof of the main coal; there would then be a space between the top of this fall and the hard rock ; and when the area of the goaf was sufficiently extended, the hard rock would break down, and expel not only the gas lodging on the top of the fall, but would probably carry with it more gas from the coal and shale above. I think it very likely that such a fall was the immediate cause of the explosion. The mode in which the air was carried round the banks would induce it to cross and drive gas from the goaves, thus rendering it still more dangerous to use naked lights. A mine may have a large amount of air, and the candles may require sheltering, but this is no proof (under such circumstances as I have mentioned) that the mine is safe. A large quantity of air, if properly conducted, is essential to safety ; but, considering that it is impracticable to ventilate the goaves so as to make them quite secure, naked lights ought to be excluded. This explosion originated either in No. 1 north goaf, or No. 2 north goaf, or No. 3 north goaf, or No. 1 south goaf; but I cannot with certainty say in which. I think there has been ignited gas in all the four goaves. An explosion in one of them would, by the concussion of the air, expel gas from other goaves, and so produce other explosions. I am inclined to believe that the first ignition was in No. 1 or No. 2 north goaves, and not in either of the other two goaves further north, nor in No. 1 south.

The remedy for all this will be the use of safety-lamps instead of naked lights. It would be easy to distribute the air round workings of this nature so as to require very few if any doors; but my opinion is, that if safety-lamps had been used exclusively (even with the present imperfect mode of ventilating) this explosion would not have happened. The method of working the coal may also be improved; but any system of taking away all the coal must be conducted with safety-lamps, if these dreadful explosions are to be prevented. There is no difficulty whatever in Durham and Northumberland about using safety-lamps. Coal mining in Yorkshire is becoming more dangerous as the pits are sunk deeper; and unless naked lights are excluded there will be frequent explosions. Whether the miners object to safety-lamps, or not, it is absolutely needful that they should be used in this district ; and the prejudice against lamps will soon be overcome. It is not necessary for trammers and drivers to carry safety-lamps ; the practice in the north of England is to hang up safety-lamps in the tramways for lighting purposes.

The near proximity of the goaves to the furnace suggests the propriety of not allowing the return air of the mine to pass through the furnace.

Messrs. Elliot, Woodhouse, and Holt, mining engineers, concurred generally and substantially in the statements and recommendations offered by Mr. Wood.

Mr. Badger, the coroner, then lucidly summed up and ably commented on the evidence of the numerous witnesses, and the jury arrived at the following verdict ; that the deceased were killed by an explosion of carburetted hydrogen gas in Lundhill colliery, on the 19th February 1857; but there is no conclusive or sufficient evidence to show the immediate cause of the explosion. Therefore, the jury cannot come to the decision that it was criminally negligent, but accidental. They, however, must condemn the laxity of discipline, and the non-observance of the special rules. The jury do not attach blame to the proprietors of the colliery, who were not cognizant of the loose discipline and misconduct of the under-viewer, deputies, and workmen. The jury fully concur in the remarks of Messrs. Wood, Elliot, and Woodhouse, that an improved system of ventilation and a better subdivision of air are requisite, and ought to be adopted, especially when working day and night. The jury further approve of the suggestions made by those gentlemen in reference to the use of safety-lamps ; and although the better education of workmen was not alluded to by the witnesses, yet the omission has been properly supplied in the able charge of the coroner ; and the jury cannot too forcibly recommend that every practicable effort should be put forth to raise the miners to a higher moral and mental standard. The jury also record their approval and admiration of the heroic conduct of Messrs. Webster, Maddison, and others, in their arduous exertions to recover the unfortunate victims ; and, finally, the jury express their deep sympathy for the bereaved sufferers in this most disastrous accident.

On the delivery of the before-mentioned verdict, the Lundhill Coal Company marked their appreciation of it by immediately changing the former management of the mine ; and the temporary but highly valuable services of Mr. Nicholas Wood, and his colleagues, being withdrawn on account of their own avocations elsewhere, the responsible direction of the colliery devolved on Mr. John Brown, viewer, Barnsley, under whose control it has since remained.

In conclusion, I beg leave to offer some practical inferences and suggestions deducible from ascertained facts and phenomena in connexion with the Lundhill accident.

The origin and locality of the explosion have been explained as far as possible: it did not proceed from the south side of the mine, but the indications were chiefly on the north side.

The leaving open during dinner-time of a single door at the eastern end of Nos. 1, 2, or 3 boardgates on the north side may have led to the calamity. The particulars of a similar though not so destructive an accident at Lower Elsecar colliery, near Barnsley, and arising from this source, will be found at page 43 of Inspectors' Reports published in 1855.

The obstructions in the airways of Nos. 3 and 4 north goaves may have caused gas to collect there, until it ignited at candles burning in the immediate vicinity.

A sudden fall of roof in Nos. 1, 2, or 3 north goaves may have set free a large volume of firedamp from the superincumbent strata, and driven it out upon the naked lights.

The means taken on the afternoon of the explosion to rescue the survivors were judiciously devised and promptly executed ; and the greatest diligence and bravery were exerted to search for and save such of the sufferers as might be living ; but, remembering the tremendous force of the blast, and the general prevalence of suffocating gases that succeeded, it was impossible that any person could be left alive in the interior of the mine when it was abandoned.

The covering up of the pits in the evening, and the submersion of the mine afterwards, were warranted by the frightful fact (known at the time) that the Barnsley coal was extensively and fiercely blazing in close proximity to the shafts; and by the subsequent discovery that the workings in the Abdy and Wathwood seams had also been on fire.

The lighting of this mine with candles was positively dangerous ; and the dislike, not to say refusal, to adopt safety-lamps in the Barnsley district has previously led to, and will (I fear) again produce lamentable results.

At Elsecar, Ardsley Oaks, Wharncliffe Silkstone, East Gawber, and a few other collieries around Barnsley, naked lights have been excluded and safety-lamps introduced. At first, the workmen objected, because they were somewhat inconvenienced by diminished light; but practice, and a reasonable compensation from the master to the labourer, will overcome the prejudice and opposition of the latter.

Lundhill colliery has, since the explosion been lighted entirely by Stephenson's locked safety-lamps ; and I am of opinion that nearly all the other mines in that locality ought to be lit exclusively with safety-lamps.

It is sometimes argued by those employers who are really (though not ostensibly) unwilling to bear the expense of safety-lamps, that great mischief might arise from an ignorant or reckless collier unscrewing the top of his lamp; and I regret to say that instances of prosecution and punishment for this offence have transpired during the past year in Yorkshire. But where the best oil and wick are burned, the lamp gauzes locked, and strict discipline inculcated and enforced, such delinquencies are not frequent.

M. Dubrulle, of Lille, has greatly augmented the illuminating effect of the Davy-lamp by inserting a flat wick, and without lessening its safety or increasing its cost; while the locking of the gauze is so contrived that it cannot be removed without previously extinguishing the light. This is a safety-lamp which workmen will not be so much tempted to tamper with, and which employers can have no excuse for withholding from their underground servants.

The use of safety-lamps need not and certainly ought not to relax the efforts of mining engineers to strengthen ventilation ; but I believe that the present ventilating agencies are inadequate, of themselves, to prevent explosions in fiery pits; and therefore the introduction of safety-lamps should be superadded.

A remarkable instance of the preservative power of safety-lamps, combined with ventilation, occurred at Ardsley Oaks in August last; when a quantity of inflammable gas suddenly burst from a fissure 50 yards long in the floor of the Barnsley coal ; the noise produced being compared by some of the witnesses to the rushing of air into a blast furnace, and by others to the escape of high-pressure steam from a boiler. I am enabled to state from details kindly furnished to me by Mr. John Brown, the viewer of the colliery, that more than 13,000 cubic feet of air per minute passed the spot where the firedamp issued ; it was soon afterwards joined by 6,000 cubic feet per minute more of air; and before it reached the upcast shaft, the quantity of air mixed with the gas exceeded 32,000 cubic feet per minute.

When diluted by nearly 20,000 cubic feet of air, Stephenson's safety-lamps ceased to burn, but Davy's-lamps were filled with flame and became red hot. Fortunately, the latter were carefully put out by drawing down the wicks, and no explosion ensued. In an hour after the first appearance of this firedamp, the "blower" was nearly exhausted ; but if during its perilous continuance, a naked light or an imperfect safety-lamp had met it, or if the return air had been carried through the furnace, a dreadful catastrophe would have followed, the precise origin of which (like that of many others) would perhaps never have been known.

The method of ventilating Lundhill colliery was in some respects defective : the number of doors was excessive ; even those in the principal airways were single and unchecked. The system of getting the coal by leading-banks and following-up banks necessitated this dangerous multiplicity of doors ; but by a change in the plan of working, a large proportion of them may be dispensed with. I have annexed to my present Report three diagrams, showing safer modes of getting coal, and of ventilating mines by separate currents of air and with few doors.

The works may be advantageously divided into several districts for ventilating purposes, each district having its own independent stream of fresh air ; so that if the air-course in one district were stopped, the ventilation in others would not be injuriously affected ; and even if a kindling of firedamp happened in one part of the mine, the deadly afterdamp would probably not be conveyed to the other parts, By thus "splitting" the main current, and giving to each district its own supply of pure and cool air, the unhealthiness engendered by people working in a contaminated atmosphere is avoided, and the aggregate quantity of air circulating through the mine is considerably augmented. The "splitting system" has been successfully applied in the ventilation of the Middleton seam at Messrs. Charlesworths' Rothwell Haigh colliery, near Leeds ; which is laid out in 23, panels or districts, each having a separate current of fresh air; the total amount being nearly 100,000 cubic feet per minute, and affording to every person employed underground more than 400 cubic feet of air per minute.

The erection of air-crossings not only renders needless a number, of doors, but also facilitates the return of the vitiated and sometimes explosive atmosphere along roads in which lights are not wanted.

The near proximity of two goaves to the ventilating furnace, at Lundhill, was objectionable ; and the passage of the return air through the furnace was still more so.

A sudden expulsion of firedamp by a fall of roof in either of the two goaves referred to, might have caused ignition at the furnace; or if the return air was inflammable, an explosion might have originated there, even if every person in, the mine had used a perfect safety-lamp.

I have already alluded to a rapid and copious discharge of gas from the floor of the Barnsley coal at Ardsley Oaks ; and in the year 1851, I recorded a similar phenomenon at Shipley colliery, near Belper, where gas actually fired at the furnace. (See page 94 of Inspectors' Reports published in 1854.).

In October last a volume of gas was liberated during the night at Higham colliery, near Barnsley; it exploded at the furnace with much violence, burnt the furnace-keeper, and killed nine or ten horses. Fortunately the pit was not at work, or, the results would have been far more serious. The furnace-keeper was the only man underground, and his escape was marvellous.

Important improvements have recently been effected in the working and ventilating, as well as in the lighting arrangements at Lundhill colliery. The "long-wall" system of getting coal has superseded the hazardous method previously pursued ; the capacity of the upcast pit has been increased ; the air has been more subdivided and better distributed ; many single doors have been abolished, and those remaining in the principal airways have been either checked, or doubled ; and isolated return air-courses have, to a certain extent, been made available, so as to exclude lights from the contaminated atmosphere.

The return air no longer comes in contact with the furnace; but a "dumb drift" (rising 1 in 3, and having a sectional area of 90 square feet) has been driven, so as to enter the upcast shaft at a height of 30 yards from the bottom, and the furnace is now entirely supplied with fresh air.

The total amount of ventilation has been raised from 55,000 cubic feet of air per minute to 93,000, of which about 14,000 are required to feed the furnace, leaving nearly 80,000 cubic feet of air per minute to traverse the interior of the mine ; and measures have been initiated, and are now in progress, which will tend to strengthen the ventilation still further.

The underground discipline, and the observance of various regulations requisite for safety, which, prior to the Lundhill explosion, were very defective, have since been satisfactorily reformed. The special rules of the colliery have been carefully revised, amended, and amplified; and I append to my Report a copy of the new edition, as a model worthy of imitation by managers of extensive coal mines in Yorkshire.

The discretionary powers frequently granted to, and sometimes assumed by, colliery operatives in regard to naked lights, safety-lamps, and other matters intimately connected with their own and their fellow-workmen's well-being, ought, to be discontinued, being wholly incompatible with wise and strict discipline, and with individual security.

The viewer, under-viewer, deputies, and other officers must be competent to devise, and diligent to carry out judicious regulations for the safety of the works; and must also be as rigidly punctual and methodical in complying with the rules, as they are stringent in exacting obedience from persons under their control.

Concerning the mode of working the Barnsley coal, heretofore, at Lundhill and other collieries in the district, it has previously been remarked that it requires many doors ; that it renders complete and reliable ventilation difficult, if not impossible ; that it creates a series of goaves between the shaft and the bank-faces ; that each goaf is too narrow to permit a gradual and effectual subsidence of the roof, and is consequently liable to become a gas holder; and that men and boys are employed on three sides of each goaf, generally with naked lights,

This dangerous plan of getting coal has been too readily imitated and inconsiderately adopted by unreflecting and inexperienced persons, and has been propagated and sanctioned by ancient custom in the neighbourhood of Barnsley ; but I believe that it has seldom, if ever, received the deliberate, unqualified, and positive approval of eminent and scientific mining engineers.

The No. 3 diagram (attached to my Report) represents a system of working and ventilating which has been long and successfully practised in the collieries around Wakefield. It is a safer and more eligible mode than that usually pursued at Barnsley.

The No. 2 diagram shows a method of getting coal and airing the mine in panels, or in wide banks, divided from each other by thick pillars of coal. Each goaf is thus swept around and across by a separate and independent current of fresh air, which is returned to the upcast shaft along an isolated road, from which lights are banished.

Several large and fiery collieries in the vicinity of Leeds, and Messrs. Charlesworths' Warren Vale pit, near Rotherham, are conducted somewhat on this principle.

But I more particularly invite attention to No. 1 diagram, which exhibits a modification of the "longwall" system, so advantageously followed in the Derbyshire coal mines. It is commendable because of its simplicity and security as regards ventilation. Few doors are needed ; the streams of air are directed immediately and in a state of purity to the bank-faces, along which they may flow freely and almost in straight lines to the return air-courses, which are driven in the solid coal for the sake of permanence, and in which lights are not required. The circuits of the air currents being much shortened, friction is materially diminished ; and the pack-walls left standing in the goaves make the latter easier to ventilate.

The "long wall" method is not only more safe, but it is also said to be more economical than the plan habitually practised in the Barnsley district. It avoids a waste of money and coal in driving narrow work, and produces larger coals in the banks, with a smaller proportion of slack, and with less labour.

At Ardsley Oaks and Lundhill collieries the "longwall" system has lately been brought into operation, and hitherto the experiments have been very satisfactory.

In each of these three diagrams the vitiated atmosphere of the mine is shown to enter the upcast pit without passing through the furnace, which is entirely fed with fresh air from the downcast.

A combination of the before-mentioned suggested remedies, coupled with improved and extended moral and intellectual culture among the mining population, will undoubtedly be instrumental in diminishing (perhaps wholly averting) calamitous explosions in the Barnsley coal-field ; but the most effectual preventive, at present, is the exclusive use of safety-lamps.

 

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