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Conclusions.

This accident shows plainly the danger of tapping moss from below, and that in making a connection between the surface and workings beneath through such material the work should be prosecuted downwards and not upwards.

I do not think that any blame attaches to the owners in connection with this accident.

Mr. A. H. Nasmyth, the manager, was responsible for the control, management, and direction of the mine (Section 20 (1) Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887), and by Section 21 (1) was required to exercise daily personal supervision of the mine. He stated at the Inquiry that with the knowledge he had of the moss before the accident he would have considered it dangerous to attempt putting through it from below, and he denied on oath any knowledge of the operations that led to the accident, and stated that the oversman alone was responsible who, he thought, had undertaken the work, expecting, if he was successful, it would be a feather in his cap.

On the other hand, the oversman was stated to be a prudent man of large experience, he was present when the great thickness of soft moss was proved by probing it from the surface, and it is difficult to conceive of his undertaking on his own responsibility dangerous work when, even if successful, he might have expected blame for taking the matter into his own hands. David Rattray, one of the oversman's sons, stated at the Inquiry that his father had told him that the manager had given him permission to put a road up, and another witness stated that Rattray told him he was going to ask for permission.

The resumption of work in the heading was known to the miners. It was for some days within the knowledge of all the under officials, of whom the only survivors, Jas. Dick, and Jas. Rattray, roadsmen, had not mentioned it to the manager, nor except for David Rattray's statement was there any evidence that the manager knew of the matter.

The manager's denial must be accepted, but he cannot relieve himself of a measure of responsibility in respect —
 (1.) 

The discipline of the mine must have been defective if an oversman undertook such work without the manager's knowledge.

 (2.) 

A more frequent examination of the working faces than he appeared to make might have brought the matter to his knowledge. Several. witnesses stated they never saw the manager at the working faces. The manager himself stated he was last round the Mynheer working faces about a month before the accident on an idle day, when he was accompanied only by the deceased, Thomas Rattray.

It must however be conceded that a most active manager of a large colliery like Donibristle might often be absent for a week or more from a small section of workings such as that into which the moss burst, and that during his absence an oversman might prosecute a heading to the outcrop, and also that an oversman might recklessly undertake work of a dangerous character in many parts of a large mine without the manager's knowledge.

It might be that Rattray intended to prosecute the heading for testing purposes only, and did not propose putting up through the moss unless he obtained permission, and that the dryness of the sand led him to think all was safe so far as the road had gone. The evidence at the Inquiry did not, however, support this view, the witnesses questioned on the point stating that it appeared to them that the work was not for testing but for putting through the moss.

It may be that there was some misunderstanding which, owing to Rattray's death, will never be cleared up. I find it difficult to believe that Rattray acted recklessly on his own responsibility. He had been for many years in the owners' employment and appeared to possess their confidence and to have been entrusted with a considerable portion of the details of administration. It is worthy of note that the extremely dangerous nature of the operations which were being carried on in the heading does not appear to have occurred either to him or to the workmen employed in it. His inquiry whether Dick would require a spade to cut the moss clearly indicates that he anticipated it would be dry and firm, and in their evidence at the Inquiry Dick and Jas. Rattray stated that they had never anticipated danger. There had been little rain during the summer, and Rattray may have thought the moss would in consequence be dry enough not to run.

No section of the Coal Mines Acts or of the Special Rules deals specifically with the direct cause of this accident, but a breach of the Act with respect to plans was disclosed.

As already stated, there was no plan of the Mynheer workings at the office of the mine at the time of the accident, and this, had the rescue of the imprisoned miners depended on a shaft sunk through the moss, would have caused the delay of some hours in reaching them.

It is a common practice in Scotland for the plans to be removed, as in this case, for a few days after the surveys are made in order to be extended, and in many cases no tracings are provided to supply the deficiency in the interval. I have frequently had to call attention to this matter, and have pointed out that it is a breach of Section 34 (1) of the Coal Mines Act, 1887, but have not hitherto recommended a prosecution.

I do not advise a prosecution in this case, but in future when I find no plan or tracing of the workings of the mine at the office of the mine, I shall report the matter with a view to proceedings.

This is an accident of an unusual character, although accidents due to inrushes of sand and mud are not infrequent. It is the first of its kind involving loss of life that I have had direct official cognizance of during the 28 years I have acted as H.M. Inspector of Mines.

It is an accident that might have been expected to have been more frequent in the early years of coal mining when shallow seams were more worked ; but, per contra, it is only of late years that coal has been worked on a large scale under moorland, which usually lies at high elevations in sparsely-populated districts away from centres of industry, and this accident is a valuable object lesson to many mines now working under mosses.

Last year an inflow of moss took place at Easter Jaw Colliery in Stirlingshire, and filled more or less the workings of two seams and ascended the shafts. A number of men employed in both seams were able to escape, as the flow was not so rapid as in the present case.

On 2nd October, 1886, moss flowed into the workings of East Benhar Colliery, near Whitburn, in the county of Linlithgow, during the time of my predecessor, Mr. Ralph Moore, who stated in his annual report that the coal seam 4 feet thick was within 54 feet of the surface, 22 feet of which was wet moss. One man lost his life and his body was never recovered, although a rescue pit was sunk and reached the coal seven days after the accident, but as the workings were found to be filled with moss, and there was no chance of the man being alive, the search was given up.

In his report on this accident, Mr. Moore stated that a similar burst had taken place two months before, at a point 200 yards away, but without loss of life.

Mr. Gemmell, at the Inquiry, referred to a case at Greenhead, on the Coltness Estate, near Wishaw.

There was, as is usual in mining accidents, no lack of men willing to undertake great risk in the hope of saving life. This was not specially characteristic of the Donibristle accident, but the circumstances attending it (1) the publicity of the operations at the hole in the moss, conducted as they were at the bottom of an amphitheatre of some hundreds of yards in circumference, and watched from the margin by large crowds ; and (2) the rescue of so many of the imprisoned miners, had, together, the effect of directing public attention to the matter in an unusual degree, and was the means of procuring for the rescuers substantial recognition of their merit. I am sure they had, at the time, no thought of any reward, but were actuated solely by feelings of humanity.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

J. B. Atkinson,

H.M. Inspector of Mines.

The Right Honourable C. T. Ritchie, M.P.,

H.M. Principal Secretary of State,

Home Office, London, S.W.

 

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