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V. Comments

(a) On the Sequence of Events at the Face of No. 5 Heading before the Inrush

Whilst all parties were agreed that the cause of this disaster was an inrush of liquid moss, the immediate sequence of events before the inrush can only be a matter for conjecture. Taking into consideration all the available evidence I think what happened was as follows :—

In dealing with immediate events it is also necessary to visualize happenings in ancient glacial times. The No. 5 Heading was driven up towards the outcrop and eventually reached it at or near the base of a relatively large hollow which had been scooped out in the softer parts of the exposed coal bearing rocks by glacial action in ages past. This hollow, which was lined with glacial boulders, gravel and sand, had formed a natural receptacle in which water accumulated. In the course of time a layer of mud accumulated on top of the deposit of boulders, sand and gravel, and in this mud, vegetation grew round the edges of the stagnant waters of the pond. In the course of time as the vegetation grew and died off, the hollow became filled with peat resting on a layer of mud. Traces of all these deposits can still be found round the inner sides of the crater left in the field after the inrush. Fig. 4 shows a diagrammatic or reconstructed section through the ground at the position of the crater as it would appear before the inrush. Whilst this section may not be strictly accurate, I think it does give a fair picture of the nature of the ground prior to the accident.

The No. 5 Heading, then, was close to the bottom of this hollow when the coal shot, as previously described, blew through, exposing the glacial boulders and gravel at the back of the holing. This deposit was naturally water-bearing and it was fresh, clean water from this source that ran into the No. 5 Heading from the day of the holing until just before the inrush. The deposit of "lake mud" was impervious and thus prevented the peat, or any water from the peat, from finding its way to the bottom of the hollow and thus into the heading. The unusually heavy rainstorm on the day before the disaster would account for the large increase in the flow of water from the bed of glacial boulders and gravel. This extra flow of water caused the collapse — in the manner previously indicated — of two of the hard wood chock pillars set for additional roof support near the face of the heading and so brought about a fall of roof. Owing to the gradient of the heading, this fall, probably initially of quite small dimensions in itself, allowed the "head coal", the calmstone and the Pennyvenie Coal above it, to fall and swing downhill and so displace other roof supports in the heading. The extension of this fall previously described by the now deceased fireman, D. Strachan, as about 300 feet in length, would leave at the face of the heading a comparatively thin barrier of coal, calmstone and Pennyvenie Coal, against the underside of the glacial boulder and gravel deposit. This thin barrier would be the full width of the heading, i.e., 18 feet, and would extend the full height from the pavement to the underside of the overlying bed of sandstone. The thickness of this barrier would be about 4 ft. 6 ins., the approximate depth of the hole which had been blown in the "breast coal" by the firing of the shot. While the solid ground at the face of the heading was 18 feet wide and between 6 and 7 feet in height, the thickness of the coal would provide sufficient mechanical strength to give support to the deposit of boulders and gravel and the peat poised above it. When the height was increased to something like 14 feet, however, the barrier would not be strong enough to provide sufficient support any longer and it would collapse. With its collapse, boulders and gravel would drop into the heading the deposit of "lake mud" would give way and thus a passage would be provided for the liquid peat. This, I think, is what happened at the time of the inrush and accounts for the steady and restricted flow of water for a week before the accident happened, the increased flow on the day of the accident, the blasts of air described by the witnesses, and for the inrush. A second possibility, though I think it less likely than the first, is that the increased flow of water washed out sufficient gravel and loose stones from the back of the shot-hole to allow of a collapse of the deposit of "lake mud" sufficient in extent to enable the peat to start running into the mine. Once this had started it would quickly scour out a larger and larger passage for itself and rapidly develop to an inrush.

 

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