III. The Accident and Events leading up to it
The accident occurred about 7.30 p.m., whilst the afternoon shift was at work, on Thursday, 7th September, 1950, when a large volume of liquid peat or moss suddenly broke through from the surface into the No. 5 Heading Section of the Main Coal Seam. The inrush started at the point where the No. 5 Heading, which was rising at a gradient of 1 in 2, had effected a holing at the outcrop of the seam beneath superficial deposits and had made contact with the base of a relatively large natural basin containing glacial material and peat. The liquid matter, rushing down the steeply inclined heading, continued to flow for some time and soon filled up a large number of existing and abandoned roadways as well as several working places, until it eventually cut off the two means of egress to the surface from the underground workings of the colliery.
There were 135 persons employed underground at the time. Six persons working near the shaft bottom quickly escaped to the surface by way of the downcast shaft before it become blocked, while 116, with all means of escape cut off, found their way inbye to a part of the mine then unaffected by the inrush, leaving 13 persons missing. The 116 men were rescued about two days later. The 13 missing men were all employed in or about the No. 5 Heading Section where the inrush began. One was the fireman in charge of the district; one was the shot-firer; nine were coal getters employed at the face of three different working places, while the other two were concerned with the transport of coal from the district.
To develop the No. 5 Heading Section for the purpose of exploiting the area of Main Coal lying to the south of the shafts, a pair of main headings, at 100 feet centres, was driven in coal to the rise in a south-easterly direction. These headings were about 18 feet wide and about 7 feet high. Connexions were put through between the headings to form stoops about 100 feet square. One of these headings was known as the No. 5 Heading. It was used as the main haulage and travelling road for the Section and was always kept in advance of its companion heading.
A contoured development plan, which had been sent to the Manager by the Sub-Area Planning Department in April, 1950, indicated, in blue, the extent of expected progress of the workings until 1st September, 1950, and, in orange, the progress expected from then until 1st February, 1951. It was not a development plan in the sense that it established for the first time the method of working to be adopted in this Section of the colliery. It was nothing more than a progress plan based on the already established Stoop and Room system of working. But it did show that the main development headings should almost reach the conjectural position of the Southern Upland Fault and that at that stage, they would have at least 100 feet of cover from the surface. This was so because the underground contours shown on the plan — which, of course, were conjectural so far as they concerned the unworked coal ahead of the existing workings -- -were based on the gradient of 1 in 4 then prevailing near the face of the actual workings when the plan was made. After that time, however, as might have been anticipated in a seam rising towards a major upthrow fault, the gradient became steeper (Fig. 2) and, on the 6th July, 1950, when the last quarterly survey was made before the date of the inrush, levellings showed that the face of the No. 5 Heading was only 196 feet vertically below the surface. By this time it had become obvious to the management that the main headings would not strike the Southern Upland Fault because the gradient of the seam, which had been increasing for some time, continued to steepen until it became almost 1 in 2, and that the headings would reach the outcrop of the seam near the surface at a point somewhere south of the shafts. This fact does not appear to have been treated by the management as a matter of concern, nor as something to which the attention of the planning department should have been drawn.
For some considerable time, at least a year or two before the date of the inrush, it had been realized by the management that, if certain inbye districts of the colliery were to be fully exploited and adequately ventilated, it would be necessary to increase the quantity of air circulating underground. Eventually, in order to achieve this, it was decided to drive a new dipping drift starting from the surface to meet the underground workings and thus provide an additional airway. This drift was in course of being driven at the date of the disaster. When this drift was commenced, however, no one knew that the development headings in the No. 5 Heading Section were likely to reach the surface. But as soon as the management realized that the headings, if continued, were bound to reach the surface, the prospect of being able to drive a road in the coal to the surface seems to have appealed to them. At any rate, at one time or another during the year, the matter was certainly discussed by the Under-Manager, Manager, Agent and Sub-Area Production Manager but, strangely enough, no definite decision seems to have been made about it. The Under-Manager apparently believed that the intention was to drive No. 5 Heading through to the surface for the purpose of providing a new airway, and said so in evidence. On the other hand, the Manager said the project was considered by the Agent and the idea abandoned, whereas the Agent said, in evidence, that the matter was still under consideration a few days before the inrush occurred. Altogether, the evidence on this important matter of planning was unsatisfactory, conflicting and disappointing.
Be that as it may, No. 5 Heading and its companion heading were driven rapidly forward. Nothing untoward happened until about 10 a.m. on the day-shift of Wednesday, 30th August, when a shot was fired in the "breast coal" at the face of No. 5 Heading by the fireman, D. Strachan, one of the victims of the disaster. This shot blew through and exposed what appeared to be a bed of stones, leaving an opening described as 2 to 2½ feet wide for the full height of the "breast coal", and 4 to 5 feet deep. Water started immediately to run out of this opening but, of the many witnesses who saw it, none was able to estimate the flow with any degree of accuracy. It was best described by one witness as the amount of water which would flow freely from a 2-inch pipe. The water was clear, fresh and without odour and it was allowed to run freely down the floor of the heading. The flow of water remained fairly constant until the morning of the accident, and does not appear to have caused any undue alarm to anyone, and certainly not to the officials, from the overmen upwards. When the holing was effected, the place was stopped and no more coal was won from it. The day-shift overman, J. N. Houston, who was on duty in the Section at the time, saw the holing about 15 minutes after the shot had been fired. Several other shot-holes had been bored in the coal at the face of the heading but none of these had been fired. Water also issued from one or more of them but the various witnesses who visited the face disagreed as to the exact number. The Manager inspected the place about an hour later and very wisely decided that wooden chocks or pillars should be built to the roof to supplement the props and bars ordinarily used to support the roof, and thus make the place more secure. These chocks were built from hardwood blocks, 30 inches long and 6 inches square. Altogether, eight chocks were built in the course of the following week. Mr. Kennedy, the Under-Manager, visited the face of the heading about noon on the day following the holing, but Andrew Houston, the overman in charge of the back-shift did not inspect the face of No. 5 Heading after the shot had blown through. He had been made aware of the position by the day-shift overman who informed him that the heading had holed through "on the crop" and had been stopped. Mr. John Bone, the Agent, was also told that the heading had reached the outcrop but he did not visit the place.
On Thursday, 31st August, as soon as the No. 5 Heading had holed through, the Agent gave instructions for the underground workings to be surveyed and levelled by Mr. Ian Murray, an apprentice surveyor, to determine the exact position of the face of No. 5 Heading and its depth below the surface. The survey showed that there was about 38 feet of cover between the roof of the heading and the surface. On the same day, a survey was made on the surface by Mr. T. D. Brown, the senior assistant surveyor for the Sanquhar and New Cumnock Colliery Groups. During the course of this survey a pointed wooden peg, two feet long and two inches square, was knocked into the ground to mark the point immediately above the face of the No. 5 Heading. This peg was knocked in by Murray, the apprentice surveyor, who said that he used a blacksmith's 2-lb. hand-hammer and that the peg went in more readily than he expected for a peg of its size. But he was not curious about the reason and appears to have thought no more about it, although he did notice the ground was "a wee bit soggy underfoot". Mr. T. D. Brown, on the other hand, who said he had walked over the ground that day taking levels and measurements, including the ground above the No. 5 Heading, said in evidence that it appeared ordinary soil. To him "it was pasture-green nice green grass on it". it was dry weather that particular day although there had been considerable rain on previous days.
About that time, Mr. Halliday, Manager, Mr. Bone, Agent, and Mr. D. Mackinnon, Sub-Area Planning Engineer, also walked over the ground to see where the No. 5 Heading would come out if it were driven right through to the surface. Surprising as it may seem, although both Mr. Bone and Mr. Mackinnon had previous experience of workings under moss at other collieries, none of them noticed the presence of peat or moss or anything unusual in the character of the ground, or even any feature to arouse suspicion of danger.
In the meantime, as the two rise development headings underground had been stopped, the miners who had been working in them were transferred outbye to two new places on the left or dip side of the No. 5 Heading, one place being six and the other seven stoop lengths back from the face of the heading. The other set of miners in the Section was put to work in a place going to the right or rise side of the companion heading, six stoop lengths back from the face of this heading.
The flow of water from the hole at the face of No. 5 Heading appears to have remained fairly constant until the morning of the 7th September, the day of the disaster, when a marked increase in the quantity was noted. The amount was described by various witnesses as two to three times the amount previously flowing. About 9.30 a.m. the day-shift fireman, Thomas McDonald, informed the day-shift overman, J. N. Houston, about the increased flow of water. The overman went into the face of the heading and found that the hole in the coal was a little wider but the stones at the back appeared to be in the same consolidated state as when the shot had first blown through. As the water was finding its way into the outbye working places on the dip side of the No. 5 Heading the overman gave instructions to one of the oncost men to dig a gutter to confine the water to the heading. The Under-Manager arrived shortly afterwards, but, as he had hurt his knee, he did not go right up to the face of the heading, stopping about 100 feet short. He discussed the position with the overman but they seem to have been more concerned as to whether the outbye pumps would be able to deal with the increased quantity of water than with any possible danger the increase might portend. The increased flow of water carried a lot of loose coal down the heading and possibly an occasional stone or pebble, and caused a lot of trouble with the conveyor belts, the result being that very little ordinary work was done that morning. When the overman came to the surface about 3.30 p.m. he informed Mr. Kennedy, the Under-Manager, that the flow of water had not increased since 9.30 a.m. Mr. Bone, the Agent, and Mr. Arbuckle, the Surveyor, were present. He told them that the fireman had reported that two chock pillars had fallen out before the end of the shift. It appeared that the base of these chocks had been levelled on loose dirt and it would seem that the rush of water had washed away the dirt, thus loosening the pillars.
On the afternoon shift of the 7th, three sets of miners were sent to work in the places already described, off No. 5 Heading. The men working in the right-hand place were J. D. Houston, T. Houston and W. McFarlane, In the outbye dip-side place were J. Smith, S. Rowan and W. Lee, and in the place, a stoop length above, were J. Love, J. Murray and J. White. These men are all missing. About 6.30 p.m. the No. 5 Heading Section fireman, Daniel Strachan, sent a message saying he wished to see the overman, Andrew Houston. Houston sent word to the fireman to come out and he met him about 50 yards inbye from the pit bottom. Strachan said there had been a big fall at the face of No. 5 Heading, that it extended to a point roughly 300 feet from the return end of the conveyor and that the water had practically stopped running. Houston instructed him to go back and satisfy himself as to the condition of the Section while he went and had a look at the surface.
Houston then went over the surface and found a hole or "sit" in the ground 25 to 30 feet long and 10 to 15 feet broad and about 2 feet deep. About 6.40 p.m. he telephoned the Manager and told him about the fall and the hole on the surface. The Manager gave instructions for a fence to be erected round the hole as a right-of-way existed across the field and, as there were not sufficient men about on the surface, he told Houston to bring three men out of the pit. The Manager had been absent on leave earlier in the day but when he got Houston's message he came to the pit to see things for himself.
Houston then went underground to investigate the position in No. 5 Heading. He went along the South Boig Mine and met John Dalziel at his working place at the foot of the Belt Conveyor Heading where he was loading coal. Houston went up the Belt Conveyor Heading and at its junction with No. 5 Heading met William Howatt, switch-attendant, who worked at that point. These are two of the missing men. Houston continued up No. 5 Heading and as he reached a point just inside the return airway he felt a sudden blast of air which came down the heading. He, nevertheless, continued inbye and met J. Montgomery, another belt-attendant. He spoke to him and almost immediately J. Haddow, the switch-attendant at the tandem belt, came outbye: Haddow had seen the framework of the conveyor moving outbye and was making his way out of the pit. At this moment all three heard a "terrific roar" and the trunk belt began to move outbye down the road. Houston at once took the two men with him and turned up the heading on the rise side which leads to the bore hole from the surface, and from there made his way into the return airway to the top of Garrowscairn No. 3 Dook. From there he went across to the telephone at the end of the West Mine and sent messengers to each of the district firemen telling them to withdraw their men immediately. Houston then went out along the West Mine where he met two men, A. McLatchie and W. Walker running inbye. They had tried to go out but had found the road closed by a mass of sludge. Houston went back to the inbye end of the West Mine where he collected the firemen and their workmen.
It was then established that the following men were missing :—
Daniel Strachan, fireman in charge of No. 5 Heading Section;
John McLatchie, shot-firer in No. 5 Section;
William Howatt, switch-attendant
John Dalziel, loader-attendant, and the nine miners who had been working in the three places off No. 5 Heading.
Meanwhile, a party of men under the leadership of J. Craig, Garrowscairn Section fireman, and S. Capstick, shot-firer in the Turf Coal, had gone exploring up the return airway down which Houston had recently come. These men had gone up to see if it was possible to get out to the surface but had found all roads blocked by sludge.
Fortunately, the telephone to the pit bottom and the surface remained in working order and Houston was able to inform the Manager of the position. A second exploring party was organized under the leadership of S. Capstick, the shot-firer, to go once more into No. 5 Section by way of the return, in order to try and locate any of the missing men and to see if any road had by this time become open to the surface. This party soon returned without finding any trace of the missing men and confirmed that there was no possible way of escape in that direction. This meant that the 116 men were imprisoned.
In the meantime the three workmen who, earlier in the shift, had been directed by Houston to go to the surface to help with the erection of a fence round the subsidence, had left the pit. They went over to the hole in the field with two surface workers. This party had only just started to erect the fence when the ground in the neighbourhood began to subside rapidly. The hole rapidly extended itself, the ground flowing in from all sides towards the point where the first subsidence had appeared. Mr. W. C. Halliday, the Manager, had arrived at the Colliery about 7.30 p.m. in response to the message from Andrew Houston. He went over the surface to see the hole in the ground and at once decided to acquaint the Agent of the circumstances. He tried to telephone him but could not get in touch with him. He then returned to the field and at that time the hole started to get bigger. He sent for Cunningham, one of the men who had come up from underground, and asked him if he would go back down the pit and try and catch the overman and tell him that the subsidence in the field was getting bigger. Well knowing the danger, Cunningham at once volunteered.
At the Inquiry, in answer to questions the Manager described the movement at the crater as follows :—
A. "The grass had gone down out of sight". Q. "Was there a hole right down?" A. "There was a hole — a deep hole". Q. "Had it gone bodily or had it tapered in?" A. "It turned in like this (indicating). The grass broke when it turned in". Q. "A sort of vortex?" A. "Yes, a sort of circular moving and tore the grass". Q. "You have seen water running out of a bath or basin when the plug is pulled out; you get a vortex?" A. "It was something like that".
The Manager then went across to the pit and when he got there received a message from Cunningham at the pit bottom saying that, although he had made several attempts, he could not get up into the Section because the roadways in the pit had filled with sludge which had driven him back to the pit bottom. The Manager instructed him to telephone to the men in the inside to get word to the firemen in each of the Districts and tell them to withdraw their workmen and bring them outbye. He then went underground himself and tried to get inbye, accompanied by Cunningham. They found the road blocked to the roof with mud near the junction of the North level and the West Mine. They tried to get up the return airway but found it also blocked with mud. Mr. Bone, the Agent, then came down the pit and it was at that time that Andrew Houston, the overman, telephoned out saying that he had all the workmen with him except those from No. 5 Section. The Manager and Cunningham made several more determined efforts to get inbye but found it quite impossible. An attempt was made to deal with the mud at the pit bottom by filling it into hutches and winding it up the pit, but the sludge kept on slowly oozing outbye and in the end reached the pit bottom and further efforts to deal with it had to be abandoned. In the course of the next 24 hours or so the sludge rose 16 feet up the winding shaft.
In the meantime the subsidence on the surface (Plate I) had increased until the area involved was approximately 2 acres in extent (Fig. 3), and 40 to 45 feet in depth. In an attempt to prevent the moss or peat running into the pit, bales of straw and hay, trees, pit timber and hutches were thrown into the crater (Plate II). This effort was entirely unavailing though some of these articles were later found in the workings where they had been carried by the flow of peat. The assistance of several Fire Brigades was obtained, portable petrol pumps were installed at strategic points round the subsidence and fresh ditches were dug in order to prevent or reduce the amount of surface water flowing into the crater. In addition, several surface drains and a burn were dammed and the water was pumped into the river Afton. Messrs. Wimpey, Public Works Contractors, were called in to secure the sides of the hole and to take such steps as were possible to make it safe for an exploring party to enter the exposed roadway at the bottom of the subsidence. This work actually started at 7 a.m. on the 8th September. By 4 p.m. on Sunday, 10th September, a party of six men descended into the workings from the crater, followed by a second party at 10 p.m. but they found that the two main headings were completely blocked with moss at a point about 800 feet down.