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At the time of the explosion Mr. Smith, the manager, was in the office at the surface of No. 3 Pit. He was informed that the haulage lads from the top of the first haulage were at No. 1 (Minnie) Pit bottom, and wanted to come up the pit; there had been a sudden gust of wind against the air current and pieces of small coal and dirt had been projected outbye and they thought something was wrong. At the same time his attention was drawn to the soot and smoke issuing from the fan chimney at the upcast shaft. He went round to the fan house, where he found the fan running all right, but the fan attendant informed him that a few minutes previously it had slowed down; he went to the hauling engine house, where the engineman said the haulage rope was fast and the engine could not be moved. Mr. Smith then rang up the Banbury Haulage and in a few seconds got into communication with Frank Halfpenny at the top of the Banbury Dip, who told him that the men and boys there were lying down in the dark, owing to their lights having been extinguished; he (Halfpenny) had travelled inbye a distance of 800 yards. Mr. Smith told Halfpenny not to allow anybody to go through the separation doors into the return airway and instructed the winding engineman not to allow anyone to go down the No. 3 or Upcast Shaft. He also rang up the Central Rescue Station at Stoke-on-Trent, and asked for rescue apparatus and teams to be sent to the Minnie Pit immediately.

The agent, manager, and under-manager went to the Minnie Pit and after a brief consultation, it was decided that the agent and under-manager should descend the pit and the manager should remain on the surface to take in hand the general organisation of the rescue operations.

On descending the pit the agent and under-manager found a party of men from the West District had preceded them up the haulage road in the direction of the area affected by the explosion. A lad was found dead about 20 yards out-bye of the Rearers junction, three bodies were found in the entrance to the stable at the Rearers junction, and close by seven men and boys alive though suffering from the effects of afterdamp. The party divided at the top of the Banbury Dip, one going to the Rearers District and the other down the Banbury Dip. No one was found alive below the top of the Banbury Dip haulage road, but the whole of the men and the lads in the Rearers Districts were alive and safe.

In the meantime Mr. Smith, the manager, called for rescue brigades and made arrangements for the reception and treatment of any injured men.

The top of an old disused shaft in connection with the Bullhurst Rearer workings was taken off, so that the shaft acted as a downcast to provide a direct supply of air to the men in that seam.

The rescue apparatus from the Central Rescue Station at Stoke soon arrived, also the Minnie Pit Brigade, fully equipped and with instructions to travel as far as they could in the direction of the workings.

By noon all the injured men had been brought out of the pit, and about the same time another rescue brigade descended the mine. The Minnie Pit brigade returned at 1.0 o'clock in the afternoon and reported "a large fall at the entrance to the Bullhurst Crut but wind travelling through to the Bullhurst; coupled up at the bottom of Lockett's (see Plate VI.) and went to the top of the dip, where there was a large fall. Came back- and went up the push-up (see Plate VI.) some distance. After returning, we went into the Return Airway and smoke was observed coming out of the Bullhurst Seam."

After receiving this report a conference was held between Mr. Saint (H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines), Mr. Henshaw, the Managing Director of Talk o' th' Hill Colliery, other mining engineers and the management. Gob fire in the Bullhurst Seam was feared and it was decided to seal off the Bullhurst Seam temporarily. To do this the Silverdale Colliery Brigade, wearing self-contained breathing apparatus but not coupled up, descended the Minnie Pit at 4.30 p.m. with Mr. Bull (H.M. Sub-Inspector of Mines), Mr. Davies, and the manager. They found that the separation doors between Lockett's Intake and Return were blown out, but fifty yards further in-bye separation doors between the intake and return were intact. The rescue brigade took a sample of the air in the main return in-bye of the destroyed separation doors, and the analysis subsequently showed CO2 3.24 per cent.; CH4 nil; CO 1.03 per cent.; and O2 15.03 per cent. The brigade reported that a natural air crossing over the Bullhurst Main Intake was destroyed and that air was going into the Bullhurst Seam. This team returned to the surface at 7.30 p.m. and was followed by the Burley Colliery Brigade. A bird was taken to the place at which the above sample of air was obtained and it at once died.

At 10.45 p.m. the speed of the fan was reduced from 350 to 300 revolutions per minute and canvas brattice stoppings, replaced later by wooden ones, were fixed across the Bullhurst Main Intake and Return Airways. The destroyed separation doors were temporarily repaired with canvas brattice. A man, boy and horse were found dead at the top of Lockett's Dip. Rescue brigades continued to attempt to enter into the Banbury Seven Feet workings in advance of the air until 4 p.m. on Sunday. when it was decided to carry forward the air with them, and at 8 p.m. Holland's Place up the Push-up was reached. Here three bodies, were found.

Early on Monday morning the Captain of the Birchenwood team, Hugh Doorbar, lost his life whilst wearing breathing apparatus in an irrespirable atmosphere in Lockett's Dip. The Minnie Pit Brigade brought out his body at 3 p.m. on Monday, and took a sample of air where he was lying, the analysis of which was CO2 2.3 per cent.; CO 4.32 per cent.; CH4 38.75 per cent.; O2 9.51 per cent., and N 45.11 per cent. The cause and circumstances of Doobar's death will be discussed later.

On the 16th January the Chairman of the North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association, realising that the exploration of the workings devastated by the explosion was going to be a long and anxious matter, and would, in all-probability, have to be done by means of rescue brigades wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, called a meeting of the Association Rescue Committee. I attended this meeting by invitation, along with Mr. Saint, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines; representatives of the owners of the colliery were also present. A Consultative Committee, consisting of Messrs. J. W. Bates, A. Daniels, G. H. Greatbatch, A. M. Henshaw and W. G. Peasegood, was appointed to consider with the owners and H.M. Inspectors the difficulties and the procedure with regard to the opening of the Bullhurst Seam and the provision of rescue teams. The Committee afterwards co-opted Mr. J. R. Allott and elected Mr. A. M. Henshaw to be Chairman. On 19th January the organisation of rescue teams and the work being done in the Seven Feet Seam were discussed at a meeting of the Consultative Committee with H.M. Inspectors and representatives of the owners, and on the 22nd January analyses of air taken from the Bullhurst back crut were considered at a further meeting of the Committee with H.M. Inspectors, and it was agreed that the whole Bullhurst area was apparently charged with an atmosphere which would not support combustion. The exploration of the Seven Feet workings was completed on the 7th February and all the bodies were recovered from that seam. There remained 98 bodies in the Bullhurst Seam, three of which were shortly afterwards recovered from the entrance to the Bullhurst crut.

On the 5th February, the Committee held another meeting at which H.M. Inspectors of Mines and representatives of the Company were present. Analyses of samples indicated leakage of air from the Seven Feet workings into the Bullhurst crut, or stone-drift, and it was agreed to build a stopping at S. (see Plate I.). It was considered that the fall in the entrance to the main Bullhurst crut was effective in preventing circulation of air, and it was agreed at this meeting to commence opening the district. The possibility of gob-fire being the cause of the explosion was discussed and the plan of the Bullhurst workings was examined, particularly with regard to the near proximity of two old districts of Bullhurst workings in which explosions followed by fire occurred three years and twenty years ago respectively. From the evidence of the Company's officials, it appeared that no fractures or gob-stink had been observed in the pillars or roads passing near the old districts, nor had heat or gob-stink been observed in the new district. The work of re-opening the Bullhurst main crut by clearing the fall was accordingly proceeded with.

On the 23rd February, Messrs. Allott, Henshaw, Greatbatch, Smith (Manager), and Weaver (Under-manager), found gob-stink over the fall in the Bullhurst crut, and a meeting of the Committee with H.M. Inspectors and the Company's representatives and officials was held the same day, and the gob-stink discussed. Captain Clive, H.M. Inspector of Mines, said he had detected it previously. Messrs. Smith and Weaver also said they had noticed it previously, as also had Mr. Bromley (Agent). Steps for preventing circulation of air were proposed and it was agreed to put in temporary stoppings, the smell to be closely watched and the Committee called if any development occurred.

On 25th February, Messrs. Bates, Peasegood, Smith and Weaver, made an inspection with Captain Clive. They again found gob-stink and called a meeting the same evening. All the members of the Committee were present, together with Mr. Saint, Captain Clive, and the Company's officials. Messrs. Peasegood and Bates reported that they found "decided gob-stink" and considered that the area should be built off immediately to prevent another accident. Captain Clive said it was in his opinion "distinctly gob-stink." The presence of gob-stink was later the cause of the suspension of operations. On this date a clear passage had been made over the fall, and a rescue team was sent in at mid-day to take a sample of air 138 yards in-bye. Analysis of the sample showed 16.50 per cent. of oxygen and 13.50 per cent. of firedamp, a dangerous atmosphere. A discussion took place and Mr. Saint suggested that stoppings should be put in and the men withdrawn for a few days. It was agreed, therefore, to build board stoppings, to make the doors as tight as possible and to suspend recovery operations for four days.

On 1st March a meeting of the Committee with H.M. Inspectors and the Company s representatives was held to discuss the situation, and as the majority of those present were of opinion that there was still gob-stink, it was decided to put in further stoppings to prevent leakage of air from the Seven Feet workings and to strengthen the existing stoppings. At this meeting the Chairman of the Colliery Company raised the question of risking further loss of life, and said he would be no party to any proceedings which might have that result. Operations were then suspended for seven days. On 8th March an inspection was made by the Committee, along with Inspectors of Mines and representatives of the North Staffordshire Miners' Association and the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, including Mr. J. B. Atkinson and Mr. Simcock as experts. A joint meeting of all the interests was held in the afternoon of the same day, when a full discussion took place and it was generally agreed that the workings were charged with firedamp and might be regarded, for the present, as safe. The meeting adjourned for a week and, in the meantime, the stoppings were to be carefully watched and samples of air taken from behind them.

On March 15th a further joint inspection was made and a meeting held, when it was found that leakage had occurred at a stopping and the position was not so satisfactory as the week before. The Committee were of opinion that there was "gob stink"; the representatives of the workmen did not agree and Mr. J. B. Atkinson said the miners were willing to proceed with the re-opening of the Bullhurst Seam at once, but the Committee replied that, in their opinion, it was unwise and unsafe to disturb the stoppings and proceed to re-open the district. An additional stopping was built and measures taken to prevent air leaking into the Bullhurst area.

On 27th March the Committee. the Inspectors of Mines, and the officials of the mine made another inspection and found that the "gob stink" had disappeared. The same night the Committee met the representatives of the workmen, including Messrs. Atkinson and Simcox, to discuss the position and the procedure to be adopted in re-opening the workings, and the North Staffordshire Miners' Association were asked to submit a scheme for consideration. This scheme was received on 2nd April. Mr. Saint, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines, also submitted a scheme, setting forth the plan which, in the opinion of the Acting Chief Inspector and himself, should be followed, and on the 10th April Mr. Sumnall, on behalf of the North Staffordshire Colliery Firemen's, Shotlighters' and Overmen's Association, submitted a third scheme.

These three schemes were considered by the Committee and later they stated their opinion and made recommendations. They considered that, of the three schemes submitted, those of the Miners' representatives and of Mr. Saint had much in common, but as Mr. Saint's scheme was more detailed and included qualifications and safeguards, they recommended his scheme as the one offering the best prospects of success. The three schemes and the opinions and recommendations of the Consultative Committee are given in Appendix B.

Notwithstanding the report and recommendations of the Consultative Committee the owners of the colliery were averse to proceeding with the exploration of the Bullhurst Seam: they were of opinion that it was dangerous to do so, and that serious risk of a further explosion and loss of life would be run if it were attempted.

The Miners' Federation and the North Staffordshire Miners' Association were of opinion that it could be done safely and the Inspectors of Mines agreed with this view and had urged all along that the bodies remaining in the mine should be recovered and the cause of the explosion ascertained if possible. Considerable pressure had to be exercised by the Home Office and the representatives of the Miners' Federation on the owners to get the work done, and it was only undertaken after a meeting with them at the Home Office on 27th June, 1918, at which the Rt. Hon. W. Brace, M.P., then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, stated the Department was strongly of opinion that the workings should be explored, the bodies recovered and the cause of the explosion thoroughly investigated.

The owners promised to consider the representations made to them and eventually agreed to carry out the work. In view of my remarks in the two preceding paragraphs, I must here state that, once this decision had been taken, the owners and management carried it out in a satisfactory and thorough manner with commendable vigour and marked success. The work was done in stages in close co-operation with the representatives of the workmen and the Inspectors of Mines, on the lines of the report of the Consultative Committee, by means of rescue brigades wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, the roads and workings in front being kept flooded with firedamp so as to avoid any risk from spontaneous combustion.

The work was started on July 18th, 1918, and four brigades were engaged for more than 12 months. Thirty-four stoppings were built in an atmosphere devoid of oxygen, and the seam was opened up, step by step, until finally the last body was brought out on August 19th, 1919.

The test to which the apparatus (Proto) and the brigades were put is probably the greatest ever applied to rescue brigades wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, and its successful completion reflects the greatest credit on the manager, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Biddington of the Miners' Federation (both of whom wore the apparatus and accompanied the brigades during the whole time), on the brigades; in fact, on everyone who had to do with the operations.

Opinions differed as to whether it would not have been safe to restore the ventilation in the ordinary way, and thus do away with the necessity of using self-contained breathing apparatus. Mr. J. B. Atkinson, in particular, was of this opinion, but, in view of the previous history of the seam and its liability in this and other mines in the neighbourhood to spontaneous combustion, such procedure would, in my opinion, have meant running a risk of further explosion, a risk which the success of the exploration by means of rescue apparatus proves to be avoidable and which should not be incurred.

The management were criticised at the Coroner's inquest for not having sent a rescue brigade down the upcast shaft as soon as it was available, to see whether any aid could be given to the men employed at the bottom and at the pump. In the conditions which existed I think that the men employed at and near the shaft bottom would be dead when the manager saw the black smoke issuing from the fan chimney on the surface or within a few minutes of his doing so, and that no lives were lost by not sending men wearing self-contained breathing apparatus down the upcast shaft. The manager explained that he thought there was no possibility of anyone being alive there and that it was better to use the rescue brigades where survivors were more likely to be found. This explanation is, in my opinion, a reasonable and proper one.

The question of the ventilation of the pump room by return air was raised by Mr. Harper Parker. who recalled the fact that a pump attendant's life was lost at this place on the occasion of the explosion in January, 1915. T agree that such rooms should be ventilated with intake air where possible, but in a mine this is not always practicable, and such was the case in this instance.

Death Of Hugh Doorbar, Captain Of The Birchenwood Rescue Brigade.

As stated previously, the Captain of the Birchenwood Rescue Brigade lost his life when engaged in the work of exploration in the Seven Feet Seam. The team of which he was a member consisted of six men, and after deceased had had a consultation with the captain of a team coming off duty, they proceeded inbye. On reaching the top of a fall in what is known as Lockett's dip, in the Seven Feet Seam, the men noticed an unpleasant smell. Tests were made for firedamp but without result; a safety lamp, however, burned dimly and it was decided to couple up the apparatus. The team proceeded slowly and ultimately reached a point where the safety lamp went out. As they were going slowly forward a sharp report was heard, and deceased said, "Oh! my apparatus." His comrades tried to assist him but he struggled violently. Efforts were made to get him back to fresh air, but owing to his struggles, during which he repeatedly knocked off the nose clips of the other men and actually knocked one man down, they were unsuccessful. The forcible removal of their nose clips resulted in the other men being affected by the atmosphere, and they were finally obliged to leave Doorbar. When they left him they were satisfied that he was dead. Birchenwood Colliery No 2 Team recovered the body the same day.

The Proto apparatus worn by Doorbar was sent to Dr. Briggs, Director of the Government Research on Mine Rescue Apparatus, at Heriot-Watt College, Edinburgh, for examination, who reported that he found the apparatus complete except for the charge of caustic soda, which had been removed from the bag. The oxygen in the cylinders on analysis gave (for two samples) 98.38 and 98.32 per cent., which are satisfactory figures.

The apparatus was found to be faulty in the following respects :—

(1) The main valve could not be closed completely; even when tightened by a tool it passed two litres of oxygen per hour, at 40 atmospheres pressure. The wastage increased with increases in pressure. This valve could only be made comparatively tight by means of a wrench and towards the end of the tests the spindle sheared across, so that the degree of force necessary can only be imagined. When the valve was merely closed by hand, oxygen escaped noiselessly but quite rapidly.

(2) On testing the apparatus by immersion in water, oxygen was found to be leaking from under the gland cap of the main valve (when the valve was open) due to the gland cap being slack, to the extent of 0.42 litres per minute. Dr. Briggs remarks that this may have been caused subsequent to Doorbar's collapse, but that in any case it cannot have been a contributory cause of death.

(3) The reducing valve was found to be out of adjustment. When the pressure in the cylinder was 120 atmospheres it supplied 1.56 litres of oxygen per minute, but the rate of flow was not constant. As the pressure was reduced the rate, of flow fell until at 35 atmospheres only 1.17 litres per minute were delivered.

Dr. Briggs emphasizes the point that a supply of oxygen less than two litres per minute involves risk of the wearer suddenly collapsing and states that an apparatus with a supply of only 1.17 litres per minute is in a high degree dangerous, and that the practice of blowing air into the apparatus when starting to use it is to be deprecated. It introduces a volume of nitrogen which reduces the oxygen percentage in the inhaled air. Instead of blowing nitrogen in, the apparatus should be swilled out with oxygen.

After numerous tests Dr. Briggs came to the following conclusions:

(a) With the apparatus, as received, inflated with ordinary air at the start, the wearer would run the gravest risk of sooner or later falling unconscious from want of oxygen.

(b) That deficiency of oxygen feed was due to the imperfect action of the reducing valve. The latter was well designed and suitable in all respects, but was not rightly adjusted.

(c) The main valve was not of a type well adapted to dealing with gas under high pressure. The combined effect of a leaking main valve and a faulty reducing valve probably resulted in the rapid collapse.

With regard to the noise of a report, Dr. Briggs, when giving evidence, stated he thought that this was most probably due to rust being expelled through the inlet nozzle of the reducing valve and that such a noise would take place if there was a partial stoppage and rust was suddenly ejected.

It is fair to state that Mr. W. Clifford, the Rescue Station superintendent, who also gave evidence, denied that the apparatus was inflated with air before starting to use it, as described by Dr. Briggs. His instruction to all the men he trained was to wash the bag out with oxygen and thus get rid of nitrogen. Dr. Briggs said that he got his information as to the procedure from Mr. Greatbatch, the Chairman of the North Staffordshire Rescue Station Committee.

The type of nose clip complained of by a witness's, James Thomas Machin, is one which is liable to be displaced, and the Mines Rescue Research Apparatus Committee has issued a memorandum describing and recommending the use of a type which cannot be displaced easily and is, therefore, much safer.

 

A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.