Great Western Colliery (Rhondda Valley) Disaster.
Reports
On A
Disaster In The Great Western Colliery
Rhondda Valley,
On 11th April 1893.
6, Pump Court, Middle Temple,
May 13, 1893.
Sir,
Great Western Colliery Disaster, Rhondda Valley.
A disaster took place at the Great Western Colliery, near Pontypridd, in the Rhondda Valley, South Wales, in the afternoon of Tuesday, the 11th April 1893, which resulted in the loss of 63 lives.
A formal inquest was held soon afterwards, which was adjourned to the 27th April last.
Acting upon instructions received from the Solicitor to the Treasury, I attended the adjourned inquest on the 27th, 28th, and 29th April on your behalf, and took part in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and assisted generally in the investigation of the cause of the disaster.
I now beg to submit to you my Report upon the inquiry, and upon the circumstances connected with or relating to the disaster, which were brought to light by the evidence which was given.
The inquiry was full and exhaustive. In all 25 witnesses were examined, including all the officials of the colliery who could give any information touching the cause and result of the accident, as well as the general management of the colliery. The inquest was held before two coroners, Mr. E. B. Reece and Mr. R. J. Rhys, because their districts are contiguous near the place where the colliery was situate, and some of the deceased workmen lived within the jurisdiction of the one, and others within that of the other. The inquest was also attended by Mr. J. T. Robson, the chief Mines' Inspector for the South Wales District; by Mr. Walter H. Morgan, solicitor for relatives of most of the deceased men ; by Mr. M. Roberts Jones, counsel for relatives of others of the deceased; and by Mr. James Inskip, solicitor for the Colliery Company.
At the time of the adjourned inquest, 62 of the bodies had been recovered. Of these, 61 died from suffocation, and the other (Jesse Titley) died from injuries sustained in a fall from the Four Feet Seam to the Five Feet Seam in the Tymawr Pit herein-after referred to, whilst he was in the act, probably, of trying to get on to the cage at the Four Feet Landing in order to ascend the pit.
The body of the sixty-third victim, viz., Patsy Sullivan, had not been found when the inquest was held ; but it was recovered, I understand, on the day after the inquest was concluded. It was found under a large fall.
The cause of the disaster was clearly traced to a fire which originated about 1.30 p.m. on the 11th April 1893 at or near an underground hauling engine, the position of which will be herein-after described.
The verdict of the jury, and their recommendations, were as follows :—
We find that, the accident at the Great Western Colliery on April 11th, 1893, was caused by a spark or sparks emitted from the brake of the hauling engine at the top of the East Hard Heading, which came in contact with inflammable substance in its neighbourhood, and that we do not attribute any negligence to any of the officials either before or after the accident, and that the 61 men lost their lives by suffocation by smoke arising from the fire.
With regard to Jesse Titley, we find that he lost his life by accidentally falling from the 4-feet landing down to the bottom of the Shaft of Tymawr.
Recommendation's.
We beg to make the following recommendations :—
(1.) That a copy of the new "Regulations" drawn up by Mr. Hugh Bramwell for adoption at the Great Western Colliery, be sent to the Home Office with the object that these, or similar ones, be adopted in other collieries.
(2.) That sufficient width or surface for brake power be provided upon all hauling engines so as to prevent undue friction.
(3.) That we recommend that every care should be exercised in letting the full journeys down the East Hard Heading at the Great Western Colliery at a uniform rate of speed.
The colliery is a steam coal colliery employing a very large number of men. There were from 930 to 950 men working in various parts of the colliery on the day of the accident; and it is a matter for congratulation that over 850 men, at any rate, escaped unhurt.
There are three pits in the colliery :—
(1.) The Hetty Pit, which is the downcast shaft; and
(2.) The Tymawr Pit, and
(3.) The No. 2 Pit, both of which are upcast shafts.
The seams of coal which the workings reach are three in number:-
(a.) The Four Feet Seam ;
(b.) The Six Feet Seam ; and
(c.) The Five Feet Seam ;
taking them in order from the highest to the lowest. The Six Feet Seam is about 25 yards below the Four Feet Seam, and the Five Feet Seam about 100 yards below the Six Feet Seam.
The Hetty Pit is sunk down to the Six Feet Seam, through the Four Feet Seam. The other two pits go down through the Four Feet Seam, and the Six Feet Seam into the Five Feet Seam, which is the lowest.
The three pits are marked on the plan which is annexed to this Report.
From the bottom of the Hetty Pit (which, as stated, is in the Six Feet Seam) a heading called the East Hard Heading is driven into the Four Feet Seam. This Hard Heading is marked on the plan. It is about 150 yards in length, and rises 1 in 6. It was at the upper end of this heading in the Four Feet Seam at the place coloured pink on the plan that the engine referred to was erected. It was a double cylinder hauling engine, working two loose drums by means of spur gearing. The drums were 3 feet 6 inches in diameter, and the engine was worked by compressed air at a pressure of about 55 lbs. to the square inch. The engine is more fully described in the evidence of Mr. Molyneux, the mechanical engineer, at pp. 79-82 of the first day's shorthand notes. A plan and section of the engine are also appended to this Report. The engine was erected in the roof above the roadway, so that workmen passing to and fro walked underneath it. It was fixed on three cross wooden beams, and two longitudinal ones; and the engine-driver stood on a small wooden platform laid upon these beams.
The engine was situate in the main air-way of the east workings of the Four Feet Seam. These are the workings shown on the plan, and it was in these workings that all the lives were lost. All the men in the west workings and in the other seams escaped without injury.
The current of air passing the engine for the purpose of ventilation of the workings was very large; it was estimated at 72,580 cubic feet per minute. Of this, about 57,913 cubic feet per minute passed along the Four Feet East Level to the East Far End Workings, and 14,667 cubic feet per minute went down the East Main Dip.
It is fair to state here, that the ventilation of the colliery was excellent; and although the mine was a fiery one, and the fire made great extensions into the Four Feet East Level, there seems to have been no trace of any explosion from gas. The course of the ventilation is shown by the arrows on the plan ; the arrows along the blue line indicate the intake, and the arrows along the led line the return air-ways. The figures on the plan show where the bodies of the men were found.
The jury unanimously found that the fire originated at the engine referred to, and of this the evidence left no doubt. They also found that the fire had been ignited by sparks emitted from the brake, and caused by the friction on the application of the brake to one of the drums, probably the tail drum, of the engine.
The drums were made of steel plates, and the brakes consisted of a strip of wrought iron called the brake-strap, bolted on to elm blocks, which went half-way round the drum. The pressure of the brake on the tail drum was as 45 to 1, and on the main drum as 15 to 1.
Underneath the engine, brattice had been fixed in order to protect the engine driver from the draught and coal-dust resulting from the great current of air. The brattice is marked on the engine plan. This brattice in course of time became more or less saturated with oil and grease which fell from the engine, and was thereby rendered more combustible. The beams and wooden flooring would also intercept some oil and grease, and would also in turn become more amenable to the flames. Some of the brattice was within 18 inches of the brake.
I think there can be no doubt that the sparks emitted from the brake ignited the brattice, and that the flames were communicated from the brattice to the beams and timber. Close up to the engine on both sides of the roadways there were posts and timber, both in the heading, level, and main dip. Immediately the fire seized the beams the strong current of air carried it along the timbers at a terrible rate. It chiefly spread into the 4-feet East Level. The smoke would be carried with great velocity into the workings, and it suffocated some of the men in or near their working places, and others as they attempted to make their way into the Tymawr upcast pit. A considerable number of men, from 70 to 80, fortunately reached the four-feet landing of the Tymawr Pit, and were raised in the cages to the surface. Four poor men who had reached the landing were too exhausted to go across the fencing into the cage, and they succumbed to the gases, in spite of the brave efforts of Fletcher and others to assist them into the cage.
Numbers of other men were kept by the admirable discretion and presence of mind of a young fireman, Thomas Rosser, in Holbrook's Heading for hours, and afterwards were able to go up by the East Main Dip.
The chief points to which I directed my inquiry and upon which I have to report were, (1) whether there was any negligence or default in the construction, or working of the engine, which caused or contributed to the disaster ; (2) whether, after the fire originated, everything was done which was reasonably possible to check it, and to preserve the safety of the workmen ; (3) whether any prosecutions should be instituted against any person or persons under the Coal Mines Regulation Act, or otherwise; and (4) whether any and what steps or precautions could or ought to be taken in similar collieries in the future, to prevent the recurrence of such painful calamities.
In the first place, I must state that it appears that hauling engines like the one in this case are in general use at this and at the other large collieries of the Rhondda Valley, similarly erected, and with similar drums, brakes, supports, and surroundings. This particular engine had been erected over five years. The evidence showed that it was not unusual for sparks to be generated by the brakes at this engine, and that on some occasions these sparks had ignited cotton waste which happened to lie about, and which was being, or had been, used by the engine driver for cleaning purposes.
The regular engine-driver was William Palmer; but he had been away from work through illness since the 30th March 1893.
George James acted as the engine-driver since that date, and on the day of the accident. One David Palmer had also been with James at the engine on the day in question from about 10 a.m. till within a quarter of an hour of the fire, practising so as to qualify himself as a spare hand at engine-driving. The regular engine driver had frequently seen sparks given off from the brake, and had even seen pieces of cotton-waste smoulder and ignite on many occasions. These he would put out by means of water which he kept in a bucket at hand for the purpose of cooling the brake when it became very heated. It did not seem to be known to the colliery official that sparks were thus emitted from the engine, and no complaints seem to have been made to any of them about these sparks by any workman.
Only one of them, Mr. Molyneux, the mechanical engineer, admitted that he had heard at least twice (although he had never seen) that sparks had been caused by the friction of the brake, once about Christmas last, and another time a few weeks before that.
It never occurred to him, or to the manager or under manager, or indeed to any of the colliery officials, that any danger might arise from sparks emitted in this way ; and consequently it was admitted that no precautions were taken by the supplying of water, or the removing of timber, or in any other way, against a danger the possibility of which had never occurred to their minds.
William Palmer, the engine-driver, said however that he always kept a bucket full of water near him to apply to the brakes when they became heated and "smoked." This water he generally got from a stand-up water-pipe, which was carried to the floor of the engine from a water-pipe 1¼ inches in diameter which was laid along the roadway, and which conveyed water to the underground workings from reservoirs on the surface. These water-pipes were laid down by a previous manager (Mr. Wales) some years ago, and were not intended in any way to be a precaution against fire, but were laid for the purpose of having fine sprays of water to allay the coal dust. They extended for about 5 miles into the workings.
It was not very clearly shown why the stand-pipe had been erected, but some evidence was given to show that it was intended to provide water for contingencies which might happen to paraffin lamps which were formerly used in the engine-house.
For some years, however, paraffin lamps had been discontinued in the engine room, electric light having been substituted in their stead. Attached to the stand-pipe was a tap and hose, and William Palmer said he never considered it safe to go on working the engine without having the bucket full of water in order to cool the brake.
According to the evidence, the use made of the water out of the stand-pipe at the engine was not known to the officials, except to Norman, the assistant mechanical engineer.
George James, who worked the engine on the day of the disaster, said he never saw sparks from the engine, although he "smelt" the brake getting heated, and saw it "smoke." This happened particularly when a large load of 12 full trams was let down the East Hard Heading, which was the sharpest gradient in the colliery (1 in 6), and along which the full load went down, necessitating, of course, the powerful application of the brake on the tail drum. It appears that such a load was let down this steep heading about 10 or 12 minutes before the fire was actually observed on the 11th April, and there can be little or no doubt but that the ignition took place at that time.
The whole of the brake was not in view of the engine driver as he stood on his platform ; and the fire had caught in the brattice, and had also seized the cross-beams underneath, before his attention was first called to it. The flames were first seen by a lad named Edwin Matthews who was going along the East Hard Heading about 1.30 p.m., intending to proceed to his work for the shift commencing at 2 p.m. He shouted to the engine-driver, and the latter came down and saw the fire. He had only half a bucket of water, so he tried the water-pipe, but there was no water in the pipe. He broke the stand-up pipe, but he could get no water ; the main pipe in the roadway was afterwards broken 8 or 9 yards away, but there was no pressure of water in the pipe ; in fact, there was so little water in it that "it would take a long time to fill a bucket." At this time all the water that could be got was from a tank in the stable at the bottom of the heading 150 yards off.
It is sad to think that if water had been found at the usual pressure on the pipe near the engine the fire could have been extinguished when it was first discovered ; but four or five minutes were sufficient for the flames to get firm hold, and to be beyond prevention.
No satisfactory explanation was given of the failure of water in the pipes on this day. The pipes had not been examined during the day ; the person responsible for examining the pipes and machinery underground was A. Norman. He had not reached the east workings on this day before the accident.
In fact, the examination of these pipes, and of the engine, did not seem to be very regularly carried out ; but, as before stated, the pipes were not intended to convey water to put out fires, and were admitted to be inadequate for such a purpose. Soon after the fire was discovered by Matthews, other persons arrived, and the undermanager was on the scene in about a quarter of an hour, and the manager in about half an hour afterwards. The first thing now to be done was to try to save the men in the Four Feet Seam, and to get the men out from the other parts of the colliery.
At first the fan at the Tymawr Pit was increased in speed from about 52 revolutions, to about 76 revolutions per minute. It is not certain who advised this. It was done in the excitement, and was well-intended ; but, in my opinion, it was a mistake, because it increased the current of air going down the Hetty Pit and passing the engine, and so lent more force to the flames, and gave increased velocity to the smoke. But no one can be blamed, and it cannot be said with any certainty that it caused any further loss of life. Soon afterwards the surveyor reduced the fan to half the usual speed, and in a little time stopped it altogether, thus converting the Tymawr Pit from an upcast into a downcast shaft, and so conveying fresh air to those who might be in the Four Feet Seam return ways. This was the prudent course. After some time when nothing more could be done, the fan was restarted at half speed, and was continued at that speed for some days.
Seventy or eighty men were taken up the Tymawr Pit from the 4-feet landing, and they were taken up quickly and without delay.
But I have to make one observation as to the state of things at this 4-feet landing. There was no signalling apparatus there to communicate with the engine-driver. The method adopted by the men who reached the landing on this day to signal was to shout down to the bottom, viz., to the Five Feet Seam, which was 100 yards below. The hitcher there stationed thereupon signalled up. The Company said they did not consider it necessary to have a signalling apparatus at the landing, because the Tymawr Pit was not used for raising men, and because the 4-feet landing was not for the time being used for loading or raising minerals, although minerals were raised from the Five Feet Seam. Evidence was given, however, that officials sometimes used this 4-feet landing to ascend the pit. Moreover, the very object of the upcast shaft is to afford a separate second means of ingress and regress (section 16 (1) of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887). In my opinion there should be a signalling apparatus there, in order to comply with General Rule 25 of the said Act ; and the manager undertook that in future it should be provided. I think, however, that no delay, and no loss of life was shown to have been caused by want of a signal at the landing of the Four Feet Seam ; and, having regard to this, and to the evidence given on this head by Mr. Robson, Her Majesty's Inspector, as follows :—
Third Day.
(Mr. Robson, Inspector of Mines, under examination.)
"I would not think it was a breach of the Act. I mean to say that I could not satisfy myself as to recommending proceedings. Of course I do not decide as to a breach of the Act, that is for a higher authority ; but so far as I could judge I would not have thought it desirable on my part to interfere and recommend the case being tested, although I should have drawn the manager's attention to it, and I think I have done so in some other place very similarly situated, and I think as a rule it has been done. But I am quite aware there are objections and disadvantages to a signal in such a place ; it would lead to confusion with the other signalling, and might induce men to come out and use that shaft when they ought not to use it, and so fall down the pit."
I cannot advise that any proceedings should now be instituted.
On the whole, having regard to the evidence of the officials, and to that of Mr. Robson, I do not feel justified in saying that the Company were negligent in the construction of the engine, or in not supplying water at the engine as a precaution against such a fire as this, as the possibility of such a catastrophe as this never presented itself to their minds ; but at the same time it was clear that a fair supply of water might have extinguished the fire in time to have prevented any loss of life.
I think also that all that could reasonably have been done, after the fire occurred, was done in bringing out the men and saving life.
With regard to the future, the terrible calamity at this colliery has opened the eyes of managers and others to this possible source of danger ; and I am pleased to be able to report that additional precautions have already been taken, not only at this colliery, but at others in the district, to prevent as far as possible any recurrence of such a disaster from similar causes.
As to what has been done at this colliery, reference may be made to the new Regulations drawn out by the manager, which are as follows :—
They are divided into temporary precautions and permanent ones. The temporary ones are intended to apply at once to the engines we have in use, and the permanent ones to the engines we subsequently put up. The first of the temporary ones is that: "Every engine-house shall be carefully cleaned out. All oil, old waste, and inflammable material other than the supports for the engine to be removed.
"(2.) All brattice cloth, now used for sheltering engine-men from draught, to be totally removed, as well as all unnecessary wood about the engine-house.
"(3.) Galvanized-iron sheets to be erected for shelter in the future.
"(4.) Each engine-man to be provided with a tin-box with a handle, into which all old waste must be thrown and brought out of the pit. No engine-man will be supplied with clean waste by the storekeeper unless he produces the old dirty waste at the surface.
"(5.) Each engine to be carefully examined to see that no moving part of it is rubbing against any framing used for its support.
"(6.) Two buckets for water to be kept in each engine-house."
Then the permanent precautions are :—
"(1.) In future no engine to be erected on wooden supporting beams. All such supports to be of iron or steel girders.
"(2.) Flooring of all engine-houses where flooring is required to be of iron or metal plates and not of wood.
"(3.) No engine to be erected except in an arched engine-house.
"(4.) The roadways to and from every engine-house to be arched with stone or brick for a distance of not less than 30 feet in each direction from the engine.
"(5.) Each engine-house to be provided with a hydrant or cock, not less than 1¼ inches in diameter, connected with the water-pipes, and fitted with not less than 15 feet of india-rubber hose pipe. The hydrant cock to be always at the intake side of the engine-house. Such hydrant to be tried daily by the engine-man."
Whenever engines of this kind are used underground, I should recommend that the following matters should be particularly attended to :—
(1.) Such engines should be arched over with stone or brick, or be covered by a stone roof, and should be erected on iron girders instead of on wooden beams.
(2.) There should be no brattice near the engines ; iron sheeting, or some such incombustible substance, should be used instead of brattice for the protection of the engine driver.
(3.) For reasonable distances from the engines all roadways should be arched with stone or brick, and not timbered.
(4.) Brakes should be used of such a size and quality as to minimise as far as possible the risk of sparks.
(5.) Care should be taken in the removal of inflammable material such as oil, cotton waste, &c.
(6.) A supply of water should be always afforded at each engine house for the purpose of cooling heated brakes, and as a precaution against possible ignition.
(7.) Engines, and the water supply to them, should be examined carefully by the responsible official every 24 hours at least.
It is also a matter well worthy of consideration whether some practicable means might not be found to communicate by signals, e.g., electric bells, to all the working places, in order to warn or call out workmen in case of any accident in any part of a mine which might render their remaining in unsafe, or any delay in coming out dangerous.
This accident illustrates also, how important it is to keep the return air-ways and the upcast shaft in good order and condition, and ready for emergencies.
I am, &c.
(Signed) S. T. Evans.
To The Right Honourable H. H. Asquith, M.P.,
The Secretary of State for the Home Department.