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IV. — Cause Of Explosion.

The fundamental cause of the explosion was the inability of the ventilation to meet the demands made upon it.

The responsibility upon those working a gassy seam intensively by the extensive use of electricity and shotfiring is a heavy one and the system of ventilation must be the main consideration in laying out a district. It is not sufficient to adopt the best possible system of ventilation that a given layout permits. Unless the highest standard of ventilation can be maintained the layout should be. ruthlessly scrapped and another substituted. Intensive mining demands intensive ventilation and it is a matter for consideration whether all layouts in mechanised mines should not be submitted by the manager to ventilation experts.

The system of ventilation adopted in this district was, in my view, unsound. The pull of air was away from the South Face and the tendency would be to short-circuit directly into the return. The inadequacy of the single door reinforced by sheets, especially in view of the traffic through them, has already been mentioned. The ventilation could have been split or the working of the North Side deferred until the South Side was finished. The latter had only a few weeks' life remaining when the explosion occurred. The need for the greatest care was enhanced by the faults bounding the district.

In view of these considerations attention is drawn to the following recommendations of the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines, which were also given prominence in the Inquest proceedings

(a) Systematic sampling of mine air. The proposals are summarised on page 489 of the Report.

No samples of air had been taken in the district where the explosion occurred and only three in the whole pit during the present manager's 36 weeks tenure of office.

(b) Ventilation of Headings and Fast Ends as proposed in page 234 of the Report.

No means were used to direct air into three of the fast ends nor indeed into that portion of the North Face, having a length of 30 yards, to the West of the North Timber gate.

(c) Prevention of leakage as outlined in the paragraph on page 228 of the Report.

It is suggested that the recommendations as to main airways could with advantage be extended to all airways in districts where mechanised mining is employed.

This is the second explosion in Yorkshire this year involving loss of life in which the ventilation of the affected area has depended on a single door.

The Point of Origin. A close study of the indications and direction of force and other considerations associated with the explosion lead me to agree with the general opinion that the explosion originated at or near the inbye end of the South Loader gate.

Source of Firedamp. In my opinion firedamp accumulated in cavities in and between the beds above the seam and was forced into the workings on the South Side through roof breaks in the gates and at fault sides as the result of the subsidence of the beds. No timber was withdrawn from the wastes and this would tend to interfere with normal subsidence.

It is not possible to say when this increase in the feeders occurred nor how far the explosive mixture extended. It is possible that the increase occurred only a few minutes before the explosion and the firedamp had not time to reach the North Side, or if it occurred earlier that the firedamp was diluted by leakages along the main gate so that the atmosphere was inexplosive on the North Side at the moment of ignition. On the other hand firedamp may have lain near the roof throughout the district, and it will be remembered that bodies in all parts of the district were extensively burnt and in Dr. Fisher's opinion the nature of the burns gave the impression that tongues of flame spread throughout the district.

We do know that layers of firedamp were found along the roof in the South Loader gate and South Timber gate immediately after the explosion and to a lesser extent along the roof of the North Timber gate, and these layers of gas, which denoted fairly strong feeders, persisted for several days. A strong feeder of firedamp was found issuing from the fault where it crossed the auxiliary intake on days following the explosion. The feeders were not finally dissipated until a brick wall with a small door had been built in the North Loader gate between intake and return and a door erected in the West main gate inbye of the South Loader gate junction.

It may be asked why the men did not smell the firedamp and immediately withdraw. There are two explanations. On the one hand the only men working in the moving air current at the moment of the explosion were engaged at ripping lips, where the roads were 8 ft. or 9 ft. high, and the explosive mixture would lie near the roof above their heads. On the other hand, it will be remembered that firedamp had been present at the ripping lips on the South Side for some days and the men had smelt it and continued work.

I do not think that the quantity of firedamp which contributed to the explosion was so large that it could not have been diluted to a point where it was inexplosive had the amount of air circulating been moderately increased.

Source of Ignition. There was no evidence of contraband articles.

Examination and tests of the electrical plant, including signalling bells and magneto exploders, revealed no evidence of electrical defects likely to cause open sparking.

Examination of the safety lamps recovered from the district revealed no defect to which an ignition of firedamp could be attributed. The two officials' flame safety lamps were found with broken glasses, and with the igniter keys in the lamps, at the outbye end of the South Loader gate, nearly 100 yards from the bodies of the two men. There is no specific requirement that a deputy should continually have the flame lamp in his possession but I think it is very desirable. Although the glasses were broken, in my opinion as the result of the explosion, and the keys operating the relighting device had been left in the lamps contrary to Clause 2 of the Safety Lamps (Relighter) Order, 1929, I do not attribute the explosion to either of these lamps.

Four theories were put forward at the Inquest as to the way in which firedamp could have been ignited

1. Delayed ignition from a ripping shot fired in the South Loader gate.

2. Sparks formed by the impact of a pick on the ironstone bands at this same ripping lip where men were erecting a girder. There were pick marks where a pocket hole had been. formed for the girder and a pick was found beside the men, but it is not possible to say if it was in use at the time of the explosion.

The possibilities of the sparks produced by the blows of hand picks on rock igniting firedamp are fully discussed in Safety in Mines Research Board Paper No. 62. At the Research Station firedamp has been ignited by the heat produced by impact of a pick on sandstone, and some explosions in Scottish mines have been caused in this way. When ironstone is struck by a pick sparks can be readily obtained, but in experiments on samples from Crigglestone, though a few sparks were produced, an ignition of firedamp could not be obtained.

3. Heat generated by the grinding action during settlement of hard beds some 24 ft. above the seam.

4. The firing of coal dust on an overheated coal cutting machine.

In my opinion firedamp was ignited in a break by a ripping shot fired in the South Loader gate some 2½ hours prior to the explosion, and it continued to burn unseen until contact was made by the flame with an explosive mixture. This shot consisted of Plastex (Sheathed) and the shothole, which was 4 ft. 6 in. long, passed through a break halfway along its length which, with others, could be traced right along the face and was found later to contain 52 per cent. and 6o per cent, of methane. The position of the break in relation to the shothole is shewn on Plan No. 2. The flame of firedamp ignited in this way can travel a considerable distance and burn for days. In his report on the cause of an explosion at North Gawber (Lidgett) Colliery on 12th September, 1935, the Commissioner, Sir Henry Walker, then H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, mentioned on page 23 that such a flame at Crigglestone Colliery on 4th November 1930, travelled 67 yards and he gave an instance at another colliery where a flame caused in this way burned for at least 96 hours. In attributing that explosion to a shot fired some time previously, he said that his opinion was not capable of proof but was based on experience and not on speculation. This holds good in the present instance.

In conclusion I desire to endorse the remarks and recommendations of H.M. Coroner, and I should like to draw attention also to the need for a better form of break detector than that provided here and elsewhere.

I should also like to express appreciation of the valuable assistance readily given by Dr. H. F. Coward, and the Staff of the Safety in Mines Research Board by consultation, underground visits and experiments and examinations in the Laboratories and at the Research Station.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
H. J. Humphrys.

 

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A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.

 

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