III. — The Inquest.
The Inquest, which was conducted by Mr. C. J. Haworth, one of H.M. Coroners for the West Riding of Yorkshire, sitting without a jury, was searching and exhaustive. Every facility was given to call and examine the necessary witnesses.
The Inquest occupied seven full days and, apart from 21 witnesses as to identification, 27 other witnesses were called.
Three of the workmen who were survivors from the explosion gave evidence. One could not remember anything, another knew of nothing untoward during the shift, whilst the third, who was working with the coal cutting machine on the South Face, said there was a little firedamp at the face ripping lip of the South Loader gate which he mentioned to the deputy. He also stated that the machine chargeman carried a flame safety lamp which was hung up in the Loader gate for the whole of the shift.
Presence of Firedamp. — A good deal of the examination of witnesses was directed to finding out if there was any truth in the rumours put into circulation after the explosion that firedamp had been prevalent in the district prior to the explosion, but in spite of. the closest inquiry, it was not established that firedamp had been found, except occasionally, at any place other than the face ripping lips of the South Loader gate and the South Timber gate. In the former place it was reported by the deputies on the day shift of the 25th July and each shift subsequently until the shift on which the explosion occurred. In the South Timber gate it was first reported on the day shift of the 17th July and on each shift subsequently until the one on which the explosion occurred. No percentage was stated in any report but it was given as "trace," "small trace" or "slight trace."
The evidence of the deputies was that the feeder of gas was present a few feet from the face and that the point of issue moved forward as the face advanced. A hurdle sheet placed under the feeder and 2 ft. 6 in. below roof level had the effect of diluting it so that gas could not be detected at all 1 ft. 6 in. nearer the face than the sheet. At the point of issue the amount of gas was less than 1 per cent. All claimed to be able to estimate 1 per cent, and to detect lower percentages.
Three shots were fired daily in each of these two rippings and shots were also fired in coal along the face, including a number at or near the gate-ends. Ripping shots were fired on the shift when the explosion occurred, but as the deputy and the shot-firer were both killed no evidence as to procedure on that shift was forthcoming. The shot-firer on the night shift, however, said that the deputy raised the hurdle sheet in the Loader gate to within 6 in. of the roof and this cleared the gas entirely and he was able to fire shots in the region of the gate-end. Halfway through the shift the sheet was lowered again and the sheet in the Timber gate was raised to within 6 in. or 9 in. of the roof. This enabled shots to be fired in the vicinity of that gate. This procedure was carried out with the knowledge of the manager and under-manager who had, of course, a special obligation under General Regulation 1 to enforce the provisions of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order. The firing of shots under such conditions will, I think, be generally deprecated.
Witnesses were examined at considerable length to ascertain whether at times a larger percentage of firedamp was present than reported by the deputies. The man in charge of the face conveyor motor on the day shift carried a flame safety lamp and said he found firedamp in the South Loader gate ripping lip but "did not get a full cap." On the shift prior to the explosion he had detected firedamp 18 in. below roof level.
A filler stated that he found a trace of firedamp with his flame lamp at the edge of the goaf 12 yards from the ripping lip at 7 o'clock on the morning of the explosion, but it was removed by the ventilation and he did not report it to anyone. He could smell firedamp as he climbed over the conveyor engine in the loader g ate at the end of the shift.
A belt breaker on the South Face was in the district to within two hours of the explosion. He said that when going to work he smelt firedamp, particularly in the South Timber gate, 9 or 10 yards from the ripping edge, but he did not report it to anyone.
A filler on the South Face said he could smell firedamp in the Timber gate about 10 or 15 yards from the ripping edge on the morning of the explosion.
The day shift deputy said that in addition to the firedamp which he reported he found some, estimated at 1½ per cent., at the 8 ft. fault in the auxiliary intake on the South Side at 6.35 a.m. on the day of the explosion, but he fixed a hurdle sheet and the gas was cleared. He made a verbal report to the manager. Failure to record the presence of this firedamp in his report was contrary to No. 7 of the Coal Mines General Regulations, 1938.
Means for Detection of Firedamp. — The evidence disclosed that the Firedamp Detector Regulations of 6th March, 1939, which are designed to give workmen the means of detecting the presence of firedamp, were not fully observed. It was stated that 42 persons were employed in the district on the shift on which the explosion occurred and all of them worked at the face. As detectors should have been issued to these persons in the proportion of one in eight, at least six detectors were required, and since two electrical coal cutting machines and two electric boring machines were in use on that shift, at least four of these detectors should have been of automatic type. Only four persons working in the district on the shift on which the explosion occurred, however, had been appointed under No. 4(a) of the Firedamp Detector Regulations, 1939, to have charge of detectors.
A record of safety lamps issued is required to be kept under Section 34(I) (i), Coal Mines Act, 1911, but that produced in Court was a very imperfect one as regards flame lamps. The head lampman stated that on the shift on which the explosion occurred nine flame lamps were issued to the whole pit, of which seven were sent into districts other than No. 1 West. His record did not show to whom the remaining lamps were issued, but according to the evidence it is probable that they were issued to the chargemen of the two coal cutting machines in No. 1 West:
No automatic detectors were issued on the shift on which the explosion occurred to any district. The manager stated that all those in working order were issued on the day shift so that there were none available for the afternoon shift; moreover, he had some difficulty in getting the coal cutter men to carry them on account of their bulk.
Ventilation. — A good deal of attention was naturally focussed on the ventilation of the affected area. It will be seen from Plan No. 1 that there are two direct connections between intake and return in each of which is placed a single door and three sheets. Otherwise the ventilation was directed round the district by sheets. It was contended in evidence by H.M. Inspectors that this system of ventilation was inefficient and that excessive leakages were likely, especially as an output of 200 tons per day was conveyed through the sheets and through the brickwork alongside the door in the North Loader gate. A hole 3 ft. square had been left in the brickwork for the conveyor and the open space had been obstructed as far as possible by flaps of conveyor belting. It was submitted in this evidence that any derangement of the door and the sheets in this gate would result in a direct short circuit into the return airway and Mr. J. Hawley, Junior Inspector, described an experiment made after the explosion in which the door erected in the North Loader gate subsequent to the explosion was opened 2 ft. 6 in. and the sheets deranged in a way which he thought might occur in ordinary working. Only 25 per cent. of the air entering the district reached the South Conveyor face in his experiment.
Questions put by Mr. J. A. Hall, President of the Yorkshire Mine Workers' Association, were directed to showing the advantage of a system of split ventilation by which the air could be taken direct along the West Main gate and split right and left along the two timber gates, which, however, it was suggested, should then have been made into conveyor gates. He put it to various witnesses that under this system the ventilation would have been more efficient and leakages reduced and that an explosion, had one occurred under such conditions, would have been confined to one side of the district.
The opinion was expressed by several witnesses that the firedamp accumulated in cavities formed above roof level during settlement of the beds above the seam. This theory was elaborated by Dr. D. W. Phillips, of the staff of the Safety in Mines Research Board, who explained how firedamp could be forced out through breaks in the roof into the South Loader and South Timber gates and along the fault sides.
All witnesses who were questioned on the point agreed that the explosion originated in the South Loader gate and then spread throughout the district.
Dr. S. W. Fisher, H.M. Medical Inspector of Mines, stated that each of the bodies was burnt and in each corner of the district were found bodies extensively burnt.
H.M. Coroner found, in accordance with the medical evidence, that the men died as the result of extensive burns or injuries and carbon monoxide poisoning following an explosion of firedamp and that they met their death by misadventure.
In his summing up he criticised the ventilating arrangements, especially the unventilated fast ends and the leakages. He favoured the split system of ventilation and thought that there should have been. more doors. He mentioned the persistent gas reports by the deputies and the occasions on which the workmen smelt firedamp, and commented that the shotfirers must have considered the steps they took to remove the gas before shots were fired as satisfactory as they were not likely knowingly to risk their own lives. He stated that the evidence as to the supply of firedamp detectors, whether automatic or flame lamp, was exceedingly unsatisfactory, and also criticised deputies who did not report gas because it cleared. He mentioned the view expressed in the evidence of H.M. Inspectors, which he saw they held strongly, that shots should not have been fired in or near the rippings on the South Side under the conditions prevailing. As to the cause of ignition he ruled out naked lights and electricity and drew attention to the four theories mentioned in evidence without expressing a definite opinion in favour of one or other. These are explained and discussed in Section IV of this report.
He made the following further recommendations :—
1. That the statutory regulations as to the supply of flame lamps or detectors should be rigidly complied with everywhere, particularly where the workings were electrified and intensively worked.
2. That every man, deputy or other, should carry out the requirements as to reporting impurities in the air.
3. Leakages should be tightened up, and additional doors provided where necessary.
4. The system of packing should receive every consideration, especially in view of Dr. Phillips' evidence.
5. That every explosion, however small — even if no one is hurt — should be treated as a matter of major importance.
6. Every precaution should be taken by management and men to see that all regulations are enforced.
A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.