II. Character Of The Seam And The Method Of Working It.
4. Reference to the longitudinal section in Plate III will show that the Cockshead seam at this colliery is comparatively thick, there being from 7 to 8 feet of clean coal with a parting 1½ to 2 feet from the roof and an intermittent band of pyrites nodules 2 inches thick at about 5 feet from the floor. The immediate roof consists of 2 feet of "Hussle," a black and very friable carbonaceous shale about which more will be said further on in this report. Immediately above the "Hussle" there is a thickness of 2 feet of dirt (a soft coal measure shale) and this is followed by a stratum of strong shale with ironstone bands,
5. The seam gives off firedamp freely so that safety lamps and Permitted explosives only were allowed to be used in the workings.
6. Generally, the working of the seam produced much dust and large quantities of stone dust were required to neutralise the coal dust, the volatile content of the coal being upwards of 35 per cent. That large quantities of stone dust were, in fact, applied is shown by the analysis of samples taken on 15th March in 15's Level. The samples contained respectively no more than 5.8 and 8.7 per cent, of combustible matter.
7. The Cockshead seam at this mine has an unenviable reputation, inasmuch as from its earliest days the workings in it have been dogged by troubles arising from spontaneous heating. Indeed, 51 years ago, on 16th October, 1889. to be exact, an explosion initiated by a gob-fire caused the loss of 64 lives. In a report on the accident, dated 15th March, 1890, the late Sir W. N. Atkinson wrote : — "The Cockshead seam at Mossfield Colliery is subject to 'gob-fires,' caused by spontaneous combustion. Considerable portions of the workings had been sealed off at different times on account of gob-fires breaking out."
8. The loss of life in the 1889 explosion was catastrophic compared with the present occurrence. There is little or no doubt that this was because that explosion was propagated by coal dust into the workings of a second seam, the Seven Feet Banbury, which was worked off the same level as the Cockshead seam.
9. There is also little doubt that the effects of the recent explosion would have been greatly magnified but for the fact that the roadways were copiously treated with stone dust. As it was, the explosion was limited both in extent and violence.
10. Experience in the intervening half century has amply confirmed Sir W. N. Atkinson's description of the seam.
On account of the liability to gob-fires special methods of working were adopted, and except for the accident in 1889 had been substantially successful until the present unfortunate occurrence. Such special methods involved, fundamentally, the avoidance, as far as possible, of leakage of air through the packs, the systematic withdrawal of roof supports, and the prevention of accumulations of bituminous matter in the wastes, backed up by working in separate panels with only one way of ingress and one of egress for the ventilation, thus affording facilities for rapid isolation in any emergency.
11. 15's longwall face, 90 yards in length in all, was for practical purposes completely mechanised, the coal being cut at a height of 2 feet 6 inches from the floor by compressed air driven coal cutting machines; shot holes were bored by compressed air driven percussive boring machines; and the coal was delivered to the loading point in the level by a compressed air driven shaker conveyor. To the dip of the level there was a short length of about or 6 yards of face which was hand filled directly into tubs.
12. On account of the weak nature of the "hussle" and the 2 feet stratum of dirt next above it, a thickness of coal 2 feet 6 inches was left up to form a safe roof in the longwall face. The strip packs were built up to this coal roof; the top coal, however, fell in the wastes whence as much as possible of it was recovered and sent out. Generally, although it was not always the case as will appear in the Narrative of the Accident, the collapse of the stronger stratum of roof followed fairly closely (within 10 yards or so) the advance of the coal face. Debris from this fallen roof provided the bulk of the material for building the packs.
13. Plate III shows with reasonable accuracy, although not from actual measurement, the arrangement of the packs and wastes at the time of the explosion.
This method of working was common to the other districts of the seam.
14. Reference has already been made to the patch of faulty ground shown on Plates I and III. In order to provide a correct picture of the effects of this disturbance, it is necessary to discuss it at some length.
15. Workings at higher levels had, as Plate I shows, passed through a fault, having a downthrow of about 10 feet, and running roughly in a north-south direction diagonally to the direction of the dip of the seam.
16. In due course, this fault was encountered in 15's Level. The fault was crossed and a face was opened out beyond it, but at about 20 yards distance along the level a second fault, apparently another downthrow, appeared, running in a direction approximating closely to the direction of dip of the seam so that the two faults met near the rise side of the face. The face was stopped pending a search for and the recovery of the seam beyond the second fault.
17. First of all, a level crut in line with 15's Level was driven in a distance of 30 yards and, finding no coal, it was stopped at that point.
18. Then a roadway was opened up on the line of face alongside the inner fault and from its junction with the return airway another crut was set out as shown on the plan (Plate III). The strata were recognised as strata usually forming the floor of the seam. A slight extension of this crut to the left therefore found the coal. From this point a heading was driven downbank on the full dip of the seam. The heading was 7 feet wide and was supported by 7 feet steel arches. The heading having reached a point known to be about the position of the first mentioned crut, a careful survey and levelling was carried out, which showed that the floor of the seam in the heading was 18 feet vertically above the floor of the crut. The position of the seam now being accurately fixed, a third crut was started from 15's Level veering slightly to the left. It cut the seam at 40 yards in, and an extension of the line of crut along the seam was met by the downbank heading. From the side of this downbank heading a new face was opened out, and at the time of the explosion it had reached the position set out in Plates I and III.
A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.