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The explosion was without doubt due to the ignition of an inflammable or explosive mixture of gas and air, produced by fire-damp from the goaf entering the air-current. Owing to the contraction of the air-way at the highest part of the goaf next No. 8 level, the quantity of air available to dilute the gas would be considerably less than the usual amount. Whether the emission of fire-damp was so copious and sudden as to have rendered the usual current explosive may be open to doubt, but I am inclined to think that it would have done so. Sudden issues of gas are not unusual when the first heavy weight takes place in a goaf, in seams otherwise comparatively free from fire-damp. In this case a thin seam, called the Stone mine, lies about eight yards above the Two-feet mine, and the gas may have come from it. The contraction of the air-way would have a tendency to force the air through the goaf in order to reach the return in No. 10 level at the far side of the goaf, and this, together with the heavy rise of the seam in that direction, would tend to carry the gas in the goaf rapidly into the return air-way.

As to the point of ignition, the indications left by the explosion, and the circumstances attending it, lead me to a decided opinion. Some of the strongest and most incontestable evidences of the direction of the blast were on the Far Jig Brow; and these were indications that the blast passed down that brow from a point above No. 7 level where the jig drum stood. The only flame above that point, until No. 1 Jig Brow was reached, was that of the open light carried by Wilde the fireman, whose body was found on No. 8 level between the New Brow and No. 1 Jig Brow. This would also be, the first flame encountered by gas entering the air current from the high side of the goaf, and it was, I believe, the flame which ignited the gas. The body of Wilde was found on No. 8 level, about 70 yards from the New Brow. He was lying on his face with his head outbye. He was slightly burnt. About 45 yards from his body and nearer the New Brow, a torch lamp belonging to him was found. Still further from his body, and within a few yards of the regulating sheet on No. 8 level, a pick which he was in the habit of carrying was found. It is not improbable that he had passed through this regulating sheet and ignited the gas on the New Brow or No. 10 level, and that he was running back, when he fell, overpowered by the afterdamp, having first dropped his pick and then his lamp. The regulating sheet on No. 8 level was left standing. That on No. 9 level was blown outward. A prop said to have been fixed in the wood frame in which the sheet on No. 8 level hung, in order to prevent the sheet being blown aside by the current, was found 8 yards outbye of the sheet. It is not probable that this prop was blown out by the explosion. A blast strong enough to displace it would also have carried away the sheet and its frame. It is possible that Wilde himself knocked it out while hurrying through after igniting the gas. The explosion having been initiated, the flame would extend inward along the top level towards the source of the gas, and probably for some distance outward, and down the New Brow as well. On its inward course the blast would cross the top of the Far Jig Brow, and would raise and ignite the coal dust on that brow. By the continued ignition of the coal dust the blast would be carried down the brow, and along the levels to the right and left of it. The flame was probably almost exhausted when it reached the goaf edge along these levels, the dust in them being largely mixed with uninflammable material. The flame had not extended into all the faces where the colliers were working. Of 14 colliers at this face only 4 were at all burnt; 2 of them very slightly. Those who were burnt were probably at the low side of their working face or possibly in the level itself. In one case (far end of No. 5 level), some clothing and a packet of food had been set on fire and had burned to ashes. Of the waggoners in these levels, eight in number, all were burnt, except one in the low level. They would be in the levels somewhere between the Jig Brow and the face at the time of the explosion. The jigger at No. 7 level, and the taker off at the bottom of the Far Jig Brow were also burned. Four workmen near the top of No. 1 Jig Brow were killed by the after-damp. The men at the pillar workings rushed out along the levels and were suffocated by the poisonous after-damp. Had they made their way down the working faces to the low level (the intake) it is probable that most of them would have escaped. They would be in ignorance, however, that one way was safer than the other, and would naturally attempt to escape by the usual route to the shaft.

The point of origin of this explosion is of importance only from a scientific point of view. The pit being worked with naked lights, similar results might have ensued had the gas come in contact with one of those lights at another point. The only other place suggested as a possible point of origin was somewhere in the vicinity of the far end of No. 3 level, but no earnest attempt was made to sustain this view. It was based on the fact that the canvas sheets on that level were blown outward, and that the only two colliers who were severely burnt worked at the face of that level. The position of the sheets may be attributed to a reversed current after the explosion. If the pieces of canvas observed to have been blown outward about half way along Nos. 2 and 3 levels, had formed part of the sheets next the Jig Brow, they must first have been blown inward: this, however, although probable, could not be determined. The canvas blown outward against the tub near the entrance to No. 3 level was no doubt parts of the sheets, but knowing that such light bodies are the most likely to be effected by a counter current after the explosion this appears very slight evidence on which to base an opinion, when it is opposed by much stronger indications. As to the burning of the colliers in No. 3 level: it is true that two of them, Joseph and Peter Gee were burnt, but the third, Thomas Gee, was not burnt at all. This difference was probably due to their respective positions at the time of the explosion; that is, the colliers who were burnt may have been on the level and within reach of flame coming from the jig brow, while the man who was not burnt may have been up in the working face beyond the limit to which the flame extended. Had the gas been ignited here it is probable that all these men would have been burnt, as well as all the colliers in the faces above them. Other objections to this view may be stated thus. There was conclusive evidence that no explosion had passed up or down by the working face; if therefore, the explosion began at the far end of No. 3 level it must have gone up the Far Jig Brow, on which there were strong indications that it came down. Again, the pack roads extending into the goaf, on the lines of levels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were examined on the 20th January, so far as they were accessible, or for distances varying from 15 to 23 yards into the goaf. No gas was found in any of them, and at the same time gas was on No. 8 level beyond the edge of the goaf.

I am of opinion that the most dangerous element in this explosion was the coal dust on the Far Jig Brow; and that the loss of life was mainly due to its ignition. Until the predominating influence of coal dust in large colliery explosions is more widely recognized than at present, explosions are likely to occur. It is therefore desirable that every opportunity should be taken of bringing to the attention of those interested all facts bearing on the question.

I see no reason for supposing that the meteorological conditions had any bearing on the explosion.

As it is sometimes supposed that subterranean movements, or earth tremors, may have some connexion with colliery explosions, it may be recorded here that an earthquake was felt in the neighbourhood of Edinburgh shortly before 7 a.m. on the 18th January, or about two-and-a-half hours before this explosion occurred.

The provisions of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, bearing on this case, are General Rules 1 and 8. These rules are to be observed "as far as is reasonably practicable in every mine." General Rule 1 is as follows :—

"Rule 1. An adequate amount of ventilation shall be constantly produced in every mine to dilute and render harmless noxious gases to such an extent that the working places of the shafts, levels, stables, and workings of the mine, and the travelling roads to and from those working places shall be in a fit state for working and passing therein."

Prior to the explosion the ventilation had been sufficient to comply with the rule, and it is not possible to prevent the temporary fouling of an air current by a sudden issue of fire-damp, such as occurred in this case.

General Rule 8 reads as follows

"Rule 8. No lamp or light other than a locked safety lamp shall be allowed or used —

"(a.) In any place in a mine in which there is likely to be any such quantity of inflammable gas as to render the use of naked lights dangerous; or

"(b.) In any working approaching near a place in which there is likely to be an accumulation of inflammable gas.

And when it is necessary to work the coal in any part of a ventilating district with safety lamps, it shall not be allowable to work the coal with naked lights in another part of the same ventilating district situated between the place where such lamps are being used, and the return air-way."

Had the fouling of the air current by a sudden issue of gas from the goaf been anticipated, this rule would have been broken. I am of opinion that it was not anticipated, and that after it did occur the explosion followed so quickly that no remedial measures were possible. I have therefore to report that the explosion was not due to a breach of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, or of the Special Rules established under that Act.

The system of ventilation in operation is open to criticism in several respects. It should be stated however that the system was in some respects temporary only, and that the seam was looked upon and worked as a non-fiery seam. The upper levels between No. 1 Jig Brow and the New Brow had only recently been connected, and the formation of the New Brow had not been completed. The quantity of air (about 3,000 cubic feet per minute at the far end) was not large, but in such a thin seam the sectional area of the roads is small, and the velocity of a given quantity of air proportionately great. It was said that the colliers at the far end frequently complained that the current was too strong, as it caused their candles to "sweel." This might easily be the case in the packed air-ways at the far end of the levels, and in the holes made through the pack walls. The seam being only two feet thick the sectional area at these places was small. Those of the workmen who were questioned on the subject all expressed a favourable opinion as to the ventilation. Too much reliance was placed on canvas sheets and canvas stoppings, the number and position of which are shown on Plan 2. It was not a good method to conduct the air which had ventilated the pillar workings down hill, up hill, and down hill again, in order to ventilate the workings out of No. 1 Jig Brow with the same current. Those workings were of sufficient importance to demand a separate split of air, and by so splitting the air its total quantity would have been increased. Other weak points in the system of ventilation might be pointed out, but it does not appear necessary to enlarge on the subject, because it is not at all probable that the explosion would have been averted by an improved system of ventilation had the pit still been worked with naked lights.

As to the system of lighting. The seam had been worked for many years with naked lights, and without accident. The previous workings, however, had all been to the rise of those in which the explosion occurred. Mr. Goodwin, the manager, had worked out a range of workings similar to those in operation, but at a higher range, with naked lights. The heavy dip of the seam caused the covering strata to vary rapidly. Thus, the Two-feet seam, which was cut in the shaft at a depth of about 210 yards, lay at a depth of about 350 yards on the low side of the range of workings in which the explosion occurred. This circumstance would have a dominant bearing on the amount of fire-damp present in the strata, and it was not prudent to accept as a guarantee of safety in the deep workings the fact that an upper range in the same seam had been worked out without accident by naked lights. The possibility that fire-damp might be met with during the removal of the pillars had not been overlooked. The manager and officials repeatedly examined the goaf edge with safety lamps, and did not detect gas. The colliers were provided with safety lamps as well as candles. Their instructions were not to use a naked light in their working places until they had examined them with the safety lamp and found them free from gas. This course appears to have been adopted by the manager as a precaution on his part entirely outside the requirements of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, or special rules. No provision in either the Act or the special rules required that safety lamps should be used. Some of the safety lamps employed were unshielded Davy lamps, which, I think, it would have been illegal to use had the use of safety lamps been required by law. This method of using safety lamps is not desirable. If safety lamps are considered necessary, naked lights should not be allowed in the same places; and it is not advisable to place discretionary power in such a matter in the hands of colliers.

Some laxity in the discipline of the colliery was disclosed during the inquiry. The obstruction of the air-way which has been mentioned was not reported by the firemen either verbally or in writing. Jas. Davies, the fireman in the afternoon shift the day before the explosion, found the air way impassable. At the inquest he said the air was still passing freely, and he did not think it necessary to report that it was impassable by men. Jos. Wilde, the fireman who made the inspection of the workings before the men went in, on the day of the explosion, did not report it in his book or mention it to the under-manager, whom he saw at the shaft. It is impossible to say to what extent the air-way was obstructed when Wilde made his examination, but it was very seriously obstructed the first time I saw it after the explosion. Both these firemen should have reported that they could not pass through the air-way, as that fact had a direct and important bearing on the ventilation.

It was not in accordance with good discipline for Wilde the fireman to be travelling through the air-way, where his body was found, with a torch lamp, when he was provided with a safety lamp for the purpose of inspecting the workings. The manager and under-manager said they were not aware that he ever did so.

The colliery is now worked with safety lamps of proper construction, supplied by the owners.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. N. Atkinson.

The Right Hon. H. Matthews, Q.C., M.P.,
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department,
Whitehall.

 

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A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.

 

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