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IV. Conclusions And Recommendations.(i.) The originating point of the explosion. — I have come to the conclusion that the explosion originated at the point where the persons were engaged in working at a fall at the furthest in-bye point of the intake airway of the No. 2 face of the North Plodder. In all probability a second fall took place immediately before the explosion, accompanied by the liberation of a quantity of gas, and this gas was, in my opinion, ignited by a safety lamp becoming overheated, falling through the gas, or by its being damaged by the fall of stone. The indications of force I saw were in absolute accord with these suggestions, and so is such evidence as was afforded by the positions of the bodies of persons in the neighbourhood. Were it not for the presence of coal dust the extent of the explosion would have depended entirely on the volume of gas discharged, but it is well established that the coal face itself was dusty. The dust in the No. 2 jig east level carried the explosion, in my opinion, to the main haulage road of the North Plodder, and the dust of the other roads carried it through the rest of the mine. (ii.) The Management of the Colliery. — The Hulton Colliery was, in my opinion, understaffed. The evidence clearly showed that Mr. Tonge, the general manager, was most assiduous in his work and devoted his whole time to it, and that he was an excellent general manager and mining engineer. But besides being general manager of the group of mines he was the manager of each individual pit. The official staff was too limited. Thus, at the Nos. 3 and 4 bank pits there was only one underground official, viz., the under manager, for the firemen can only be regarded as semi-officials. Mr. Tonge, since the disaster, seems to have arrived at a somewhat similar conclusion to myself, as the following quotation from his evidence shows : Q. "I put it to you, Mr. Tonge-I am not saying that you are not perfectly careful, but I put it to you as a general principle-would it not be-I would like to hear what you have to say against it-would it not be a very advisable thing that the general manager should, every night, confer with his subordinates. By subordinates I mean those in charge of each mine. Some places, you know, it is de rigeur that the manager shall nightly, at a fixed time, confer with his staff ? — A. Yes. Q. "It is a matter of organisation ? — A. Yes, it is. Q. "He then takes up the threads of their whole day's work at each place and they have a general sort of review of the situation as they left it ? — A. Yes, I think that is very customary where there is a certificated manager with under lookers, say, or under managers under him. I think that is a very customary thing. I do not know that it is quite as customary where the general manager is directly over them. Q. "What I mean is this: in this case, you see, you were directly above the under managers ? — A. Yes. Q. "There was no one intermediate between you and the under managers? -A. I quite admit, Sir, that after the experience of the last two months, I would not think of not seeing the men as often as I possibly could, but I do not think for one moment that it would have made any difference to this explosion. Q. "What system of reporting to you had the under manager ? — A. I am afraid we relied on verbal reports from the under manager to myself. Of course, he sent me a lot of notes of one sort or another, but they were not systematic; they had no connection with the firemen's daily report book, say, and we had no systematic daily report from the under manager to the manager at all. Q. "Rather as a corollary to that question, with a view of obviating a recurrence of this, as has been said both at the inquest and at this Inquiry as to the future, do you think that your colliery is under-staffed ? — A. I had not thought so, Sir, before this accident. I have never suspected that it was. I never suspected that such a thing as this could have happened at our colliery, and I think the disaster is quite out of proportion to the cause of it. It has been a small cause wherever it is. Q. "I quite appreciate the point that a small cause may cause a big disaster. It may have been a small ignition of firedamp. Small as the explosion may have been-tiny it may have been-I quite realise it. But still it is with a view of obviating such an initiation that the Inquiry is being carried on ? — A. I had not thought so before the accident, but I might say that I shall not be satisfied for the future to have so much work on my own shoulders. Q. "I mean the responsibility is enormous of the management of several collieries, is it not There are, I know, many collieries in the country where the duties of a general manager would be excessive were not the burden of responsibility lightened by the appointment of a manager, with an efficient subordinate staff, to each separate colliery. The manager did not meet all his under-managers every day, nor did he receive a daily report from them. This I know is frequently the case, and no breach of the Mines Act is thereby committed. The Act by Section 21 (1) merely requires that daily personal supervision shall be exercised by the manager, or by an under-manager nominated in writing by the owner or agent of the mine." There should be either some limit put to the area of management, the number and size of the mines under the control of the manager, or he should be required to exercise a certain definite amount of daily control as well as the under-manager. In order to fulfil the latter requirement there should be a thorough system of daily reporting whereby the manager should be kept in daily touch with all his officials. (iii) The system of reporting under General Rules 4 and 7. The subject of reporting under General Rules 4 and 7 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, is dealt with in pages 13 and 14 of this Report. The making of the statutory examination by the night-shift fireman instead of by the fireman in attendance on the morning shift is open to serious criticism (1) It is made by a tired man towards the close of his shift-by a man consequently in a less vigorous and alert state of mind and body than the incoming fireman. (2) There would be an inducement to make one inspection serve the purpose of both Reports. I do not for a moment wish to imply that it was an inducement that resulted in wrong-doing, but the inducement would be there nevertheless. (3) The discovery of danger is made by someone who has not the charge of the incoming shift, but who is leaving the pit. He may not mention everything of importance to the day fireman when they meet. (4) The night shift and morning shift were not continuous in so far as the work at the face " is concerned; there was a considerable interval between the time that the night shift left the face and that at which the morning shift reached it, seeing that the night shift commenced to ascend at 6.30 a.m. and the morning shift descended at 6.45 a.m. Under these circumstances I do not consider that the night shift fireman's report fulfilled the conditions laid down in General Rule 4 (1) of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887. The Act states that for the purpose of this Rule: "Two or more shifts succeeding one another without any interval are to be deemed to be one shift." Whether one shift riding in the shaft against another can be said to meet the point I greatly doubt. The point is one for legal interpretation, but I think that in any new Act the language should be less vague, as it is certainly most desirable in the interests of safety that if the face is not continuously occupied it should be examined and reported on before workmen are admitted to work there. The form of report used for recording the firemen's reports was merely a book of foolscap pages, of which a specimen page is given in Appendix A. It will be seen that each report occupied but one line, and that the expression diluted as "made," frequently followed the notification that such and such a place was "giving off gas." The meaning was that although the place was giving off gas, a little distance back from the actual face of the coal it became so diluted by the air current as not to be detectable on the flame of an ordinary safety lamp. When it was not so rendered harmless but could be detected some distance back in the air, then the place was "fenced off for gas." The expression "diluted as made" is an unfortunate one for customary use in a fireman's report, for if there is any ventilation at all the gas cannot be other than diluted as made, one requires to know where diluted and the extent of the dilution. The expression is far too indefinite for practical purposes. At the same time,, in view of the rumours as regards the quantities of gas present from time to time in the mine, it is, in justice to the management, pleasant to record that I am unable to find that men had been allowed to work in places containing detectable quantities of gas or had failed to be withdrawn when gas showed in a working place. A proper form of fireman's report is given in Appendix C. There can be no doubt that were some such form made compulsory throughout all mines coming under the Coal Mines Regulation Act, it would be more informing to the management as to the state of the mine and so conduce to closer attention to questions of safety. The use of the report book necessary for the proper fulfilment of General Rule 7 of the Act had not been rigorously adhered to. Had duplicates of the daily reports of the fireman been sent to the surface every day for-submission to the manager, a written official record of the state of the mine up to the day of the explosion would have been available, and have proved of the greatest value for the purposes of my inquiry. (iv) Safety Lamps. — It is only by the entire elimination from the mine of flame and sparking that collieries can be rendered immune from explosions of gas and coal dust. The chief causes of ignition in the past have been naked lights, safety lamps, and explosives. The danger of ignition of coal dust by naked lights is a possible one-there is the well authenticated case of the ignition by open lights of coal dust in a coal hopper.*The temperature of an electric spark also is sufficient to effect ignition. Experiments carried out with safety lamps have shown that they will not externally ignite coal dust, however dangerous the dust may be, even when carried at great velocities. The so-called safety lamp even when in a state of proper repair is only safe under certain conditions. It is unsafe if the gauze becomes red hot, as the gauze then loses its cooling property and will pass flame if an explosive mixture explodes within the gauze; it is unsafe if allowed to fall in an explosive mixture, and it is easily rendered unsafe by reason of a punctured gauze or cracked glass. * Ignition of coal dust in a coal hopper at the surface at North Brancepeth, Durham, in April, 1889. Given a certain combination of circumstances nearly all explosives will ignite coal dust; but to prohibit entirely the use of explosives below ground would entail the closing down of many mines. Shot firing, however, is a momentary matter, and one which can be so hedged round with regulations as to render it comparatively free from risk if the recognised precautions be observed. Safety lamps, on the other hand, are in continuous use, spread throughout the whole mine, and placed in the hands of all the persons in the mine. Since the date of its invention in 1815 the use of the safety lamp has gradually spread, until there are in use throughout the United Kingdom no less than 679,131*of these lamps. It would seem as if the time had come when something safer may be used. The electric lamp, in that it provides a light which is absolutely shut off from the atmosphere, would seem to present possibilities in this respect, but the matter is one which requires further and very careful consideration. I merely adumbrate the possibility of the replacement, or partial displacement, of the gauze lamp in fiery mines by the electric lamp (for it would still be necessary to provide the deputies, firemen, and shot lighters with either a gauze lamp, or some other means of detecting the presence of gas), as a subject worthy of the most serious consideration of mining engineers and others connected with the working of gassy collieries. There are already in use 2,155 miners' electric portable hand lamps; and at Murton Colliery in the County of Durham miners' electric hand lamps have been in use since the year 1897, when 500 were introduced; these have since been increased to 1,840. The disadvantages that have militated against their extensive use have been- (1) Their greater weight; (2) Trouble in respect of the batteries; (3) Greater first cost and greater working costs. (4) The detection of the presence of gas by them is impossible. The advantages in respect of these lamps are- (1) The risk of ignition of an explosive mixture can be eliminated; (2) The lamps give a better light than that afforded by "safety" lamps, and hence allow of a better examination of the roof and sides. Mr. Pope, in his report on the inquest, has alluded to the fact that the practice at the colliery in respect to relighting of safety lamps was at variance with the Special Rules. That was owing, as Mr. Tonge explained, to the Special Rules having been framed to meet another type of safety lamp previously in use at the colliery; but Mr. Tonge should have set about a revision of the rules to meet the introduction of a new type of lamp. I am in agreement with Mr. Pope's conclusions in this respect. As to whether anyone, not an authorised person-and so unprovided with a key from the management-could relight his lamp if he were so minded, it can be taken as proved that not only could he do so, but that unauthorised relighting of lamps was practised at the colliery, and that lamps had been relit in the return airway. The temptation to a man whose lamp has been extinguished to relight the same without waiting in the dark-perhaps for some time-before being visited by an authorised relighter, is considerable. As the lamp may have been extinguished by violence, and thereby rendered defective, it is obviously imperative that the relighting of lamps should be entrusted to as few persons as possible, and that such persons should be carefully selected for the purpose. In the present case, the importance of this was very pronounced, as the mine was one which generated much gas, and, with the exception of one district, the main haulage roads were in the return airways. I know the Continental practice is at variance with this recommendation, but it seems to me the risks due to indiscriminate relighting far outweigh any advantages that the practice may possess. The relighting of an electric safety lamp would not, of course, come under this criticism. (v) Coal Dust. — I have stated that the spread of the explosion throughout the No. 3 mine was undoubtedly due to the presence of coal dust. This is a mine in which attempts had been made to combat the danger. The precautions were, however, limited to certain parts of the pit and they were not carried in-bye for a sufficient distance. They were also ineffective, inasmuch as the dust on the roof and sides was not dealt with, yet at few collieries have greater precautions been observed in this respect. It is obvious that a great deal yet remains to be done in spite of the long recognised urgency of the matter.* Short of absolute removal of the dust, or the production of a saturated atmosphere thus so rendering the dust innocuous, it is doubtful whether any positive means have as yet been devised for annulling the dust danger in collieries. So far as investigations have proceeded, it does not appear that the quantity of coal dust present is of great importance. Recent experiments in France have shown that it was possible to obtain an explosion of coal dust when it was present to the extent of only 56 grammes (about 2 ozs.) per square metre (about 10¾ square feet). The complete removal of the dust is practically impossible unless an even surface exists. Watering is only effective if sides and roof as well as the floor are kept moist, and in many mines this would occasion the closing in of the roadways. Keeping the atmosphere of the mine in a saturated condition might occasion trouble greater than that which it is sought to allay; not only might it have an effect on the roadways similar to that of watering, but under certain conditions occasioned by temperature it would adversely affect the health of the miners. I am not yet satisfied that the adulteration of coal dust in the mine with stone dust is a practical solution of the difficulty. It is, however, a matter which is occupying the attention of mining engineers and others interested in collieries, and some practical scheme may be evolved in this direction. I think the solution of the difficulty may perhaps be found in the provision of specially prepared zones in the workings-the nearer to the face the better which will be kept free from dust, and made, where possible, damp, the idea being to prevent an explosion at the face spreading beyond the district in which it occurs. The chief difficulty, however, that presents itself to my mind in this connection is that due to the movement of the strata due to subsidence or removal of the coal, which is, of course, much greater in the workings than further out-bye. I prefer, however, not to express any decided opinion or put forward any recommendation on the subject, in view of the fact that it will shortly come before the consideration of a Departmental Committee. * The figures are for the year 1909. The number of persons employed below ground in mines under the Coal Mines Regulation Acts for the same year being 818,381. (vi) The Ventilation of the Mine. — I am of the opinion that the volume of the air current was ample for the adequate ventilation of the mine, and that the ventilation of the workings was well maintained except in the case of some of the winning places, or "dead-ends," as they may be termed, of which mention has already been made (see p. 6). I do not, however, believe that men were allowed to work in such places when gas showed itself therein, nor am I of the opinion that the imperfect ventilation of these places had any bearing whatever on the explosion. Had I been the manager of the mine, I would have preferred, seeing the mine made a fair amount of gas, not to have depended in so great a measure upon the return air from the Down brow district for the ventilation of the East jig district, though I do not wish to labour this point, seeing the air-currents were so ample in volume. There was a scale of fresh air in the East level, and the distance of the faces from the shaft was not great. Further there had never been any complaint of, or reference to, firedamp being detected on the lamp in the air passing from the one district to the other. Undoubtedly a technical breach of the General Rule 1 (last paragraph) was committed by the management in limiting the measurement of the air-currents to the main splits, and omitting to measure or record the volumes of air in the secondary splits. The second paragraph of the rule states that- "In the case of mines required by this Act to be under the control of a certificated manager, the quantity of air in the respective splits or currents shall at least once in every month be measured and entered in a book to be kept for the purpose at the mine." The measurement, though made once in every calendar month, was made at very irregular intervals. * See the reports on the causes and circumstances attending: (1) The West Stanley explosion of February 16th, 1909 [Cd. 4788]. (2) The Whitehaven Colliery disaster of May 11th, 1910 [Cd. 5524]. The form of ventilation record was of an imperfect type, but this is true of many mines. I would put forward the suggestions that- (1) the volume of air in all splits be measured at a point closer up to the workings than is customary; (2) the ventilation record should be in the form prescribed by the Secretary of State, and the measurements should be made and recorded every fortnight. (vii) The position of the Ventilating Fan. — The question as to whether or not General Rule 3 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, which specified that "where a mechanical contrivance for ventilation is introduced into any mine after the commencement of this Act, it shall be in such a position and placed under such conditions as will tend to insure its being uninjured by an explosion" was observed or not, is one which should be considered. At the time the 1887 Act was framed and passed it is very doubtful whether there were any cases of mechanically driven fans placed underground at any mine in the United Kingdom, though undoubtedly the wording of the Act "introduced into any mine" might justly be interpreted to apply to the surface or underground. It cannot, however, be said that a fan introduced underground in a gassy mine is "in such a position and placed under such conditions as will tend to insure its being uninjured by an explosion." As auxiliary means of ventilating a mine when the workings are extensive underground fans are of very great assistance, and are in many instances very properly resorted to, but in no case of a gassy or dry mine, and in only one instance of a non-gassy and wet mine, has the Home Office consented to their constituting the sole or principal means of ventilation, insisting that the main fan shall be placed at the surface, for although it cannot be said that the ventilating fan even when placed at the surface is not liable to damage from an explosion in the mine, experience has shown that the risk is much less, and that even when injury has occurred it has usually been slight. In many cases in which the explosive force has reached the surface of the upcast shaft the fan drift has been partially destroyed, but never to such an extent as to entail much expenditure of time in restoring the damage. In the present instance a fan capable of satisfactorily ventilating the whole mine was placed at the surface, but was not run except at week-ends, when the top of the upcast shaft, which otherwise was open, was covered in. Though considerable destructive force was exhibited at the top of this shaft, the fan and fan drift escaped damage. It was contended by the general manager and other witnesses that had the sole means of ventilation been at the surface, and had it been put out of work by means of injury to it or to the fan drift, the men in the Arley seam would probably not have been saved, whereas they owe their lives to the fact that the fan in that seam was uninjured and continued working after the explosion. But this is no argument against the main, ventilator being at the surface, for it is a remarkable chance that the explosive blast did not enter the Arley and destroy the fan. I think it is better to adhere to the present interpretation of the Act and insure that the main ventilator be placed at the surface. The management would appear to have legally complied with the terms of the Act in that a fan sufficient to adequately ventilate the mine was placed at the surface and kept in readiness, but whether they acted within the spirit of the Act I doubt, inasmuch as it did not work, though it could be put to the work of ventilation within 10 minutes. In my opinion it is inadvisable to drive the main mechanical ventilator of a mine by an electric motor of fixed speed. A fan cannot be regarded as an apparatus which is subject to an unvarying speed, it may at any moment be found necessary to considerably increase or decrease the number of its revolutions, depending on the condition of the mine, for which purpose steam is the most adaptable power, and it is well to have a spare or stand-bye engine in case of breakdown, a fact well-recognised and carried out in some instances. (viii) Haulage Roads and Return Airways. — The main haulage roads of the No. 3 pit were in the return airways, with the exception of that in the Down brow Yard seam. This, in a mine of the character of the Hulton Colliery, was a fact which militated against health and safety, for the following reasons (1) It is a well-proved fact that a cloud of coal dust which may be liable to ignition in pure air with even a small admixture of firedamp is rendered much more inflammable and more liable to cause and to spread an explosion. No analyses were ever made of the return air at the No. 3 pit to determine the amount of firedamp contained therein, but, at times, at any rate, there must have been an appreciable quantity. Usually the air in the return of mines is fairly humid-in some mines almost to the point of saturation, a condition which would adversely affect the inflammability of the coal dust or gas,*but the remarkable fact was forthcoming at the Inquiry that the atmosphere in the mine was actually less humid than that at the surface (see p. 16). (2) The coal dust produced in cutting the coal and in the process of carrying the cut coal to the tubs was carried in large quantities into the return. Under ordinary conditions at collieries where the haulage roads are in the intake very few persons are engaged at work in the return, indeed, the only persons who are necessarily employed therein are the wastemen, who attend to the upkeep of the road; in a mine the roof of which is good practically no persons are so employed. Where a number of persons are engaged at work it follows that the risk of ignition is greater due to the greater number of lamps. There is also the risk of damage to the lamp of a man engaged in the haulage. (3) It is more wholesome to work in the intake than in the return air of a gassy mine. Mr. A. H. Leach, who for a number of years managed collieries at West Houghton, lying to the west of Hulton Colliery, and who took a prominent part in the attempted rescue work and work of reclamation of the mine, said: "I am bound to say this one of the lessons of this explosion is, it is undesirable to have your main (i.e., haulage) roads in the return." (ix) The electrical plant. — The electrical plant was, generally speaking, mechanically and electrically strong, properly erected, and well maintained. There were some deficiencies, however, which might have been remedied, and although I have come to the conclusion that any sparking which may have occurred at the conveyor switchbox had no bearing on the explosion, nevertheless, I think it unwise to use electricity at the coal face in a gassy mine, such as this undoubtedly was, and I am satisfied that under the Electrical Special Rules just proposed by the Secretary of State its use under such conditions would be prevented. I am perfectly satisfied that the explosion did not originate in the No. 1 North Plodder, and that the use of electricity in the mine had no bearing on the disaster. It is a noteworthy feature in respect of the electrical plant that armoured cables were in use throughout the mine, and that these satisfactorily resisted the effects of the explosive blast, heat, and heavy falls of ground, and were in every case found afterwards to be mechanically and electrically perfect-a more convincing argument in favour of the use of armoured cables it would be hard to find. So far as I observed, and so far as Mr. Nelson observed, no breach of the Electricity Special Rules can be alleged against the management. The improvements which might be made in the plant are confined to points of detail, as follows, namely (1) The removal of open type switch gear from the pit. (2) The protection from abrasion of all insulation (except that on flexible cables) by an earthed metallic outer covering. (3) The provision of a better design of plug and socket connection for use with flexible cables. The most frequent causes of accident in underground conditions are: (1) live parts left uncovered by insulating material, and insulating material left unprotected from the risk of mechanical damage; and (2) the absence of a sound connection to earth for metallic outer coverings. The first point had received due consideration except at the down cast shaft bottom, and at several places where short lengths of unprotected cable were used for connecting to switches and fuses. The second point had received consideration, so far as I observed, everywhere in the pit. * The experiments carried out with coal dust by the Prussian Committee showed that on foggy days ignitions could not be obtained, and observations in respect of climatic conditions in the United States of America have shown that colliery explosions occur most frequently on days in which the atmosphere is dry. It is generally agreed that pressure should be cut off from electrical apparatus as a precautionary measure upon the first appearance of firedamp. That duty is, indeed, imposed by the Electricity Special Rules, but apparatus can, and should be designed so that if gas should unexpectedly appear, unknown to the workmen, there is still no risk of its ignition. This is not, however, equivalent to saying that such apparatus may be installed or used where gas is likely to occur, for there is always the risk due to want of vigilance. The conclusion which I suggest may be drawn from the evidence submitted at the Inquiry as regards the electrical plant is the importance of its proper supervision. A daily report as to the condition of the electrical apparatus was made at the mine, but it is not sufficient merely to say that the condition of apparatus was found to be "good." If the apparatus is intended to be completely enclosed then it would be better for the report to say that it was completely enclosed in fact at the time of the inspection, that is to say, that all joints were found to be sound and that the mechanism, both electrical and mechanical, was found to be in good order. If a switch is oil-immersed the person making the inspection should satisfy himself as to the level of the oil. Other points suggest themselves, e.g., the continuity of cable armouring. Such an inspection and report should clearly be made by a competent man. I was greatly impressed in the course of the Inquiry by the importance of the proper maintenance of electrical plant. However well designed the apparatus, its safety may still be dependent upon constant supervision and efficient maintenance. (x) Inspection of the Mine by the representatives of the Miners. — The miners did not make use of the powers of inspection given them under General Rule 38, though asked to do so by the management. The reason they declined was quite frankly explained by Mr. Roughley, who said: "I do not think Mr. Tonge himself would object to the kind of thing being done (viz., the men's inspectors reporting anything which they found to be wrong), but l do think that it is through the under officials that our men would have to suffer, and that was the reason why, in speaking to the President of the Branch, I said 'No, we will not have the thing carried out.' " Since the explosion, however, the men have intimated to Mr. Tonge their desire to make inspections under General Rule 38. Mr. Greenall, the President of the Lancashire and Cheshire Branch of the Miners' Federation, agreed with me that a satisfactory way could be found in Lancashire of putting General Rule 38 into force throughout the coalfield. He said "I think it is very desirable that we should do that. I believe that the time has arrived now when it can be done. I do not think I should have said that before the explosion. Q. "I think, somehow, that all right-thinking men on both sides-if we may use the term 'sides'-would be willing ? — A. I am certain they are now. The employers and the management are with us in this matter, and I think we shall work together in the future with the object of putting that rule in operation." (xi) The Rescue Operations. — Where all the rescuers did so well and were so eager to undertake great risks in order to attempt the rescue of their fellows, it may appear somewhat invidious to point to any particular persons as meriting commendation beyond others, but I think that undoubtedly the greatest amount of risk was run by those who first entered the mine after the occurrence of the explosion, because they entered upon unknown conditions, and, as it happened, seeing there were several fires in existence, very dangerous conditions-as a second explosion might have occurred on the restoration of the ventilating current. These persons, who descended the mine together, were Mr. Tonge, manager; James Henry Polley, electrical foreman; James Moss, a shaftman; John Hilton, a shaftman; William Markland, a fireman; John Hardman, a fireman; Robert Roberts, a fireman; John Herring, a fireman; James Hartley, a fireman. When it is considered how handicapped the management were by the loss of the under-manager of the No. 3 mine and all the morning shift firemen of the Yard seam, I think the greatest credit is due to them for the rapidity with which the rescue operations were organised and carried out. In concluding this Report, I wish to acknowledge the courtesy of the management and of their representatives in assisting me in every way possible to further the objects of my Inquiry. I would at the same time like to thank the legal and other representatives of the relatives of the deceased, and of the Miners' Federation for similar assistance. I have the honour to be, The Right Honourable Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, M.P.,
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