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I. Description Of The Colliery And Method Of Working.

(i) The Management of the Mine. — The mines constituting the Hulton Colliery were under the control of a general manager, Mr. Tonge, who was also the agent. Mr. Tonge resided at the colliery and acted as resident manager, but he did not go underground every day. Under him was an under-manager at each mine. Some of these men were the possessors of 1st class certificates, some only held 2nd class certificates.

Mr. Rushton (killed in the explosion), who was the under-manager of the Nos. 3 and 4 pits, held a 1st class certificate. He descended the mine every day, usually at 6.45 a.m., and ascended at 10.30 a.m. for his breakfast, which he had in the pit office, going down again at 11 or 11.15 a.m. He came finally to the surface at about 3.15 p.m., so that he was down the pit-omitting the breakfast interval-the whole time of the morning shift. It was the custom at this colliery for the under-managers to be in the pit the whole of the coal-getting hours- excepting the breakfast interval. Under Mr. Rushton were the firemen. There were no officials intermediate between under-manager and firemen-such as overmen, back-overmen, master-shifter, or master-wasteman, as is customary in some mining districts. The latter arrangement is not ordinarily followed in Lancashire.

The general manager frequently saw his under-managers, but he did not see each one every day; he said: "I sometimes meet them at the pit and sometimes down the pit, sometimes at the general office. I see them, I should say, practically three times a week. Sometimes more than that; sometimes I see them every day."

Of the 11 firemen in the Yard seam level (the level in which the explosion occurred, i.e., No. 3 pit)-six were in the day shift, four in the night, and one in the afternoon shift. All the day-shift officials-and one night-shift fireman also- belonging to the workings of the Yard seam level were killed by the explosion-a fact which rendered the Inquiry the more difficult.

As there were 344 persons in the No. 3 pit at one time, and six firemen, there would average about 57 persons to a fireman. A certain number of these would be employed on the haulage roads, at the shafts, &c., still the number of persons in the workings under the control of each of the firemen would be rather large.

The mine was a "single shift pit" so far as regards coal getting and coal winding. The coal-getting shift began to descend at 6.45 a.m. and began to be wound up the shaft at 2.45 p.m. The repairing and the mechanical coal-cutting shift-the latter work being carried on in the North Plodder only-was from 10.30 p.m. to 6.30 a.m. In the repairing shift there would be about 150 persons.

The firemen were chosen when possible from the colliers; the manager "gave special preference" to colliers, as in his view they make the best firemen, but he had not many applications from among the colliers. When he could not get firemen from among the colliers he obtained them from among the datallers. The difficulty in getting a collier to become a fireman was thus explained by the manager: "I think," he said, "largely it is because he does not care for the official positions, and because he does not care for night work . . . . but I think chiefly because of the responsibility."

The electrical staff appears to have been sufficient and efficient. It consisted of a thoroughly competent electrical engineer, who had control of the entire electrical arrangements at the colliery under the general manager, and in each mine there was an underground electrician, so that in the case of the Nos. 3 and No. 4 pits there were three such persons. It was the duty of the electrician to examine daily the electrical plant, and to report defects to the electrical engineer, and generally to keep the electrical plant in proper order. In addition to this, the firemen examined the electrical plant and reported thereon, but it was admitted that this examination was external only and that they could not be expected to detect an internal defect.

(j) The System of Reporting. — There existed no regular system of reporting from the under-managers to the manager. When I interrogated Mr. Tonge on this point he said quite frankly: "I am afraid we relied on verbal reports from the undermanager to myself. Of course, he sent me a lot of notes of one sort or another, but they were not systematic-they had no connection with the firemen's daily report book-and we had no systematic daily report from the under-manager to the manager."

The day firemen went down with the morning shift, but they did not make the statutory examination and report under General Rule 4. This was done by the night-shift firemen. To quote again from Mr. Tonge's evidence: "That is to say, the night fireman, before coming off work in the morning, examined the place within three hours of the men coming into the place, and he came to the pit and made his report and stated whether it was safe or not for the men to go to work. The men were allowed to go to work then, and the day fireman followed them and made at least two inspections during the course of the day.

The night fireman then came on at night and he went into the workings before the night men were allowed to go in.

The fireman in each district made the reports: "He reported an examination at the beginning of his shift and an inspection at the end of his shift." Records of both were entered into a report book kept at the office in the mine near to the shaft. The first inspection was recorded sometimes during the night, the firemen leaving the face and coming out to the pit bottom for the purpose-so they admitted men before recording their inspection-and the second inspection was recorded when they came out at the end of their shift.

The form adopted in the so-called "sudden danger" book for the withdrawal of workmen, required to be kept under General Rule 7 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act (a specimen page of which is shown in Appendix B), was in all respects satisfactory, but I find that it was irregularly kept. Thus during the year 1904 only one withdrawal is recorded, 1905 one, 1906 one, 1907 six, 1908 one, 1909 one, 1910 three (one only of which is on account of gas). Yet during the last three months of 1903 (the first entry in the book is 21st September, 1903) there are seventeen records. Again, I find in the firemen's reports records as to places being fenced off because of gas or weighting of roof, but no entry in the "sudden danger" book. The explanation might be that the firemen fenced these places off before the men entered them and that the removal of the danger did not take place at a time to allow of re-admittance of the men during the working of a shift, but it puts a considerable strain on one's credulity to accept such an explanation. The Manager was quite frank. He said: "I should be inclined to think that men had been withdrawn from their places probably. I am thinking now of the Top Yard district . . . But I do not think they would be sent home . . . I know we were troubled in the Top Yard with gas coming, not in large quantities, but coming from small breaks in the roof . . . . but I think he (fireman) would consider that not having sent them home, (their) not having to he withdrawn from the mine, that it was not necessary." He added later, referring to no mention of withdrawal on account of gas from the Top Yard during 1909-1910 (unless one entry for 1909 respecting the low side places in West level refers to the Top Yard district) "I think in the Top Yard there have been these conditions; in fact, I think I remember more than one case where the men have been put into another place." It would appear as if the report book had been rigorously used in the early days of the opening out of the mine, but that it had gradually fallen into a state of semi-desuetude.

 

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A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.

 

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