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Reports Prev Page Return to Index Next Page Reports
Index

The Investigation

38. The circumstances of the accident indicated that there had been a complete failure of the winding engine brake and it was found that the centre rod in the spring nest had broken. A short length of this rod and the distance piece were found underneath the brake engine. It was agreed at the colliery that a small group of H.M. Inspectors of Mines and Quarries and National Coal Board Engineers should conduct the investigation and keep the interested parties informed of progress. Concurrent with this witnesses were interviewed.

39. The bottom deck of the cage which crashed on to the landing baulks was severely distorted but there was little damage to the top deck (Plate 2). Speed of impact was subsequently estimated to be 27 miles per hour. The top of the airlock was damaged and there was slight leakage of air but this did not seriously affect the ventilation of the mine. Inspection of the shaft from a hoppit wound by the mobile emergency winding engine revealed no serious damage and the shaft top was then sealed off to facilitate removal of the overwound cage and repairs to the airlock. Before investigation in the engine house could proceed the building had to be made safe and weatherproof.

40. The winding engineman's brake lever and the control lever were found in the 'off' position, the brake lever having moved to this position when released after the brake solenoid was de-energised. The 'ungabbing' gear had operated and the compressed air supply was still available at the Iversen type valve. The brake shoes were about 1/8 inch clear of the brake paths, part of the drum side and brake path — where the overlap rope sword capel had been attached — was missing and the underlap rope was fully wound on to the drum with the capel lying in the drum pit. The column type depth indicator had overwound and one of the mounting brackets for the overwind screw on the automatic contrivance had broken due to overtravel of the traverse nut. The cross shaft between the engineman's brake lever and the Iversen type valve had been bent.

41. The man/coal lever and the associated cam on the automatic contrivance were in the 'man winding' position and this was indicated on the signal panel in the engine house.

42. In the motor generator house the 3,300 volts feeder switch had been isolated shortly after the accident occurred and the liquid starter and the circuit breaker for the motor generator set were seen to be in the 'off' position. All contactors and relays in the control cubicle were in their normal de-energised position. The exciter overcurrent, Ward Leonard overcurrent, and motor generator overspeed relays had not tripped. Although the circumstances of the accident did not suggest that it had resulted from, or was initiated by, a fault in any of the electrical systems these were carefully examined and tested. No defects were found which might have caused the accident.

43. The automatic contrivance was visually examined and when no defects were apparent in the mechanism it was sent to the manufacturer's works for thorough examination and test. When the cover was removed at the works it was found that the governor linkage had been displaced in transit because a grub screw in the reversing cam was loose. After this defect had been corrected it was established from the position of the traverse nut that the winding drum had overwound by 16 2/3 revolutions. The contrivance was then tested and the results obtained were similar to those previously recorded by the Area Overwind Testing Engineers.

44. At an early stage of the investigation the broken centre rod was removed from the spring nest and sent to the Safety in Mines Research Establishment for metallurgical examination. A replacement cross shaft and spring nest centre rod were fitted and the brake then operated correctly in response to the engineman's lever, and also when automatically applied. In a test it was demonstrated that the brake did not always fail safe, in that if the cross shaft lever keys or the pin in the lever above the 'ungabbing' gear were removed, the weight of the linkage opened the Iversen type valve and admitted compressed air to release the brake. Three nuts on the brake lever system were loose and these, with a number of keys, had not been made captive.

45. The centre rod appeared to have failed due to fatigue and, therefore, it was decided to investigate the loading and working conditions of a similar rod in service, consequently, the Director of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment was asked to arrange for a technical investigation of the spring nest assembly to be carried out. At the colliery four strain gauges were fitted at 90° to each other on the replacement centre rod as near as possible to the position where the fracture occurred in the original rod. With the winding engine drum stationary, the strains on the surface of the rod were measured with the brake off, when it was applied manually, then automatically and when power was applied to the drum with the brake on. The results of these tests showed that, in addition to the expected direct tensile stresses at the gauge positions, there were substantial stresses due to bending when the brake was operated. On the gauges at right angles to the winding drum shaft the magnitude of the stresses varied to such an extent that on the one furthest from the drum there was a change from tension to compression as the brake was released. Because the origin of these bending effects was not established the complete spring nest assembly was sent to the Safety in Mines Research Establishment for further investigation (Plate 3).

46. In the laboratory the complete spring nest assembly was installed in a test rig and tests were made which accurately simulated operation of the brake. These confirmed that bending was the cause of the alternating stresses in the centre rod. Significant stresses were induced by bending in the lower part of the rod because the main lever was unable to rotate freely about the crosshead trunnion due to excessive friction between the trunnion axles and the bearing surfaces in the main lever (Fig. 1). It was found that if friction at the crosshead trunnion was relieved by forcibly separating the bearing surfaces and inserting lubricant the stresses in the rod caused by bending were significantly reduced. However, after a few operations the lubricant was forced out by the high bearing pressure.

47. Metallurgical examination of the spring nest rod showed that it had failed because of fatigue, where it passed through the distance piece, at a thread 4¾ inches from the bottom end (Fig. 2). There was evidence that three small cracks had existed for some time at this thread and that one of these had propagated to a depth of 1.1 inches before the rod broke (Plate 4). Numerous additional cracks existed in the threaded portion above and below the fracture (Fig. 3). Although small cracks, present in the region of the fracture, were found in the laboratory by the magnetic particle method of non-destructive testing, experiments showed that they would not have been revealed by applying an ultrasonic probe to the top end of the rod while it was installed in the spring nest. However, a saw cut representing a crack which had penetrated the rod to a depth of inch, was detected by an ultrasonic test.

48. All the main links and pins of the brake system were crack detected and minor defects were found, also worn and corroded bearing surfaces showed that lubrication had not been effective but it was concluded that none of these defects was significant to the accident.

49. The broken rod was made from 0.4 per cent carbon steel of good commercial quality with an ultimate tensile strength of 38 tonf/in2 and the mean tensile stress induced by the spring nest at the minimum cross section was 6.2 tonf/in2. Consequently, the static factor of safety was 6.1. However, because of bending, alternating stresses with an amplitude of +6 .6 tonf/in2 were superimposed on the tensile stress. This is far in excess of an appropriate working value of 3.6 tonf/in2 for this type of threaded rod as quoted by Dr. Heywood in his book Designing Against Fatigue. On this basis failure of the rod was inevitable.

50. The results of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment investigation are contained in five comprehensive reports (Appendix IV) which were submitted to the Inquiry and will be published in their 'Technical Paper' series.

51. The manager's scheme for the systematic examination and testing of mechanical apparatus was comprehensive except that no provision had been made for non-destructive testing of the centre rod in the spring nest. The only record of a special inspection of this rod during its life of 21 years was an entry dated 19 February 1961, referring to a visual examination made by the Colliery Mechanical Engineer in post at that time. This stated 'Examined brake rod in No. 3 Winder. Main Rod on Blacks servo unit nest of springs examined. Mr. Farnsworth'.

 

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