General Remarks.
I think it necessary to make some further observations in regard to two or three matters arising out of this accident.
(1) Electrical Apparatus at the Coal Face.
General Regulation 132 requires that in any part of a mine in which inflammable gas, although not normally present, is likely to occur in quantity sufficient to be indicative of danger, all cables and apparatus shall be constructed, installed, protected, worked and maintained, so that in the normal working thereof there shall be no risk of open sparking. The use of certified flameproof apparatus is not legally required even in safety lamp mines, and this is one of the matters under consideration by the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines. But the question of maintenance is of equal importance. Obviously there can be little value in having any apparatus approved as safe for use unless it is kept in the condition under which the official test showed it to be safe.
In this case the coal-cutter, though ten years old and not of certified flameproof design, did, when tested in an explosive atmosphere with the cover properly closed, fail to ignite the surrounding mixture, but unfortunately the cover was not kept in this condition, partly owing to human failure and partly to the design, which did not permit of such careful gauging of the closeness of the joint as it ought to have had.
Even in machines of much newer design than that in question a similar difficulty is presented. In the manufacture of new machines this point should receive attention, and I suggest that the matter be brought to the notice of coal-cutter makers. It should also be possible, I think, to alter existing machines so as to ensure that after a cover has been taken off and replaced the closeness of the joints can be readily observed and tested in situ. H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines is already considering means by which this may be effected.
(2) Firedamp Detectors.
The Coal Mines General Regulations (Firedamp Detectors), 1935, require that in every ventilating district in which safety lamps are required by the Act or regulations a sufficient number of firedamp detectors of an approved type (in longwall workings not less than one for every eight persons employed at the working faces) shall be provided for use by the workmen employed, and that each such detector shall be in charge of a workman who has been instructed in the method of using, and certified as competent to use, the type of detector provided.
Flame safety lamps and the "Ringrose" automatic firedamp detector have been officially approved by the Mines Department as detectors for the purpose of these regulations, and as already stated, both these types of detectors were in use at Markham Colliery.
The Staveley Coal & Iron Co., Ltd., indeed, were among the first to install the "Ringrose" automatic firedamp detector at their collieries, and since the year 1933 Mr. J. Hunter and his officials have by their investigations and suggestions contributed in no small measure to the improvement of this appliance to its present state of efficiency.
At the date of the explosion 133 "Ringrose" alarms or detectors were in use at Markham Colliery, and every man employed at the face had been instructed in the use of this appliance as well as how to test for gas with a safety lamp.
For each double-unit conveyor face four "Ringrose" detectors and a number of flame safety lamps were provided, two of the former for each bank (one at the end and the other a little distance from the centre gate) with the flame lamps spaced at intervals between these. The system (as explained at the inquest) was for each man appointed to carry a detector (of whatever type) to take it with him from the lamp cabin at the commencement and return it there at the end of the shift; in the event of any of these men being absent the detectors would be sent below ground to the deputy of the district for issue to other workmen.
Every encouragement was given to the workmen to make tests for firedamp and to watch the detectors carefully, the instructions being that if a detector indicated the presence of firedamp the men in the vicinity were to leave the face and report to the deputy at once. On several occasions the red bulb of a "Ringrose" detector has lighted up showing firedamp to be present and the instructions as to withdrawal have been observed; on arrival the deputy found gas present and having removed it the men returned to the face. The man who reported the gas was rewarded for his vigilance, and payment was also made to the workmen for any loss sustained through their withdrawal.
In view of these special precautions, and the attention given to safety matters in general at this colliery by Safety Committees and Safety Officers and the establishment of Fire Stations below ground, the officials naturally considered the possibility of an explosion as extremely remote.
Unfortunately it is not possible to state exactly where the "Ringrose" detector at the top end was hanging at the time of this explosion, but since it was found opposite the tail gate it must have been hanging somewhere between there and the top corner. It was in an explosive atmosphere and in view of its condition when tested appears to have functioned properly, but at what time it gave warning could not be determined.
It may be, as suggested by Mr. Hunter, that the cutter men switched off because they saw the red bulb, glowing; on the other hand, it is not unlikely that, being intent on their work, they failed to notice the detector, especially if it was some distance from them and on the gob side. It should also be noted that the diaphragm masks the red bulb over an angle of nearly 90 degrees, so that from certain angles the warning light may not be easily visible.
The fact remains, however, that there was a hitch in the effective provision and use of the detectors, and that full advantage was not taken of the efforts of the management to provide the best means available for the detection of firedamp as a safeguard against such happenings as this. Even a perfect detector will be of no avail if it is not used, and its warnings promptly acted upon.
This consideration raises the question as to the best position for a detector. Apparently it was customary here for the detector to be placed ahead of the machine somewhere near the anchor prop and moved forward with that prop from time to time, and I understand this is also the practice at other collieries.
In some conditions this may be a satisfactory arrangement, but where as in this case the machine is to cut downhill against the ventilation, I consider the detector should be kept as near the machine as possible if it is to serve the purpose for which it is intended.
Incidentally, the "Ringrose" detectors here were set to operate at two per cent. of firedamp. At this setting the detector does not meet the requirements of General Regulation 132 (v), nor provide the means for compliance with Section 60 (2) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911; to do so it must be set to function at 1¼ per cent., failing which a flame safety lamp must also be provided.
A further point arises. So long as a firedamp detector, whether automatic or flame lamp, is in the nature of a separate appliance additional to the lamp a workman needs to provide light for his work, it is liable to be regarded as an "extra" and treated accordingly, and excellent though the detector may be its object may be defeated by human neglect or failure. A man should always have his detector with him.
It would, in my opinion, be a distinct step forward if a lamp could be designed which combined a good light and an automatic detector in one unit, so that attention to the presence of firedamp would necessarily be directed by a diminution of the light.
I would like to express my thanks to Dr. McCrea, and to the colliery officials and the workmen's representatives for their assistance in the investigations.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J. R. Felton.