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Index

Igniting Medium.

The nine electric lamps and four flame safety lamps issued to the deceased men and to Walter Frost were recovered and sent to the Mines Department Testing Station, Sheffield, where they were examined for defects likely to make them unsafe for use in the presence of firedamp. No defect in any of these was discovered to which an ignition of firedamp and air could be attributed.

Two flame safety lamps taken from the lamp cabin by two of the deceased stall men were unaccounted for, and a prolonged search was made for them on the face and in the wastes. They were later found extinguished about 150 yards from the pit bottom beside clothes belonging to these men, and had never reached the workings.

The "Ringrose" detector issued to E. Smith and later found on the face opposite the left tail gate about twenty yards from the coal-cutter was also examined by Capt. C. B. Platt in the presence of representatives of the Colliery Company and of International Gas Detectors Ltd., the makers of this appliance. It was fitted with a relay and was similar to that approved under the Firedamp Detectors (No. 2) Order, 1935, so that if the red bulb came into action it would remain glowing until turned off. A diagram showing the action of this appliance is given in Figure 2.

Externally it was found to be in good condition, but the carrying hook was bent out of shape suggesting that the detector had been wrenched from its support with some violence.

Further examination showed that the filament of the red bulb was intact and that the relay was in working order; furthermore, the heater filament was ruptured and the diaphragm bent in such a manner that the electrical contact attached to it was no long co-axial with its corresponding fixed contact.

A microscopical examination of the heater filament showed that it had been fused; the appearance of the fused ends is shown enlarged in Figure 1, from which it will be seen that one of the ends is of globular formation.

In Capt. Platt's view the distortion of the diaphragm and the fusing of the filament in no way caused the apparatus to be capable of igniting an external mixture of firedamp and air, and there was no ground for thinking that the detector was in any but a safe condition up to the time of the explosion. He had little doubt that the distortion of the diaphragm was due to the pressure of the explosion, which would cause it forcibly to contract, and considerable strain of the diaphragm and its associated contacts would result. An experiment carried out with a new detector confirmed this view.

He attributed the fusing of the filament to the presence of a high concentration of firedamp in which the detector had been burning: experiments he carried out showed that 20 per cent. of firedamp or over is required to fuse the filament in a short time (approximately two minutes), but it might be less than 20 per cent, if the filament were glowing in the mixture for a sufficient length of time.

From this evidence I deduce that (1) the "Ringrose" detector was present in a rich mixture of firedamp and (2) it was not the cause of the ignition.

The coal-cutter, which was in the top end of the face, was working between 1.40 p.m. and the time of the explosion, and had cut a little into the rib side in the process of being turned round ready for starting to cut the face.

Shortly after 2p.m. something happened at the machine causing a visible flash following which the machineman went down to the gate-end switch box for some purpose — probably to replace the switch there — stating as he returned that he intended to "try it again". What was done after this can only be surmised. It is reasonable to assume that either in switching on again or, if the machine was running — probably light as they were getting ready to re-set the anchor prop — in switching off, there was another flash, and this ignited an explosive mixture of firedamp and air surrounding the machine.

The switch was found in the "off" position, and Mr. Allott (Assistant Electrical Engineer) said he later found that in the reverse position it was definitely slow which would have the effect of extending the arc when switching off.

The machine was subjected to a minute examination at the surface by Mr. J. A. B. Horsley and Mr. J. Cowan (Electrical and Junior Electrical Inspectors) in the presence of Prof. I. C. F. Statham (for the Colliery Company) and colliery officials.

At the top flange of the door or cover enclosing the controller compartment there was no measurable gap, and the two side flange gaps could not be measured because of the design. In the bottom flange a feeler of .006 inch could be inserted, but the skid-plate on this type of machine prevented the insertion of a larger feeler and it was therefore not possible to measure this gap properly.

When the cover was carefully removed it was observed that coal and dirt had been trapped in the bottom right corner of the controller casing flange, causing a gap of inch in the flange joint. It was then decided to send the machine to the Mines Department Testing Station at Buxton for test as to whether in that condition it would pass flame, the flange gap being recreated by the insertion of 3/16 inch steel packing.

A preliminary observation test with a nine per cent. firedamp mixture inside the switch was first made, and flame was ejected through the gap at the cover joint. The test was then repeated. in an explosive mixture of 10.2 per cent. firedamp surrounding the machine, upon which external ignition resulted.

A further test under similar conditions was carried out with the metal spacer removed from the cover joint and the cover rebolted up tightly, and no ignition of the external explosive atmosphere occurred.

Plan 3 shows the cover plate and the situation of the dirt.

The presence of this coal and dirt has now to be explained. Two days before the explosion Alfred Thomas Harvey, one of the colliery electricians, visited No. 2's face and examined the coal-cutter in question, which was then a few yards below the loader gate. He took the door off the switch compartment and examined the switch. The gun carriage was found to be loose, one screw having fallen out, but this was replaced, the other studs tightened, the contacts cleaned and all put in order.

In evidence Harvey said that before replacing the door he cleaned the facings with a piece of rag, and after puffing the door on tightened up the studs securely. He tried the top flange with his feelers, but tried the bottom only by running his fingers round, and was satisfied the door was in order. After this attention the machine cut through to the top end of the face and, this face not being at work on the following day, it remained there untouched until the arrival of the cutter men on the afternoon of the explosion.

Harvey again saw the coal-cutter on the Wednesday (the day before the explosion) and externally it appeared to be all right; the trailing cable and gate end switch gear were then examined and found in order.

It would seem that in replacing the controller door or cover plate, which is a fairly heavy casting, some coal and dirt lying on the floor was scraped up and trapped between the flanges at the bottom corner as afterwards found, and that by reason of its position and the inaccessibility of the bottom for minute examination the presence of this obstruction escaped detection.

It was unfortunate that, having seen the flash from the coalcutter shortly before the explosion and having therefore had warning of its unsafe condition, the men in charge of it decided to "try it again" instead of reporting the defect to the deputy or to an electrician. Had they so reported, the explosion might have been averted.

Presence of firedamp. — The presence of an accumulation of firedamp in the vicinity of the coal-cutter remains to be accounted for.

On both occasions on which deputy Fish visited the left bank during his shift he saw a roof break running diagonally from the face over the machine, and on the second visit at 1.35 p.m. it was a little more pronounced than at the first. As the coal was stripped out roof subsidence would naturally follow tending to open the break, and that this process continued was evidenced by the fact that after the explosion it was found to be much worse, and firedamp was then issuing from it and continued to do so for some time.

In his inspection after the explosion Mr. Hall also found an explosive mixture at the tail gate ripping lip, and an accumulation was present along the inbye end of 9's face. A sample taken on the following day along this face where the roof was broken seven yards from the machine, and behind a brattice sheet erected to clear the top corner, gave over 58 per cent. of firedamp, and in the air current a little outbye of this there was 2½ per cent.

On the morning of the 23rd January, in a roof cavity extending from the face into the waste at the point (some 30 yards from the machine) where the main fall occurred to which reference has already been made, there was still an explosive mixture, and there was evidence of breaks extending over the gob and packs between 9's face and the tail gate.

At what time the large fall occurred which was found on 9's face after the explosion was not definitely established. It was not there at 10.30 a.m., and at 1.35 p.m. the deputy noticed nothing to indicate that any change had taken place. The appearance of the fall suggested that it occurred before and not after the explosion, but in any event there must have been a clear passage from 2's face along 9's face at the time of the explosion, and the fact that neither the deputy, nor Herbert Smith (who was working near the top end) nor anyone else noticed any change in the ventilation during the shift seems to indicate that the fall did not materially alter the course of the air current.

In my opinion the fall in conjunction with the break in the top corner is evidence that weighting of the roof was taking place in the area between the tail gate and 9's face, accompanied by an abnormal emission of gas which the air current was not sufficient to deal with, and this in all probability developed between the deputy's last visit and the time of the explosion.

Mr. Hall in evidence gave it as his opinion that rather too much of the air travelling up the left bank was getting away down the tail gate over the hurdle sheets (the area over the top of which was given as about nine and a half sq. feet), and while I think (as the officials suggested) that it was necessary and important to course sufficient air over the sheets to keep the gate lip clear, it was still more important to ensure that a good current of air swept the top corner where of all points on the face gas was most likely to collect and in which corner the coal-cutter had to operate.

Mr. Hall also expressed the view that the passage of the roll across the lower end of the left bank restricting the height by 1½ to 2 feet at that point would most probably have the effect of allowing more air to pass down the right bank than normally was the case, which seems to me a reasonable assumption

These circumstances in combination provide a sufficient reason for the accumulation in the top corner of the face.

 

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