Conditions Before The Explosion.
On the day of the explosion the day shift men were engaged in filling off the undercut coal and timbering up the face (steel props and bars used as supports) as the coal was extracted, 11 colliers and three contractors being in the left bank. The three contractors (one of whom was Frank Mansell) were normally employed in 9's main gate — "scouring" a road through from the loader gate to the left tail gate — but had been sent into the left bank to deal with a "roll" which at the time was crossing that face. This roll partially cut out the seam and restricted the height in the bank, and these men (as were others on two previous shifts) were engaged in enlarging the area at this point.
The regular day shift deputy (Leslie Stevens) having gone to the Central Rescue Station for his quarterly practice, Willis Fish, a shot-firer and spare deputy, was in charge of No. 2 unit on the day of the accident. He arrived at the face about 7 a.m. and first examined the left bank and then the right bank; tests for firedamp, he stated, were made in the left bank at various places, including the wastes, the left tail gate lip, the left hand top corner and eight yards down 9's face, but none was found. At that time he noticed a break over the coal-cutter, which stood in the top corner, but it was not giving off gas. Similarly the loader gate lip and the right bank were inspected and found clear.
At about 9.30 a.m. the deputy attended to some matters in the loader gate, and then proceeded by way of 7's main gate up 2's left tail gate to the face, The two regulator cloths in this gate were seen to be in order. From the tail gate he then proceeded into the top corner and travelled the whole of 9's face, returning the same way to 2's face and along the left bank of that face to the loader gate. There was then no fall on 9's face and no gas was there found.
Later the right bank was again inspected as also was the right side airway to 6's main gate, and thence he returned up the loader gate to the face spending some time with the shotfirer (John Dowds) en route.
On the face there were eight "Ringrose" automatic gas detectors, two in the left bank and six in the right bank; two of the latter had been taken in by men moved from other faces. There were also a number of flame safety lamps used as detectors on this face, of which at least four went into the left bank.
Having again examined the right bank another examination of the left bank was commenced about 1 p.m., starting from the loader gate. This examination extended to the top corner and 20 yards down 9's face, also into the left tail gate a few yards, and all was in order as before, the ventilation taking its normal course and indicating no noticeable change, except that the break on 2's face was a little more pronounced.
When the deputy left the top corner (at about 1.35 p.m. he estimated) Edmund Smith was the only man working there and he was setting supports. He had with him a "Ringrose" automatic gas detector which was hung on a bar within five yards of the corner and over the belt race. The coal in the top stints having been filled out, four men (including two of the deceased) were moved down near the roll to assist in filling off some remaining coal there. The deputy again went into the right bank and on his way saw the left bank coal-cutter men in the loader gate getting their trailing cable ready, after which he returned to the men near the roll and finally left them completing their timbering preparatory to going home.
Fish had once more gone down the right bank to see that all was being left in order at the end of the shift, and was about 40 yards from the loader gate when he felt a rush of air and heat, an interruption of the ventilation followed by smoke and dust; he saw no flame and heard no report.
John Dowds was the shot-firer on No. 2 conveyor face and between 6.45 and 11.30 a.m. on the day of the accident fired 22 shots, which included three shots in the roll on the left bank at about 9 a.m. In no case did he detect the presence of firedamp in his examinations before or after the firing of these shots. The nearest shot to the left tail gate was about 24 yards lower down the face, and this was fired at 8 o'clock. In the course of the shift he had no occasion to go into the top corner, nor did he go into the left tail gate.
When the explosion occurred Dowds was in the right bank about 25 yards below the loader gate; he felt a rush of wind down the face, but was not injured in any way.
The evidence of Dowds eliminates any possibility of the explosion having originated through the firing of a shot.
During the morning the left bank was also visited by the day shift overman, Albert Edward Brown. Starting from the loader gate at about 10 o'clock he travelled up the left bank as far as the top corner where he tested for gas and found none. He also went into the left tail gate where he found the hurdle sheets in order and the ripping lip clear of firedamp. One sheet was five feet from the lip and the second about four yards further outbye.
At that time the ventilation appeared to be satisfactory and taking its normal course. He noticed a "Ringrose" detector hung up about eight feet from the top corner, and there was also a flame safety lamp between the corner and the tail gate. After spending some time on the roads the overman returned to the pit bottom which he reached at 1 p.m.
The last man to leave the top end of the left bank before the explosion was Herbert Smith, a stallman on the day shift, and his evidence is of considerable importance.
Smith worked in the third stint from the top, i.e. almost opposite the left tail gate; he was supplied with a flame safety lamp, as well as an electric lamp, and this he hung on a bar near to where he worked. By about 1 p.m. he had filled out his stint, and the deputy asked him to give a hand to Slater, the man below him: he stayed with Slater until about 2.30 p.m. Meanwhile (at about 1.45 p.m.) the cutter men (F. Roddy and L. Cadywould) arrived, and Smith helped them to get the trailing cable along the face up to the machine. Some 15 minutes later when Smith from his position down the face was looking towards the top, end he saw a flash and heard a crack from the machine which appeared to come from near the pommel end.
Shortly afterwards Roddy came down the face and as he passed Smith the latter asked what was the matter, to which Roddy replied, "The machine has burst." After being away some little time Roddy returned, and in answer to Smith's inquiry as to what he was going to do said, "Try it again." A similar conversation took place between Walter Frost, another man in the face, and Roddy.
Confirmation of this occurrence at the machine was also given by Frank Mansell, one of the three contractors normally engaged in driving No. 9's main gate scouring, but who on the day of the accident had been working at the roll. According to this witness Roddy and Cadywould arrived at the face about 1.30 p.m. and the contractors helped them to get the cable along the face. Cadywould later returned and asked the contractors to leave a shovel for him when they went out. This they forgot to do, but when dressing in 9's scouring just after 2.30 p.m. Cadywould came to them again to get the shovel.
Before he left Cadywould said, "We have had a blue flame flash out of the side of the cutter," and Mansell told him to tell Roddy to leave the cutter alone until someone had attended to it. W. Hardwick, a fitter, who also heard the remark, told Cadywould to get an electrician to the machine before working it again. There was, in fact, an electrician at the sub-station less than 300 yards away. Cadywould made no reply, but left with the shovel.
Herbert Smith having finished his work went to the tail gate (where his clothes were), dressed and proceeded outbye by that gate: he arrived at the pit bottom without knowing of the explosion, which must have occurred not more than ten minutes after he left the face. When he passed through the sheets in the tail gate they were in order, and he said he left them undisturbed.
Whilst working in his stint Smith had noticed a "Ringrose" detector hanging over the belt race towards the top corner, and this did not come into action during the shift nor did anything occur to suggest any abnormality in the ventilation. The detector was in charge of Edmund Smith who worked in the top stint, but, according to Herbert Smith, Edmund, at about 2.15 p.m., went down the bank to give a hand between Slater and Cauldwell, six to eight yards below the tail gate. Edmund Smith did not take his clothes with him, but whether he took his "Ringrose," Herbert was unable to state.
The coal-cutter men, as we have seen, reached the face about 1.30 p.m. When they descended at 1 p.m. they were seen at the pit bottom by the overman Brown who, learning that the second man (A. Pitchford) of the team of three usually with the machine had not turned up and that in consequence they had no "Ringrose" with them, told Roddy to use the "Ringrose" already at the face in the charge of E. Smith until a third man (Charles Moreton) who would be sent to join them arrived with another "Ringrose" detector. It should be here noted that no flame safety lamp was taken into the face by the cutter men, although it was stated at the inquest that the practice was for the coal-cutter team to take a "Ringrose" detector and a flame safety lamp with them.
Moreton went inbye with Sydney Smith, the gummer for the right bank cutter; they travelled in together up No. 6's main gate and into 2's right hand tail gate, and undressed about 200 yards from the face. Moreton then had a "Ringrose" detector and when he left Smith to proceed to the face (whence he would go up to the left bank) he was carrying this. For some reason, however, this detector never arrived in the left bank; it was, in fact, taken out after the explosion by Walter Bray (a stallman who worked in the winning heading at the extreme right of the face), who found it hung on a bar at the face almost opposite the right tail gate.
Moreton was found dead near the machine along with the two cutter men he had gone to assist; he could not have been in the vicinity of the machine more than a few minutes when the explosion happened.