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Index

10. Events Following The Explosion

(a) In the workings. — The only persons in the workings who escaped came from 29's district. They were David Jones, night-shift deputy; John Edward Samuel and Albert Samuel, coalcutting machinemen; and Thomas Fisher, Robert Edward Andrews and Cyril Challoner, colliers. All these persons gave evidence.

David Jones told how he and his assistant, Bertram Colin Maggs, were standing at the junction of 160's and 163's roads — see Plan 5 — at about 2 o'clock, when there was a loud blast "like the sound of a bursted airpipe", which threw him off his feet and blew dust and small stones against him.

Jones continued his narrative but that of John Edward Samuel was more lucid and, quoted almost verbatim, was as follows — On the night of the accident I was working on 160's face and just a little before 2 o'clock we started to turn the machine with the sylvester. David Jones came up to me and said "They will not be long now, Jack, before they will clear so that you can start". He went from me straight down 183's road. Just after he left me, there came a violent thud which was followed at once by dust. I told my brother and my mate, Dai. Lewis, to go down the face to 160's road end and wait there until I came to them. My brother said "What the hell's up, Jack". I said "That's the bloody bottom gone". I then told him to go down to 160's road end and wait for me. I came down 183's road after the fireman and when I got to the junction on to 160's, I fell over him. There he was by himself. He said "Jack, your air-pipes are burst". I said "Don't talk soft". I tried to come from him outbye to my air valve to turn the air off my machine. I only came about four or five yards. I could not get on account of the dust. It was just like a wall. I turned back and said "Come on, Dai., the bottom has gone" I said "We want to get out on the wind road as far as we can

Asked by Mr. Henderson what he meant by that, Samuel said "The bottom end" and was continuing his narrative when Mr. Henderson asked :— "The bottom end of what?" to which Samuel replied — "The bottom side of us I thought about when we heard the thud, below us — 14's district". Mr. Henderson then asked "You meant another district?" to which Samuel replied "Yes 14's" and then continuing said:— I brought Dai. with me from off the place on to the face and we started to come off the face. We came under a step on to the next face, 158's. When we got there, there were a lot of men standing at the road-end. Those men were rather excited. They wanted to know what was the matter and I told them not to get excited but to make for the wind road. A lot had lights. We then came up the face to 161's and told the men from 161's to carry on to the wind road. We came to 156's and me and Fisher and David Jones went down 156's. We came to three or four men. They were in the dark. We told them to go to where they could see lights on the face. We tried to go further out, but we could not get, there was too much dust there. We turned back then to the face and we all started up the face and got to the top end to an old road and we started to come down this old road.

By Mr. Henderson —

Q. Was that 99's old road?

A. I was not sure of the numbers.

Q. The old wind road?

A. Yes, we came a good way down that road. There were some men there started to turn back. They said we could not get down, that there was too much gas. I said to Fisher "This is our only way, let us see what is down here." We went further on and I heard Andrews say "Jack, there's a man in here," that was in the road leading off 99's by the junction, and I said "Let's get him out." Andrews got in first and he said "I've got hold of him" so we linked hands together and we pulled him out. We tried to revive him but he was too far gone for us. Then Andrews fell over. I left the other man and turned to Andrews and we were just getting Andrews round when the deputy came from the back end and, without saying anything to us, he made a dive to get in the same road. Just as he did, I collared him by the shoulder. I told him not to be a damned fool and to take his time. He came hack. I suggested opening the doors in front of us, leading off 7's road. The road goes straight down into 7's pass-bye. We told him not to open that door as it opened on to the main haulage. He suggested opening the one on our right-hand side. He opened it a matter of a few inches. We just had a smell, a puff of wind through it. We called on him to close it as we could smell the burning. It was a warm wind. He closed the door and then came hack. We had some conversation and then a man called Bill Crump came out and told us there were some doors further along this road. Fisher then said "If we can get behind those doors, we will be all right." So me and Fisher suggested to the deputy that we should get through those doors and he said "All right." We called to all the other men and told them what we were going to do and told them to get anything they had — caps, singlets or anything to fan with, and to follow close together. We put David Jones, the deputy, down on his hands and knees and Fisher took the lead. We kept wafting these hits of rag and our caps and things round our faces. It was very hot and a lot of gas there. We carried on until we came to a slight bend in the road and David Jones said something about being done but I said "Stick it" and we kept carrying on until we came to the bottom of the ladders. The going had been heavy and it was hot, and David Jones again said he was done. Fisher and Challoner had started up the ladder by this time and I said to my brother "Take your time; don't be in a hurry. We will not leave Dai here." We got him to the foot of the ladder and he got his hands on the rungs and I got my shoulder underneath him and pushed him up. As we were going up the ladder he seemed to revive and the air was clearer. When we got to the top of the ladder we were able to make some headway but after we had gone a bit Andrews started to fall back. Dave Jones, Challoner and my brother were getting ahead of us. I called Fisher back to me and said "Take your time; we will not leave Andrews behind if we have to carry him." While we were hanging back with Andrews, the others were getting the lead of us. I called to them, "Half-a-minute." They stopped, and just as we got up by them there came a big gush of wind down the road just before we got to a junction and I said Thank God, they have reversed the wind. We are all right now. Let's get this way as soon as we can now and we continued out against the wind along this junction road and we came to a man who was dead and then we carried on a bit further and I heard my brother shout "We are by the Clutch."

So I was all right then, I knew where I was. We carried on over falls and runaway tubs until we met Mr. Andrew Williams, the Under-Manager, who asked us where we had come from and we told him and how many there were. He said "I think you have come the wrong way." We carried on from there and then we saw Mr. Bonsall, the Manager, and he asked us where we had come from. And then Andrews collapsed and we put him on a stretcher and carried him out and then went to the surface, and away home — all except the deputy, David Jones, who had turned back inbye with the Under-Manager.

Samuel then, in answer to Mr. Henderson, said there was no smoke in the Martin return when they turned out of it to come to the "Clutch". Everything was at a standstill and the time would be "somewhere between three to a quarter past".

In answer to Mr. Charlton, Samuel said the smell they got when Jones, the deputy, opened the door to the right of 99's airway, was like burning rubber and he had smelled the same smell right at the beginning when he picked the deputy up.

Thomas Fisher corroborated the evidence of Samuel except that he said the smell when the deputy opened the door he put down to burning timber.

Robert Edward Andrews said he could tell nothing further than had been told by Samuel and Fisher. Asked how many lights they had between the six of them he said they had three all the way out from the bottom of 99's airway. They warned the men who were at the bottom of 99's airway that they were going outbye "and we thought when they saw us going that they would follow". The smell he smelled was of something burning, "like you have been standing by a bonfire and smelling something like that — a bonfire of wood".

Cyril Challoner said he had nothing to add to the evidence of Samuel, Fisher and Andrews. The smell he smelled was just a smell like burning wood".

The evidence of Albert Samuel had been given some days before the evidence of these four witnesses just mentioned; it was similar to that of his brother, John Edward Samuel. He said he asked his brother when the explosion occurred "What the hell's up?" and his brother replied, "It's the bottom end gone". Asked by Sir Stafford Cripps, "What is the bottom end?" Samuel replied:— "Of course we have always judged 14's that something would happen there".

The smell which Fisher, Andrews and Challoner likened to burning wood, he, as his brother did later, said was like burning rubber.

He said, as Andrews said later, that when they moved off from 99's airway, they expected the other men to follow them; they had told them to follow.

One can only admire the spirit of these men who, I think, owe their lives to the coolness and courage of John Edward Samuel. He summed up the position and displayed qualities of leadership in a most terrifying situation and I recommend him for suitable recognition.

(b) Events near the Dennis Shaft bottom following the explosion. — The evidence given by those who were working in the neighbourhood of the Dennis Shaft bottom was contradictory in some respects, namely, whether or not the electric lights went out, whether or not the haulage rope was running and whether or not there was noise when the explosion occurred, but I think it was clearly established that the electric lights did not go out; that the haulage rope was not running; and that noise did accompany a rush of wind outbye which raised clouds of dust of such density that for a short interval all lights were obscured.

Further, I think it was also clearly established that the automatic switches which controlled the electric power supply were heard by the switch room attendant, Joseph William Bellis, to trip simultaneously with the arrival of the rush of wind and clouds of dust; and that these switches were tripped consequent upon a leakage to earth.

The night-shift overman, Fredrick John Davies, when in his cabin not far from the Dennis Shaft, at about 2 o'clock heard what he described as a crashing sound and thought, at first, one of the drop cages at the shaft bottom had been let down out of control, but when he came out of his cabin he was enveloped in a cloud of dust which he thought cleared in about half a minute. He sent Edward Williams, the haulage engine driver, to telephone to the "Clutch," and he himself telephoned to the banksman to tell the Manager and Undermanager to come down the pit at once. He also telephoned into the Slant district for the afternoon-shift overman, Benjamin Edwards, who was still in that district, to come outbye. There was no reply from the "Clutch," but from the surface the Manager telephoned asking what was the matter, and Davies said he told him "Something has happened down the Dennis. I think it has fired." The Manager came down at 2.30 and the Under-manager followed in the next cage.

In the meantime, Edward Williams, the haulage engine driver, and another youth, Hubert Rogers, on their own initiative had gone inbye along the Dennis Main to look for a boy, Isaac Williams, who was working about 30 yards on the outbye side of No. 3 North. They brought the boy out, frightened but otherwise unharmed.

Benjamin Edwards had by now — about 2.15 according to Edwards — arrived from the Slant district, and he and Davies went through the separation doors to the Martin Return, which they found to be full of grey smoke. They came back to the Dennis, and Edwards then had all the men called out of the Slant district by telephone, and he also sent a message to a deputy, Robert Williams, to pick a dozen good men, as help was wanted down the Dennis.

Edwards hearing that Edward Williams and Hubert Rogers had gone inbye went, with Davies, after them but met them returning. They (Edwards and Davies) went on and just below No. 3 North came upon a fall which they thought they could not get through. They therefore decided to return outbye and catch men coming out of the Slant to help to rid the fall. They had not come far out when they met first the Manager and then the Under-manager, whom they told of the fall lower down and that they were going for men and tools to clear it.

(c) Explorations along the Dennis Main. — The Undermanager, accompanied by Henry Tomlinson, the rope splicer, went on inbye and just on the outbye side of No. 3 North met the night-shift deputy, David Jones, with the other five survivors from 29's district, they having got past the fall by a way which had escaped the notice of Davies and Edwards. The five men continued on their way outbye but the deputy volunteered to go back inbye again with the Under-manager and Tomlinson.

It should be said here that the Manager and Under-manager, accompanied by Henry Tomlinson, very shortly after they came down the pit, had gone through to the Martin Return and had there seen that it was full of smoke.

The Under-manager, now on his way inbye with David Jones and Tomlinson, was told by Jones how he and the five men had come out of 29's district by way of the return airway and how there were other men left behind. These three travelled on and over three further falls to the "Clutch," where they were overtaken by Ben Edwards.

The Under-manager, leaving Edwards at the "Clutch" to see whether anybody came up 142's Deep, then went with Jones and Tomlinson along the connecting road towards the Martin Return. When they had travelled about 100 yards along this road, Tomlinson was sent back to the "Clutch" to prevent anyone going down 142's Deep before the Undermanager got back there. In a little while the Under-manager and Jones having been to the Martin Return came back and, according to the evidence of Edwards, the Under-manager then said to him "Well, it is hopeless there" and sent David Jones home.

The Under-manager in his evidence said he found that the four doors in the connecting road between the Dennis and the Martin had been blown out; the Martin Return at the end of the connecting road full of dense, light-coloured smoke and a smell like timber burning. There was no smell of gob fire. He up-ended a tram bottom against the fourth door frame to check the air as far as possible and then returned to the "Clutch". He later put a canary into the Martin Return and it was at once distressed.

He (the Under-manager) and Ben Edwards then went down 142's Deep and found a heavy fall 8o yards down and then two others and having got over them heard a hissing noise and saw a fire about 20 yards on the outbye side of 29's Turn. The hissing noise was made by compressed air escaping from the six inch main and blowing on to the fire which was on the right-hand side and, according to the Under-manager, burning freely. The place was full of smoke.

They (the Under-manager and Edwards) decided to come up 142's Deep to get men and material to put out the fire, but on the way they met the Manager and he with the Under-manager went inbye to look at the fire whilst Edwards continued up the Deep to the "Clutch", where the compressed air was turned off.

The Manager and Under-manager decided to get men as quickly as possible and try to smother the fire with dirt and dust off the road until sand and fire extinguishers could be got: there was no water available. The Manager returned to the "Clutch" to make the necessary arrangements and the Under-manager, with Davies, the night-shift overman, who was wearing breathing apparatus, tried to get through the dense smoke to the fire but failed.

Returning to the "Clutch", the Under-manager went into the drift beyond and there found a prop on fire and some clothing smouldering. Further in, the drift was full of smoke and he could not go into it. The fire was put out with water from the men's bottles. The Under-manager said later that the smell of burning wood which he had smelled when on his way from the "Clutch" to the Martin Return was no doubt due to the prop which was on fire in the drift.

Men from the Slant district now began to arrive at the "Clutch" and they were set on to level the falls in 142's Deep and so to make a way to get at the fire. About five o'clock Mr. Dominy arrived and after consultation with the Manager brattice sheets were put up across 142's Deep to keep the air from fanning the fire; sand and fire extinguishers were brought in from the shaft and endeavours made to overcome the fire but without success.

The sand and fire extinguishers had to be carried by hand some 450 yards until the evening when a tub road was cleared as far as the "Clutch".

The efforts to subdue the fire went on unceasingly but it gained ground and on the Sunday afternoon it was burning fiercely not only on 142's Deep but also along 29's haulage road, the coal sides of which were glowing like coke in a beehive oven.

Late on the afternoon of Sunday, 23rd September, when it was seen that the fire was increasing and when it was known that the air returning from 29's district contained a dangerous percentage of gas and when explosions were known to be taking place beyond a heavy fall blocking 142's Deep on the inbye side of 29's Turn, it was decided to withdraw from the mine.

I was a party to that decision and now, two years later, knowing what I then did and experienced and having heard the evidence and considered the whole matter I am satisfied that, to have gone on working would have been to risk lives to no purpose for I feel sure no one down 142's Deep survived long after the first explosion.

During Saturday, the bodies of seven men were recovered from the neighbourhood of the "Clutch" and the entrance to the drift beyond that point, and on the following day a further body was brought out from that drift. All, except one, had, according to the evidence of Dr. S. W. Fisher, Medical Inspector of Mines, suffered burns, and in every case death was due to poisoning by carbon monoxide.

The occurrence of the fire at 29's Turn raises the question whether, if water or sand or stonedust or fire extinguishers had been available when that fire was first discovered it could have been put out.

The Under-manager and the Overman Benjamin Edwards, were the first to see the fire — at, according to the Undermanager's estimate, about 3.30 a.m.

Questioned by Mr. Charlton, the Under-manager's evidence on this point was:—

Q. What was the form of this fire; was it an extensive fire?

A. When I first saw it I had to put my head down on the floor to see it because of the amount of vapour there was hanging from the roof down.

Q. What height would the road be at that point, Mr. Williams?

A. Anywhere from 6 feet to 7 feet, sir.

Q. So you found that by putting your head down on the floor.

A. Right on the floor.

Q. You could see under this — what is it? A. Vapour I would call it.

Q. And what did you see when you got your head down?

A. Fire on the right-hand side of the road looking in.

Q. Was it burning freely?

A. Yes, I should call it a proper fire.

The evidence of the Overman, Ben Edwards, on this point was:—

Q. You said the fire was in the roof or near the roof when you first saw it?

A. Yes.

Q. But you could not get nearer to it than 20 yards?

A. We could have got, I think, if we had tried.

Q. What stopped you?

A. Well, the fire. There were only two of us. There was only me and Mr. Williams, and I think Mr. Williams decided at that time to go up and get some more help.

Q. There were plenty of people?

A. Yes, there was a few.

Q. Plenty of people to deal with the fire if they had had any appliances?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that if you had had some appliances there at that time — fire extinguishers or water — that you could have put the fire out then and there?

A. Well, it did not seem much of a fire then, sir.

The Manager's evidence was rather different from that of the Overman. In answer to Mr. Charlton he had said that when he first went down 142's Deep he could not see very much fire because of the smoke and he could not get near it because of the heat. On this point I asked:—

Q. If when you got down 142's Deep to 29's Junction or near it on your first visit you had had apparatus of any sort for throwing water, say 30 or 40 feet, do you think you could have managed to put that fire out?

A. No, I do not think so.

Q. We are told it was not a big fire?

A. No; I could not see much fire because of the smoke in front of the fire.

Q. You could not really see it?

A. As to how much material was on fire, no, I could not.

Q. Do you know what it was that was burning?

A. No; it was on the right-hand side, but what it was I could not say. We could not actually see that spot. Afterwards, of course, we saw all the timber blazing but not at that time.

Q. I was anxious to know what it was like at the outset?

A. We could just see the flame colour through the smoke itself.

Q. The smoke was coming against the air?

A. There was a volume of smoke, hut we could not see the fire.

Q. Was the smoke filling the whole road, on the floor as well as the roof?

A. Yes.

From this evidence it is difficult to say whether the fire when first discovered could or could not have been subdued had the means been available; it is obvious that the possibility of doing so would have been very much greater and it is also obvious that the lesson to be learned is that the necessary means for dealing with fires should be provided in mines.

Consideration of the use in this instance of the compressed air pipes to convey water to the scene of the fire was not omitted, but as water could only be put into them at the surface the only result, owing to the great pressure, would have been to burst them and so cause confusion and hindrance

(d) Exploration along 20's Return. — In the conditions as they were found by the Manager and Under-manager on the Saturday morning — Martin's Return full of smoke and a fire at 29's Turn — there was no work in this part of the mine which men equipped with breathing apparatus could do, but early on Saturday morning the Manager sent instructions to have a 6-yard dirt stopping broken down in order to get direct access to 20's return from the Dennis Main, his object being, as he said, to ascertain the state of the return airway". He felt sure the return would be charged with carbon monoxide, and if that was found to be so in fact, he did not want anyone to go into it, for he had in mind that, in such case, there would not be the slightest chance of bringing men back through it.

At about 7 a.m. the Manager received a message that the stopping had been broached and he sent word to the two deputies, the brothers Thomas, whom he had put in charge, that rescue men would be required but that they were not to go into the return until they received definite instructions from him.

Unfortunately these instructions were not observed and four rescue men did go through the broached stopping into 20's return airway and three of them lost their lives.

I asked the Manager what instructions he sent and he replied:— "The instructions I gave, I told them to be there ready to go in but not to go in until they got definite instructions from me, because what I had in my mind was that it would be charged with carbon monoxide, and I did not want them to go through that because there would not be the slightest chance of getting men back through it. That was what was in my mind."

Q. You stated to Mr. Charlton, I think, that you told them you wanted to know the state of the return airway?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that correct?

A. That is correct. The state of the air in the airway.

Q. You said "the return airway," but your intention really was to find out what the state of the air was in the airway?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. And in any case, is this correct: They were not to go through until you got back?

A. That is so, and I told them I was coming straightaway.

Q. Do you know that there was some miscarriage of your message?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. And that the rescue men did go through before you got there?

A. Yes.

Further evidence on this disastrous episode was given by John Charles Williams, captain of Llay Main Colliery No. 1 Rescue Team which had been called for duty at Gresford Colliery. He said that about 8.30 a.m. a man came into the general office at the surface of the mine, where he and his rescue team were awaiting events, to ask for two rescue men, a request that a minute or two later was altered to one for the whole team of six men. A team, "with the exception of one whose apparatus was out of order", at once got ready and at 8.45 went down the Dennis Shaft. They then travelled inbye to where the

stopping had been broached to give direct access to 20's airway. At this point Williams received instructions from a man whom he afterwards learned to be the deputy, Harold Thomas, "to ascertain the conditions in the airway". He, Williams, asked for a plan but there was none available, but one of the rescue team was William Hughes, a member of one of the Gresford Colliery rescue teams, and "he said he knew the way and would act as guide".

The apparatus of one of the five rescue men was found to have lost oxygen, so that left Williams himself, William Hughes, Daniel Hughes and John Lewis to carry out the examination.

To continue — Williams said a cage containing a canary was handed to him by Harold Thomas who, with him and William Hughes, went into the airway about five or six yards when the bird dropped to the bottom of the cage dead. He handed the cage back to Thomas and told him to go back.

Williams, William Hughes, Daniel Hughes and John Lewis then went down the airway some 40 or 50 yards, where Williams said "I got the men together and told them the conditions we were in. Asked "What did you tell them? What were those conditions?", Williams said:— "That the atmosphere was dangerous".

Q. It had killed the bird?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you tell them that?

A. Yes.

Q. They would probably see that?

A. Yes, they knew it. "Are we to go forward, or are we to go back? There is a probability there are some men alive in here, but seeing they are using flame lamps in general they will probably all be in the dark." We each carried a bulls-eye electric inspection lamp and a flame lamp. I knew we could not get them out the way we were going in.

Then Williams was asked if he had tested for gas and he said he had made frequent tests and there would be from 2½ to 3 per cent. of firedamp present.

Williams' further narrative was to the following effect :— They decided to go on, the distance between each man being approximately 20 yards. They encountered places of small size and, at approximately 200 yards from the stopping through which they had gone into the airway, he met a body of hot air. He went further in until it became impossible for him to get any further on account of the small size of the road — a matter which is dealt with elsewhere in this Report. Eventually he signalled for a halt and, unable to turn round, he came out backwards. I turned back, took the first man I came to, Bill Hughes, back on to Jack Lewis, and took those two on to Dan Hughes, and told them the conditions; that we were done; we had better get back; could not get any further; impossible".

Q. Do you know how long you had been in this road at that time?

A. I should say approximately half an hour or 25 minutes; and I told them the conditions I had met further inbye.

Q. How did you talk to them at this time?

A. By pushing the mouthpiece to one side to make myself understood. it is a difficult matter to make oneself understood with a mouthpiece.

Q. I agree.

A. But at the same time one has to be careful not to inhale the outer atmosphere.

Q. Now you had these three men?

A. Yes.

Q. What were their names?

A. Bill Hughes, Jack Lewis and Dan Hughes.

Q. You had come back then how far?

A. 80 to 100 yards:

Q. You told them the conditions?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what happened?

A. Lewis and Bill Hughes seemed to get alarmed and kind of jostled for supremacy of leadership out, to get out. I called out to them not to be alarmed, but to take their time. They did not take much notice of that. Dan Hughes did quieten down a bit, and he kept a bit behind, but the other two went. I saw one; he would be about 40 yards away. He had got about 40 yards, and he fell. I did not know which it was at the time, but it was Lewis when I came up to him. Hughes was perhaps 14 or 20 yards in front of me. He goes on, continues his way out, and me behind him. I stopped with Lewis, to have a look at him. He had ceased breathing. He had no pulse, and I lifted his eyelid and tapped the ball of the eye, and there was no response. I came to the conclusion that he was dead. His mouthpiece was in, and his nose clip was on, and his apparatus was working, but he was dead. I could find nothing wrong with the apparatus, except that he had had his nose clip off and replaced it.

Q. How do you know that?

A. I am surmising that. I left him and I proceeded on. I got up close to Bill Hughes, and I could see he was lying down. I did not know for the time being whether it was Dan Hughes or Bill Hughes, but I found it was Bill Hughes, and Dan was a few yards in front of him, and from what I could see of Dan Hughes he had apparently been assisting Bill, to try and get him on. I examined Bill Hughes. His nose clip was off, and he was apparently dead. I could see Dan Hughes in front in difficulties, very unsteady on his feet. I left Bill Hughes, and I assisted Dan Hughes out for a matter of 40 or 50 yards, until I fell on top of him. Something had gone wrong, and when I examined my apparatus the feed pipe from the oxygen cylinder had become disconnected off the barrel, and that is what had brought me down, and I was practically exhausted. I did try to make up this union joint, but I had not time. My only alternative was to push the pipe in my mouth, to save myself. I then had to leave Dan Hughes, and Dan was alive at the time; on his knees, crumpled up, but alive. I could see lights at the top end of the airway, a matter of 40 or 50 yards away. I signalled for help. Someone whistled. I signalled again, and waited about four or five minutes, I should say. I could not see anyone coming down. I made my way out. I got out to within 10 or 12 yards, when I was met by two men. They dragged me out neck and crop. It was not necessary, as I was quite all right in myself, except that I had had a whiff, but I had not lost consciousness. I can recollect everything that happened. The assistance I wanted was not for myself, but for Dan Hughes.

Q. Quite so. Does that mean three rescue men were left in there?

A. That is right, sir.

Q. With regard to this joint of your apparatus, what sort of apparatus was it?

A. Proto.

Q. Proto rescue apparatus, or self-breathing apparatus?

A. Self-breathing, yes.

Q. You say this joint had come loose. Did you test these joints before you went in?

A. Yes, every one of them.

Q. With your finger and thumb, or with a spanner?

A. Finger and thumb.

Q. And they were all tight?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you think yours came loose?

A. With wrestling with Dan Hughes. I was behind him, holding him up and pushing him forward. I came to the conclusion that had undone the joint.

Q. I take it these men that came forward to get you had no rescue apparatus on?

A. No. They had rags over their mouths.

Q. You were dragged out, or taken out?

A. Assisted out.

Q. And that was the end of that attempt at rescue, was it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What happened to you then? Did you go to the surface?

A. No, sir, I stayed there until they got Dan Hughes out.

Q. Who got him out?

A. T. P. Jones and Dick Harrison.

Q. These were other men?

A. Other rescue men.

Q. Was there a team standing by waiting when you came out?

A. No, I understand not.

Q. Well, you would see? You were there?

A. Yes. They came down afterwards. I think they were sent for. Immediately I signalled for assistance, when I was down the airway, the team was sent for. I was out a couple or three minutes, perhaps less, when the other team arrived.

Q. Do you know who was at the door when the whole lot of you went through to start with?

A. I did not notice.

Q. You being a stranger, coming from Llay Main?

A. I did not know them. They were all strangers to me.

Q. You are quite certain that your instructions were to go in there to find out the condition of the airway?

A. The words I received were, to ascertain the conditions prevailing in the airway.

Q. Do you know from whom you got those instructions?

A. Harold Thomas.

Q. You now know the man from whom you got them?

A. I did not know the fellow at the time. I took it to be the UnderManager, from the instructions I received. I asked for a plan, and he said there were none available.

Q. What is in my mind is this, whether your instructions were to find out the condition of the air in the airway, or the condition actually of the airway itself? — You say your instruction was to find out the conditions prevailing in the airway?

A. That is as far as I can recollect.

Q. Would that not convey to you that you were to find out whether the airway was charged with gas of any sort, or with smoke; or was it, as you evidently took it, that you were to find out whether the airway had been blown about or not?

A. That is what I took it for.

Q. The condition of the air in the airway you discovered within five minutes of getting into it?

A. Less than that.

Q. Is that not so?

A. Yes.

Q. The canary was dead?

A. Yes.

Q. You had found the 2½ to 3 per cent. of firedamp in the air. You have not said so, but was there any smoke in that airway?

A. None.

Q. You had then found out the condition prevailing in the airway?

A. So far as atmosphere was concerned, yes.

Q. But you thought your instructions were

A. To find out the conditions in the airway.

Q. To find out what the airway was like, as to its being broken about or not?

A. Yes.

Q. There is a difference, is there not?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you recognise the difference at the time?

A. I did not, not at the time, no.

Q. You realise the point, do you not — that if you were only going in there to find out the condition of the air in the airway ?

A. We had found that in the entrance.

Q. You had found that in two minutes?

A. Yes, we had already got that.

Q. Well, it is very unfortunate, but there it is.

Such was my remark at the end of my examination of Williams and there is little further to be said except to add Dr. Fisher's examination of him, as follows —

Q. When you saw Dan Hughes last did he have his nose clip on and his mouthpiece right?

A. Yes. I saw to that before leaving him.

Q. When you came back from the very narrow part of that airway, you told us you spoke from the side of your mouth?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they agree with you as to coming back?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they speak back to you?

A. No; they simply turned round, and off.

Q. So not one of the three answered you?

A. No, Sir, no answer at all. They simply turned round and scampered off.

Q. Had they up to that moment been perfectly calm?

A. Yes, so far as I know. I was in front.

Q. Did their apparent restlessness or excitement begin as soon as you began to come back?

A. Yes.

Q. After that moment when you had spoken to them?

A. Yes — not up to then.

Whilst making allowances for the state of mind of men at the time, it is not expected that men specially trained for rescue work will behave as Williams, the Captain of the team, behaved on this occasion. To have been aware that the atmosphere was poisonous and then to have pushed a mouthpiece to one side to be able to talk was suicidal and the extraordinary thing is that Williams himself survived.

The sole useful object of the entry into this return airway was attained when the canary was killed by the poisonous atmosphere within a few yards of the entrance at the broken-down stopping. There could be no doubt then that no one further inbye could be alive.

The bodies of two of the ill-fated rescue men were recovered the same day; that of the third John Lewis, was not recovered until 18th May, 1935. All three men had been poisoned by carbon monoxide which they had inhaled either directly through moving their mouthpieces to one side, as Williams said he had done, or because the sets of breathing apparatus were faulty.

If the immersion test prescribed in Clause 2 of the Fifth Schedule to the General Rescue Regulations of 10th December, 1928, had been carried out, as is required by Clause 3 of that Schedule, any defect in the several sets of apparatus would have been discovered. There was ample time for this test to have been applied but Williams said, in evidence, that so far as he could see there were no facilities for making this test. As a fact, there were such facilities and if the Superintendent of the Wrexham Central Rescue Station or Williams, the Captain of the Rescue Team, had carried out the Regulations, they would have made use of such facilities.

Prior to the mine being re-entered it was necessary to train a number of men in the use of breathing apparatus and during the course of that training, in which Mr. P. L. Collinson, then Junior Inspector of Mines but now Professor of Mining at Nottingham University, and Dr. Fisher took prominent parts, the equipment of the Wrexham Central Rescue Station was thoroughly overhauled and much of it replaced by new, but I regret that the Committee controlling the station have not thought fit to replace the Superintendent by a competent person who has been fully trained in rescue work and has had five years' practical experience underground in a mine, thus coming into line with the spirit of the Regulations as amended in 1928.

 

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A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.

 

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