105. Within minutes of discovering the fire, Stirling was warning the surface. Lister reacted with responsibility to the situation — as witness the messages and information he passed underground — and clearly the question of calling out the Rescue Brigade exercised his mind as part of the larger issue of declaring an emergency. He obviously regarded himself as unqualified to call out the Brigade and decided to leave it to Nicol. Nicol's first reaction when he reached the colliery about 4.15 a.m. was that the Rescue Brigade should be summoned and he asked for them to be called on the telephone. As a result of telephone delays and other distractions, the Brigade was not called until 5.00 a.m., some 90 minutes after the fire had been discovered. This is not the first report in recent times on a mining accident where reference has had to be made to delay in calling the Rescue Brigade. It is true that, as events turned out, the delay on this occasion in no way contributed to the loss of life. Even if the Brigade had been called at the earliest possible moment, at, say 3.45 a.m. they could not have established their underground bases much before 5.00 a.m. by which time the smoke was so dense that their operations would have been impossible. Nevertheless, the situation might well have been different. Here was a clear case of emergency underground; yet the Brigade remained unsummoned for 90 minutes.
The Emergency Organisation
106. Clearly there was uncertainty among those officials immediately concerned with the events of the early morning about the exercise of authority to declare a formal state of emergency at the colliery. Lister, upon whom fell the brunt of having to deal with the emergency when it was first reported to him, certainly did not regard himself as authorised to initiate the full emergency procedure. Webster, who was at a remote point underground and who was not really in a position to judge how serious matters were, referred Lister to Simpson, an under-manager, or Nicol, the deputy manager. Even Nicol hesitated to take the positive step of declaring an emergency and it was not until 5.30 a.m., some two hours after the finding of the fire, that a general emergency was in fact declared on the instructions of J. S. Wilson, production manager. It is true that many of the emergency measures required by the Emergency Organisation had already been taken as a result of the sheer pressure of events but such an essential one as the setting up of an Incident Room was not achieved until 6.00 a.m. The Emergency Organisation was thoroughly comprehensive in the range of action it required, but it seems to have been associated in the minds of some with the action to be taken on the occurrence of a fatal or serious personal injury accident. Moreover, the presentation of the organisation chart lacked the clarity which I regard as absolutely essential. The merit of a carefully devised emergency scheme is that it removes from the individual the need to remember a great many things which have to be done quickly and effectively and to take decisions about priorities. The declaration of an emergency immediately results in the appointment of men to carry out specific tasks until they can be relieved on the arrival of more senior officials.
107. There was no evidence to suggest that any authority to institute the Emergency Organisation had been specifically delegated to anyone either by name or by appointment. Indeed, I think I am right in saying that the manager held the view that it was the responsibility of any competent official to use his initiative and institute the procedure if he thought the circumstances justified it. I have some sympathy with this, but the absence of timely action at the colliery on the morning of the fire merely supports the opposing view that too much reliance should not be placed on the readiness of persons to take the initiative in an emergency situation, when they are unsure of their authority to act. It is not so much a reluctance to take a decision which deters persons from acting in such circumstances as a fear of being accused of having acted hastily if, in the event, there is no emergency.
108. It is imperative that the emergency procedure, including the posted charts, should be clearly understood by all officials and particularly that there should be no doubt in their minds as to their powers to declare an emergency. The National Coal Board should review their present procedures in this regard and give specific instructions to managers that the senior official at the mine available at the time of an incident should be authorised, without prejudice, to call on the Rescue Station services and to declare an Area emergency.
109. Some two hours after the start of the fire it was reported that all men had been withdrawn from the Dysart Dip Sections; this unfortunately proved to be false in that two men who had been working in that part of the mine were in fact still missing. As a result of this, the effectiveness of the checking system was called into question at the Inquiry. To my mind the system at the colliery was quite satisfactory. I recognise that it disclosed imperfections but it must be remembered that any system has to rely on the complete co-operation of the individual and that this is always the limiting factor. As Mr. Wilson, for the Ministry of Power, said, the perfect checking system has yet to be devised; nevertheless the possibility of improving existing systems should be examined. In this respect, the suggestion offered by Mr. McGahey, for the National Union of Mineworkers, that a man's tokens and cap lamp should bear the same number, is well worthy of further consideration.
The Marking of Second Ways Out
110. There was a considerable amount of evidence at the Inquiry about the signposting of the airways and the second means of egress from the working sections to the surface. The routes were marked with chalk on boards, painted letters on boards and by luminous signs of letters three inches high with an arrow. In the returns, some of the signs directed men to the 'Return Airway' and in others to the 'Escape Pit'. It was not, however, clear if the 'Escape Pit' was the Michael No. 2 Shaft or Lochhead Colliery.
111. A particular case of the confusion about the marking of the means of egress arose in connection with the escape of McArthur and McEneamy from the Four Feet Seam workings in the Sea Mine area to the inset in the No. 2 Shaft. They had neither of them travelled the route before and they missed the way to the second means of egress when they went up the return airway instead of down through Walker's Dook to the Lochhead Level, In the event, it was probably lucky that they did so as the Lochhead Level was full of thick smoke. Having missed the escape route they were nevertheless able to find the No. 2 Shaft, an indication that some of the signs were effective. However, when they got to the shaft, they found their way on into old workings, which were not regularly inspected and should therefore have been fenced off. They were prevented from reaching the No. 3 Shaft because of a fence and a 'no road' sign which were not really necessary.
112. In order to ensure that men can find their way, sometimes in smoke, through roads with which they are unfamiliar, the direction signs should be easily recognised and unambiguous. I consider that managements should review the methods of marking routes and adopt a standard type of sign. Officials in charge of the men in the various parts of the pit should not only be conversant with all the means of egress but should ensure that they are safe for travelling and that the direction signs are properly maintained. I consider that officials should inspect every means of egress from the part of the mine assigned to them at least once a month and report on their condition.
113. There were critical comments in evidence about the alleged inadequacy of the telephone system. These really stemmed, I think, from the fact that the automatic system became blocked just after 5.00 a.m. but some witnesses suggested that the telephone system was generally unreliable. I am satisfied that in general the internal telephone systems were adequate and I accept the evidence of management and officials that, apart from the normal breakdowns, the systems were reliable. It is readily apparent that a considerable number of emergency messages were passed within a comparatively brief period from about 3.30 a.m. onwards. The evidence suggests that the blocking of the automatic system on the morning of the fire was brought about by a main telephone cable or junction box being put out of commission by the fire. The fault so caused would have simulated the effect of all ten circuits, which the automatic exchange provided, being occupied by calls. When an engineer disconnected the faulty circuits, the automatic exchange operated normally.
114. I have said that the internal telephone service was adequate; nevertheless, there is scope for some improvement in one particular respect. As I understand it, the automatic telephones in the manager's and deputy manager's offices had over-riding facilities. In my view, automatic telephone installations would be better equipped for use in an emergency if over-riding facilities were also provided at a strictly limited number of underground extensions, as for instance at pit bottoms and perhaps one in each working district. The provision of such facilities would have to be accompanied by a strict injunction that they should be used only in an emergency. A considerable amount of telephoning and, consequently, time, could have been saved had the underground workings been equipped with a system of alarms operated from a central point on the surface. I am aware that such systems, either in the form of separate installations or associated with the telephone system, are available. The general provision of equipment of this kind should be considered as an early warning aid.
115. Finally in this context, I would refer to communications between the colliery and the outside world. There is no doubt that the outside telephone facilities, adequate in every respect for ordinary day-to-day needs, were woefully inadequate during the emergency. As it became known that there was trouble at the colliery, there was a flood of incoming calls which seem to have occupied the limited switchboard facilities to the exclusion of outgoing calls. There is no doubt in my mind that much of the delay experienced by Nicol in making his call to the Rescue Station was caused by a blocked private branch exchange; in his evidence he recounted his frustration when police and hospital calls came in while he was waiting to make his call. Managements should review their external telephone arrangements and consult the telephone authorities with a view to alternative arrangements if there is any doubt that the present provisions might prove inadequate in an emergency.
116. The question of self-rescuers was not raised in evidence but I took note of a submission made on behalf of the National Coal Board that the Board had now decided in principle that self-rescuers should be provided for all underground workmen as soon as an acceptable model could be produced. Mr. McGahey pledged the full co-operation of his Union in advancing the date of the introduction of this vital safety device into service underground. Within a very short time after the Inquiry, the National Coal Board set up a Working Party to "co-ordinate the procurement and introduction of self-rescuers and to consider whether the Board should themselves undertake manufacture". Mr. H. T. Ramsay, the Director of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment, and I are members of it.
117. As has been indicated in the description of the colliery, there were eight fire hydrants in the No.3 Pit Bottom, of which four were in the 300 fathoms Lateral and four in the Loco Level. There is no doubt that this disposition of hydrants can be faulted on two counts. First, they were confined to two roads and a fire occurring in some situations in either road could render half the hydrants unusable. The hydrants in the other road would then be equally useless because they would be too far away. Second there was no hydrant in the Loader Mine or in Bell's Heading; with the ventilation travelling along the Loco Level towards Tilson's Alley, this meant that a fire in the Loader Mine could only be dealt with by fire-fighters operating in smoke. The installation of a hydrant on the inbye side of the Loader Mine, in Bell's Heading, was planned but the work was far from complete when the incident occurred.