V. — Matters Arising From The Explosion
The Compressed-air Turbine Fan
It is a tragic feature of this occurrence that there was never any necessity for the installation in the supply gate of the fan which initiated the explosion. indeed, had there been strict compliance with the requirements of the Coal Mines (Ventilation) General Regulations, 1947, it is very unlikely that the fan would ever have been installed.
A fan installed in a gateway of a longwall face could not be termed an auxiliary fan as defined in Regulation 18 (1). The installation of this fan was therefore governed by Regulation 15 (1) which requires that "No fan (other than an auxiliary fan) may be installed below ground unless and until, as the result of a survey of the ventilation of every part of the mine liable to be affected made at the time by a qualified person and of a report as to the appropriate type, size and location of the proposed fan prepared by a qualified engineer, the manager is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient for the proper ventilation of that part of the mine that it should be installed", In the case of this fan, which could have no appreciable effect on the ventilation of the district and which merely caused turbulence at the ripping face, it might be open to question as to whether or not such a survey was imperative, but had such a report been made it is most unlikely that a fan would have been installed for a purpose which could have been served equally well, if not better, by the erection of a brattice. Certainly, no fan, auxiliary or other, should be installed below ground without a good deal more thought than was shown in this case.
Another important feature of the occurrence is that it directs attention to the hazard of frictional sparking caused by foreign bodies coming into contact with the rotating blades of a fan. In this case the blades were made of aluminium alloy, but it would appear that the hazard would be much the same if the blades were made of iron or steel. If the ducting leading from such a fan is inclined upwards there must always be a possibility that any foreign body entering the open end of the ducting will gravitate to the fan blades. Most, if not all, of these fans are fitted by the manufacturers with a wire mesh guard on the inlet side; it would be a wise precaution if all these fans were fitted with a guard on both inlet and outlet sides. If the apertures in the mesh were as small as practicable, this particular hazard would be reduced to a minimum.
Ventilation of the "Q" Face
The amount of ventilation produced on the face was adequate under normal circumstances but could not be expected to cope with a sudden and unforeseeable issue of firedamp of such magnitude as occurred a minute or so before the explosion. The failure to provide means for ensuring the adequate ventilation of the return end of the face is, however, a matter for serious criticism.
Due to the geological disturbance and the thickening of the seam from the usual 3 feet to about 7 feet at the roadhead of the supply gate, the thickness of the rippings in this gate had been reduced. This resulted in a shortage of packing material for the gateside pack which, on the morning of the explosion, was about 8 yards back from the coal face. No steps had been taken to counteract the natural tendency for the air current to take the shortest route into the supply gate and thus by-pass the top end of the face.
It is only fair to state that, despite this deficiency in the ventilating arrangements, there is reason to believe that the standard of ventilation at the top end of the face was adequate up to the time the abnormal issue of methane occurred.
This deficiency did, however, have an important bearing on the nature of the explosion. Had the air current been properly directed into the top corner of the face, there would have been no area outside the sweep of the ventilating current in which firedamp from the blower could accumulate by migration to form a highly explosive mixture of methane and air, and the severity of the explosion would undoubtedly have been reduced.
Either additional packing material should have been imported or, if this were impracticable, a brattice should have been erected and maintained so as to direct the ventilating current to the top corner of the face.
The fact that there were cigarettes in the pockets of clothing on this face is a matter for serious concern even though it had no bearing on the occurrence.
Searching was carried out by the deputies on each shift in accordance with an approved system, and the deputy in charge of "Q" face had, in fact, searched 15 of the men employed in his district on the morning shift of 6th September.
The finding of contraband reflects badly on the effectiveness of the searching, but even more so on the mentality of men who would risk taking contraband into a mine where firedamp was, and always had been, a hazard. It is to be hoped that this occurrence will draw attention to the tragic consequences that can result from an open spark or flame produced when methane is present in the atmosphere, and will lead to a stricter observance of the law prohibiting the taking of contraband articles into a safety lamp mine or part of a mine.