IV. — The Cause Of The Explosion
The Nature of the Explosion
All the evidence pointed conclusively to an explosion of firedamp having occurred at the top corner of the face in the vicinity of the supply gate roadhead, causing flame and blast to be projected down the face against the air current and outbye along the supply gate. There was evidence of the passage of flame over a length of about 60 yards of the supply gate measured from the coal face and over a length of about 75 yards along the face measured from the ribside at the return end. There was not the slightest indication that coal dust had played any part, and the explosion had obviously been one of methane.
The Source of the Methane
The only firedamp detected after the explosion was that issuing in the form of a "blower" from the roof some 20 yards down the face from the supply gate ribside and near the return-side edge of the roof cavity formed by the fall. This issue of firedamp was of such magnitude — probably about 400 cubic feet per minute — that it had to be piped into the return airway before satisfactory ventilation standards could be restored on the return side of the point of issue. The deputy is positive that this gas was not issuing when he passed the spot a few minutes before the explosion occurred. Furthermore, had this gas been issuing for any appreciable length of time prior to the explosion, the men working near the top corner of the face would undoubtedly have been affected by the high concentration of methane which would quickly accumulate there.
It must be concluded that it was methane from this "blower" which provided all the fuel for the explosion, and that the "blower" commenced to issue only a minute or so before the explosion occurred. It is very unlikely that the "blower" would have caused pollution of the atmosphere downhill, but it would almost immediately have raised into the explosive range the methane content of the air current passing.
All possible igniting mediums were considered and carefully investigated follows:
Safety lamps
All the electric and flame safety lamps which were in use in the district at the time of the explosion were sent, in the condition in which they were brought out of the mine, for examination and testing at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment. Many of the lamps had sustained damage, but in all cases the damage was found to be consistent with that which might easily be sustained as a consequence of an explosion, and no evidence was found to suggest that any of the lamps were likely to be the source of an ignition of firedamp.
Electricity
All electrical apparatus and mains lighting equipment in the district was subjected to a thorough examination and found to be in good order. Moreover, there was no electrical apparatus or mains lighting equipment in the part of the district affected by the explosion.
Naked lights and smoking
During the recovery operations cigarettes wrapped in pieces of newspaper were found in the pockets of two articles of clothing on the face. This focussed attention on smoking as an igniting medium, but after careful consideration this was ruled out. No evidence was found to suggest that smoking had actually taken place in the district, and the possibility that anyone in the affected part at the critical time could have been smoking or attempting to smoke without being detected was very remote. The finding of contraband in this safety lamp mine is, nevertheless, very disturbing.
Frictional sparks from stones
Frictional sparking caused by falling stones was considered and ruled out. The only fall of ground found after the explosion was the one on the face, and this must have occurred after the explosion, otherwise the bodies beneath it would not have been exposed to the flame.
Shot firing
It is certain that no shot firing was in progress at the time the explosion occurred. Shots had been fired in the top rippings in the supply gate about an hour earlier, and consideration was given to the possibility that methane ignited by these shots had continued to burn in roof breaks or bed separation planes. Nothing was found to support this theory and it was eventually ruled out.
Compressed-air hose
Two lengths of compressed-air hose having patched leaks were considered and ruled out after expert examination of the patches at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment.
The compressed-air turbine fan at the supply gate rippings
This was a Meco, Type CF3, compressed-air driven, four-bladed fan, 12 inches in diameter, in which both rotor and casing were made from an aluminium alloy. It was sent exactly as it was found after the explosion to the Safety in Mines Research Establishment where tests showed it to be in good running order. There were no signs of the rotor having fouled the stator, but each of the four blades showed considerable damage by abrasion of its trailing edge, and microscopic examination revealed small fragments of rock embedded in the aluminium of the blades where recent abrasion had occurred. In one case a fragment of stone was found embedded in caked dust near the tip of the blade.
A photograph taken at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment and included with this report shows the results of the abrasion and the embedded stone (see Plate I).
The only feasible explanation of this damage seemed to be that, when the fan was running in the supply gate, the rotating blades had rubbed against pieces of stone which had entered via the outlet ducting and come to rest against the spiders of the fan casing so as to foul the trailing edges of the rotating blades. With the ducting lying at the steep gradient of the gate and with the outlet pointing to the ripping lip while the ripping shots were fired, the presence of pieces of stone in a position to foul the trailing edges of the blades is easily explained. Furthermore, one of the men working at the supply gate rippings stated in evidence that, a few minutes before the explosion occurred, he noticed that the fan appeared to be running sluggishly, so he struck the fan casing with an iron bar whereupon the fan picked up speed. He had done this on previous occasions under similar circumstances and always with the same result. The obvious explanation is that stones from the ripping shots had been projected into the outlet ducting and were fouling the fan blades, thus causing the sluggish running; a blow on the casing moved the stones and allowed the fan to pick up speed. The stones would, of course, still be in position to foul the blades.
At the Safety in Mines Research Establishment it was found impracticable to carry out frictional sparking tests with the fan itself, but experiments were carried out in which discs of an alloy similar to that used for the fan blades were made to rotate under very light pressure in contact with pieces of stone obtained from the supply gate rippings. These experiments proved that at rubbing speeds less than those which would occur in the normal running of the fan, sparks were produced which readily ignited a methane air mixture.
On this evidence, coupled with the lack of supporting evidence for any of the other possible igniting mediums, it was concluded that the explosion had been initiated by this fan and that the sequence of events culminating in the explosion was as follows:
At a time when work was proceeding normally with the ventilation taking its normal course, a blower of firedamp of considerable magnitude suddenly issued from the roof some 20 yards down the face from the supply gate. The rate of emission was such that within a minute or so the methane content of the air current on the return side of the point of issue was raised above the lower explosive limit. Simultaneously, migration of the firedamp caused a richer and more highly explosive mixture to accumulate in the top corner of the face. As soon as the atmosphere being drawn through the fan became inflammable, it was ignited by sparks produced by friction between the trailing edges of the fan blades and pieces of stone which had been projected by the ripping shots into the outlet ducting and were now fouling the path of the blades. Flame instantly spread throughout the inflammable atmosphere and reached the highly explosive accumulation at the top corner of the face, whereupon flame and blast were projected down the face and outbye along the supply gate. The men at the top end of the face were enveloped in flame but were too near the seat of the explosion to be affected by blast.
It may be asked why, with the fan continuing to run after the explosion, this sequence of events was not repeated. The answer seems to be that before the ventilating current could resume its normal course after being interrupted by the blast down the face, the fall of roof occurred. The obstruction caused by this fall so reduced the quantity of air flowing that, with the issue of firedamp continuing undiminished, the methane content of the atmosphere throughout the area on the return side of the point of issue was above the upper explosive limit. This state of affairs continued until the fan was stopped before steps had been taken to restore the ventilation.