Discovery

At 6.45 a.m. Vincent Love, who was, as already stated, acting as a conveyor attendant at the 3rd East Junction, felt a temporary reversal of the ventilation which raised some dust into the air in the 3rd East intake road. As he could not understand the phenomenon, he quite, properly and wisely went to the new longwall face and reported the incident to the overman, Short, expressing the opinion that there had been a big fall inbye. Short proceeded to investigate, going down the 3rd East intake to a point about half way along it without, however, finding anything unusual. Returning, he then went into the return airway and travelled it as far as the compressor stenton, seven stentons outbye of the charging station, through which he passed into the intake and so back to the 3rd East Junction, without having found anything untoward. Satisfied in his own mind that there was no cause for alarm, he went outbye to the Hopper to arrange the work for the oncoming shift.

While on his way outbye at 8.0 a.m. George Williams, a shot firer on the new longwall face, spoke to Love at the 3rd East Junction and commented upon the peculiar smell in the air reaching the face. Thereupon Love told him of his concern at the non-appearance of Whitney and his four men, and as a result of this conversation Williams spoke to Short by telephone and received instructions to investigate further. Accompanied by a workman he travelled the intake to the overcast, three stentons back from the charging station, which he found severely damaged and beyond which he saw a heavy fall. Going back to the compressor stenton, he and his companion entered the return airway and travelled inbye for about 170 yards until they were compelled by foul air to retrace their steps to the intake end of the compressor stenton. Here they were joined by Overman Short, who had come inbye again, accompanied by some deputies of the oncoming shift. They in turn tried to explore the return airway and were similarly affected. After confirming that the overcast was wrecked, Short sent a telephone message outbye and to the surface to the effect that the five men in the district had apparently been overcome behind a large fall which blocked the intake airway.

On receiving this information the manager, accompanied by the undermanager, at once descended the mine and travelled inbye. by the intake. Reaching the booster fan they went into the return airway to see what conditions were like therein and, immediately on entering it, realised from the state of the air current that something much more serious than a large fall had taken place. The manager accordingly sent a message to the surface summoning the Rescue Service and then they proceeded as quickly as possible along the intake to the damaged air crossing, where they found repair work had already started with the purpose of restoring the ventilation inbye. The repairs had been practically completed when the first Rescue Brigade arrived at 11.12 a.m., and it was only then that the true nature of the occurrence was revealed to those on the surface.

It is probable that the damage to the overcast minimised the extent of the disaster, for the resulting short circuit of the ventilation kept most of the explosion products confined, and such as were forced out were sufficiently diluted by the time they reached the new face that the men working there were only affected very slightly.

Rescue and Recovery Work (First Stage)

With the arrival of the first rescue team and the completion of the temporary repairs to the air crossing, which partly restored the ventilation, exploration of the affected area was begun. It was soon discovered that the water in the return airway outbye of the charging station had risen to within two feet of the roof, which was not altogether surprising seeing that the pump had been out of action for several hours. Progress on the intake airway inbye of the charging station was prevented by a large fall, but this was by-passed via the charging station and the return airway to the pumphouse where the body of the pump attendant was located beside the pump. Further exploratory work was limited by another large fall two pillar lengths up the 3rd North and by the presence of thick impenetrable fumes in the roads inbye of the pumphouse. The information available was that the four men still missing should have been carrying out repairs either to the conveyor road or to the return airway outbye of the pump. but preliminary explorations by rescue teams established that the men must be at some other point or points and that falls would have to be cleared before further exploration could be undertaken. To enable this latter work to be carried out involved the restoration of the ventilation to the inbye workings so that those engaged on it could work in fresh air.

However, before any such work could be started, the unwelcome discovery was made that the water was rising at such a rate in the return airway that the latter would soon be blocked, and all energies were accordingly directed towards installing a pump in the main intake airway at the charging station.

Before a suitable pump could be transported into the district some hours elapsed, during which the water reached the roof in the return airway just outbye of the charging station and effectively cut off all ventilation, so rendering the original pump site untenable.

A new site was selected two stentons further outbye and by a superhuman effort on the part of all concerned, the pump was installed but unfortunately it did little more than hold the water at the level it had then reached. A larger capacity pump was obviously required but its installation was not achieved without much delay; indeed it was not until nine days had elapsed from the explosion (i.e. on the 9th October) that it started up. It lowered the water level at an appreciable rate and, when the water was one foot below roof level in the return airway. the ventilation started to flow again into the explosion area.

Throughout all these anxious days, protection was given to those engaged in these operations by the close and continuous watch which was kept upon the affected area by relays of rescue brigades. They took innumerable samples of the atmosphere at the fringe of the area and thereby ensured that the atmosphere outside was not too dangerously contaminated by the products of the explosion which were constantly and steadily, although in small quantity, pushed out by the rising water.

Very early on in this work it became abundantly clear that the explosion area was filled with an irrespirable atmosphere which would be fatal to life, and all hope of finding the missing men alive was abandoned.

By the 11th October the restored ventilation was having its effect upon the afterdamp and a rescue team was sent in along the main intake airway with instructions to make what exploration it could and to collect samples of the atmosphere. It reached the entrance to the charging station and discovered that one of the brick walls of the latter had collapsed, thus letting down the straight girders supporting the roof which in turn had broken four storage batteries, so that the acid they contained had run out. They also observed what later became a most alarming matter, that the charged batteries on the opposite side were apparently undamaged but had the displaced girders very close to their tops. This team collected two sets of duplicate samples of the atmosphere, one set from a fall cavity on the main road opposite the charging station and the other from a point 12 yards inside the latter. One sample of each set was passed through a methanometer at the fresh air base and these indicated that there was a high proportion of inflammable gas present, which did not occasion any alarm. When, however, the duplicates of the samples reached the surface and were duly analysed a most disturbing and indeed alarming situation was revealed.

At this point I should explain that the Scientific Department of the National Coal Board, which had charge of the analytical work and was fortunate in that one of the Area Laboratories was situated at the mine surface, had been keeping a close watch for any appearance of hydrogen gas in the postexplosion gases and had found ample confirmation of its occurrence in very small proportions. Furthermore, the possibility that " gassing" by the charged shuttle car batteries, of which there were 18 in the area, might take place had been fully discussed and it was more than ever important that any excessive amount of hydrogen should be detected. However, up to the time of these last two samples, none had been shown to contain more than 15 per cent. of hydrogen, and with such no danger was apprehended. The two latest samples, however, gave rise to the greatest apprehension as will be appreciated, for they read :–

These clearly indicated that from the main road at the entrance to the charging station and for at least 12 yards inside it, there was a mixture of Hydrogen, Methane and Oxygen in proportions which could give rise to an extremely violent explosion, while within that atmosphere there were charged storage batteries with exposed terminals, and, precariously poised above them, partly fallen roof girders which might slip down at any moment and in so doing cause a short circuit which would give rise to an incendive spark. Additionally, in use around the fringe of this area were apparatus and equipment, such as flame safety lamps, the switches of electric safety lamps, hot wire methanometers and even flameproof electrical apparatus, none of which could be considered safe for use in such a mixture.

Confronted with this alarming situation, in which some seventy or more men were exposed to danger, the only possible course of action was to withdraw everyone from the area at once and, until the situation had been properly assessed, from the mine as well. This was done without delay.

During the next two days, substantial sandbag stoppings were built in drifts well outbye of the district as a safeguard against the spread of any explosion which might occur.

Meanwhile it was decided that the only permanent safeguard would be to allow the water, which had of course begun to rise as soon as pumping ceased. to continue doing so until the batteries in the charging station were completely submerged, so that not only would the spilt acid from the broken batteries be diluted but also it was hoped that the undamaged batteries would be discharged and made powerless by the short-circuiting of their terminals through the medium of the water. Additionally, of course, any arcing of the undamaged batteries caused by short-circuiting of the terminals by a falling girder, for instance, would take place under water and therefore be harmless. The level to which the water was to be allowed to rise was decided and the period necessary to achieve this was estimated to be ten days. Allowing for two days as a safety margin, plans were made for re-entry into the district on the 23rd October.

In the meantime, experiments were carried out at the surface to note the behaviour of a shuttle car battery under water. A new and fully charged battery was immersed in a tank of pit water out of which it was raised daily to allow the voltage across the terminals to be measured, while from time to time the terminals were short circuited. It was hoped by this to gain some valuable information as to the period of immersion necessary to ensure its complete discharge. Contrary to expectations, however, the voltage fell very slowly from 92 volts to 50 volts and then so imperceptably as to be almost unnoticeable, and for months afterwards, despite the continued immersion, the short circuiting of the terminals produced visual and audible arcs which undoubtedly were capable of igniting an inflammable fire damp /air mixture. In view of this unexpected result it was decided that the shuttle car batteries at the charging station would have to be kept submerged while the recovery of the district was being carried out.

On the 23rd October the sandbag stoppings were breached and the district re-entered, through ventilation being re-established as far as the compressor stenton, inbye of which temporary seals were erected. The water was found to have reached within a few inches of the position which had been estimated, reflecting greatly to the credit of the Surveying Department which made the calculations.

The first stage of the recovery operations being now finished, the Rescue Service withdrew, having functioned throughout the period.

Recovery Work (Second Stage)

While enlargement of, or necessary repairs to, the roadways already recovered were being carried out, plans were made for the continuation of the recovery operations. These, owing to the results which were being obtained in the above-mentioned experiment with the shuttle car battery, had now to envisage the maintenance of the water level in the district at a height which would ensure that the batteries in the charging station were kept constantly submerged. The contours in the seam were such that a section of the existing main intake airway between the compressor stenton and the inbye side of 3rd North was, and would have to remain, submerged and, this being so, there was no other option but to drive what were virtually new roads into the district, keeping them above the water level. In fact. a completely new section of road had to be driven directly above the main intake airway for as far as 3rd North, while a companion road was formed by taking a skirting along the side of the existing road one pillar length to the north. Each road was provided with separate means of ventilation produced by fans exhausting through 2-feet diameter tubes maintained as close to the working face as possible, so that any gases drifting from the explosion area would be drawn into the tubes and passed direct into the return airway.

The commencement of these two roads marked the beginning of what was to be a long and arduous recovery operation. By June, 1952. the two roads had reached the 3rd North and had been connected there.

After the fans had been re-sited, exploratory work continued along the 3rd East road and up the 3rd North road. Both these roads were completely closed and the work of recovery was akin to driving a scouring through goaf.

Between the 19th and 29th November the bodies of the four missing men were recovered, within a short distance of one another about 200 yards up the 3rd North. Contrary to hopes and indeed expectations, the discovery of the bodies was not accompanied by any definite proof as to the cause of the explosion and it was decided to continue with the exploratory and recovery work, but, as there had of necessity to be some limit placed upon this work, it was agreed that the operations would cease when the following apparatus had been located and inspected, namely –

On 18th April, 1953, the last of these four objectives was attained and the recovery operations were brought to an end. Without doubt they had been one of the most protracted and expensive sets of operations ever undertaken, not only to recover bodies of victims but also for the purpose of finding the cause of a disaster.